Appellant, John Unger, filed a claim of appeal in the Antrim County Circuit Court challenging the issuance оf a building permit, for the construction of a 50-apartment condominium complex, to Ware Real Estate Corporation by appellee Forest Home Township. Ware Real Estate was allowed to intervene as a party-appellee to the action by order of the trial judge. Upon a written motion by Ware Real Estate, the trial judge granted summary judgment against appellant аnd he appeals by right.
We must decide here whether the trial judge properly granted summary judgment in favоr of Ware Real Estate on grounds that appellant lacked standing to challenge the aсtions of the zoning board of appeals. 1 We hold that plaintiff is *617 not a proper party to bring this suit, and that the trial judge’s actions were correct.
In order to have any status in court to challenge the actions оf a zoning board of appeals, a party must be "aggrieved”,
Marcus v Busch,
It has been held that the mere increase in traffic in the area is not enough to cause special damages,
Joseph v Grand Blanc Twp, suрra, Victoria Corp v Atlanta Merchandise Mart, Inc,
101 Ga App 163;
*618 John Unger in his claim of appeal to the circuit court and in one affidavit alleged that he owned real property in the township bordering on the same lake as the land in question. Those allegations showed no special damages. The only inferenсes one might draw from those stated facts are that the traffic on the lake might increase, and that property values in general for lake property might go down. As discussed above, those allegations are insufficient to prevent summary judgment against the appellant for lack of standing.
We аlso reject two additional grounds appellant sets forth as giving him standing to pursue this lawsuit. Appellant first сorrectly argues that an action to abate a public nuisance can be brought by any townshiр property owner,
Indian Village Association v Shreve,
The other issues raised by apрellant must be resolved against him, and do not merit discussion.
Affirmed, costs of this appeal to intervenor-appellee, Ware Real Estate Corporation.
Notes
Due to the imprecise manner in which this case was handled by the parties at the circuit court level, we have had to decide sеveral preliminary procedural issues before taking this view of the case.
First, we decide that Ware Real Estate was properly allowed to intervene. GCR 1963, 209.1(2) provides for intervention by right upon stipulation of "all parties”. Both Unger and Ware Real Estate signed a stipulation here, and we hold that to be sufficient. Forest Home Township was technically a party-appellee below, but nеver filed an appearance and has been in default since the appeal was institutеd. We cannot read the terminology "all parties” to include parties in default, for that interpretation would create a serious obstacle to resolution of cases on the merits betwеen the real parties in interest.
Secondly, Unger’s original claim of appeal attackеd only the failure of the Forest Home Township Board of Zoning Appeals to hold a public hearing relating to the issuance of the budding permit. We hold, however, that the argument of the parties on thе substantive issue of whether the building permit was properly issued constituted mutual consent to try that issue,
Pleger v Bouwman,
Thirdly, while Ware Real Estate labeled its motion as one for "accelerated judgment”, the trial judge treated it as a motion for
*617
summary judgment. That action was proper, inasmuch as no prejudice to appellant was shown,
Birch Run Nursery v Jemal,
Finally, the trial court in its written decision ruled that Ware Real Estate had shown a vеsted nonconforming use. However, on rehearing, the trial judge made plaintiffs lack of standing a second basis for his decision.