251 N.W. 911 | Minn. | 1933
1. By 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 9556, it is provided:
"Any person in possession of real property by himself or his tenant, or any person having or claiming title to vacant or unoccupied real property, may bring an action against any person who claims an estate or interest therein, or a lien thereon, adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim and the rights of the parties, respectively."
The plaintiff in its complaint stated the source of its title and alleged that it and its predecessors in title had been in actual open and adverse possession for more than 15 years. Its allegation of possession was sufficient under the statute and was more specific and of longer duration than was necessary. It was sufficient to admit proof of title by adverse possession. The plaintiff alleged that after it acquired title and within a year before the commencement of the action it gave to two persons, Henry J. Petran and Paul H. Petran, contracts of sale for the land and that they were in possession under the contracts.
It is the claim of Smith and Dockendorf that the possession of the plaintiff, in view of the allegation as to the sale on contract to the Petrans, and their possession, does not satisfy the statute.
There is no settled case or bill of exceptions. All that is raised on the appeal is the sufficiency of the findings to support the judgment. Where there is no settled case or bill of exceptions, it is presumed that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the findings and, if the facts found are not within the issues, that they were litigated by consent. In re Trusteeship under Will of Rosenfeldt,
2. Smith and Dockendorf alleged that they owned the lands involved and asked judgment decreeing them to be the owners. The fact of possession or vacancy is not a jurisdictional fact, nor does it go to the merits of the controversy as to title. It goes only to the right of the plaintiff to present his claim of title under the form of action authorized by § 9556 quoted above. If a defendant alleges title in himself and asks judgment quieting it, he waives objection to the form of the action, and the fact of possession or vacancy is unimportant. Baker v. Berg,
3. The position of the Hayward Farms Company is different. It made default. It appeals from the judgment. It may urge the insufficiency of the pleadings to state a cause of action; and the relief granted plaintiff must be within the allegations of the complaint and the demand for relief. In Northern Tr. Co. v. Albert Lea College,
4. The possession which plaintiff must show under § 9556 is possession by himself or tenant, and it is actual as distinguished from constructive. Miesen v. Canfield,
Under the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff, the vendor-owner, contracted to sell the land to the vendee-owners, the Petrans. The possession of a vendee-owner is not adverse to the vendor-owner; he holds in subservience to him. He can no more attack the title of the vendor under whom he holds than can a lessee deny the title of his lessor. Johnson v. Peterson,
Not much authority upon the plaintiff's claim is to be had. In Thomas v. White,
"How is it in the present case? Thomas does not himself occupy the land, but his vendees, or their assigns, to whom as yet no conveyance has been made, do occupy it. They are in possession claiming title under Thomas, and not adversely to him. Under such circumstances, their possession is his possession, so far as the present question is concerned."
In D. W. Kaufman Realty Co. v. Lucas,
"* * * the actual possession of the premises by the present vendee of the realty company is the possession of said realty company, within the meaning of the statute authorizing actions to quiet title."
There was no discussion. In Bigelow v. Brewer,
"may not have been a tenant, strictly so-called, in the ordinary meaning of that term as applied to a lessee, but his possession was analogous to that of a lessee, since he was placed in possession by respondent, and held it for respondent as well as for himself."
We find no case in direct opposition to those cited. Upon the authority of them, we hold that the allegation of possession in the complaint is sufficient notwithstanding the further allegation that the plaintiff had contracted to sell the lands to the Petrans, who were in physical possession under their contracts; their possession not being hostile to the title of the plaintiff but in subservience to it. In holding so we do not neglect our holdings that the owner's *366
possession must be actual or by tenant; nor do we overlook that the vendee-owner in possession, since he has an equitable title, may maintain an action to quiet title. School Dist. No. 73 v. Wrabeck,
From what is said it follows that the judgment is effective according to its terms against the Hayward Farms Company. For the same reason it is good against Smith and Dockendorf.
5. A recorded contract for the sale of real property which has been terminated by abandonment or cancelation is a cloud upon the vendor's title. Dahl v. Pross,
6. The case made by the complaint is this: In 1925 the plaintiff was the owner in fee of the land. In 1926 it executed to the Quevli Farms, Inc. a contract for a deed. This contract was recorded in 1932. The Quevli Farms, Inc. assigned the contract to the Hayward Farms Company. It does not appear whether the assignment was recorded. Prior to the commencement of this action the *367 plaintiff canceled the contract with the Quevli Farms, Inc. See 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 9576.
The contract for a deed was a cloud. The complaint sufficiently alleges it. The plainfiff can maintain an equitable action to remove it. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff has not an adequate remedy at law. The prayer for relief is sufficient for in equitable action to remove a cloud. The facts alleged are sufficient to maintain either an equitable action to remove a cloud or the statutory action to determine adverse claims. See Palmer v. Yorks,
7. The plaintiff may maintain an equitable action to remove a cloud though he is not in possession. Donnelly v. Simonton,
Our conclusion is that the plaintiff can maintain against the Hayward Farms Company the equitable action to remove the cloud of the recorded contract though not in possession. For the same reason the action can be maintained against Smith and Dockendorf.
8. The plaintiff urges that the claim of the defendant Hayward Farms Company is moot. It bases this claim upon an allegation in the answer of Smith and Dockendorf that they acquired by assignment the defendants' contract which came from the Quevli Farms, Inc. Plaintiff's reply denies this. If it had appeared in a pleading to which the Hayward Farms Company was a party that it had sold its interest to Smith and Dockendorf, the claim might be an interesting one. As it is the plaintiff cannot prevail upon it.
For the reasons stated in the previous paragraphs, the judgment is valid against all the defendants appealing.
Judgment affirmed. *368