UNIÓN DE EMPLEADOS DE MUELLES DE PUERTO RICO, INC., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN‘S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, Defendant, Appellee.
No. 16-1372
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
February 28, 2018
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon.
Before Lynch, Lipez, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Eddie Q. Morales for appellant.
John P. Sheridan, with whom Kevin J. Marrinan and Marrinan & Mazzola Mardon, P.C. were on brief, for appellee.
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. This case involves a dispute between an international union -- the International Longshoremen‘s Association (“ILA“) -- and one of its affiliated local unions in San Juan, Puerto Rico -- Unión de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico, Inc. (“UDEM“) -- regarding the validity of the ILA‘s decision to place UDEM into a trusteeship after UDEM opposed the ILA‘s plan to merge it with other local unions. In the proceedings below, initiated when UDEM filed a lawsuit against the ILA, the district court held that the trusteeship was lawfully imposed, denied UDEM‘s motion for a preliminary injunction against the trusteeship, and struck UDEM as a party because it did not have authorization from the trustee to sue the ILA. Having stricken the sole plaintiff, the district court dismissed the complaint.
Appealing from the dismissal of its complaint and the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction, UDEM contends that the trusteeship was invalid because UDEM voted to disaffiliate from the ILA before the trusteeship was imposed and because UDEM was placed in trusteeship for reasons that are improper under Title III of the
After considering the parties’ supplemental briefing on mootness, we hold that UDEM‘s appeal from the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction is moot due to the termination of the trusteeship. However, because UDEM‘s claims for declaratory relief and damages present a live controversy despite the end of the trusteeship, the remainder of the appeal is not moot. On the merits of the remaining appeal, we affirm the order of the district court. UDEM‘s vote to disaffiliate before the ILA placed it in trusteeship was invalid under the ILA constitution, and the trusteeship was lawfully imposed under the LMRDA, leaving UDEM without authority to bring this lawsuit absent permission from the trustee. Because UDEM did not receive authorization from the trustee, the district court properly struck UDEM as a plaintiff and dismissed the case.
I.
A. Initial Proceedings in the District Court
On June 3, 2015, UDEM filed suit against the ILA under Title III of the LMRDA, see
After the ILA answered the complaint, UDEM filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. In the motion, UDEM alleged that it had disaffiliated from the ILA at a meeting of its membership on May 9, prior
The ILA then filed an opposition to UDEM‘s motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to strike UDEM as a plaintiff, arguing that UDEM in fact did not disaffiliate before the trusteeship was imposed because it failed to give notice to its members that a vote on disaffiliation was being held, as required for a disaffiliation vote to be effective under the ILA constitution. Additionally, the ILA argued that the purposes for which the trusteeship was imposed -- UDEM‘s opposition to the merger, financial misconduct, undermining of collective bargaining relationships with employers, and refusal to cooperate with the work-sharing agreement -- were all legitimate under the LMRDA. Because UDEM was under a lawful trusteeship at the time the suit was filed, the ILA contended, no one could file a complaint in UDEM‘s name without the authorization of the trustee. The old officers of UDEM, who were removed when the trusteeship was put in place, no longer had authority to initiate this action on behalf of UDEM, and, if they sued at all, should have done so individually.
The case was referred to a magistrate judge, who held a hearing on both motions and issued a report and recommendation.
B. The Magistrate Judge‘s Findings of Fact
UDEM, which was founded in 1938, represented certain workers in the Port of San Juan. In 1961, after UDEM affiliated with the ILA, it became known as Local 1901 of the ILA. René A. Mercado-Álvarez (“Mercado“) was elected president of UDEM in 2012 and was president during the time relevant to this case.
In addition to UDEM, there were three other local ILA unions in the Port: Local 1575, Local 1740, and Local 1902. The present dispute began in January 2015 when Horizon Lines, a major stevedoring company, closed its operations in the Port and was replaced by another stevedoring company, Luis Ayala Colón (“Ayala“).1 Prior to closing, Horizon Lines employed members of ILA Local 1575 under a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA“) with that union. Following the closure of Horizon Lines, Local 1575 asserted that its members had the right to work for Ayala because, pursuant to the CBA with Horizon Lines, Ayala was a successor employer. On the other hand, UDEM and Locals 1902 and 1740 each had existing CBAs with Ayala and believed that they, not Local 1575, were entitled to work for Ayala in Horizon Lines‘s former terminals.
In February and March of 2015, the ILA held a series of meetings with the four locals involved in the dispute over bargaining with Ayala. At those meetings, ILA representatives took the position that the other locals needed to accommodate Local 1575 so that its members would not be out of work, and they proposed a work-sharing agreement to achieve that goal. UDEM and Local 1902 both opposed the proposed arrangement, and no agreement
At the end of March, all four locals consented to a work-sharing agreement that had been drafted by Mercado. Following the ratification of that agreement, the ILA informed the locals that, in order to implement it, UDEM and Locals 1902 and 1740 would have to accept transfers of some unemployed members of Local 1575 to jobs held by their members, even though such transfers were not expressly required in the agreement. The ILA was later informed that UDEM had not complied with this directive.
On April 14, the leadership of UDEM met with ILA officials, who told Mercado that the ILA was planning to merge the locals and that the reason for the merger was the dispute with Local 1575. After learning of the ILA‘s intention to merge the locals, Mercado called a meeting of UDEM‘s executive board on April 23. The board voted unanimously against a potential merger and in favor of disaffiliating from the ILA. Following this vote, however, Mercado continued to refer to UDEM as affiliated with the ILA.2
On May 1, the ILA sent a letter to members of the four local unions explaining that it had decided that merging the locals was the best course of action and that it would move forward with that plan. A few days later, it informed the locals that Local 1740‘s charter would be amended to add job classifications that were currently included in UDEM‘s charter. Mercado saw this move as a first step toward removing those job classifications from UDEM, as the ILA generally did not permit two locals to cover the same job classifications.
On May 8, the ILA informed UDEM‘s membership that a meeting would be held on May 11 to discuss the merger. The letter reiterated the reasons that the ILA felt the merger was necessary, and it alleged that Mercado had spread false information to UDEM‘s membership about the merger. On May 9, the day after that letter was sent, Mercado called an emergency UDEM membership meeting. At the meeting, a motion was put forth for
the Board of Directors to continue making the efforts that it understands pertinent as up to the present and that every effort be made which is not limited to any action which must be taken to protect [the] Union and for every action taken by the Board to be accepted, including the disaffiliation from the ILA.
The motion was “seconded unanimously.”3 A motion was then made to reject the merger, which was also unanimously approved.
Few members of UDEM showed up for the ILA‘s May 11 meeting, and the ILA was informed that Mercado was at a nearby location attempting to dissuade UDEM members from attending. An ILA representative tried to convince Mercado to attend the meeting and air his concerns. Although Mercado testified that, in declining this invitation, he told the representative that UDEM had voted to disaffiliate from the ILA, the magistrate judge found more credible the ILA representative‘s testimony that Mercado did not mention disaffiliation.4
That same day, Mercado sent the ILA a letter informing it that UDEM had unanimously voted to oppose the merger. It did not mention disaffiliation. The next day, May 12, Mercado sent another letter to the ILA stating that UDEM had voted to disaffiliate. Also on May 12, the ILA sent a letter to Mercado stating that, following an investigation into UDEM‘s conduct, the
ILA had decided to place UDEM in an emergency trusteeship.5 Mercado testified that the trusteeship letter arrived after he sent the disaffiliation letter to the ILA and that, in fact, he had written the disaffiliation letter on May 11, 2015, per its dateline, but had failed to send it that day due to problems with UDEM‘s fax machine. The magistrate judge concluded that this testimony was not credible because the fax machine appeared to be working when Mercado sent the letter opposing the merger, and there was no reason why Mercado would write two different letters on the same day and fax them separately. Instead, the magistrate judge found that the disaffiliation letter was sent only after Mercado learned of the emergency trusteeship, and that therefore the ILA did not know about UDEM‘s disaffiliation vote prior to imposing the trusteeship.
On May 14, Mercado again wrote to the ILA, stating that the imposition of the trusteeship was illegal under the ILA‘s constitution and that the ILA and UDEM should “go before the corresponding forums”6 to resolve the legality of the trusteeship. The ILA did not respond to the letter. UDEM then held another membership meeting on May 19, where the membership voted to “ratify” the previous decision to disaffiliate from the ILA.
The ILA constitution requires that an emergency trusteeship be ratified by the
Peter Clark, and Bernard O‘Donnell -- were appointed by the president of the ILA to conduct a hearing on the charges against UDEM.7 The hearing was held on June 11 and was attended by Mercado and UDEM‘s vice president, Ramón Rodríguez, along with counsel.
At the hearing, counsel for UDEM insisted that UDEM had disaffiliated and that Mercado was representing UDEM as a separate entity, not as a local of the ILA. Based on those statements, Mercado was told that there was no reason for him to be there unless he would appear as a representative of Local 1901. Mercado started to leave, but a lawyer for the ILA convinced him to stay. Mercado continued to identify himself as a representative of a disaffiliated UDEM, rather than Local 1901, however, causing someone on the hearing committee to again state that there was nothing else to discuss, and Mercado left. The ILA sustained the charges against Mercado and the Union and approved the trusteeship, removing Mercado as president of UDEM and expelling him from the ILA.
C. Legal Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge and District Court
Based on these factual findings, the magistrate judge concluded that UDEM did not successfully disaffiliate from the ILA
prior to imposition of the trusteeship because its disaffiliation vote was taken at a meeting that did not comply with the notice requirements in the ILA constitution, and that the trusteeship was imposed for lawful reasons, particularly to effectuate the merger between the locals. She therefore concluded that UDEM had failed to overcome the presumption of validity applied to trusteeships under the LMRDA. She recommended that the district court deny the motion for a preliminary injunction and, because the trusteeship was lawfully imposed and the lawsuit was not brought by the trustee, strike UDEM as a party to the case. Given that UDEM was the only plaintiff, she also recommended dismissal of the action.
In a short opinion addressing UDEM‘s objections to the magistrate judge‘s conclusions, the district court adopted the magistrate judge‘s report and recommendation in full and dismissed UDEM‘s claims without prejudice.8 See Union de Empleados de Muelles de P.R., Inc. v. Int‘l Longshoremen‘s Ass‘n, 156 F. Supp. 3d 257 (D.P.R. 2016).9
D. Appeal
UDEM appealed both the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction and the dismissal of its claims, continuing to argue that (1) it had disaffiliated prior to the emergency trusteeship being imposed, (2) the trusteeship was imposed for an improper purpose, and (3) it should be allowed to proceed as plaintiff without authorization from the trustee.
In its response, the ILA argued that the appeal was now moot. We directed the parties to file supplemental briefs on the issue of mootness, specifically, “whether [the ILA‘s] mootness argument applies only to the denial of the injunction as to the trusteeship or dismissal of the entire suit.” In its supplemental briefing, the ILA informed the court that the trusteeship ended on November 12, 2016, following the completion of the merger between the locals. The ILA argued that, because the trusteeship had been terminated, both UDEM‘s appeal of the denial of the injunction and UDEM‘s appeal from the dismissal of the case were moot. We turn to the issue of mootness first.
II.
“Article III prohibits federal courts from deciding ‘moot’ cases or controversies -- that is, those in which the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” United States v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 624 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting U.S. Parole Comm‘n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even after an appeal is filed, a case may become moot “if changed circumstances eliminate any possibility of effectual relief.” Me. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. U.S. Dep‘t of Labor, 359 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. R., 321 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) (stating that “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed” (quoting Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2003))). Thus, if the termination of the trusteeship extinguished the controversy between UDEM and the ILA, we must dismiss the appeal in its entirety.
UDEM‘s appeal from the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction is plainly moot. UDEM sought to enjoin the ILA “from the continuation of the emergency trusteeship.” The trusteeship has already ended. The preliminary injunction sought by UDEM is therefore no longer needed. See Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 321 F.3d at 17 (stating that, ordinarily, where a suit seeks only injunctive relief, “once the act sought to be enjoined occurs, the suit must be dismissed as moot“).10
To determine whether UDEM‘s claim for declaratory relief is moot, we examine whether “there is a substantial controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass., 705 F.3d at 54 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402 (1975)). UDEM‘s complaint sought a declaration that the trusteeship “is null and void, ab initio, without any legal effect.” UDEM contends that such a declaration would resolve a real and immediate controversy because it would have the effect of creating an opportunity for UDEM to challenge the validity of actions taken by the trustee during the course of the trusteeship.
A declaratory judgment is often a means to an end rather than an end in and of itself, as its purpose is to determine the rights and obligations of the parties so that they can act in accordance with the law. See Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 534 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that the
Declaratory Judgment Act “is designed to enable litigants to clarify legal rights and obligations before acting upon them“). Because “[a] declaratory judgment is binding on the parties before the court and is res judicata in subsequent proceedings as to the matters declared,” it can be used by a party to later obtain further relief. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 111, 122 n.11 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting 10A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2771 (1983)). Indeed, the
If a declaratory judgment were issued by the district court in favor of UDEM here, the invalidity of the trusteeship would be established for the purposes of a subsequent challenge to the merger, and could even be used by UDEM in this action to seek further relief from the effects of the trusteeship. Such a challenge by UDEM is not merely hypothetical, as the declaratory judgment would provide UDEM with opportunities to challenge the merger that would have been unavailable without it. For example, on May 19, after the trusteeship had already been put in place but before the merger occurred, UDEM‘s membership took a second vote on disaffiliation that, assuming the vote followed the procedures set forth in the ILA constitution, would have been effective but for the trusteeship. If the trusteeship were invalid, therefore, UDEM would have a colorable challenge to the validity of the merger based on the argument that, regardless of the procedural invalidity of its first disaffiliation vote, it took a valid vote to disaffiliate before the merger occurred. Thus, the controversy over the validity of the trusteeship is sufficiently real and immediate to permit UDEM‘s appeal to go forward. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 499 (1969) (holding that an action for a declaratory judgment was not moot because, after a declaratory judgment has been issued, it “can then be used as a predicate to further relief“).12
Additionally, UDEM‘s appeal is not moot because it asserted a claim for damages in its complaint. See, e.g., Thompson v. Office & Prof‘l Emps. Int‘l Union, 74 F.3d 1492, 1504 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that, if lifting a trusteeship mooted a claim for damages arising from the trusteeship, “national and international unions could impose trusteeships with impunity . . . and remain immune from legal scrutiny as long as they lifted the trusteeship before the plaintiff has his day in court“). The ILA contends that UDEM‘s claim for damages is moot because UDEM‘s complaint did not elaborate on its basis for seeking damages. That argument goes to the sufficiency of the complaint, however, not mootness. Moreover, courts have recognized a cause of action under Title III of the LMRDA for damages, for example, for costs incurred by the trustee on behalf of the local while the trusteeship was in place. See, e.g., Local Union 13410 v. United Mine Workers, 475 F.2d 906, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that “[t]he Local should also be permitted to recover whatever
III.
In determining whether the district court erred when it struck UDEM as a plaintiff and dismissed the case, we must first decide whether the trusteeship was lawfully imposed. If UDEM was under a lawful trusteeship at the time it brought this lawsuit, we must then address whether UDEM nonetheless had standing to bring this suit without authorization from the trustee.
A. Disaffiliation
As a threshold matter, UDEM contends that it disaffiliated from the ILA before the ILA placed it in the emergency trusteeship and thus the ILA lacked authority to impose the trusteeship. Under the LMRDA, the authority of an international to impose a trusteeship depends on whether a local is a “subordinate body” under that statute. See
The dispute over whether UDEM disaffiliated from the ILA prior to the imposition of the emergency trusteeship on May 12 focuses on whether the vote taken at the May 9 meeting of UDEM‘s membership complied with the disaffiliation provisions of the ILA constitution. See Int‘l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Local Lodge 714, 845 F.2d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 1988) (looking to international‘s constitution to determine whether local had disaffiliated and therefore whether trusteeship could be imposed).
In reviewing the interpretation of the ILA constitution, we apply the principle that, “in the absence of bad faith, a labor organization‘s interpretation of internal union documents puts an end to judicial scrutiny so long as the interpretation is ‘facially sufficient’ or grounded in ‘arguable authority.‘” Dow v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 1 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Local No. 48, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 920 F.2d 1047, 1052 (1st Cir. 1990)) (footnote omitted); see also Local No. 48, 920 F.2d at 1052 (“[W]e align ourselves
As relevant here, the ILA constitution provides that “no local shall withdraw or be dissolved so long as at least ten (10) members in good standing object to its dissolution at a meeting called to consider the question.” UDEM contends that this provision does not apply to its May 9 disaffiliation vote because the provision does not use the word “disaffiliation.” As the district court explained, however, the provision does contain the word “withdraw,” which can reasonably be construed as a synonym for disaffiliate in circumstances where there is no other mechanism for “withdrawal” from the ILA. Although the second part of the clause mentions only dissolution, reading both clauses together suggests that “dissolution” is used as shorthand and that the requirement that a meeting be held and notice given applies to both dissolution and withdrawal. We therefore agree with the district court‘s conclusion that the ILA has plausibly read this provision to dictate how a local‘s disaffiliation vote must be conducted.
With regard to the procedures required by the constitution to conduct a valid disaffiliation vote, the district court adopted the ILA‘s interpretation of the disaffiliation provision, holding that the provision‘s requirement that the meeting be “called to consider the question” mandated that “prior notice be given to the membership that a meeting will be held specifically for the purpose of considering disaffiliation.” We agree that the ILA‘s interpretation of this provision is plausible on its face and grounded in the language of the provision. The fact that the vote must be taken “at a meeting called to consider the question,” suggests both that the meeting must be announced to the membership in advance and that the purpose of the meeting -- to discuss disaffiliation -- must have been clear in that announcement. As the district court noted, “only in this manner, after all, would dissenting members know to show up for the vote.”14
In sum, the ILA‘s interpretation of the constitutional provision at issue here easily meets the deferential standard applied to a union‘s interpretation of internal union documents.
Turning to the question of whether UDEM complied with the requirements of the ILA constitution, we review the district court‘s factual findings for clear error. See McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C., 775 F.3d 109, 115 (1st Cir. 2014). UDEM does not dispute the district court‘s finding that “Mercado did not inform the membership before the May 9 meeting that disaffiliation
B. Validity of the Trusteeship
Under the LMRDA, “a trusteeship established by a labor organization in conformity with the procedural requirements of its constitution and bylaws and authorized or ratified after a fair hearing . . . shall be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months from the date of its establishment.”
That process was followed here. The ILA conducted an investigation, initially imposed an emergency trusteeship, and then conducted a further investigation, which resulted in charges against UDEM and Mercado. The ILA then held a hearing to resolve those charges, which resulted in the continuation of the emergency trusteeship. UDEM asserts that the hearing it received was not fair because Mercado left the hearing without having an opportunity to participate. However, there is no requirement in the ILA constitution that the president of the union participate at the hearing, and, in any event, Mercado refused to represent the interests of the local that had been placed in trusteeship, instead purporting to represent a disaffiliated entity. Thus, the trusteeship is presumptively valid, and UDEM must show by “clear and convincing proof that the trusteeship was not established or maintained in good faith for a purpose allowable under [the LMRDA].”
UDEM has not met this high burden. Pursuant to section 302 of the LMRDA, an international may impose a trusteeship over a local
only in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of [the international] and for the purpose of correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a bargaining representative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such labor organization.
The district court credited the ILA‘s claim that the primary purpose for the trusteeship was to “neutralize local 1901‘s resistance to the proposed merger.” Union de Empleados, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 271. That finding was not clearly erroneous.16 The ILA made its intention to merge the unions known prior to imposing the trusteeship, attempted to convince the members of UDEM to accept the merger, and then imposed the trusteeship the day after UDEM informed the ILA in writing that its members had unanimously rejected the merger. In sum, the ILA threatened to impose a trusteeship if UDEM continued to oppose the merger. When UDEM did oppose the merger, the ILA followed through on its threat.
Moreover, we agree with the district court‘s conclusion that effectuating the merger was a proper purpose for imposing the trusteeship under the LMRDA. The ILA‘s constitution gives the ILA “authority to merge or consolidate two or more locals on such terms and conditions as it deems necessary or appropriate when such action is deemed to be in the best interest of the International and its members.” Prior to imposing the trusteeship, the ILA thoroughly documented the likely benefits to its members from the merger, including increased bargaining power and unity during collective bargaining with employers, uniformity in benefits that could lead to financial savings, and more effectively promoting cargo growth for San Juan. As these benefits relate to improving the performance of core union functions, realizing them is a “legitimate object[]” of the ILA.
UDEM nonetheless contends that the trusteeship was unlawful because it was motivated by additional improper reasons, chiefly, preventing UDEM‘S disaffiliation and unlawfully circumventing the grievance and arbitration procedure in the work-sharing agreement between the locals in an effort to punish UDEM for failing to comply with the agreement. UDEM argues that if the ILA was concerned with UDEM‘s failure to comply with the work-sharing agreement, its only recourse was to file a grievance, not impose a trusteeship.17
UDEM‘s contention that the trusteeship was imposed for the purpose of preventing disaffiliation fares no better. Although “courts have widely recognized that preventing disaffiliation is not a proper purpose under § 462 for the imposition of a trustee,” AFL-CIO Laundry, 70 F.3d at 719, the district court here found that “at the time the ILA imposed the trusteeship, it had no knowledge of UDEM‘s intent to [disaffiliate] or attempt at disaffiliation,” 156 F. Supp. 3d at 271. That determination is supported by the district court‘s finding that the fax informing the ILA of disaffiliation was sent only after Mercado received the letter stating that UDEM had been placed in an emergency trusteeship. Although Mercado asserted that he had told ILA officials of UDEM‘s disaffiliation sooner, the district court found that evidence not to be credible. The speculation in UDEM‘s brief that UDEM members present at the meeting where the disaffiliation vote was taken would have told ILA officials that UDEM had voted to disaffiliate is insufficient to overturn these reasoned credibility determinations by the district court.
UDEM has therefore failed to overcome the presumption of validity in
C. Motion to Strike UDEM as a Party
Under the ILA constitution, the only entity with authority to bring suit on behalf of UDEM was the trustee, and the trustee did not authorize this suit. The ILA constitution provides that the powers of the trustee are set forth at the time of his appointment. As relevant here, the trustee was given the power to “take control of all . . . affairs of Local 1901.” Thus, only the trustee, not Mercado or any other former officials, had the power to authorize a suit on behalf of UDEM. See Cty., Mun. Emps.’ Supervisors’ & Foremen‘s Union Local 1001 v. Laborers’ Int‘l Union, 365 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that lawyers acting without authorization from the trustee could not act as representatives of the local in lawsuit against international).
Nor does UDEM have standing to bring this suit as its own entity, rather than as an affiliate of the ILA, as UDEM suggests. As explained above, the LMRDA limits suits challenging a trusteeship under Title III to those by a member or “subordinate body.”
UDEM contends that holding that a union in a trusteeship cannot sue to challenge that trusteeship without permission from the trustee would leave local unions that are placed in a trusteeship without a mechanism for challenging the trusteeship‘s legality. The travel of this case undermines UDEM‘s argument. UDEM was able to file a lawsuit challenging the trusteeship and to obtain a ruling on the merits of the validity of the trusteeship. That is because the question of whether the local is the proper party to file the lawsuit challenging the trusteeship necessarily turns on the validity of the trusteeship. If we had held that the trusteeship here was unlawful, UDEM would not have needed permission from the trustee to bring this suit, and it would be a proper plaintiff to obtain relief. Only where a court first finds that a trusteeship was lawfully imposed will a union be unable to continue to challenge the legality of the trusteeship without the trustee‘s permission. At that point, such a challenge would be futile.
Furthermore, individual members of the union who wish to challenge a trusteeship imposed for purposes that violate their individual rights have a cause of action under Title I of the LMRDA. See
IV.
In summary, for the reasons set forth herein, we dismiss as moot that portion of UDEM‘s appeal challenging the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction. We affirm that portion of the district court order striking UDEM as a plaintiff and dismissing the case without prejudice.
So ordered.
Chronology of Events
| January 2015 | Horizon Lines closes operations in San Juan, leading to dispute about which local unions could bargain with its successor. |
| End of March 2015 | Locals, including UDEM, consent to a work-sharing agreement. |
| April 14, 2015 | ILA officials inform Mercado that the ILA plans to merge the locals. |
| April 23, 2015 | UDEM‘s executive board meets and allegedly votes in favor of disaffiliating from the ILA. |
| May 8, 2015 | ILA informs UDEM‘s membership that a meeting will be held on May 11 to discuss the merger. |
| May 9, 2015 | Mercado calls an emergency meeting of UDEM‘s membership, and members present at the meeting vote to “accept” the board‘s decision to disaffiliate from the ILA and to reject the merger. |
| May 11, 2015 | ILA meeting regarding the merger is held and Mercado sends ILA a letter stating that UDEM‘s membership |
| May 12, 2015 | ILA sends a letter to UDEM imposing an emergency trusteeship. Mercado sends the ILA a letter stating that UDEM had voted on May 9 to disaffiliate. |
| May 19, 2015 | UDEM holds another membership meeting where members again vote to disaffiliate from the ILA. |
| May 26, 2015 | ILA officer James Paylor files written charges against UDEM with the ILA and requests that the trusteeship be continued. |
| June 1, 2015 | Paylor amends the charges to allege additional misconduct by Mercado and UDEM. |
| June 3, 2015 | UDEM files this lawsuit. |
| June 11, 2015 | The ILA holds a hearing on the charges against UDEM and the charges are sustained. The trusteeship is continued. |
| November 12, 2016 | UDEM merges with local 1740, and the trusteeship is terminated. |
Notes
After receiving numerous complaints regarding Local 1901‘s practices and Local 1901‘s refusal to honor its obligations under a work sharing agreement entered into by Locals 1901, 1902, 1575, and 1740, I conducted an investigation into these matters. I have determined that it is necessary to impose an emergency trusteeship on Local 1901 in accordance with Article XXI of the ILA Constitution to correct financial malpractice, to assure the performance of collective bargaining agreements, to assure the performance of the duties of a collective bargaining representative, to restore democratic procedures, and to otherwise carry out the objectives and purposes of the ILA.