130 Pa. 536 | Pa. | 1890
Opinion,
This is an action of assumpsit, brought July 20, 1888, to recover the price of a certain lot of fire-works and celebration goods, ordered by the defendant, George Polites, from the Unexcelled Fire-Works Company, of New York, in February, 1888. The first order, which was for his store in Newcastle, was given through the plaintiffs’ agent, Alexander Morrison, and amounted to $208.53; the second, sent directly to the plaintiffs, was for the defendant’s store in Washington, Pa., and amounted to $123.83. These orders were in writing, and were signed by tbe defendant; they specified, not only the particular kind and quality of the articles ordered, but contained also a schedule of the prices to be paid therefor. The goods were to be shipped in May, and were to be paid for on the 10th day of July thereafter. Upon receipt of these orders the plaintiffs transmitted by letter a formal acceptance of them; a contract was thus created, the obligation of which attached to both parties, and which neither of them, without the agreement or assent of the other, could rescind. On April 5, 1888, ■the defendant, by letter, informed the plaintiffs that he did not want the goods, and notified the plaintiffs not to ship them, as he could do better with another company. The plaintiffs replied that they had accepted the orders, and had placed them in good faith, and that the goods would be shipped in due time, according to the agreement.
The goods were shipped within the time agreed upon — the first lot to New Castle, and the second lot to Washington, according to contract; but on their arrival the defendant declined to receive them. The carrier notified the shippers that, owing to the dangerous and explosive quality of the goods, they would not retain them in their possession; the plaintiffs there
The plaintiffs allege that they are manufacturers and importers of such fire-works as are used in the Fourth of July celebrations throughout the country; that it is not profitable to carry these goods over from one season to another, and that therefore the quantity manufactured and imported depends upon the extent of the orders received; that the defendant’s orders entered into their estimates of goods to be made up and imported for the season of 1888, and that the goods ordered by the defendant were actually made up before the order was countermanded. The defendant testifies, 'however, that Mr. Morrison, the plaintiffs’ agent, informed him, at the time he gave the first order, that the plaintiffs had some, at least, of the articles in stock, and that he did not order any, either to be manufactured or imported on his account; that the transaction was simply a bargain and sale of goods, and not an order for goods to be manufactured or imported; and the evidence does not seem to conflict with this view of the case.
It is plain that the notice given to the plaintiffs by the defendant not to ship the goods was a repudiation of the contract; it was not a rescission, for it was not in the power of any one of the parties to rescind; but it was a refusal to receive the goods, not only in advance of the delivery, but before they were separated from the bulk, and set apart to the defendant; the direction not to ship was a revocation of the carrier’s agency to receive, and the plaintiffs thereby had notice of the revocation. The delivery of the goods to the carrier, therefore, was unauthorized, and the carrier’s receipt would not charge the defendant. The plaintiffs made the carrier their agent for delivery, but the goods were in fact not delivered. 'A delivery was tendered by the carrier, when the goods arrived at their destination, but they were not received. The action, therefore, could not be for the price, but for special damages for a refusal to receive the goods when the delivery was tendered. We think the statement was sufficient to justify a recovery of such damages, as the'words of the statement were clearly to this effect; but there was no evidence given of the market value of the goods as compared with the price. It does not appear that the plaintiffs had suffered any damage. For any
Whilst the manifest tendency of the cases in the American courts, now, is to the doctrine that when the vendor stands in the position of a complete performance on his part, he is entitled to recover the contract price as his measure of damages, in the case of an executory contract for the sale of goods not specific, the rule undoubtedly is that the measure of damages for a refusal to receive the goods is the difference between the price agreed upon and the market value on the day appointed for delivery.
Judgment affirmed.
