delivered the opinion of the court.
Xédes, a section hand on the Union Pacific Railroad, was injured, in Kansas, while in the performance of his duties. Laughlin, an attorney at law, was employed by him in Missouri to prosecute and settle his claim against the company; and Xedes agreed-'that Laughlin should rеceive as compensation one-half of whatever amount he *205 might obtain in settlement of the claim. The Revised Statutes of Missouri (1909), §§ 964 and 965, authorizing such agreements, give to the attorney a lien on the cause of action and. on the proceеds, if notice of the lien is duly given to the defendant or “proposed defendant”; and, аs construed by the Supreme Court of Missouri, 1 they also provide that if, after such notice, the claim is settled in any manner without first procuring the written consent of such attorney, thе defendant or “proposed defendant” shall be liable to the attorney in an independent suit to an amount equal to that for which he held the lien.
Laughlin gave to the сompany this statutory notice. Later and without his consent, Xedes brought, through other cоunsel, in a state court, suit against the company which was removed to the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, and judgment was entered therein for $550. The. company paid this amount to the clerk of court in satisfaction of the judgment; and it was paid by him to Xedes and his new counsel. When Laughlin learned these faсts, he brought suit against the company in Missouri before a justice of the peace, for $275, and recovered a judgment therefor which was affirmed in the state circuit cоurt and again by the Kansas City. Court of Appeals. A rehearing applied for in June, 1917, was denied by that court, which also refused to transfer the case to the-Supreme Court. The company, contending that the Federal Constitution has been violated, brings the cаse here under § 237 of the Judicial Code as amended.
It does not appear here, as it did in
Dickinson
v.
Stiles,
The Missouri statute simply gives a cause of action against one who, with knowledge of the existence of a lien, defоrces it. To grant süch a remedy against the wrongdoer clearly does not, deprive him of any right guaranteed by the Federal Cohstitution, even if the in
*207
strument by means of which the wrong is аccomplished happens to be the judgment of a federal court. No substantiаl federal question is involved. We have no occasion, therefore, to cоnsider whether the validity of the Missouri statute was drawn in question
(Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.
v.
Gilbert,
Writ of error dismissed.
Notes
O'Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
Rev. Stats., §§ 966, 967, 995, and § 996 as amended by Act of February 19, 1897, c. 265, § 3, 29 Stat. 578, and Act of March 3,1911, c. 224,36 Stat. 1083; Act of August 1,1888, c. 729, § 1 and § 2, 25 Stat. '<357.
