Thе United States District Court for the District of Maine has certified to us two questions of state law pursuant to 4 M.R. S.A. § 57 (Supp.1986) and M.R.Civ.P. 76B. The requirements for our acceptance of these questions have been met.
See Hiram Ricker & Sons v. Students International Meditation Society,
I. Factual Background
The factual background and procedural history in this case may be summarized as follows: On January 2, 1985, Clifford Winter and Robert Sanford, both Maine residents, traveled to Maryland in Sanford’s station wagon on a hunting trip. The following morning, the two men met their guidеs at the designated hunting area, loaded their shotguns upon sighting geese, but fired no shots. They were then called back to their car by the guides to depart for a second hunting area. Winter unloaded his gun before seating himself in the right front passenger seat. Sanford, however, placed his loaded shotgun in the back seat of the vehicle, with the gun pointing toward the rear door on the passenger side. The safety mechanism of the shotgun wаs in an off position. Upon reaching the second hunting area, Winter got out of the vehicle on the passenger side and walked toward the rear of the vehicle. Sanford got out on the driver’s side, opened thе left rear door, and reached for his shotgun. The gun accidentally discharged upon being grasped by Sanford, resulting in injuries to Winter.
Sanford was insured at all relevant times under two insurance policies. One policy was issued by defendant Commercial Union Insurance Company (Commercial Union). The Commercial Union automobile policy stated that the insurer would “pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident.” The term “covered person” is defined as the named insured or any family member “for the ownership, maintenancе or use of any auto or trailer.”
The second policy was issued to Sanford by the Plaintiff, Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company, (Union Mutual). The Union Mutual homeowner’s policy covered claims against the insured for “damagеs because of bodily injury,” but excluded coverage for claims “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of: ... a motor vehicle owned or operated by ... any insured.” The liability coverage limit of each policy is $100,000. Both policies obligate the insurer to defend the insured against covered claims.
Winter subsequently filed a complaint against Sanford in Superior Court, seeking *310 damages for personal injuries resulting from Sanford’s alleged negligence. Sanford notified the two insurers of the pending state court action, demanding that they defend and indemnify him. Although Commercial Union refused to defend or indemnify Sanford, Union Mutual undertoоk his defense, reserving all rights under its policy and informing Sanford and Commercial Union of its position. Acting on behalf of Sanford, Union Mutual settled with Winter in an amount stipulated by the insurers to be reasonable.
Union Mutual filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, seeking declaratory relief against Commercial Union and Sanford. After both insurers moved for summary judgment, it was agreed that there were no genuine issues of material fact. The following issues of law were certified by the federal court to resolve the question of coverage under the two policies:
(a) Does the clause in the Commercial Union Insurance Company рolicy, providing coverage for accidents arising from “the ownership, maintenance or use of any auto,” include coverage for personal injuries resulting from the accidental discharge of a firеarm while being removed for hunting purposes from an insured vehicle?
(b) Does the clause in the Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company policy, excluding coverage for accidents arising from the “use, loading or unloading” of a vehicle, exclude coverage for personal injuries resulting from the accidental discharge of a firearm while being removed for hunting purposes from an insured vehicle?
We answer both questions in the affirmative.
II. Commercial Union Policy
It has long been the rule in Maine that insurance policies are to be liberally construed in favor of the insured and strictly construed against the insurer that drafted the policy.
Bartlett v. Union Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
The Commercial Union policy in the present case employs the word “usе” in an ambiguous manner. The word “use” is a general catch-all term, encompassing all proper uses of a vehicle. See 6B Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (Buckley ed.), § 4316 (1979). We have previously interpreted the “use,” as distinguished from the “operation” оf a vehicle, in the context of an omnibus clause of an insurance contract, as contemplating a broad construction of that term:
... the words use and operation ave not synonymous. The use of an automobile denotes its employment for some purpоse of the user; the word operation denotes the manipulation of the car’s controls in order to propel it as a vehicle. Use is thus broader than operation ... One who operates a car uses it, ... but one can use a car without operating it.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lyons,
In determining whether a particular injury is within the meaning of the “ownership, maintenance or use” clause of an insurance policy, the cases аre in general agreement that a causal relationship must exist between the accident or injury and the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle.
See
Annotation,
Automobile Liability Insurance: What are Accidents or Injuries “Arising out of Ownership, Maintenance, or Use” of Insured Vehicle,
*311
The vehicle in the instant case was bеing used to transport the two men and their firearms for the purpose of hunting. The utilization of the vehicle for a hunting trip constitutes a proper “use” of the vehicle within the meaning of the Commercial Union policy. Incidental to that use, it was necessary, reasonable and foreseeable that the weapons would be placed into and removed from the vehicle at some point during the course of the expеdition. The “loading or unloading” of a firearm into or from a vehicle is a reasonable and proper use of the vehicle in this context. 1 Because the injury occurred during the “unloading” of the gun from the vehicle, the requisite causal connection is present. This relationship was sufficient to afford coverage under the Commercial Union policy provision. 2
III. Union Mutual Policy
Exclusionary provisions in insurance contracts, such as the оne in the Union Mutual homeowner’s policy, are ordinarily construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.
Baybutt,
The terms “loading or unloading” in the Union Mutual policy exclusionary provision are unambiguous, and must therefore be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Undеr the facts of the instant case, the insured was removing cargo (i.e., his shotgun) from his vehicle, or “unloading” the vehicle. The insured’s negligent placement of the loaded firearm in the vehicle, together with his carelessness in unloading the vehicle, provide a sufficient causal connection between the act of unloading and the consequent injury. In interpreting a similar exclusionary provision in Morari v. Atlantic Mutual Fire Ins. Co., supra, the Supreme Court of Arizona analyzed a factually analogous situation as follows;
*312 The unloading does not have to be the cause in the sense of proximate cause of the accident. The accident need only be connected with the unloading. [The insured’s] act in keeping the gun loaded and not on safety created a dangerous condition from which reasonable men might conclude greater care in its subsequent handling was required in order to рrevent its accidental discharge. No doubt the rifle could have been removed from the truck with such care that [the defendant] would not have been injured. The careless use in connection with the unloading was thе negligent act from which the injury stemmed.
Id.,
For the foregoing reasons, we answer both certified questions in the affirmative.
All concurring.
Notes
. The fact that the Commercial Union policy did not specifically define the term "use” in terms of “loading and unloading” does not change оur analysis. We note that ''[t]here is adequate precedent for the view that when the policy is silent on the point, loading and unloading is ‘using’ an insured motor vehicle.”
American Oil Co. v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.,
.
See e.g., Laviana v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co.,