21 Pa. Commw. 47 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1975
Opinion by
After three hearings, a remand order of this Court, and two opinions of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), Carol J. Walton (appellant) appeals the Board’s latest decision which denied her unemployment compensation benefits because of her discharge from employment with Eaton Corporation for willful misconduct connected with her work.
In willful misconduct cases, the burden of establishing claimant’s ineligibility is placed on the employer. MacFarlane v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 550, 317 A.2d 324 (1974). Additionally, our scope of review in these cases is confined to questions of law and to a determination as to whether or not the findings of the compensation authori
In interpreting the concept of willful misconduct, we have often stated that “ ‘ [m] isconduct within the meaning of an unemployment compensation act excluding from its benefit an employee discharged for misconduct must be an act of wanton or toilful disregard of the employer’s interest, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employe or negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest or the employe’s duties and obligations to the employer.’ See Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 289, 310 A.2d 449 (1973) ; DiAmico v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 286, 310 A.2d 433 (1973).” (Emphasis added.). Chambers v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 317, 319-20, 318 A.2d 422, 423 (1974).
The Board’s only finding of fact on the concept of willful misconduct was that “[t]he claimant was discharged because she left her place of employment without permission from her supervisor, following an argument over work procedures.” It is impossible for us to exercise our review, or for the Board to have made its determination, based on this single limited finding.
As Judge Flood said, in speaking for the Superior Court, “it was incumbent upon the board to make findings of the underlying facts from which it could be determined
Here the Board’s findings do not- meet any of the issues raised by claimant that may be legally determinative of a conclusion of willful misconduct pursuant to Chambers, supra.
And now, this 7th day of August, 1975, the record is remanded to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. The applicable law in such a case is Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(e), which provides in part:
“An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week—
“(e) In which his unemployment is due to his discharge or temporary suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with his work . . . .”
. See, for example, the following cases which deal with some of the issues raised by claimant that are not here available to our scrutiny because of the absence of appropriate findings: Druzak v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 481, 315 A. 2d 925 (1974) (reasonableness and applicability of a rule); Frumento v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 64, 316 A. 2d 112 (1974) (good cause — sickness); Loder v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 484, 296 A. 2d 297 (1972) (single dereliction of duty); Weimer Unemployment Compensation Case, 188 Pa. Superior Ct. 185, 146 A. 2d 367 (1958) (enforceability, applicability, and existence of a plant rule).