145 So. 503 | Ala. Ct. App. | 1932
There are in this record some eighty-five assignments of error, which are presented in ten propositions of law in appellant's brief. It is obvious that to treat each assignment of error in this opinion would entail much useless labor and extend the opinion to unnecessary length. This is evidently the position taken by appellant in grouping its contentions under the ten heads as indicated in its brief.
Under proposition II appellant states the proposition that: One who disclaims familiarity with a piece of real property, or who testified that he does not know the value of land in that neighborhood, should not be allowed to testify as to its value. This is a correct statement of the law as decided in Adler
Co. v. Pruitt,
Appellant cites many authorities and argues at length that defendant was entitled to the affirmative charge on its plea 5, which, after setting up the provisions of the policy as to fraud and false swearing, averred that plaintiff after the loss swore in writing that the origin of the fire was unknown to her, when it was admitted that at the time she filed the proof of loss, she knew that one John Thomas had confessed to having set fire to the building. "A false answer as to any matter of fact material to the inquiry, knowingly and willfully made with intent to deceive the insurer, would be fraudulent." Tubb v. Liverpool London Globe Ins. Co.,
We are also of the opinion that the evidence is such as to prove the general agency quoad hoc of Manly Co., and that notice and proof of loss filed with Manly Co., the local agents of defendant, was sufficient notice to defendant. The law is as is stated by us in Royal Ins. Co., Limited, v. Eggleston,
The principal insistence of error is that the court should have granted the defendant's motion for a new trial on account of the weight of the evidence in its favor. We enter into a consideration of this question fully conscious of the presumptions in favor of the verdict of the jury and the weight to be given to the ruling of the trial judge before whom the hearing was had as declared in Cobb v. Malone,
Reversed and remanded.