19 F. 671 | N.D. Ill. | 1883
This is a bill of interpleader filed by the complainant, tlie Union Mutual Life Insurance Company of Maine, charging,
The case is submitted to the court upon the bill and answers, and certain stipulated proof, including the original policy, the new policy, and the correspondence between Samuel P. Stevens and the officers of the complainant at about the time the second policy was issued. The material facts, as they appear from the pleadings and the proofs submitted, are, briefly, these: Samuel P. Stevens took out the first policy in question, and paid the premiums regularly thereon until and including the premium which matured in June, 1869. In June, 1856,
It further appears in the case that Samuel P. Stevens had one child horn to him by his first wife, Mary F. Stevens, who is the Mary Taylor made a defendant in this case, and that said Mary Taylor is, so far as this case discloses, the sole heir at law of tire said Mary F. Stevens. It also appears that the said Mary F. Stevens was killed in 1856, in a railroad accident in the state of Now York, and that Samuel P. Stevens, her husband, received from the railroad company the sum of §2,000 in settlement of the claim against the company for having caused her death, which claim lie collected as the representative and guardian of his daughter, the said Mary Taylor, as lieir of her mother, Mary F. Stevens, but has never paid the same to her. It further appears that said Samuel P. Stevens, by his will, which has been duly probated in Du Page county, in this state, provides “that the sum of §2,000, received by him from the New York Central Ilaiiroad on account of the death of his former wife and the mother of his daughter Mary, should be paid to his said daughter Mary as soon after Ids decease, and from his estate, as conveniently may be, and made the said legacy a charge and lien upon all his estate, real and personal, including any money that may be due “on any life insurance policy, or any other property or money. ”
The first question made in the case is, is this a proper case for a bill of interpleader ? Docs the case show such a state of facts as places the complainant in the position of an innocent stakeholder who has no interest as to which of the contending parties shall re
In this case, it can hardly be contended that, after the death of Mary F. Stevens, her daughter, Mary, had any vested right in the proceeds of the then existing policy, payable to her mother and heirs. It is even doubtful whether the true construction of the language of that policy, describing the beneficiary, does not mean that the money should bo payable to the wife, Mary F. Stevens, and the heirs of Samuel P. Stevens; that is, whether the words “his wife ,Mary F. Stevens, and heirs” do not really mean his wife, Mary F. Stevens, and his heirs; thereby making the children by the second wife, or the heirs at law of Samuel P. Stevens, if he has any other than his daughter, by his first wife, equal participants in the proceeds of this policy. But, be that as it may, the facts in this case show that Samuel P. Stevens retained possession of this policy, and that he, and he alone, always paid the premium; that in June, 1870, he failed to pay the premium on the original policy, and that by its own terms it lapsed and became void by such non-payment; and that he subsequently applied for and obtained this second policy. Now, it is very clear that no one could compel him to continue to pay the premiums on this original policy. He had a right to suspend paying the premiums at any moment, and the policy would at once lapse by reason of such failure. He was under no obligation to his daughter, now Mrs. Taylor, to continue to pay these premiums for her benefit. As he says in his letter, addressed to the officers of this insurance company, the circumstances of his family had so far changed that he did not consider it right to continue paying these premiums for the sole benefit of his daughter. It seems to me, therefore, that he had the right to make the arrangement with the insurance company, and it may be assumed, for the purposes of this case, that he did arrange before hand with the insurance company to allow the policy to lapse, with the understanding that he was to have a new policy issued to him, payable to himself, for the express purpose and no other purpose than to change the beneficiary. If Mrs. Taylor could not compel her father to continue paying those premiums for the purpose of keeping the policy alive for her sole benefit, it seems to me very clear that he was under no legal obligations to her to do so. In other words, it strikes me very forcibly that this policy, at the time the change was made, was, at most, an inchoate or uncompleted gift from Samuel P. Stevens to his wife and heirs. He had the right to change his mind. He was in a position where he could revoke that gift, and direct that the money secured by this policy should go elsewhere. I can see no
It is urged, however, that Mrs. Taylor has certain equitable claims in this fund, from the fact that, as heir of her mother, she has never received the amount which Samuel P. Stevens, her father, collected from this railroad company as compensation for the death of his wife, and to which the daughter was entitled; and that in his will Samuel P. Stevens directed the application of this insurance money to the payment of his indebtedness to her. A sufficient reply to this, as it seems to me, is that the money accruing on this policy, being payable to the assured, becomes assets of his estate, and is to go into the hands of his executor like any other money collected in the due administation of the estate, and that Mrs. Taylor’s claim is to be paid in the due course of administration, with proper regard to the will, under the directions of the probate court in which that estate is being settled. It may be that the probate court can award or has awarded the proceeds of this policy to the widow of Samuel P. Stevens. With that, this court, I think, has nothing to do. If this money is an asset of the estate of Samuel P. Stevens, then it is to be applied as the court charged with the settlement of that estate shall order.
The decree will therefore be entered ordering the payment of the money involved in this suit to Eliza M. Stevens, executrix of Samuel P. Stevens. It is further ordered that each party shall pay their own costs.