UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, et al., Petitioners-Respondents, v. The BOARD OF TAX APPEALS of the State of Idaho, Respondents, and The State Tax Commission of the State of Idaho, Respondent-Appellant. BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC., a Delaware corporation, Petitioner-Respondent, v. The BOARD OF TAX APPEALS of the State of Idaho, Respondent, and The State Tax Commission of the State of Idaho, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 14194, 14195.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Nov. 22, 1982.
654 P.2d 901 | 103 Idaho 808
David G. High, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent-appellant.
Thomas C. Frost, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondents.
Robert L. Bilow and Eugene A. Ritti, of Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, Boise, for petitioners-respondents.
SHEPARD, Justice.
These are appeals in consolidated cases from a declaratory judgment adverse to the State Tax Commission, holding that the Union Pacific Railroad Company and Burlington Northern, Inc., petitioners-respondents, have a right to appeal the Tax Commission‘s valuations of the railroads’ operating properties to the Board of Tax Appeals. The Tax Commission asserts that the only avenue of appeal available to the railroads in this instance is through the district court, pursuant to the state administrative procedure act, that our statutes do not contemplate such an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals and that our constitution and public policy considerations should preclude a review of Tax Commission decisions by the Board of Tax Appeals.
The Union Pacific and Burlington Northern railroads own and operate interstate railroads, a part of which are located within Idaho. The Tax Commission valued the
At that point the railroads perceived a dilemma. If they appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals, the Tax Commission could argue, as it does here, that the only avenue of appeal is through the district court pursuant to the administrative procedure act, while if they filed for appellate review in the district court, it might be argued that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies in not appealing to the Board of Tax Appeals. Consequently, the railroads filed simultaneous appeals, one to the Board of Tax Appeals, pursuant to
In the district court the railroads also sought a declaratory judgment to clarify the appropriate appeal procedure from the decision of the Tax Commission. Further relief was sought in the event the district court should determine that the Board of Tax Appeals did not have jurisdiction to proceed. Under the declaratory judgment cause of action, an expedited trial was held and thereafter the district court ruled that an appeal de novo lies to the Board of Tax Appeals from an order of the Tax Commission valuing railroad properties, and further determining that the Board of Tax Appeals may properly “substitute its judgment” for that of the Tax Commission regarding the
The essence of the case presented here is determination of the proper avenue of appeal which may be pursued by a utility taxpayer who is dissatisfied with the Commission‘s valuation of the taxpayer‘s statewide operating property. The trial court held and the railroads argue here that such an appeal must be taken pursuant to
“63-3811. Appeal from determination of tax liability.—Appeal from statewide valuations.—Taxpayers may, within the period herein provided and by following the procedures herein required, appeal to the board of tax appeals from a final determination of any tax liability, including those pursuant to sections 63-401, 63-2210, 63-3049, and 63-3632. County assessors may appeal to the board from valuations of property made on a statewide basis by the state tax commission, or allocation of such value.”
The Tax Commission on the contrary asserts that
“(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case of an agency other than the industrial commission or the public utilities commission is entitled to judicial review under this act [administrative procedure act]. This section does not limit utilization of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress or relief provided by law....”
Both parties address a possible third avenue of review as provided by
“63-2213. Taxes paid under protest—Limitation on action for recovery.—An action against a county, an officer, or officer de facto, for taxes or money paid to such county, officer, or officer de facto under protest, or seized by such officer, in his official capacity as a collector of taxes, and which it is claimed ought to be refunded, shall be commenced within sixty (60) days after such payment or seizure.”
Since the respondent railroads had paid their taxes under protest to each of the counties in which operating properties were located, the railroads filed protective actions in Ada County against all the counties to which they had paid 1980 operating property taxes.
We agree with the assertions of the parties regarding
“63-701. Operating property assessable by state tax commission.—The operating property of all public utilities and railroads and the franchises of all persons
owning, or operating as lessees, or constructing any public utility or railroad wholly or partly within this state shall be assessed for taxation for state, county, city, town, village, school district and other purposes, exclusively by the state tax commission; except land or buildings rented by a company or corporation as lessee which is used as or in connection with its business such as business offices, warehouses, service centers, moorage grounds or docks, shall be assessed to the owner by the county assessor.”
That statute vests in the Tax Commission the responsibility for the assessment and valuation of railroad operating properties. Following assessment by the Commission, that amount is apportioned among the several counties,
Chapter 7, Title 63 of the Idaho Code relates solely to the assessment of the properties of public utilities and railroads, and one of its principal objectives was the attainment of uniformity in valuation and assessment of public transportation and utility properties which extend through more than one county and which by nature constitute unitary systems. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Bender, 208 Kan. 135, 490 P.2d 399 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 967, 92 S.Ct. 2408, 32 L.Ed.2d 665 (1972). That statutory procedure is clearly designed to eliminate inequalities in the assessed values of utility and railroad properties which might occur if local assessors were free to exercise individual judgment and discretion as to assessed values of utility operating property. It would make little or no practical sense to require centrally assessed taxpayers to challenge those assessments in local actions filed pursuant to
Statutes which are in pari materia are to be construed together to the end that legislative intent will be effected. Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 97 Idaho 917, 556 P.2d 1197 (1976); North Idaho Jurisdiction of Episcopal Churches, Inc. v. Kootenai County, 94 Idaho 644, 496 P.2d 105 (1972); Janss Corp. v. Board of Equalization of Blaine County, 93 Idaho 928, 478 P.2d 878 (1970). As stated in Meyers v. City of Idaho Falls, 52 Idaho 81, 89-90, 11 P.2d 626, 629 (1932):
“The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means that each legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the same matter or subject. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same subject. Such statutes are taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of learning the intention, all statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared, and so far as still in force brought into harmony by interpretation.” (Citations omitted.)
It is also well settled in Idaho that where an irreconcilable inconsistency exists between statutes in pari materia, the latest expression of the legislature will control. Pittam v. Maynard, 103 Idaho 177, 646 P.2d 419 (1982); Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 612 P.2d 542 (1980); Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 599 P.2d 1012 (1979).
The Commission first suggests that
In the enactment of
The Tax Commission argues that the doctrine of expressio unious est exclusio alterius should be applied in that the legislature‘s specific authorization allowing an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals by a county assessor impliedly excludes all others such as the railroad taxpayers here. It is argued that the designation in a statute excludes all things not so specified. Such is not an unimpeachable rule of law, merely an expression that the courts will adhere to the literal language of the statute in determining legislative intent. Noble v. Glenns Ferry Bank, Ltd., 91 Idaho 364, 421 P.2d 444 (1966). Here a legislative intent to exclude a taxpayer from the same right of appeal does not clearly appear from a literal reading of the statute, and to give the statute the interpretation sought by the Tax Commission would controvert what we deem to be legislative intent.
Hence, we hold that the legislature intended
The Tax Commission next asserts that since the Commission is a constitutional entity entrusted with constitutional duties, the legislature is prohibited from taking away its constitutional duties by authorizing an administrative agency, such as the Board of Tax Appeals, the power to review orders of the Commission relating to the valuation of railroads’ operating property.
The constitutional predecessor of the State Tax Commission was the State Board of Equalization, which was constitutionally created in 1890 by
“State board of equalization.—There shall be a state board of equalization, consisting of the governor, secretary of state, attorney general, state auditor, and state treasurer, whose duties shall be prescribed by law. The board of county commissioners for the several counties of the state, shall constitute boards of equalization for their respective counties, whose duty it shall be to equalize the valuation of the taxable property in the county, under such rules and regulations as shall be prescribed by law.”
The above provision of the original constitution was amended in 1944, and in pertinent part presently provides:
“There shall be a state tax commission consisting of four (4) members... The duties heretofore imposed upon the state board of equalization by the Constitution and laws of this state shall be performed by the state tax commission and said commission shall have such other powers and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law, including the supervision and coordination of the work of the several county boards of equalization.”
The Tax Commission asserts that the language of the 1944 amendment stating that the Tax Commission shall perform the “duties heretofore imposed upon the state board of equalization by the Constitution and laws of the state” somehow “constitutionalized” the statutory duties previously performed by its predecessor, the State Board of Equalization. It is asserted that among those duties so incorporated in the constitution, was the assessment of operating properties of public utilities, railroads and car companies. It is argued that the legislature may not empower an administrative agency to interfere with or substitute its judgment for the discretionary determinations of constitutional entities in the performance of their constitutional duties, and hence the Board of Tax Appeals may not interfere with nor substitute its judgment for the Tax Commission‘s statewide valuations of the railroads’ operating property.
In an early case, this Court stated: “The state board of equalization [state tax commission] is wholly the creature of the law. It has no power or authority except that which is given by [statute].” Orr v. State Board of Equalization, 3 Idaho 190, 199, 28 P. 416, 419 (1891). Accord Kootenai County v. State Board of Equalization, 31 Idaho 155, 169 P. 935 (1917); Northwest Light and Water Co. v. Alexander, 29 Idaho 557, 160 P. 1106 (1916). Those cases which were decided prior to the 1944 amendment to Article VII, § 12, of the Idaho Constitution hold that the Tax Commission‘s predecessor, the State Board of Equalization, had no inherent constitutional duties, express or implied, albeit it was a constitutional entity. The Tax Commission relies heavily upon the sole exception to the great weight of the pre-amendment case law, i.e., Blomquist v. Board of County Commissioners, 25 Idaho 284, 137 P. 174 (1913). The Court framed the precise question there presented as “Has the tax commission power to compel a county board of equalization to adopt its views in equalizing the value of certain property for taxation?” Id. at 291-92, 176. The Court there had for consideration legislation creating a state tax commission with powers which could have been interpreted as being fully coextensive with those of the constitutionally-created state and county boards of equalization. The Court in Blomquist construed the legislation as merely
As aforesaid,
When the people of our state have deemed it necessary to impose specific duties upon constitutional entities, they have done so in a manner which is clear and our constitution contains many examples. See
We hold, therefore, that the predecessor of the State Tax Commission [state board of equalization] was not entrusted with any constitutional duties other than to perform such duties as were imposed upon it by the legislature. The 1944 amendment to
The legislature, therefore, is free to amend or repeal its enactments and we find no provisions in the constitution prohibiting it from creating a Board of Tax Appeals empowered to review the Tax Commission‘s assessments of the railroads’ operating property, and hence hold that the legislative authorization that the Board of Tax Appeals has the power to review the Tax Commission‘s assessments of railroads’ operating properties is not prohibited by the constitution.
Finally, the Tax Commission argues that public policy considerations militate against the result sought by the railroads and which we have reached today. It is asserted that multiple de novo hearings on the operating property assessments, first before the Tax Commission, second before the Board of Tax Appeals under
The Tax Commission emphasizes that since its valuation decisions are utilized by
Although we are urged to here determine the time within which an appeal must be filed before the Board of Tax Appeals from a final decision of the Tax Commission, we decline to do so. The Board of Tax Appeals is empowered to publish rules and regulations governing procedure before it,
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to respondents.
McFADDEN and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.
(McFadden, J., registered his vote prior to his retirement on August 31, 1982.)
BAKES, Chief Justice, dissenting, in which BISTLINE, Justice, joins:
The original
Consequently, I dissent.
BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.
In addition to joining the views expressed in the opinion of Justice Bakes, I write briefly to disapprove of the Court‘s denigration of Blomquist as obiter dicta. My reading of that case brings me to the conclusion that it is not at all dicta, but an appellate court‘s comprehensive review of the then existing scheme for assessing and equalizing of taxes throughout the state. Such an appellate court review is not unusual and is a proper judicial exercise when circumstances so require. Examine, for instance, the language of the eminent jurist, Justice Ailshie, in his concurring opinion:
“It seems to me from an examination of the whole act creating the tax commission and the simultaneous act embodying the revenue laws, that the legislature had no intention of conferring any such power on the commission as is claimed for it. The revenue law was passed and approved the same day as the tax commission act, and must be considered and construed as a simultaneous act under the same rule of construction as if a part of this act. When we so consider it, there can be no doubt but that the legislature intended that the assessor and the county board of equalization and state board of equalization should still retain the same powers and exercise the same functions that have heretofore been exercised by them. Indeed, the revenue act specifically so provides.” Blomquist v. Board of County Commissioners, 25 Idaho 284, 306, 137 P. 174, 182 (1913) (emphasis added).
I, also suggest that note be taken of the Colorado Supreme Court‘s assessment of Blomquist made in the Bi-Metallic case which came under discussion in the recently decided case of Idaho State Tax Commission v. Staker, 104 Idaho 238, 658 P.2d 350 (1982), and a portion of which is set forth in the dissenting opinion filed in that case. Commentators down the line may conclude that the Court in that case might have been influenced in a different direction upon a close reading of both Bi-Metallic cases, the Colorado court‘s found at 138 P. 1010 at 1011 (Colo. 1914), and the High Court‘s at 239 U.S. 441, 36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915).
ALLAN G. SHEPARD
JUSTICE