129 Mass. 82 | Mass. | 1880
This is a bill in equity by a mortgagee of land taken by the city for the public use, and the equity of redeeming which from the plaintiff’s mortgages is owned by the defendant Farnsworth, to enforce a lien upon the money due from the city for damages for such taking. By the terms of these mortgages, the amounts of the mortgage debts were to be paid in five years, which had elapsed some time before the filing of the bill, “ with interest semiannually at the rate of seven and a half per centum per annum; ” and the question is, at what rate the interest is to be computed for the time since the principal sums became due.
By the St. of 1867, c. 56, § 1, the legal rate of interest in this Commonwealth is six per cent a year, when there is no agreement for a different rate; and by § 2, it is lawful to contract for any rate of interest, “provided, however, that no greater rate of interest than six per centum per annum shall-be recovered in any action, except when the agreement to pay such greater rate of interest is in writing.”
When a written agreement is made, as authorized by the statute, to pay a greater rate of interest yearly than six per cent, the intention of the contract and the effect of the statute appear to us to be that the creditor shall receive the stipulated rate of interest so long as the debtor has the use of the principal; and that, in an action upon the contract, the creditor shall recover interest at that rate, not merely until the time when the principal is agreed to be paid to him, but until it is actually paid, or his claim for principal and interest judicially established.
In Brannon v. Hursell, 112 Mass. 63, it was accordingly held, in an action upon a promissory note payable in four months, “ with interest at ten per cent,” that interest was to be computed at that rate, not merely to the maturity of the note, but to the time of the verdict; and upon reconsideration of the authorities there referred to, and examination of the numerous decisions cited at the argument of the present case, we see no reason to overrule or qualify the point adjudged, although the statement in the opinion that “ the plaintiff recovers interest, both before and after the note matures, by virtue of the contract, as an
In Price v. Great Western Railway, 16 M. & W. 244, 248, Baron Parke said that the reason why, under a mortgage deed whereby interest is payable up to a certain day, interest beyond that day might be recovered as damages, was “ because the deed shows the intention of the parties that it should be a debt bearing interest; ” and added, “ The jury give it as damages for the detention of the debt. It is not recoverable as interest on the contract itself.”
In Morgan v. Jones, 8 Exch. 620, the owners of a vessel mortgaged it as security for a debt, with a proviso for redemption on payment of the principal and interest at the rate of ten per cent in six months, but without any provision for payment of interest after that time. The principal not being paid then, it was held by Chief Baron Pollock and Barons Parke, Platt and Martin that the mortgagee was entitled to interest at the same rate until payment; and Baron Parke said: “ It was a sale of a chattel, redeemable on a certain day; then, if the mortgagors do not avail themselves of that provision, the same rate of interest continues payable. It is exactly like a mortgage of real estate, where the mortgagee becomes the legal owner.”
So in Keene v. Keene, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 144, an action by an indorsee against the drawer of a bill of exchange for £200, payable in twelve months, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, was referred to a master, who allowed ten per cent interest after, as well as before, the maturity of the bill. The defendant moved to recommit the case to the master; and argued that there was no implied contract on the part of the drawer, upon the acceptor’s default, to pay more than the ordinary interest of five per cent; that the acceptor could only be liable to interest at five per cent after maturity of the bill; and that the bill was in effect a bill for £220. But the court overruled the motion. Mr. Justice Willes said: “Until the maturity of the bill, the. interest is a debt; after its maturity, the interest
In Cook v. Fowler, L. R. 7 H. L. 27, a debtor, on May 2, 1864, gave a warrant of attorney to a creditor “ to secure the payment of the sum of £1330, with interest thereon at and after the rate of £5 per cent per month, on the 2d of June next, judgment to be entered up forthwith; and in case of default in payment of the said sum of £1330 and interest thereon on the day aforesaid, execution or executions and other processes may then issue for the said sum of £1330 with interest, together with costs of entering up judgment, &c., &c., and all other incidental expenses whatever.” The debtor died before the 2d of June, and no judgment was entered up. The creditor, who also held mortgages on lands of his debtor, concealed his warrant of attorney for three years, and then set it up in answer to a bill of the executors against him for an account, and more than a year later first claimed to be allowed interest for the whole time at the rate of sixty per cent a year. It was held by the House of Lords, affirming a decree of Vice Chancellor Stuart, that he was entitled after the 2d of June, 1864, to ordinary interest only; and this upon two grounds: 1st. That the warrant of attorney and the defeasance did not create a contract, but only an authority to enter up judgment on June 2, 1864, and a stipulation that execution might then issue. 2d. The extraordinary and excessive rate of interest, and the conduct of the creditor.-
Although Lord Chelmsford (apparently overlooking the cases of Morgan v. Jones and Keene v. Keene, above cited) said, “ There is no authority that I can find to support the argument of the
In a later case, Lord Justice Amphlett considered it to be clearly established by the" previous decisions that in the case of a mercantile security it is to be supposed that the parties intended interest to run on at the old rate if the money was not paid at the date; and so, in the redemption of mortgages, although the day for payment has passed and there is no provision with the creditor for payment of interest after that day, the court will assume that interest is payable after the day at the same rate as before; and that, although what has to be paid may technically be called damages, they are damages of a peculiar
In the very recent case of In re Roberts, 14 Ch. D. 49, where by a mortgage deed, reciting an agreement for a loan of £5000 at the rate of ten per cent per annum, the mortgagor covenanted to pay in six months the sum of £250, being half a year’s interest on the £5000, and in twelve months the sum of £250, being a further half-year’s interest, and also the principal sum of £5000, making together £5250, and made no covenant for the payment of interest in the event of the principal remaining unpaid after the day named for its repayment, but actually paid interest at the rate of ten per cent for three years afterwards, and then died; and after a decree for administration of his estate, the mortgagee proved as a creditor for principal and interest ; it was indeed held by Sir George Jessel, M. R., and Lords Justices Brett and Cotton, that he was entitled, in such a suit, to interest at the rate of five per cent only. But no decision upon the point appears to have been brought to the notice of the court, except Cook v. Fowler, above cited; and the case was decided upon the assumption that there was no precedent for giving more than the ordinary rate of interest by way of damages. Under such circumstances, the case cannot be considered, by a court not bound by it as authority, to outweigh the decisions of Chief Baron Pollock and Baron Parke, of Chief Justice Cockburn and Mr. Justice Willes, and their associates, and the opinions of Lord Cairns and Lord Selborne, above quoted. It may also be observed that the Master of the Rolls said (without giving any reason why the agreement of the parties should be allowed a greater effect by way of protection of the party who had broken his contract, than for the benefit of the party who by such breach had been deprived of the use of his money) that, if the rate of interest named by the parties were below the ordinary rate, it would be the proper measure of damages; and that Lord Justice Cotton took the precaution to remark that the court was not deciding what rate of interest should be allowed in a suit for redemption.
In Connecticut, the law seems formerly to have been consid.ered as settled in accordance with these decisions; and, although some recent dicta have a tendency to explain away the grounds assigned in the earlier judgments, there is no adjudication to the contrary, Beckwith v. Hartford, Providence & Fishkill Railroad, 29 Conn. 268. Adams v. Way, 33 Conn. 419. Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 524, 537. Suffield Ecclesiastical Society v. Loomis, 42 Conn. 570, 575. Seymour v. Continental Ins. Co. 44 Conn. 300.
The earlier decisions in New York support the same rule, both as to mortgages and as to ordinary debts. Miller v. Burroughs, 4 Johns. Ch. 436. Van Beuren v. Van Gaasbeck, 4 Cowen, 496. But in the light of later eases the question may perhaps be considered an open one in that State. See Bell v. Mayor of New York, 10 Paige, 49; Hamilton v. Van Rensselaer, 43 N. Y. 244; Ritter v. Phillips, 53 N. Y. 586. It may be doubted, however, whether the cases of Macomber v. Dunham, 8 Wend. 550, and United States Bank v. Chapin, 9 Wend. 471, sometimes referred to in discussions of the subject, are really applicable. In one of them, the decision was that a corporation, authorized by its charter to charge interest for a full month on loans for more
In Ashuelot Railroad v. Klliot, 57 N. H. 397, 437, 439, cited for the defendant Farnsworth, the point decided was, that, upon bonds bearing interest at the rate of six per cent annually payable half-yearly, interest, after maturity, and payment of all the coupons, should be computed in equity at the rate of six per cent, without annual or other rests; in short, that compound interest should not be allowed in a suit on the principal debt. That decision, in effect overruling Peirce v. Rowe, 1 N. H. 179, accords with the general current of authority, in equity as well as at law. Ferry v. Ferry, 2 Cush. 92. Connecticut v. Jackson, 1 Johns. Ch. 13. Van Benschooten v. Lawson, 6 Johns. Ch. 313. Mowry v. Bishop, 5 Paige, 98. Sparks v. Garrigues, 1 Binn. 152, 165. Stokely v. Thompson, 34 Penn. St. 210. Doe v. Warren, 7 Greenl. 48. Parkhurst v. Cummings, 56 Maine, 155. It does not affect the question before us.
The leading cases in support of the defendant’s view are Ludwick v. Huntzinger, 5 W. & S. 51, and Brewster v. Wakefield, 22 How. 118.
In Ludwick v. Huntzinger, it was held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that, on a bond for the payment of money in twenty-one months, with three per cent interest from date, the obligee was entitled to recover three per cent interest until the time fixed for payment, and six per cent afterwards.
In Brewster v. Wakefield, it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States, (reversing the judgment of the Supreme
The same rule appears to have been followed by the Supreme Court in a case from the Territory of Utah. Burnhisel v. Firman, 22 Wall. 170. And it has since been adopted as a general rule by the courts of Kansas, Minnesota, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Kentucky, Arkansas and Maine. Robinson v. Kinney, 2 Kans. 184. Lash v. Lambert, 15 Minn. 416. Moreland v. Lawrence, 23 Minn. 84. Langston v. South Carolina Railroad, 2 So. Car. (N. S.) 248. Pearce v. Hennessy, 10 R. I. 223. Rilling v. Thompson, 12 Bush, 310. Newton v. Kennerly, 31 Ark. 626. Duran v. Ayer, 67 Maine, 145. Baton v. Boissonnault, 67 Maine, 540.
But the later judgments of the Supreme Court exhibit a difference of opinion as to the general rule, though not of adjudication in the particular cases before the court.
On the other hand, in the case of Holden v. Trust Co. 100 U. S. 72, which arose in the District of Columbia under a statute like ours except in not allowing the parties to stipulate for interest at a greater rate than ten per cent, it was held, upon a bill in equity, that on a note made payable in four years, with interest at the rate of ten per cent payable semiannually, and secured by a conveyance of real estate in trust, interest from the maturity of the note should be computed at the ordinary rate of six per cent only; and Mr. Justice Swayne, in delivering judgment, said: “The rule heretofore applied by this court, under the circumstances of this case, has been to give the contract rate up to the maturity of the contract, and thereafter the rate prescribed for cases where the parties themselves have fixed no rate. Brewster v. Wakefield, 22 How. 118. Burnhisel v. Firman, 22 Wall. 170. Where a different rule has been established, it governs, of course, in that locality. The question is always one of local law. This subject was fully examined in the recent case in this court of Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351. [The reference intended is evidently 96 U. S. 51, above cited.] We need not go over the ground again. Here the agreement of the parties extends no further than to the time fixed for the payment of the principal. As to everything beyond that, it is silent. If payment be not made when the money becomes due, there is a breach of the contract, and the creditor is entitled to damages.
The law upon this subject, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States, would appear to be that in the District of Columbia or in a Territory of the United States, the rate of interest agreed by the parties in the usual form is recoverable to the stipulated time of payment only,' and the statute rate of interest afterwards; but that cases arising in any State must be governed by the local law as expounded by its courts.
Two observations may be made on the judgments which are opposed to the decision in Brannon v. Bursell. 1st. They admit that the intent of the parties, if expressed with sufficient clearness in their contract, will govern the rate of interest to the time of judgment. Brewster v. Wakefield and Holden v. Trust Co., above cited. Pearce v. Hennessy, 10 R. I. 227. Capen v. Crowell, 66 Maine, 282. Paine v. Caswell, 68 Maine, 80. Gray v. Briscoe, 6 Bush, 687. Young v. Thompson, 2 Kans. 83. 2d. They assume, in opposition to the leading English cases, that, if interest after the maturity of the contract is to be recovered, not as interest, but as damages, it must necessarily be estimated at the ordinary rate.
The question being, as is clearly recognized in the two most recent judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States, one of local law, in deciding which this court is not bound by the opinion of any other tribunal, we are constrained, with great respect for those who take a different view of the subject, to say that the rule established in this Commonwealth by the adjudication in Brannon v. Hursell appears to us to best accord with the purpose of the Legislature, with the apparent intention of the parties, with the usage and understanding of men of business, with the weight of legal reasoning and authority, and with the principles of equity that govern the enforcement and redemption of mortgages.
In the case before us, each of the mortgages to the plaintiff, duly recorded, and subject to which the defendant Farnsworth
The stipulated rate is only one fifth of one per cent a year higher than the interest payable upon some notes of the United States, and there is no pretence that it is unconscionable or unreasonable. The claim upon the money received by Farnsworth from the city is no less than it would have been against the land for which that money is a substitute. Farnsworth v. Boston, 126 Mass. 1. As he might at any time have stopped the running of the interest after the maturity of ■ the notes by performing his obligation and paying the mortgage debt, neither the lapse of time nor the other circumstances of the case afford any reason why the plaintiff should not recover interest at the stipulated rate to the time of the decree. Decree affirmed.