72 Neb. 187 | Neb. | 1904
This action was brought by John Fickenscher in the district court for Dawson county against the Union Pacific Railroad Company to recover damages sustained by him on acount of having been burned in a prairie fire, which he alleged in his petition was started through the negligence of the railroad company. Upon the trial the plaintiff recovered a judgment for $1,175, to review which, the defendant has brought error to this court.
It was contended upon the part of the defendant that the fire which it was alleged to have negligently set out never reached the point where the injury occurred, and that the fire which burned the plaintiff, was a fire which originated from unknown causes, and was driven down from the northwest by a heavy gale which was blowing from that direction at the time of the injury. The petition in error contains 63 assignments of error, but, in the view we have taken of the evidence, it seems unnecessary to consider any of the assignments of error except those relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and judgment. For the purpose of
The theory of the plaintiff Avas that the fire had crept around and through the sand hills along the north side of sections 16 and 17, and thence through the north side of Beatty’s pasture until it reached a point nearly north of Brady Island; that it then spread northeasterly until it
It seems a striking fact that none of the neighbors living in the vicinity of Avhere the fire is supposed to have burned suav it or eAren the reflection of it. Granting that the fire Avas burning north of Brady Island late in the evening, it does not seem to ais that that fact alone Avould be sufficient to go to the jury that it Avas the cause of an injury occurring six hours thereafter and six miles distant. It is a fact within the common observation of men, that the location of a fire is but a mere conjecture Avhen the reflection of it on the sky is the only knoAvn fact to determine its location. Even Avhen the fire itself can be seen, its location is very deceptive. Taking this Avhole evidence it seems to us that the verdict of the jury is founded upon a mere conjecture.
The testimony is clear that soon after three o’clock the wind changed to the northwest and blew a gale, some of the witnesses placing its velocity at upwards of thirty miles an hour. The testimony is also undisputed that for several days prior to the injury, a fire had been seen a long distance to the nortliAvest of the place of the injury, and that it was driven doAvn over the country in that vicinity is shoAvn beyond any doubt.
The plaintiff contends that it could not have been the northwest fire which did the injury, because that fire did
The rule of law requires of the plaintiff that he make out his case by a fair preponderance of the evidence, and the evidence must relate to facts which establish with reasonable certainty the plaintiff’s cause of- action; and while it is for the jury, and not for the court to pass upon the weight to be given the evidence, it does not seem to us that the rule should be carried to the extent of allowing a verdict to stand, based upon evidence which at best is a mere conjecture. The plaintiff’s theory of the case is possibly the correct one, but, if so, he is unfortunate in not having witnesses who are able to trace the fire with a reasonable degree of certainty to the place of the injury.
For the reason that the testimony fails to sustain the. verdict and judgment, we recommend that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
It is practically conceded that a fire was started by a Union Pacific train Sunday the 16th of April, 1899, between the stations of Vroman and Brady Island. The wind was blowing from the southeast and this fire worked its way in a northwesterly direction into the sand hills.
The opinion of Judge Day upon this branch of the case is so conclusive that I think it ought to stand.
This case has been several times argued, and there being some difference of opinion among the commissioners Avho heard the several arguments, it was heard again by the court. With the assistance of able counsel for both parties, we have examined the entire record and conclude that the foregoing opinions of Mr. Commissioner Day and Mr. Commissioner Duffie show the true condition of the evidence.
For the reasons there given, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed.