*1
No. Maryland. Appeals Court 28, 2001. Nov. *2 P.A., (Leo Dunn, Jr., on Dunn, William Jr.
Leo William MD, brief) Chester, petitioner. (Donna & Stock- Mullin, P. Sturtz of Miles L. Jr.
Timothy (White- brief) Baltimore, P.C., Judith C. Ensor on bridge Towson, L.L.P., brief), Preston, ford, Taylor & *3 respondents. WILNER, RAKER, BELL, C.J., and
Argued before HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, F. CATHELL, LAWRENCE (Retired, assigned), JJ. specially RODOWSKY RAKER, J. enters into plaintiff is whether a who in this case
The issue judgment against as satisfied a and has marked agreement an action maintaining a second is barred from one tortfeasor harm. The for the same alleged other tortfeasors against two alia, held, in Mathews v. inter Appeals of Special Court (2000), Underwood-Gary, Md.App. ground action on the not maintain the second petitioner could agree satisfaction rule. We it was barred the one shall affirm. action malpractice a medical arises out of appeal
This in George’s County, which in Court for Prince filed the Circuit George J. Underwood-Gary, petitioner, alleged Rita Yousaf, M.D., per Mathews, respondents, M.D. and Shaheer one surgery upon Approximately her. unnecessary formed in money judgment1 of satisfaction of a entry week after in stemming 1992 lawsuit from an automobile accident (the County “Thompson litigation”), Circuit Court for Charles in petitioner malpractice filed this action the Circuit Court for In this we shall that the George’s County. Prince hold Thompson litigation judgment precluded satisfaction2 Mathews, George from claims J. petitioner pursuing Yousaf, M.D., treating M.D. Shaheer in physicians, malpractice medical action. 10, 1991, July On Rita and Ms. Marie Underwood-Gary Thompson were involved an automobile accident Charles accident, County, Maryland. Following petitioner devel- and, oped pain August severe her lower back she Yousaf, from Dr. an ortho- began receiving treatment Shaheer pedic surgeon. period Dr. Yousaf treated over a approximately seven months. The treatment did not relieve pain, petition- back and Dr. Yousaf concluded that er suffered from an to the soft in her back injury tissue and an injury joint to the facet Dr. lower back. Yousaf that surgery might necessary petition- indicated to relieve her, pain. er’s He referred for a to Dr. opinion, second Mathews, George neurosurgeon. J. After Dr. Mathews met treatment, with previous reviewed her medical he concurred with Dr. Yousafs diagnosis petitioner’s inju- 20, 1992, surgery. ries and recommended back On May Drs. Mathews, along Yousaf and with Dr. a thoracic Dadgar, surgeon, performed vascular back surgery petitioner. *4 2-626(a) Maryland provides Rule as follows: "Upon being paid money judgment, judg- all amounts due on a judgment ment creditor shall furnish to the debtor and file with the Upon clerk a written statement that the has been satisfied. filing of the statement the clerk shall enter the satis- fied.” " acceptance compensation 2. A satisfaction of a 'an of full ” Cohen, 304, 312, injury.’ Morgan for the (1987) Prosser, (quoting Liability, Joint Torts and Several 25 Cal. (1937)). 421-22 L.Rev. sounding in complaint filed a July On County Court for Charles in the Circuit negligence her of the vehicle that collided with the driver Thompson, Ms. 10, 1991, injuries allegedly for the seeking recovery July automobile accident. her of the suffered as result negligently Thompson that Ms. petitioner alleged complaint, the collision. Petitioner vehicle and caused operated her accident, that, as a result alleged further serious, injuries permanent painful sustained “[She had] body, including but not limited her entire and about body; that head, back, parts and other of her hip, neck Underwood, Plaintiff, has suffered and will Rita Lee anguish mental great physical pain, suffer the future Underwood, Plaintiff, has shock; Rita Lee that the nervous expend required will in the future be past rehabilitation, medical and money hospital, of large sums care, items.” treatment and related nursing life, enjoyment of of damages for loss Petitioner also claimed income, earning power. request- Petitioner and loss loss for her to award her County ed the Charles during discovery, peti- Significantly, pre-trial surgery. back included Thompson’s on notice that defense placed tioner was At the surgery unnecessary. the contention that the back latest, unnecessary surgery on notice of the she took the de bene esse when defense as October Respon- witness. Hanley, Dr. a defense Kevin deposition knew of the unnec- Underwood-Gary that Ms. dent contends date, Ms. long through before this essary surgery defense discovery responses, Complaint, Answer to the Thompson’s Dr. predated Hanley’s all of which discovery depositions, by some time. deposition 27, 1993, to trial Thompson proceeded case
On October to her entire course of jury. Petitioner testified as before following the automobile accident. She therapy and treatment related to her into all of the medical bills offered evidence Mathews, including the bills treatment Drs. Yousaf and claimed a total of surgery hospital stay. and the She $38,195.28 all of the medical expenses, including in medical *5 $250,000.00 expenses surgery, related to the back as well as for pain suffering. Additionally, petitioner testified to the pain physical experienced limitations she both before and that, surgery. presented after the She evidence as a result of accident, surgery, percent and after she was 30 permanently disabled. She described her three month recov- house, ery having at a relative’s to miss two to three weeks of work, inability long periods and her to sit for of time. Peti- injury placed tioner testified to the financial strain that the on marriage, pain the constant that she felt in her lower back, longer and that no in participate she could activities that she used to enjoy, bowling walking. such
During her case-in-chief in the Thompson litigation, peti- tioner Drs. Yousaf testify called and Mathews as witnesses to on In eliciting testimony her behalf. addition to about the surgery, petitioner’s nature of the counsel inquired Dr. necessity Yousaf as to the of the surgery: Now, Doctor, “Q: Doctor, I you, want show let me ask this, you you do have an opinion probabili- based on medical ty, the operation you performed and assisted was to have in her necessary case?
A: Based indications.” Mathews, Petitioner also called Dr. who petition- testified that back surgery er’s was related to the Thompson accident.3 pre-trial Consistent with the discovery, Thompson presented evidence in that petitioner defense suffered from a soft tissue injury, joint not a injury, facet and that surgery the back performed by Drs. Mathews and Yousaf not necessary. was jury
The found Ms. Thompson negligent, petitioner had injuries accident, suffered as a result and awarded $8,337.00 the amount of for medical expenses, for wages, lost for pain and suffer- $750.00 $0 closing argument Thompson litigation, petition- argued surgery argued: er’s counsel that the was called for. He “You any testimony saying didn’t hear that he shouldn't have done that. It was called for and was an effort to relieve this woman.” favor was entered
ing.4 Judgment Special an to the Court $9,087.00. appeal Petitioner noted parties settled appeal pending, and while the Appeals, $20,000.00. appeal limit of policy the case *6 in the was entered an order satisfaction dismissed and 15,1993.5 May on Circuit Court the order the court entered one week after Approximately filed suit litigation, petitioner Thompson in the of satisfaction Mathews, complaint in her alleging Drs. Yousaf and not have in that did negligent that the doctors were and that surgery for accepted indications any of the recovery unnecessary. sought Petitioner fusion was lumbar bills, suffering. wages, pain lost her medical for Mathews filed motions trial, Drs. Yousaf and Prior to action was petitioner’s that judgment, arguing summary estoppel, collateral judicial estoppel, the doctrines of by barred Coun- George’s Court for Prince The Circuit and satisfaction. trial, offered evidence At the motions. ty denied of care with to meet the standard failed respondents that surgery and that the operate the decision regard to that the ground defended on the unnecessary. Respondents jury The trial court instructed necessary. surgery was surgical in the case is whether “only issue that argued Petitioner’s counsel or not.” negligent treatment was totally aby “is caused pain that jury petitioner’s have to and that it didn’t unnecessary operation completely but it did.” happen, in the favor petitioner’s a verdict jury
The
returned
$437,073.69.
respondents’
denied
The Circuit Court
amount of
question
presented to the
did not include
verdict sheet
The
persuaded
it was
that Petition-
questions requiring
specify
it to
whether
injuries
necessary
claimed
surgery
or that Petitioner’s
back
er's
facets,
injuries,
opposed
tissue
were caused
to the soft
her vertebral
by
Thompson’s vehicle.
the collision with
any
concerning
case contains no information
5. The record in this
contemporaneously with the
been executed
that
have
release
entry
appeal
of the order of satisfaction
dismissal of
Thompson litigation.
post-trial motions and respondents
timely appeal
then filed a
Special
the Court of
Appeals. That court reversed the
grounds
on the
the claim was barred
judicial
doctrine of
estoppel and the one satisfaction rule. See
Mathews v. Underwood-Gary,
133 Md.App.
(2000).
granted
This Court
Underwood-Gary’s petition
Mathews,
writ
certiorari. Underwood-Gary v.
erred argument the doctors’ claim for all her damages had been satisfied in Thompson litigation. See 133 Md.App. at at 1024. We agree. We shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals ground that petitioner’s claim has been satis- fied Thompson settlement litigation and shall not reach the court’s alternative holding the action is barred by the judicial doctrine of estoppel.6 *7 begin
We
with
general
that a
principle
plaintiff is
entitled
but one compensation for her loss and that satisfac
tion of her claim prevents further
action
another for
the same damages.
Products, Inc.,
See
v.
Welsh Gerber
315
510, 524,
486,
(1989);
Md.
555
Cohen,
A.2d
493
Morgan v.
309
304, 312,
1003,
Md.
(1987);
523 A.2d
1006
see also Knutsen v.
Brown,
229,
833,
96 N.J.Super.
(1967);
836
Turner v.
Pickens,
(Miss.1998).
891,
711 So.2d
893
This
equitable
rule is
in nature and the
purpose
the rule is to prevent double
and, thus,
recovery
unjust enrichment.
Morgan,
See
309 Md.
312,
at
1006;
that there should be more.”), rev’d on injury one that done injury, whether 1003; A.2d 309 523 Sacchetti grounds, Morgan, other (1939); v. 42 22 N.E.2d Vaca 303 Mass. Springer, Whitaker, (1974); also 319 see N.M. P.2d (W. et Page § at 330 Keeton Torts, and Keeton on Prosser ed.1984). eds., 5th al. Special erred Appeals
Petitioner that Court argues ignored because the court holding that her claim satisfied Drs. Yousaf and Mathews Thompson fact Ms. that separate there was a joint not tortfeasors and that were the doc- malpractice the medical injury caused distinct the back unneces- only surgery She that not argues tors. surgery percent caused an additional sary, but that the con- body impairment rating. Petitioner whole permanent respondents no has asserted that party cludes because tortfeasors, of satisfaction should joint the doctrine are to a apply non-party. tort ignores principle the well-settled
Petitioner that he only “a actor is liable not harm negligent law that harm from resulting also for directly any causes but additional aid, rendering irrespective persons of third normal efforts proper negligent acts are in a or a of whether such done 1005-6. See 309 Md. at Morgan, manner.” c, § 457 illus. cmt. also Restatement Of (Second) Torts (1965) is liable for additional original tortfeasor (noting treating improper diagnosis aby physician’s harm caused premise This is based on the unnecessary surgery). rule *8 conduct, actor, by placed his or her has negligent for the and should answer plaintiff position danger a rendering Morgan, aid. risks inherent in treatment and See time, 310, at At the when a Md. at 523 A.2d 1006. same injuries, physi treats plaintiffs physician negligently to the extent of the harm plaintiff cian liable to becomes Thus, negligence. See id. physician’s caused for which treatment is a tort physician’s negligent original jointly both the doctor and the tortfeasor are liable. See id. indicated,
As
a plaintiff
we have
entitled to but one
is
loss,
compensation for his
full satisfaction of a
Thus,
claim
it from
plaintiffs
prevents
being
pursued.
further
multiple
jointly
severally
while
tortfeasors
liable
for the same
injury,
payment
when
a
full is
tortfeasor,
made
plaintiff
one
“there is no
doubt
from a
action against
barred
further
another who is liable for
”
48,
§
the same
damages....
Torts,
Prosser
Keeton
on
Thus,
recovery
at 331.
same harm
double
is not
permissible.
Morgan,
See
1008.
of the
law that held that a release
previous
our
case
ruled
a negligently
a
of law released
wrongdoer as matter
original
(overrul-
at 1011
id. at
treating physician. See
(1930),
Id.
Prosser,
Torts
William
A.?d
(citations omitted).
(2d ed.1955))
§
at 243-44
important respect.
Morgan
from
in an
Unlike
present
case differs
Morgan, the
judgment in
satisfied
satisfied consent
such,
As
this
litigation
trial on
merits.
Thompson
followed
full
present Morgan.
estoppel
Peti-
presents collateral
issues
case
issues,
relitigating
including the
potentially
estopped from
tioner
litigation.
alleged damages, fully litigated
Thompson
value of
preclusive
Judgments explains this
Commentary
of
to the Restatement
effect:
adjudication
adjudicated.
of
... The
of
amount
“Amount
loss
of
establishing
injured
the limit of
also
the effect of
the loss
has
redress,
obligor
be. This is
whoever
party’s entitlement
resulting
amount of
loss
from
the determination
because
injured
litigation
person’s
results
the issue
actual
“If releases given under the circumstances of these cases do
not,
law,
as a matter
bar action against one in Dr.
position,
Cohen’s
it follows that
the satisfaction of a judg-
Jones,
tortfeasor,
ment
original
in an action to
*10
which Dr. Cohen was not
party,
a
should
no greater
have
effect. The policy implicated here is that against double
being precluded
Therefore,
relitigating
damages
from
question.
judgment
when a
litigation
is based on actual
of the
of
measure
loss,
full,
judgment
and the
paid
injured
is thereafter
party
has
no
against any
enforceable claim
obligor
responsible
other
who is
for
the same loss.”
Judgments
(1982).
§
(Second)
50 cmt. d
Restatement
of
Products,
Inc.,
510,
(1989),
In Welsh v. Gerber
315 Md.
672 harm, and it underlies the decisions for the same
recovery (1968) Grantham, 548, A.2d 246 like cases (1961) a, Trieschman, 159 892 Lanas Md. Harbaugh, A. 21 also and Cox. See Huff v. (1981). But policy Md.App. not when a apply does against recovery double the.original only for tort has original tortfeasor against the satisfied, has tortfeasor been least when (Second) of suit. See Restatement joined been with question § 50 Like the intent Judgments releases, presented we are with respect ambiguous dam of fact: the satisfied include question Did torts, judg tort? If the ages just original for both former, HovermilTs claim in fact encompassed ment full she has received Dr. Cohen because is barred encompassed only if it injuries; all her compensation has com latter, claim is not barred because she been harm This is initial caused Jones. *11 pensated only the fact for trial court.” question a of the 320-21, 523 A.2d at ordinarily judgment of fact whether the question It is a injuries by all encompassed in the first action sustained alleged in the action to and included those second plaintiff alleged As several malpractice. to the doctor’s be attributable however, recognized, although of our sister states have a appears to be of scope question the satisfied of here, full fact, where, the satisfaction of follows merits, the trial properly trial of the issue is decided See, e.g., summary judgment. court a motion for Williams Woodman, 611, (Ala.1982); 424 v. v. So.2d 614-15 Cimino (1972); v. Alway, Ariz.App. 501 P.2d 453 Knutsen 18 Brown, (1967); 837 N.J.Super. Vaca Whitaker, N.M. As the court 519 P.2d in Knutsen stated: resolved, opinion as the below
“That issue is to be directs, by having jury malpractice case evaluate damages by all tortfea- plaintiffs ‘injuries all caused 17,000 sors’ its evaluation with the award- comparing $ by the in ed the automobile accident case. Such a comparison would be of no legal significance. very The process nature of admeasuring damages for personal injuries results in juries different reaching different results in evaluating injuries. the same injuries
The plaintiff which in recovery seeks malpractice case are those set forth in plaintiffs answers to interrogatories pretrial injuries order. The which plaintiff recovered in the automobile acci- dent case are to be ascertained by the court from an examination pertinent portions of the record case. portions Such may the record plaintiffs include answers to interrogatories, order, pretrial the testimo- ny, the charge of the court and the opening and closing statements of counsel. procedure to be followed is analogous to that used
deciding a plea collateral estoppel in order to ascertain whether or not the issues sought to be presented in the instant case were presented at the former trial.
Since resolution of posed question study involves a and comparison of cases, records the two issue court, be tried not by the jury. The issue should be disposed of before trial of the merits of malpractice action properly be decided upon a motion for summary judgment.”
Knutsen, (citations omitted). A.2d at 836-37 agree
We with the rationale set forth by the court in Knutsen. The preclusive effect satisfied in a prior case is properly question for the trial judge, not the jury.
A review of provided the portions of the trial record from the Thompson litigation demonstrates that the satisfied the Thompson litigation embodies an evaluation as to all of the harms that Petitioner later claimed malpractice action.10 Petitioner sought to recover the same 10. The present record in the case conclusively fails to demonstrate that jury Thompson in the litigation accepted rejected the defendant’s to presented jury that she expenses medical
post-surgery the Yousaf and Mathews including Thompson litigation, bills, bills, post- other related to and bills hospital medical recovery for the sought Petitioner also operative treatment. cases, presented suffering. same and both pain expectancy requested and fifty years of her life evidence limitations pain physical her for future jury compensate to to also injury. argued that her back Petitioner accompanied that, she surgery, approximately after the juries both In the medical malpractice disabled. percent permanently action, approximately percent presented she evidence to the unneces- disability was attributable permanent her have surgery may contributed sary surgery. The but, disability, in the permanent severity to recover specifically sought litigation, petitioner Thompson jury The evalu- percent disability. for the damages entire damages percent for the full ated claim and awarded in the present All of harm claimed disability. permanent to have resulted among alleged case harms was included Thomp- in the The Thompson litigation. from negligence their son all of the claims and determined jury evaluated in a worth in a verdict that was embodied precludes relitigating That now satisfied. marked Therefore, litigated. all of actually of the claims value been damages have satisfied. Petitioner’s claimed Special Court of Judge Murphy, writing Chief Appeals, observed that
“[wjhile negligence may settlement the amount of auto ‘satisfactory’ appellee, damage when the not have been as matter asserting was ‘satisfied’ claim that she had been verdict, unnecessary. jury surgery defense that the permit, policy appeal, on this limit settlement on do record, present or this Court either trial court case did) (if Thompson jury parsed speculate it the various how sought only legal damages by Petitioner. The conclu- made and claims record is awarded be reached this sion 9,087 injuries $ all of the she claimed Petitioner that trial. *13 law, she was thereafter prohibited from recovering more funds for the injuries. same Having filed an order of (auto satisfaction in the negligence) case, Charles County appellee could not thereafter assert an ‘unnecessary sur- gery’ claim in the Circuit Court for George’s Prince Coun- ty.”
Mathews v. Gary, 138 Md.App. at A.2d 1025. We agree. In the Thompson litigation, plaintiff presented evi- dence all of injuries her arising from the accident and from the surgery. Petitioner has no identified new and indepen- injury dent that was not presented to the Thompson jury. As such, there are no damages that remain to be recovered medical malpractice action.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
Dissenting Opinion BELL, C.J.
BELL, C.J., Dissenting. A person who seeks advice treatment from a profes- and/or sional is entitled to trust rely advice, upon that care or Otherwise, treatment. that person will not have the trust and confidence so necessary for there to be the candor open- ness that are likely to lead to adequate or represen- treatment tation. just This is common Thus, sense. a rule that condi- tions ability of a plaintiff in a tort action to recover for the negligence or malpractice of his or witness, her expert or treating physician, on plaintiffs second-guessing, investi- and, gating, perhaps, suing, his or her witness or physician defense, whenever the buttressed by expert testimony of its own, challenges, as or inadequate just plain wrong, plain- tiff expert’s opinion treatment, or only undermines trust and confidence critical to plaintiffs relationship with his witness, or her but hamper impede the ability the plaintiff to present his Moreover, case. such a rule may, effect, insulate the plaintiffs expert witness from liability for his or her negligence. Because this is the proba- in this holding see majority’s
ble effect 708, 717, I supra, dissent. accident, in an injured automobile from and received treatment sought result which she *14 Dr. Yousaf Dr. Yousaf and Mathews. Drs. and respondents, diagnosed injuries injury the as an to the petitioner’s Mathews joint. They to the facet recom- soft tissue her back and and, the petitioner agreed, they performed, mended when joint injury. for facet surgery the other to the against Thompson, party In her suit the negligence involved and she accident which she was whose (the injuries or claimed automobile accident case caused $38,195.28 in the claimed Thompson litigation), petitioner the $250,000 in suffering. and That expenses pain medical and claim from her back resulting action included a for and, indeed, disputed that surgery, claim the defendant unnecessary.. Special Appeals sug- was The Court of alleged or it gests that this latter at least allegation, witnesses, have testimony defense should been deposition Dr. Dr. sufficient notice to the that Yousaf and for unnecessary have liable to her Mathews been and, therefore, joined have surgery should been as defendants. 570, 580, Gary, Md.App. Mathews trial, for both Dr. Yousaf and testifying petitioner, At was petitioner’s surgery Dr. Mathews stated that the back necessary by expected, made accident. As and consistent raised, presented in the testimony with the defense only case that the suffered from soft tissue defense injury joint surgery as a accident and facet result fact, was, in necessary. Although jury not returned $8,337.00 it petitioner, only favor of the awarded her verdict for lost expenses wages. medical for No award $750.00 suffering. verdict submitted pain was made sheet require jury specify not to decide and then did surgery'was necessary by whether the back made the accident.
While the petitioner’s appeal pending, parties set- limit, $20,000.00. tled for policy the defendant’s Conse- quently, the petitioner appeal dismissed her and entered an order of satisfaction Circuit Court. settlement,
Following the an petitioner brought action respondents, alleging surgery they per- result, and, formed on her was unnecessary as seeking bills, recovery of her wages pain medical lost and suffer- ing. evidence, She in support offered of her claim namely the deposition of the defense who testimony expert testified on the issue in the first trial that the respondents did meet the standard of care in determining necessity opera- merits, tion. Although respondents on the argu- defended ing they trial, first they did acted properly and out of they also necessity, maintained that the action was alia, satisfaction, barred by, inter the petitioner had already received the one satisfaction to which she was entitled *15 when she settled Thompson litigation. The found for $437,073.69. and awarded her reversed,
The Court of Special Appeals
that
holding
both
judicial
578-80,
estoppel, Md.App.
1023-24,
133
at
at
758 A.2d
rule,
580-83,
and the one satisfaction
id. at
“We persuaded are that the order of satisfaction filed Charles County precluded case appell[ee] from thereafter While damages against appellants. award of an
obtaining have may not negligence of the auto settlement the amount damage when the claim ‘satisfactory’ to appellee, been law, matter of she as a asserting had was ‘satisfied’ she been for recovering from more funds prohibited was thereafter filed an order satisfaction injuries. Having the same ease, (auto could County appellee Charles negligence) claim in the ‘unnecessary surgery’ assert an not thereafter George’s County.” for Circuit Court Prince 583, at 1025-26. Id. at 758 A.2d Special affirms the Court of The this Court majority 662, 660, 366 Md. on the one satisfaction rule. Appeals nature of the rule Noting equitable A.2d recovery, id. at is to double prevent and that its purpose that it from points out follows majority 785 A.2d at negligent law ‘a actor is of tort principle “the well-settled causes also for directly the harm that he but only liable of third resulting harm from the normal efforts any additional are aid, whether such acts rendering irrespective persons ” Id. a at negligent in a manner.’ proper done Cohen, at supra, Morgan at 712-13 (quoting 1005). concludes, Thus, it physician’s 523 A.2d at prior tortfeasor injuries caused negligent treatment and that tortfea- both the doctor tort which Id. at sor are hable. is confusion in the admits there majority candidly to distin
law, much of it to “the failure courts attributing tortfea or successive guish jointly between liable concurrent joint they true existed one hand and tortfeasors sors *16 accompa rules that law, as well the procedural at common as (footnote 669, at 785 A.2d 713 them.” 366 Md. at nied omitted). distinction, see 366 at 667 explaining Md. After 6, 6,n. another majority acknowledges n. 785 at 712 A.2d “to distinguish failure courts of confusion: the of source of a yet concepts conceptually related distinct between the 669, Id. 785 of a claim.” of a claim and satisfaction release Eaton, 111, 224 116- Quoting A.2d at 713. Trieschman
679
n.4,
892,
(1961),
Prosser,
4
in
17
166 A.2d
895 n.
turn quoting
(2d ed.1955),
§
Torts
46 at 243-44
“a
majority
notes that
satisfaction is an
of full
for the
acceptance
compensation
injury;
action,
release
a surrender of the cause of
which
gratuitous,
consideration,”
or
given
inadequate
id.
7,
7,
at 669 n.
(1967); Whitaker, Vaca v. 86 N.M. 519 P.2d (1974)). case, regard
With to this the majority holds that the judg- ment entered the automobile accident case was satisfied and that this satisfaction all encompassed damages sought that case. Because the damages sought case, this and which she recovered earlier are the same damages giving effect to the one satisfaction rule’s policy against recovery, double concludes, majority law, as a matter presumably determin- ing that no otherwise, reasonable trier of fact could conclude 2-501(e),1 see Maryland Rule the petitioner’s action against respondents precluded. Its conclusion as to identity in the two cases is on its based review of the trial record from the automobile accident case 2-501(e) Maryland provides, Rule as relevant: "(e) Entry Judgment. The court shall enter in favor of moving party response if the motion and show that genuine there dispute any is no party as to material fact and that the in whose favor is entered is entitled to
matter of law.” *17 680 by the analysis petitioner the evidence offered
and its of one under review. that case the is that a principle plaintiff I no with the quarrel have loss and that satisfaction compensation to entitled but one action, even further precludes a claim to recover loss of cases clear quite the same loss. Our are another for Inc., Products, v. point.2 on this See Welsh Gerber Cohen, (1989); 523-24, v. Morgan 1006; Beggs, 523 A.2d. at Lanasa 309 Md. at supra, a I have A. Nor do to double equitable principles prevent with use of problem And I thus, unjust agree generally enrichment. recovery, and ordinarily question law: a statement of the majority’s with the from full fact, is satisfied results judgment when the of i.e., merits, decided may on the its effect be adjudication, trial summary My judgment. of as a matter of law context simply I quite basic and majority specific; with the dispute that, of scope the facts of this agree under do been, or case should have the automobile accident judgment of been, have as a matter law. could determined was of sure, judgment in favor To be merits, at which the after a trial on entered 2-641, procedures by which a Maryland provides the Rule which 2. See execution, request of of judgment can the issuance writ creditor point. It states: the same makes creditor, "(a) request judgment Generally. Upon the written — judgment entered shall of a where the or is recorded clerk court levy upon property directing sheriff to issue a writ of execution satisfy judgment. money writ The shall debtor exemptions advising the that federal and state contain a notice debtor right to of the may and that there is a move for release be available levy. request accompanied The instruc- property shall from the (1) specify debtor’s last that shall tions sheriff address, (2) under the and the amount owed known location, (4) (3) upon and property to its judgment, be levied found, property is to leave the levied where whether sheriff it, or to it from exclude access it or use remove others from premises. judgment creditor file additional instructions necessary copy to More appropriate deliver a the sheriff. judgment, only but satisfaction may be issued on a one than one writ judgment may of a be had.” sought, presenting support, damages evidence for the sur- gery she negligence maintained necessitated defendant the automobile accident she case claimed caused injuries. It also is true that an as to order satisfaction *18 the was in I entered that case. But also find it significant that the entry the order of satisfaction postdated the agreement settlement that the to parties the first case into appeal entered while the Circuit Court pending.3 logical was It is to assume that the dismissal of the appeal entry and the of satisfaction were terms of the settle- is, addition, ment. It worthy note that the evidence that petitioner the in support offered claim compensation countered, so, for her back surgery, was strenuously evidence maintaining that surgery the was unnecessary. verdict, From the size of the given conflicting argu- these ments, it may fairly argued be that jury may the not have to, and, therefore, not, intended compensate did surgery, accepting perhaps the argument defendant’s that the surgery was unnecessary.
Thus, this issue is not appropriately
decided
a matter of
law,
summary judgment.
clear,
short,
It is not at
all
parties
that
intended the petitioner’s
to
recovery
include
compensation for the surgery performed by the respondents.
is,
There
to
submit,
I
contrary,
good reasons to suppose
petitioner appealed
3. The
Special Appeals
Court of
seeking a new
damages.
trial on
Although
the issue of
granted
the trial court had
petitioner’s motion in limine to exclude
surgery
evidence that her back
unnecessary,
was
an examination of the
transcript
trial
confirms that
the defendant did in fact offer
petitioner's
such evidence over the
objection
petitioner only litigated
and that the
surgery’s
the issue of the
necessity to counter the
Additionally,
defense.
the trial court refused
petitioner's request
jury
instructed,
specifically
that the
be
consis-
Cohen,
Morgan
tent
supra,
with
that the defendant was liable for the
surgery,
negligently performed,
even
long
if
surgery
so
as related
appeal,
to the accident. On
asserted that the trial
by allowing
court erred
the defendant
present
in the automobile case to
any
not,
surgery
evidence that the
unnecessary,
which was
under
Cohen,
Morgan v.
establishing
relevant to
liability,
the defendant’s
by failing
clearly
to
instruct
respondents
that even if the
negligently performed surgery
petitioner,
on the
the defendant nonethe-
damages
less was liable for the
surgery.
related to the
no
on the
Certainly,
not.
there was
incentive
they
that
did
respondents’
to carry
in that case
of the defendant
part
water,
just necessarily
explicit, quite
since
particularly
the defendant’s insistence that
implicit, in the defense was
that
not made
she should
respondents
negligent
were
for it. Nor
negligence, by paying
for that
to be responsible
to
agree
interest
would it have been
viewed as insufficient recom-
accept
clearly
an amount she
those
injuries, including
of all of her
pense, in full satisfaction
respondents
responsibili-
were the
was advised
she
that,
had
appears,
but
it
she
ty of the defendant
realize,
automobile accident
come to
as the defendant
respondents’ negli-
really
the result
argued,
case
were
an action
pursue
when she
intended
gence
apparently
negligence
caused.
for the
recover
the majority
from those on which
quite
This case is
different
cases,
plaintiff accept
of those
bases its decision.
each
*19
verdict;
no
appeal
there were
jury’s
ed
reveal,
and,
cases
there
so far
the facts
those
settlement
as
as to
at
on
damages
no
in the trial court
issue
dispute
was
Woodman,
the plaintiff
In
v.
appeal.
supra,
Williams
involving
in an action
having
on the merits
prevailed
policy,
in an insurance
provision
motorist
withdrew
uninsured
by the insurance
registry
moneys deposited
from
court
Brown,
following
in
v.
a
Similarly,
supra,
carrier.
Knutsen
merits,
for the plaintiffs,
trial on
was entered
judgment
appeal,
Rather than
how
they
with which
were dissatisfied.
ever,
after
motion
set the
judgment
their
to
they accepted
denied,
as
had
and subse
inadequate
aside
been
The
malpractice.4
quently
treating physicians
sued the
primarily
proposition that the
majority
relies
on Knutsen for the
a
be determined as a matter
preclusive effect of
satisfied
("We agree
Md.
As the facts of this case
this case
is not one
purposes
application
decided on the merits for
of the
of the
rule; rather,
one satisfaction
it
because was settled before the
concluded, it
appellate process
is more akin to a case which
or a
In
given
judgment by
release
consent is entered.
event,
as the
at
majority recognizes,
either
see 366 Md.
7;
Cohen,
at 713
n.
Morgan
supra,
see also
v.
1008-09;
at
A.2d.
Welsh v. Gerber
Products,
supra,
reach of
collateral estoppel following the
plea
estoppel
of collateral
in order
to ascertain whether or not
sought
presented
presented
issues
to be
in the instant case were
at the
Knutsen,
Here,
previously
former
trial.”
See
Id. necessary. stand for the essen- majority relies cases on which of a satisfaction that the effect proposition
tially unremarkable merits, a full trial of the following entered of the records study comparison it “involves a because Brown, 232 A.2d at cases,” supra, v. Knutsen the two fact, on sum- may be determined although question still 837; see at a trial. Id. at rather than mary judgment, 615; Woodman, 612-13, v. Vaca So.2d v. Williams 319; Whitaker, Alway, supra, v. 519 P.2d at Cimino supra, summary judgment principles A at 449-50. State’s 501 P.2d principles may applied. to be Such may need consequently Whitaker, P.2d at to State. See Vaca differ from State summary judgment between (noting the difference 319-20
685 in applicable applied rules in New Mexico and those Arizona Alway). Cimino v.
Thus, Maryland summary judgment practice implicated. is in Frederick Road Ltd. v. Brown & Recently, Partnership Sturm, 76, 93-94, 963, (2000), 360 756 972-73 Md. A.2d we stated, subject: on the
“Summary judgment practice
governed by
in this state is
states,
2-501.
It
Maryland
part,
Rule
relevant
‘[t]he
judgment
moving
court shall enter
favor of or
party if the motion and
show that
there is no
response
as to
genuine dispute
any
party
material fact and
judgment
whose favor
is
to summary
entered
entitled
2-501(e).
judgment as a matter of law.’ Rule
Summary
is not a substitute for trial. Goodwich v. Sinai
Baltimore, Inc.,
185, 205,
1067,
Hosp.
343 Md.
680 A.2d
of
(1996).
1077
The function of the trial court at the summary
stage is
determine whether there is a dispute
as to a
require
material fact sufficient to
an
issue
be
Sussex, Inc.,
247, 255,
tried. Gross v.
332 Md.
630 A.2d
1156,
(1993); Foy
1160
v. Prudential
Insurance Company
al.,
418, 422,
371,
(1989);
America et
316 Md.
559 A.2d
373
Coffey
241, 247,
v. Derby
Company,
Steel
291 Md.
434 A.2d
(1981).
564,
Thus,
568
an
court’s
appellate
review of the
grant
summary judgment
involves the determination
exists, Gross,
whether a dispute of material fact
Mtg. Co. v. summary- a motion for Instead, reviewing court a trial dispute a genuine whether there exists must ask *22 not, and, if the of law ruling fact what as to a material Mele, 267 facts. Brewer v. undisputed those upon should be (1972). 156, 437, 442, If the facts are A.2d inference, materiality the of more than one susceptible judged by looking be dispute factual must arguable that in most favorable light drawn inferences that the in the the motion is made and against whom party Moore, Id.; movant. Dietz v. favorable to the light least Platinum, (1976); 1, 4-5, Impala 351 A.2d 277 Md. (U.S.A.), Inc., 296, 326, 389 283 Md. Impala Ltd. v. Sales (1978).” 904-905 in v. Mid-Atlantic recently most Jones points these We made Co., 661, 675-76, 624-25 766 A.2d Funding (2001). Thompson satisfied the concluding
In that the present damages all of the claimed litigation included sought that on the fact the majority the relies she some of the same in the former case recover case, i.e., respondents’ medical to recover in this sought suffering. persuaded It also was pain same bills and the as to the both cases identity of the evidence pain physical and of her future expectancy life addition, injury. the back accompanying limitations juries that she argued to both majority asserts she jury that the disability and percent permanent suffered a 30 automobile accident disability awarded that level case. setting it in out the acknowledging
Significantly, although
to, and, indeed,
facts,
does
majority gives
weight
no
issues, identity
in its discussion of the
mention
case
the neces-
disputed
in the automobile accident
defendant
even as the
respondents'performed
sity
operation
of the
necessary,
insisting
operation
were
respondents
only litigated
response
and that the
the issue
defense,
maintaining
necessity
all the while
that the
major-
was not relevant. Also not considered
operation
seems,
ity,
significance
or so it
is the
of the award that
than half of the
jury actually
jury
made. The
awarded less
claimed,
$8,337.00
$38,195.28
of the
expenses
medical
claimed —
portion
represented
respondents’
sizable
of which
bill for
pain
medical services. The
also awarded no
and suffer-
ing damages. Knutsen
out that one of the critical
points
inquiries
determining
to be made when
the effect of a satisfied
is “whether the amount
full
paid actually constituted
compensation for the
by plaintiff
total
loss suffered
as the
result of the negligence
original
tortfeasors
negligence of the doctors.” 232 A.2d at
citing Daily v.
Somberg, 28 N.J.
would that the both claims lawsuit, actions, the same and ... separate if she elects to do it in two Cohen, recognizes, whether the citing Morgan supra, v. ty, by sought compensated in the second action were damages first: ambiguous to the respect of intent with question
“Like the
releases,
of fact: Did the
presented
question
we are
with
torts,
just
include
for both
satisfied
tort?”
original
Nevertheless,
majority