155 Mo. 95 | Mo. | 1900
This is an action by plaintiff, a national bank doing business in the city of Chicago, Ulinois, against the defendant bank, doing business in the State of Missouri, and its co-defendants, to have -adjudged a certain deed of trust given by the John Moran Packing Company to the use of the defendant, the State National Bank, fraudu
The plaintiff, a creditor of the John Moran Packing Company, an . Illinois corporation, doing business in this State, began suit by attachment against it in the circuit court of Buchanan county on the 22d day of February, 1895. Under the writ of attachment issued all of the property of the packing company, including that involved in this litigation, was levied upon. The attachment was sustained and judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff against _said company for the sum of $27,034.91.
This suit was then instituted by plaintiff against the defendants to set aside a deed of trust executed on the same property by the John Moran Packing Company to the defendant Donovan on the 18th day of February, 1895, for the use of the defendant, the State National Bank, to secure two notes for twenty-five thousand dollars each, executed by the packing company, by its president, John Moran, to the State National Bank on November 8, 1894, and due respectively in three and four months. This deed of trust was authorized at a meeting held in the city of St. Joseph, at which only three of the board of directors were present, while ‘the board was composed of five directors. The petition alleges that said deed of trust was fraudulently procured; that the meeting of the directors was illegal and void; and the execution of the deed of trust to the use of the defendant bank, by which it destroyed the corporate existence of the John Moran Packing Company as a going concern, was in violation of its charter, being the general law of the State of Illinois.
The answer of the State National Bank admits the incorporation of the plaintiff, and of the defendant State Na
Plaintiff in its reply to the answer of defendant bank alleged that the defendant bank had filed a bill in the courts of the State of Ulinois against the plaintiff and others, to foreclose a mortgage on certain real estate lying in that
The incorporation of the John Moran Packing Company was under the law of the State of Illinois, and the certificate of incorporation recited that the location of the principal office was at that time in the city of Chicago, although all the business, which was -that of buying and selling, killing and packing, was done at St. Joseph, Missouri. John Moran owned 'all the stock, although some of it was in the name of others. Of the five directors, Moran, Fogarty and Linaker lived in St. Joseph; Nash lived in Chicago; Moran was president and manager.
On the 18th day of February, 1895, ‘the John Moran Packing Company executed the conveyance which is here sought to be set- aside, as alleged in the petition. Before its execution, however, and on -the same day, a meeting of the board of directors of the packing company was held at St. Joseph, Missouri, at which its execution was ordered. The meeting was properly called by Moran, as president of the company, and all the directors duly notified. Of the five directors, Moran, Taylor and Fogarty were present, 'and all voted for the resolution directing the execution of the deed of trust. Nash and Linaker were not present.
The validity of these deeds was afterwards questioned, and -a meeting of the board of directors "was held in Chicago, on March 25, 1895, at which all were present except Linaker, at which the former action of the board was ratified and new deeds ordered upon the same trusts without prejudice to any rights accrued under the former ones.
The defendant bank pleaded in abatement to the attachment, but by agreement of the parties, -the plea was subsequently withdrawn, the attachment sustained, and judgment rendered in flavor of plaintiff for the amount sued for.
Thereafter the defendant, the State National Bank, brought suit in Illinois, to foreclose a mortgage bearing date February 16, 1895, executed by John Moran, and Kate Moran, .his wife, on certain real estate in Chicago. In addition to Moran and wife, the defendants in the suit were the St. Joseph Stock Yards and Terminal Company, a subsequent mortgagee, and the Union National Bank of Chicago, a subsequent attaching creditor. In this suit it was 'held that the mortgage was not fraudulent, and was a first lien upon the property.
The Buebanian circuit court, on the 10th day of December, 1896, made its final decree in this case, setting aside the defendant’s mortgage of February 18, .1895, so far as it affected the attachment lien of plaintiff, the court holding in a written opinion that the mortgage in question, dated February, 18, 1895, was void because the meeting of the directors which authorized it was held in this State, and that the adjudication to that effect with reference to the Illinois mortgage constituted an estoppel upon the defendants in this case.
After unsuccessful motion for a new trial defendant bank appeals.
No question of fraud is raised on this appeal, so that the questions to be passed upon are of law, rather than of fact, and the first of these is the effect of the judgment of the Illinois court with respect to the lands in that State, upon the land in this State. That suit was brought by the State National Bank to foreclose the mortgage executed by
“If the matter in controversy is land, or other immovable property, the judgment pronounced in the forum rei sitae is held to be of universal obligation, as to :all -the matters of right and title, which it professes to decide in relation thereto......On the other hand, a judgment in any foreign country, touching such immovables, will be held of no obligation.” Story on Conflict of Laws (Eedfield’s Ed.), sec. 591.
“It has been declared to be the well settled rule in America, that any title or interest in land or in other immovables, can only be acquired or lost agreeably to the law of the place where the same is situated.” 3 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (1 Ed.), p. 565, note 4, and cases cited.
It may be conceded that a court of equity has power to decree the performance of a contract relating to land beyond its jurisdiction, where it has jurisdiction over the parties, but no such decree can affect the land, and can only be enforced by compelling the party who has contracted to do so to execute a conveyance in accordance with the terms of the contract. In such circumstance it is the conveyance, and not the decree of the court, that affects the land. [Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 115.]
So it has been held 'that a decree of a court in one State
In Osburn v. McCartney, 121 Ill. 408, lands in Pennsylvania and Illinois were devised and the courts of the former State had construed the will in a suit for the partition of the lands in that State, and it was held that the judgment in that suit did not operate as ‘an estoppel in a suit in the Ulinois courts for the portion of lands lying in that State, as the courts of the latter State were not bound by the construction of the will placed upon it by the courts of Pennsylvania, although the testator was a resident of that State.
It is for the courts of this State to determine the capacity of the John Moran Packing Company under the laws of this State to acquire ‘and hold real estate, as well also as under its charter. [Jones on Real Prop., sec. 189; Boyce v. St. Louis, 29 Barb. 650.]
This brings us to the consideration of the validity of the mortgage of the John Moran Packing Company to the defendant bank made February 18, 1895, conveying the property in this State, which plaintiff claims is void because the meeting of the directors which authorized it was held in this State', instead of Illinois.
By section 20, of chapter 32, of the Statutes of Illinois of 1896, in regard to corporations, it is provided that the action of any meeting of the directors of a private corporation, 'its trustees or other officers corresponding to trustees, held beyond the limits of the State, shall be void, unless such meeting was authorized or its acts ratified by a vote of two-thirds of the directors, trustees or officers corresponding to trustees at a regular meeting.
It is plain, that the meeting of the board of directors
The general rule is that a hoard of directors of a corporation-may hold their meetings and transact business outside the limits of the State where it is incorporated, unless it is otherwise prescribed by its charter or by-laws. [1 Morawetz on Private Corporations (2 Ed.), sec. 533.] But where it is provided by its charter as in the case at bar, that the action of any meeting of the directors held beyond the limits of the State in -which the company is incorporated shall he void, unless such meeting he authorized or its acts ratified by a vote of two-thirds of the directors, at a regular meeting in the -absence of such authorization or ratification all of its acts of a corporate character -are without authority and void. And such a ratification in order to he effective as -to other creditors must occur before their rights have intervened. While the director’s of the corporation were hut its agents, Moran had no authority to convey its property without first being authorized to do so by action of the hoard of directors, and therefore the act of the hoard in directing the conveyance of the property to the nse of defendant bank, was strictly a corporate act, and entirely unlike other acts not of a corporate^but of a business character, which may he conducted in any State, when authorized by the corporation, and not prohibited by the laws of the State where transacted. While upon this, and similar questions, the authorities are in great conflict and irreconcilable, the decided weight seems to he to the effect that -acts of a corporation of the character in question are corporate -and not acts of agents. Assuming that we are correct in the position taken it must follow that the meeting of the hoard in this State was within the prohibition of the charter of the pack
"While it is not expressly so decided in either McCall v. Byram Manfg. Co., 6 Con. 121, or Bassett v. Monte Christo G. S. M. Co., 15 Nev. 293, it is clearly intimated in both cases, that Where the directors of a corporation are restricted by its charter, or the laws of the State from which it derives its existence, in holding meetings of 'a corporate character to the limits of the State in which it is incorporated — the exercise of such power beyond the limits of such State would be void.
Nor are we able to concur with the contention of defendant, that the fact that the corporation was organized for the purpose of doing business-in this State, -that it conveyed all the property in this State to secure its only creditor in this State, that the mortgage was -made for the -purpose of enabling it to procure means with which to continue its business, paying its debts and going on with its operations, had the effect to legalize the mortgage which we have held w-as void because not executed in conformity with the provisions of the charter of the corporation.
That this State has the right -to impose such terms, conditions and restrictions -as it m-ay see fit upon foreign corporations doing business in this State, or exclude them entirely may be conceded, but it does not hence follow that tibe packing company could transact its corporate business in this State in any other manner than that prescribed by its charter nor could it do -so if so inclined.
But defendant insists that this State has -expressed its policy in the respect now under consideration by “An act to require every foreign corporation doing business in this State to have a public office or place in this State at which to transact its business, subjecting It to certain conditions, and requiring it to file its -articles or charter of incorporation with the Secretary of State, and to pay certain taxes and fees
It is contended that plaintiff’s attachment constituted an incumbrance on the land -attached to the “exclusion” and “injury” of the defendant bank. That 'the packing company’s chief place of business was in this State, -as well as its president and managing officer, and was not subject to nonresident attachment. That it was doing business in this State upon condition that ordinary process could be served upon it. La the absence of fraud these questions could only be raised by plea to the attachment, -as otherwise the result of the attachment could not be attacked collaterally, but defendant alleged in its answer in the case in hand that -any pretended lien the plaintiff may have upon the property in question was fraudulently procured by it and through collusion and combination with said John Moran, --and John Moran Packing Company; that at the time of the said pretended -attachment, long before and ever since, there was no ground for the -attachment -against said parties.
A final contention is that the deed of trust in question was made by John Moran, the president of the packing company, who was the owner of the entire capital stock of the company, and was valid without- the action of the directors. In support of this position, defendant relies upon Union Nat. Bank v. Shoemaker, 68 Mo. App. 592. That case is predicated upon the ground that the persons who made the sale of the property involved in that litigation, were the only stockholders and directors of the corporation and were in fact the corporation, while in the case at bar there were four directors beside John Moran and although they may have been but nominal stockholders they, together with Moran, composed the board of directors, and without the authority of the board he had no right to make the deed of trust. "We do not therefore think that case an authority in this.
Now if the meeting of the board of directors directing John Moran 'the president of the John Moran Packing Company to make the conveyance had been held in Illinois in accordance with the provisions of the charter of the company instead of in this State there is no question but that it would have been valid. But such an instrument can not under the- circumstances disclosed by this record be legally executed without such -authority. [Missouri Lead M. & S. Co. v. Reinhard, 114 Mo. 219; Calumet Paper Co. v. Haskell Show Ptg. Co., 144 Mo. 331.]
The judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.