*1 claim of ineffective assistance cannot be satisfied assistance counsel trial strategy, State, based on Leake v. appeal. matters v. Deegan one 711 N.W.2d State, 531, (Minn.2007), (Minn.2006). Here, 89, Hathaway attorney’s particu- and an failure to raise represented by on appeal counsel direct lar claim will constitute as- not ineffective this, right and thus had no to counsel in attorney legiti- sistance if “could have postconviction proceeding.6 his second mately that he not have concluded would Therefore, the postconviction court did not prevailed” that claim. v. on Schneider appoint err when it declined to counsel State, (Minn.2007). Hathaway. Hathaway alleges that he was denied conclusively Because the record shows the effective assistance counsel his merit, Hathaway’s lack claims hold we postconviction hearing first when his coun- the district did court not abuse its concerning sel failed certain to raise issues postconvic- discretion when it denied his Dwyer’s committing perjury at trial. This petition an evidentiary tion without hear- claim fails on the merits. ing. above, Hathaway’s attorney As noted Affirmed. perjury declined to raise claim.
particular, attorney observed
proposed could not with testify witness
certainty support to facts would
perjury claim. The decision not to raise strategy ground- issue was a matter of Hathaway
ed the conclusion that could Therefore, prevail
not the claim. Hathaway’s conclude that counsel was not THE UNDER RAINBOW CHILD performance ineffective because his did not CENTER, INC., CARE objective fall below an standard of reason- Respondent, ableness.
II. GOODHUE, COUNTY OF Relator. Hathaway’s appeal readWe challenge postconviction also court’s No. A07-468. this, refusal him appoint counsel for his postconviction proceeding.5 By second Supreme Court of Minnesota. statute, the state defender must Dec. 2007. represent indigent prisoner a post- “if proceeding conviction the person has already a direct appeal had
conviction,” but, others, as to all rep such optional.
resentation Minn.Stat. petitioner’s 590.05 A (Supp.2007). right counsel under state constitution is motion, By 5. separate Hathaway asked Hathaway right 6. While had no counsel appoint appeal. postconviction court to him counsel proceeding, for this first his he none- That denied motion was order dated June had pro- theless the benefit of counsel in that ceeding. *3 purposes.” Rain- Betcher, literary, or educational N. Goodhue Stephen Lee, profit during Assistant Goodhue has not realized K. bow Attorney, Carol MN, Wing for Rela- County Attorney, year Red of its existence.
tor. each paid Tuition must be Biersdorf, Biersdorf & Associ- Daniel J. in Rainbow. Rainbow children enrolled MN, ates, Lap- Jennifer Minneapolis average rates its child care based Wing Red Speight, & pegaard, Watson by day other care centers charged rates MN, Respondent. County. According compari- to a Goodhue child care centers
son of rates Coun- Wing prepared in Red Goodhue *4 ty, weekly rates were Rainbow’s 2006 OPINION other child care cen- higher than the two infants, toddlers, Wing ters Red A., ANDERSON, Jus- RUSSELL Chief weekly rate preschool children. Rainbow’s tice. but was lower than that one center case, the final order of In this we review than the rate of the other center higher exempting Tax real the Minnesota Court age The tax court found school children. Under the respondent owned property were “at or that Rainbow’s tuition rates (Rain- Center, Inc. Child Care Rainbow just market rates.” below bow), payment property of real taxes from The tax court 2004 2005. assessed families who had diffi- Rainbow directed quali- property concluded that Rainbow’s County culty paying tuition Goodhue Rainbow is exemption fied for tax because Services, in- and Rainbow’s clients Social charity un- purely public an institution of families received cluded children whose X, 1 of the Minnesota der Article Section Goo- payments assistance from child care 272.02, § and Minn.Stat. Constitution County, County, from Pierce Wiscon- dhue (2006), applying six factors subd. 7 sin, Tribal Prairie Island from the Institute v. listed in North Star Research Families that received child Community. 1, 6, Hennepin, 306 Minn. County of from the counties or care assistance from (1975). 754, On certiorari Community were Prairie Island Tribal court, County asserts relator Goodhue the same tuition as families did not establish that the evidence Rain- Although assistance. did receive purely public is an institution Rainbow director testified that bow’s executive the tax agree We and reverse charity. off “several thousands Rainbow wrote court. payments in unclaimed childcare dollars child care Rainbow is a state-licensed no every year,” Rainbow offered scholar- Wing, sole center in Red established collec- past pursued had ships and in 1994 Michelle Fin- proprietorship did not against families that tion efforts holdt, Rain- executive director. Rainbow’s pay. as a non- in 1995 incorporated bow was North that all of the The tax court found ch. under Minn.Stat. profit corporation by Star factors were satisfied (2006). articles of incor- Rainbow’s 317A on this third factor. Based except mission poration state Rainbow’s factors, the tax court evaluation away children from [for] “to that Rainbow was entitled “orga- concluded that Rainbow their homes” and scientific, charitable, property from taxes assessed exemption exclusively nized Church, as an of purely Shakopee 2004 and 2005 institution St. Peter’s v. Bd. of 272.02, Comm’rs, 395, § public charity under Minn.Stat. 12 Minn. 397-98 (Gil. 282) (1867). subd. must We therefore purely public charity
construe the exemp- I. narrowly tion care to avoid take ex- tending under exempt Rainbow claims it is from Minn.Stat. pay- 272.02, § “beyond plain subd. property ment of real taxes as institu- re- X, quirements of the law tion Article itself.” the Minnesota Section Constitution may “We final review order “[tjaxes requires that shall be uniform of ground court that the tax subjects” upon same class of but ex- jurisdiction court lacked or committed an “public burying empts taxation error law its order was not houses, grounds, public school hos- justified by the evidence or in conformity academies, colleges, universities, pitals, all with the Manpower, law.” Inc. v. Comm’r churches, learning, all seminaries of Revenue, (Minn. property, worship, church houses insti- 2006) (citing 271.10, Minn.Stat. subd. *5 public charity, public tutions and of (2006)). “will We affirm the tax court property exclusively used when, independent after an of review the added.) purpose.” (Emphasis Minnesota record, there is sufficient evidence in the 7, 272.02, Statutes pro- subd. echoes this upon record which the tax court could have “[ijnstitu- vision, exempting from taxation reasonably based its conclusion.” Care public charity.” of purely tions Inst., Inc.-Maplewood County v. Ram (Minn.1998). 734, sey, 576 N.W.2d 738 As exemptions Because tax are “an result, great give we deference to the tax exception derogation equal rights,” all organiza court’s determination whether an taxable, property presumed is to be qualifies tion as a purely charity, so taxpayer of proving bears the burden long as that determination reasonably exemption. Camping entitlement an to & supported by the evidence. Id. We review State, 250, 245, Educ. Found. 282 Minn. legal the tax court’s de conclusions novo. 369, (1969); 164 N.W.2d 372 see also Clubs, Racquet Nw. Swim & Health Inc. v. Croixdale, County Washington, Inc. v. Dakota, 582, 557 N.W.2d (Minn.2007). 483, 726 N.W.2d Fur (Minn.1997). thermore, exemptions property from tax liability strictly must be construed. E.g., ease, In this analyzed the tax court Found., Camping Educ. & 282 Minn. at six factors in our listed decision in North 250, 164 372. We have also Star:
observed: (1) whether the purpose stated of the government
As the burdens of
should
undertaking
be
is to
helpful
to others
in equal propor-
borne
all the citizens
without immediate
expectation mate-
tions,
(2)
property
exempt
reward;
no
should be
rial
entity
whether the
in-
from
taxation
the absence of clear and
supported by
volved is
donations and
same,
explicit
(3)
legislation authorizing
gifts in
part;
whole or in
whether the
and in
of a
exempt-
the construction
law
“charity”
of the
required
are
ing property
taxation,
courts
will
to
for the assistance received in
indulge
(4)
presumption
no
that will extend
whole or in part;
whether
income
the exemption beyond
plain require-
gift
received from
and donations and
ments of
law
charges
itself.
produces
profit
users
to the
institution;
(5)
in our
general
ence to
statements made
whether
charitable
re-
of limited value.” N.
“charity”
previous
are
cases are
beneficiaries
Star,
and,
at 757.
if
306 Minn. at
unrestricted
restrict-
stricted or
Thus,
apparent
it should be
that North
ed,
persons
the class
whether
mandatory
establish six
ele
charity is made available
Star did not
whom the
relationship
ments
must be considered
satis
having a reasonable
one
(6)
objectives;
every
whether
fied in
charitable
case.
substance,
dividends,
as-
or
form
approach
explained
appropriate
We
are available
upon dissolution
sets
contempora-
factors in a
the North Star
private interests.
case, Mayo
neous
Foundation v. Commis-
Star,
Revenue,
Minn.
N.
306 Minn.
236 N.W.2d at
sioner
Foundation,
(1975). Mayo
satisfied
The tax court found that Rainbow
N.W.2d 767
except factor
argued
prior
all of the factors
three
that our
Commissioner
qualified
an
prerequisites
that Rainbow
concluded
cases established seven
we
purely public
As
status as a charitable
granting
exempt
institution
entity
35-36,
explain, we conclude that
N.W.2d at
will
institution.
Id. at
purely public
rejected
be an institution of
cannot
772-73. We
the Commissioner’s
fac
satisfying
rigid
without
North Star
approach, explaining:
three,
tor
and therefore we reverse.
The factors identified
the commis-
set forth
comparable
sioner are
those
caution
But first we add a note of
case,
the North Star Research
six
against overly rigid reliance on the
agree
they
appropriate
part
Due in no small
North Star factors.
*6
of charitable status. How-
consideration
opinions, the North Star factors
to our own
ever,
significant
between
difference
multi-part
to
as a
have come
be viewed
by the commis-
approach
advocated
an
determining
in
whether
test to be used
lies
adopt
sioner and
one which we
organization
purely
is an institution of
given
to
weight
in our view of the
be
charity.
identify
But we
not
public
did
general
lan-
the individual factors.
parts
six
in North Star as the
of
factors
guage
our
statements
definitional
Rather,
of
ex
simply
test.
we
multi-faceted
our
in
identification of factors
were
the factors
plained that these
some of
only guides
analysis.
prior cases are
previous
in
cases when
we had assessed
be
on
own
Each case must
decided
evaluating “organizations which were en
particular facts and it is not essential
in the
gaged
undertakings
in charitable
in our deci-
every
factor mentioned
Star,
at
N.
Minn.
traditional sense.”
306
institution
present before an
sions be
5-6,
And,
point
as
We
further
provision
and
Because
constitutional
every gift with a benef-
ment that not even
the statute at
here limit the exemp-
issue
qualifies as char-
necessarily
icent purpose
purely public
of
charity,
tion
institutions
“it
ity
purposes:
is not safe to
these
is
an organization
it
not sufficient that
say
any gift
a
rule that
which
as universal
a
purpose,
serves worthwhile
even that
well-being
a
promote man’s
tends to
nonprofit
does
on a
For exam-
it
so
basis.
390,
Id. at
select and favored
This
passage
North
followed imme-
would,
essence,
in
hold
serving
a diately the recitation of the six North Star
and
purpose
operating
factors,
worthwhile
on a
in
listing
which
turn followed a
exempt
sufficient to
nonprofit basis is
several
in
undertakings
“charitable
taxation
“purely
from
as
traditional sense” and citations to cases in
charity.” This
interpretation of
they
which
had been
at
addressed.
Id.
5-6
charity
expand
exemption
would
the tax
4-8,
& nn.
at
nn. 4-
N.W.2d
756-57 &
broadly,
far
several
too
reasons.
cited,
8. Of the five
only
cases
one could be
said to lack the element of a charitable
First,
expansive
charity
this
view of
is
Homes,
gift.
Assembly
See
Inc. v. Yellow
contrary
majority
to the
of our
vast
cases
County,
Medicine
273 Minn.
applying
exemption.
The dissent re-
(1966),
N.W.2d 336
discussed below.
in
passage
lies on
North Star
which
Moreover, in numerous cases since North
we stated:
Star we have declined to exempt from
tendency
our decisions has
taxation as
organi-
charities
been
sustain
where these
that merely
traditionally
zations
had
chari-
traditionally
objectives
“charitable”
are
objectives
table
operated
prof-
without
being furthered, so long as no individual
See,
it to any
example,
individuals.
profits
ownership
“charity”
from
SHARE,
(“Although pro-
889 taxation, long no property from as as exemption from tion enjoy basis would profit charity. of members of profits as a inured to benefit taxes property Indeed, grant would ex- This flies in the organization. view result the dissent’s taxes payment property of North emption from of our that Star face observation from exempt virtually any organization to three intended to assess whether factor “is under federal income taxes payment of organization’s from people will benefit (2000).3 501(c)(3) legisla- § If the I.R.C. greater to than if the activities an extent exempt organizations all ture had intended merely providing were a ser organization un- income taxes payment from of federal part private Sky as market.” vice of 501(c)(3) exempt § also be der I.R.C. Polk, County Pres. v. line Found. of taxes, it payment property of real from (Minn.2001). N.W.2d it with provided, as did could have so legislature governor, The taxation. See regard to state income court, policy this should make the not (2006) 290.05, (provid- Minn.Stat. subd. scope of tax judgments that determine the income fran- from state ing exemption N. exemptions. See State v. Star Re organizations exempt from chise taxes for Inst., 56, 80, & Dev. 294 Minn. search Subchapter taxation under federal income (1972) (“We unhesitating Code, which F of the Internal Revenue legislature, rather than ly concede that 501(c)(3)). That it has not includes section court, policy of should determine that, the legislature’s so done indicates regard exemption, if this state with view, an enti- is a difference between there from such as any, corporations taxes pay- ty exemption for from qualifies The dis given.”). North Star should of taxes because ment federal income requiring gift focus sent criticizes our from which its own- good does works and pro that an benefit, in order find entity personally ers do not an tax charity diluting goal as of qualifies payment for from vides exemption view, pure- as In the dissent’s property exemption. “[t]hat taxes an institution of treated ly public encourage We have never is to charitable services goal Star, for organization’s tax-exempt because, status as in North we observed purposes federal determina- income will benefit an economic sense ‘people See, SHARE, 363 inquiry. e.g., tive of our undertaking.’” We [a] from (determinations of tax ex- N.W.2d at 50 people benefit most from chari note state emption purposes of federal and re undertaking they when not table “are on the controlling income taxation full for the benefit quired value issue”); Corp. Hous. Rio Vista Moreover, in goal our view the received. Non-Profit Ramsey, purely public charity (Minn.1979). economically make encourage and more charity the form of precisely viable consequence second broad demanding full confers benefit without interpretation would be dissent’s course, legislature may, of payment. The charge enterprise “charitable” could encourage other forms of eco for-profit as a choose the same for its services beneficial exemp- nomically publicly or otherwise competitor enjoy and nevertheless 501(c)(3) competition sports exempts payment of international amateur Section n * n , cruelty "organized prevention or to chil- for the income taxes those entities charitable, animals, part earnings net exclusively religious, or no operated dren scientific, any private testing safety, literary, or which inures to benefit individual.” purposes, shareholder or or to foster national educational *10 890 various forms of rates” by providing “considerably requirement reduced
endeavors See, incentives, meaning has done so. has been described as “consider- 272.02, (2006) ably § subd. 13 less than e.g., Minn.Stat. market value or cost.” Id. (exempting property proper- taxation from standard, Utilizing this we held Rio ty provide emergency shelter for used nonprofit entity private pro- Vista a violence). merely But victims of domestic viding housing moderate and low income provides an economic or because endeavor people was an of purely institution social does not make it a other benefit charity entitled to exemption. the 277 charity. And, again, policy those tax once (Minn.1979). 187, 192 In Rio Vis- left to appropriately politi- choices are the ta, corporation levels, the two offered rent cal branches. level, and a fair higher basic level market is, thus, concept
It inherent in the of but of paid almost all the tenants the basic charity is, gift wealthy is a pay there rent and none was enough —that services, goods, or is conceived fair whatever market rent. Id. 188. Similar- provided ly, Worthington benefit must be Dormitory, the charitable Inc. v. Revenue, charity to the without community- Commissioner of requiring them full value for it.4 nonprofit organization based provided Nevertheless, expanded legal definition housing rental local students charity 276, that has evolved the context community college. 292 N.W.2d 278 (Minn.1980). exemptions require of tax does not This court reversed the rul- provided recipi- be to all ing charitable benefit the tax court that the Therefore, entirely ents of charge. free was not a purely public charity for tax the third Star has re- North factor been purposes. Id. at 277. The require charity fined to that the provid- court paid concluded the students less ed charge, “free of or at re- considerably housing than cost for the they received Home, Cmty. duced rates.” Mem’l 573 it was “doubtful” that the stu- added). (emphasis rents,” N.W.2d at 87 paid And the dents they “market because position unique. we take property exclusively The here is not is used for 'charitable' example, Pennsylvania Supreme 265, For (Utah purposes.” 1985). 709 P.2d 269 purely public Court limited the definition of charity An "essential element of is an act of that, charity entity among things, to an other giving." Id. adopted The Utah court then gratuitously or renders "[d]onates a substan following identifying "gift”: features of a "ei portion Hosp. tial services.” * * * Utilization ther a substantial imbalance the ex Commonwealth, 1, Project v. 507 Pa. 487 A.2d change charity recipient between the and the 1306, (1985). Pennsylvania legisla The * * * gov of its or lessening services aof subsequently incorporated ture require through charity’s opera ernment burden statutory into one ment criteria Supreme tion.” Id. The Illinois Court simi purely public charity. institution of 10 Pa. larly required entity exempt that an from 375(d)(1) (2007). Cons.Stat. Ann. Ore payment property taxes as a charitable in gon Supreme similarly Court held that one stitution, among requirements, other "dis required elements of a charitable institu pense[ apply ] to all need who exempt payment property tion from taxes * * * it, profit gain pri not or ain organization's performance "the must it, any person vate sense to connected with gift giving.” involve or Sw. Or. Pub. De * * * appear place obstacles of Servs., Revenue, Dep’t v. Inc. Or. fender way character in the of those who need 1292, (1991). P.2d In Utah and would Care, avail themselves of the Inc., County v. Intermountain Health dispenses.” Peoples benefits it Methodist Old Supreme Court Utah observed that an Korzen, entity exempt property "only Home 39 Ill.2d N.E.2d taxes (1968). 'charity' if it meets the definition of a if its
891 49, at charges change not our assessment. Id. 52- substantially than the at less paid dormitory facil- 53. state-operated comparable Id. at 281.
ities. Chisago In Health Services v. Commis- Revenue, organi- we affirmed the tax exemption to sioner granting the While rejection purely public the considerably less than court’s chari- charged that zations health fur- consistently ty exemption for a clinic that prices, we have denied market outpatient to nished services at market level property taxes enti- exemption (Minn.1990). 386, fees. of their “chari- 462 N.W.2d 387 charged recipients ties that rates, the clinic to substantially explained even where We that claimed ty” market patients all forgiven. open policy, have an door but were discounted some fees services, Housing, organi- were for medical and the Community billed Chateau exemption simply clinic off the bills uncol- seeking wrote zation faculty housing patient pay. on a lectible if a was unable to Id. provided student accepted payment The clinic at nonprofit basis. 388. (Minn.1990). pro- that rates from Medicare and Medic- We found Chateau reduced aid, but we declined to view the scholarships no or rent assistance to discounted vided students, charity as an needy payments that students were evicted extension of rent, by in patients and that con- clinic. Id. nonpayment for Rather, with tax agreed rental rates in Rio court’s trast to the discounted charged ruling that there was no difference be- Worthington, Chateau Vista housing tween those and Medicaid dis- comparable private Medicare rents university-owned considerably higher negotiat- than counts and business discounts As health with housing. by 452 N.W.2d at ed HMOs and insurers 243-44. result, hospi- clinics and private denial of the other we affirmed Likewise, charity Id. at 244. tals. Id. at 391. we endorsed exemption. writing the tax court’s that off a conclusion SHARE, we affirmed denial Similarly, small number uncollectible accounts was charity purely public exemption of the merely practice charity but business organization. health maintenance provid- that other health care similar to (Minn.1985). HMO, The ers. Id. SHARE, provided no services without a fee, pro- Community Home an- for a Memorial except one-time short-term policy no substan- other case which we affirmed the ject, and had charity purely public cost denial of the tial discounts to those whom court’s an that exemption be an unreasonable bur- treatment would Rather, essentially market rates. den. Id. at 52. HMO member- (Minn.1997). 83, 85, if individual N.W.2d Communi- ship would be discontinued an ty Id. In Memorial Home involved assisted pay monthly could not full fee. facility attempted satisfy fac- living the other North assessing addition to Star money it lost factors, by showing tor that “SHARE’S chari- three we declared rejected Id. by year. each at 87. We appli- table claim is defeated out argument, pointing losses of factor three —whether cation factors. Id. required for the could be caused numerous fact that it part.” facility Id. The also relied in whole or assistance county accepted grant payments from of the HMO members were fact some rent, at less than full fees were some residents participants Medicare whose facility had not but we remarked largely paid program that federal did *12 “acceptance agree. shown that referrals we from differ with We the tax court in Douglas County anything respects, First, two is more than a however. the tax fill court’s empty finding business decision to that rental Rainbow’s tuition was just “at or We market units.” Id. at 88. concluded that below rates” is not supported by Second, the evidence. “[t]he record is devoid evidence demon- hold, more organization’s] importantly, strating that because we for the [the intended above, reasons discussed purpose provide housing is to and services satisfaction of the third North Star factor economically disadvantaged for the is essential or that qualify to purely charity, as a it will so in continue to do the future.” Id. tax court’s conclusion that quali- Rainbow summary, these cases establish fied as an of purely public institution chari- qualify for the exemption from ty despite satisfy failing factor three property taxes as an institution of an error of law. organization charity an pro must We first address tax court’s factual vide “charity” its free of finding that Rainbow’s tuition was “at or charge considerably or at reduced rates. just below rates.” market The memoran- Moreover, it is sufficient provide dum accompanying findings court’s free or goods or reduced-rate services on of fact and conclusions of law lists child they such a merely small scale that are an care rates that court characterizes as part organization’s incidental opera of the “representative child care in rates tions. or goods Nor will free reduced-rate Goodhue County July 2006.” It or provided primarily services that are for against was “representative” these rates purposes adequate. business be The or that the compared court Rainbow’s rates ganization must demonstrate that in its and concluded that Rainbow’s rates were tended purpose is to substantial just “at or market below rates.” But proportion of its goods services on a these “representative” rates come from an If the basis. does exhibit by the county introduced terms, not operate on these is indeed not fact lists the maximum child care rates purely public institution of charity and that Goodhue is authorized to pay.5 qualify cannot for tax on that Rainbow’s child care rates are gen- indeed basis. erally county’s less than the maximum au- We these apply principles now thorized rates.6 But there is no evidence the case at hand. The tax court found that the maximum authorized rates are satisfy three, Rainbow did not factor actual market rates.7 119B.09, § 5.Minnesota payment Statutes provider's subd. 1 charges in excess of (2006), requires county to make pay. the state child care maximum the will services available “to families who need child example, 6. For County’s Goodhue maximum care keep employment to find or or to obtain daily full-day rate in 2006 for infant child care the training necessary or education to find $49.82, but Rainbow’s $34.00. rate was employment” qualify financially. and who Similarly, County’s Goodhue maximum rate 119B.13, 1(e) Minnesota Statutes subd. weekly 2006 for toddler child care was (2006), authorizes the Commissioner of Hu- $151.58, but $127.00. Rainbow’s rate was man Services to set on a county-by-county out may basis the paid maximum rates that 7. The dissent concludes county’s child care program funds. Under sec- maximum actually authorized rates "are be- 119B.13, 1(e) (f), tion county subds. low market rates” because "[w]hen Rainbow pays the provider’s charges up child care full operations subject commenced proper- maximum; 2003,” parent responsible ty the maximum rates had been care were own actual rates of market rates child its lists the A different exhibit two child cen- Wing and those of the other Red by child care centers exhibit, Wing. located in Red Rainbow’s exec- Rain- ters According to that in 2006. sets utive director testified generally weekly rates were bow’s running child care rates “[s]o rates Red than the other higher *13 in average everybody with else the area.” Rainbow’s week- Wing child care centers. of the other higher rates were than both ly argues only dissent that the “true The infants, Wing in care centers Red child that be ‘market rates’ are those would children, toddlers, who con- preschool and, charged by for-profit corporation” a 55 Rainbow’s 70-child licensed stituted no care for-profit there were child because children, Rain- age school capacity. For County, in no Wing Red “there is centers rates were lower than those weekly bow’s Noting of a true market rate.” evidence center, the higher but than those of of one care in the other two child centers that age occupied But school children other. are, Rainbow, Wing nonprofit like or- Red spots. 15 of 70 licensed only Rainbow’s the dissent raises what could ganizations, Thus, are compared when Rainbow’s rates in the case legitimate questions proper be rates, find- the tax court’s to actual market if measuring against the “market” about just that rates were “at or ing Rainbow’s entirely comprised the “market” during years the in market rates” below assuming But even a more enterprises. supported by is the question evidence. market rate would that appropriate be Rather, rates weekly were Rainbow’s entities, for-profit evidence charged rates. part most above market to the by Rainbow as “market” presented comprises nonprofit three shows whether questions The dissent entities, weekly of which Rainbow’s rates is sufficient evidence this case there highest.8 met generally are Rainbow “market” child care ser establish the rates burden to show what the market its fell Wing. But the burden vices Red competi- its rates to its comparing were Rainbow, entity seeking squarely on tors, meet show but did not its burden to its were exemption, prove rates substantially those rates were below its or substantially than either market less market rates. squarely fell cost and therefore burden that, regard- posits further Rainbow to evidence dissent child rates rates of whether Rainbow’s “market” which its should less against rates, still less than market Rainbow offered compared. The evidence Rainbow rates are not below market by legislative levels. mum authorized frozen action provided no there is Rainbow evidence and rates. relationship between none the record county’s rates maximum rates actual comparison suggests to oth- 8. The dissent concerning than the evidence other providers' rates should take into account er Wing. child care centers in Red the other two example, noting differing cost levels. For is, then, no basis in the record There competi- larger two than its that Rainbow can which the dissent’s conclusion be drawn. concludes, result, tors, a one "[a]s the dissent county's Regardless maximum au- of how expect great- would have would set, clear thorized rates were the record is needs, corresponding- space with er and staff competing three child care that rates at the ly greater But Rainbow insurance costs.” Wing significantly less centers in Red were greater space evidence introduced no county’s rates than maximum authorized great- presumed associated needs or the staff Again, categories com- care. across all er costs. only which pared to the market of there record, county's maxi- evidence in this presents factor three comparison North Star because 488. The dissent satisfies child are less than its care rates costs. of Rainbow’s revenues and ex- operating opines “[t]here The dissent is no dis- penses in an effort to demonstrate cost, rates are pute that Rainbow’s below Rainbow’s are “sufficiently rates below at a operated every because it has loss test,” cost to meet the factor three but But year reject- of its existence.” we have comparison dissent’s is flawed. Rain- For bright that would equate ed line test “operating expenses,” bow’s re- the dissent simply with operating operating at a loss expenses” reported by lies on “total Rain- held that the fact that We an bow on its federal information returns entity operates at a is not sufficient loss Indeed, years for the at issue. that is the satisfy factor, the third Star North Com- only expenses evidence of in the record *14 Home, munity Memorial at N.W.2d before us. But for Rainbow’s “revenues may because not revenues cover costs rates,” dissent relies on a sched- reasons, variety a necessarily for of “not prepared by ule purpose Rainbow for the facility because the intends to charge a of arguing that it received con- substantial Inst., rent.” below-cost Care Inc.-Roseville (in form government pay- tributions of Ramsey, ments, labor) gifts, and volunteer in the (Minn.2000). no in There is evidence years in question as a “total percentage of that deliberately record Rainbow enrollment billed.” There was no testimo- during years below-cost rates at issue. ny at trial how as to “total enrollment Indeed, the record before consisting us— billed” was calculated or what it includes little more than Rainbow’s federal tax think excludes. We a more appropriate information returns —is not sufficient to support why comparison conclusions as to purpose Rain- for this is between operates bow at a loss. expenses,” Rainbow’s “total reported as on its returns, federal tax information Further, if accept even we were to “program revenue,” service reported on cost, precedent Rainbow’s rates are below those same federal re- information requires Rainbow’s rates to be “consider- turns. comparison That shows that Rain- ably less” than proving cost “as means of bow’s rates not significantly were than were less [rates] established the stated and, fact, cost in at purpose years charitable rather than for purely issue— Croixdale, business reasons.” 726 N.W.2d were in one instance more than cost: These results are with consistent an or incidental any possible charitable activi ganization nonprofit Found., is a under both Mayo ties.” 306 Minn. at Minn.Stat. ch. 317A and I.R.C. N.W.2d at 773. 501(c)(3), organization but not with organized
that is “so operated Turning that its to the larger issue commercial activities are qualifies subordinate to or whether Rainbow as an institution acceptance us not even the charity, the case before did consider in which the pattern paid participants cases rates fits the discounted denied, especially the exemption has been government programs as evidence of Community Home, Services and Chisago Health Cmty. charitable endeavor. Mem’l Rainbow 87; Servs., cases. sets Memorial Home Chisago N.W.2d at Health charges level and at or above market Rather, rates at 462 N.W.2d Commu- at those all the its services Home nity Memorial we looked to makes no rates. Rainbow accommodations no and found purpose full are unable to for those who intent to serve the dis- evidence overall tax court found Rainbow rates. The advantaged Cmty. basis. scholarships” and no “retains “offers Home, 88; Mem’l 573 N.W.2d see also a child in the event right to dismiss Servs., Chisago Health pay- unable to afford fee families are 391-92.10
ments,” findings that Rainbow does not
Here,
Al-
the same is true of Rainbow.
that, as the tax
challenge.9 It
is clear
though
accepted government
Rainbow
concluded,
does
correctly
court
partic-
it offered no
payments,
discount
It
satisfy
third North Star factor.
not
government programs.
ipants
equally clear
Rainbow does
*15
is
Therefore,
represent charity
did not
this
on a
basis
provide any services
families,
Rainbow
these
provided by
to
qualify as an institu-
and cannot therefore
fully
was
compensated
because Rainbow
purely
charity.
of
public
tion
it
As
provided.
for the services
in Com-
acceptance
government
Rainbow’s
Home,
munity
there
no evi-
Memorial
is
not
some of its clients does
payments for
intended purpose
dence
Rainbow’s
It
change
conclusion.
is true
provide day
was to
care to
economical-
by
than 20% of the fees received
more
rather,
ly disadvantaged;
pur-
Rainbow’s
by county
gov-
or
paid
Rainbow are
tribal
day
was
care to
who
pose
provide
to
those
for families that cannot afford
ernments
or
pay,
through
could
either on their own
But our
to
the full rates themselves.
subsidy.
government
receipt
it clear that
cases make
case—Assem-
only
We
aware
one
on
payment of fees
behalf
government
bly
purely
Homes—in which the
trans-
of the client families does not
some
charity
an or-
granted
was
to
operation
form Rainbow’s fee-for-services
a market rate fee
Community
ganization
a
In
Memorial
into
Services,
Chisago
paid
all and
of those fees were
Health
to
some
Home
provide
testimony
purpose
services on charitable
cites
of Rainbow's
9.
dissent
provided
ser-
compared
executive director
annual
when
to Rainbow's
basis
no or
fees
vices
some children for
lower
program
in excess of
services revenues
and wrote off “several thousands of dollars
$400,000.
year.”
payments every
unclaimed child
explanation
evidentiary
or
Without further
Vista,
contrast,
govern-
In
in Rio
where
absent,
support,
entirely
no
which is
there is
appear
rent
families
ment
subsidies for some
way to
the actual
know
circumstances
mak-
have
considered
the court in
been
The write-offs could be
those write-offs.
determination,
purpose
ing
its
the overall
merely
billings,
which
based
uncollectible
corporation
housing to
charity in
this court refused
consider
means, and the
people of
to moderate
low
Services,
Chisago
government
goods
substantial
of its
ser-
or
(1966).
Assembly
Homes
at considerably
N.W.2d
vices free or
rates.
reduced
exempt
nursing
home was
reason,
we held
if
For that
an
does
purely
taxation as a
chari
property
factor,
satisfy
not
third North
it
Star
rates,
ty,
though
even
we found that its
qualify
cannot
for tax
an
exemption as
patients by
paid
which were
some
public charity.
institution
county welfare boards and the U.S. Veter
case,
these
Applying
principles to this
Administration, were
to the
ans
“similar
we hold that
the tax court erred as a
charged generally in the State of
rates
concluding
matter of law in
that Rainbow
201,
by nursing
Id. at
Minnesota
homes.”
qualified
tax exemption
as an institu-
339,
204,
In there of children must be a substantial members. The tax court charitable, gift, component organi- payments, or characterized amounting these operation in qualify zation’s order to as an to at least 20% of operating Rainbow’s purely public charity. institution of That resources in each of years ques- the tax tion, provide means a “public must as donations” and concluded “very gov- North Vista owed its existence” factor two of that basis that funding and guarantee status ernment’s analysis favor of as Star weighed “signifi- loan and charity. Be- low-interest construction an institution of Id. cant rent assistance.” 190-91. We were made ser- payments cause these qualifying stated that fact that donor is by “[t]he Rainbow to rendered vices private in- Federal and not families, they not have been classi- Government should preclude a determination to Rain- stitution does as donations or contributions fied by supported part that Rio Vista bow. Id. Again, we did not distin- donations.” Assembly years ago, than 40 More guish government’s interest between Homes, nursing we home held subsidy subsidy. rent and its from as an institu exempt property taxes Vista, declined, since Rio But have “charges for we whose tion classify by patients, explicitly implicitly, both and are individual paid services boards, government payments as “donations” county and U.S. welfare when, in Assembly Administration.” the rent 273 Minn. at like subsidies Veterans Vista, Homes Rio they pay- are at 341. But we did not direct Chisago goods ments or In payments characterize the from services.11 explicitly Services, Health the health care clinic ar- county governments federal as Vista, from In Rio gued exempt payment that it was again gifts. donations part taxes in received entity property of an re because addressed the status percent payments. of its revenues Medicare government ceived monies clinic case, corpora payments, and Medicaid nonprofit which involved as argued should be counted donations. tion established to low-rent hous low moderate in at 391. declined to extend ing to families with N.W.2d We Rio Vista comes, types' gov- “the rationale” to treat the were two different there Vista, donations, noting payments. Rio payments as ernment’s government First, facility government’s payments under “the programs housing pro a federal Medicare Medicaid constructed under 236,” accurately pay- more characterized as known under which gram as “section rendered, not dona- the ments for services government guaranteed the federal *17 SHARE, tions.” Id. charged In the fees construction loan. Id. Rio Vista made the organization to by the maintenance payments on the loan and inter health principal percent; by covered Medicare were payments at the rate of one members est largely by the Federal Health Care paid paid to the lender government the federal Administration, but did not Financing interest rate the difference between the (seven agency’s by payments characterize the federal percent) the bank donations, Id. Second, federal by although grants Rio as paid the interest Vista. a health the awarded to the HMO to establish government the federal subsidized patients were qualifying program low-income tenants. low-income rents of Id. at 188-89. We govern support the treated as from donations. agreed Community Memo- Rio at 49-51. In provided assistance to Vista N.W.2d ment Home, rial “donations,” half of the of more than qualified noting Rio rents addition, housing are provided we note that after Rio Vista sistance for low-income 11. legislature charitable tax gifts the amended the not to the owner. See or donations expressly 272.02, (2006). state provision to § Minn.Stat. subd. government financing as- rent assistance and nursing paid, very home’s residents were the decisions that have fostered confu- through part, grant programs or in sion. whole by county. administered the 573 N.W.2d specifically, More I do agree not Again, county’s we did not treat the North Star factor three —“whether the re- (conclud- Id. at 87 payments as donations. cipients ‘charity’ required to ing that had not taxpayer the sustained its for the assistance received in whole or proof to show that it was sup- burden other part” trumps all factors. N. Star — despite charitable donations ac- ported Research Hennepin, Inst. care for cepting payments county resi- (1975) Minn. To market dents at less than rates because contrary, the I question believe “appears the decision to do so to be a whether an organization is a de- designed decision”
business reduce the pends primarily on the nature of ser- units). empty number of rental provides only vice it secondarily on any uncertainty To the extent type funding re mechanisms it uses mains appropriate support as to the treatment of that service. Because factor three government payments, we hold that when only many addresses one funding mech- government directly pays goods may anisms that used a nonprofit citizens, on of its organization, services behalf of one materiality has limited payment gift is not question considered or dona of whether the organization is purposes determining tion for a charity. whether entity providing goods or services were, time, Even if we for the first exempt property taxation as an give factor such im- overwhelming three purely public charity.
institution of portance, I believe that majority has Reversed. incorrectly applied that factor by focusing only on First, market rates and not cost. HANSON, PAGE, Dissenting, I do believe true market rates MEYER, JJ. can be County. determined Goodhue Second, our allow HANSON, taxpayer cases dissenting. Justice prove factor three the basis of either I I respectfully dissent. would affirm cost, market or proven Rainbow has the well-reasoned decision of the tax court that its rates are well below cost. and hold qualifies that Rainbow for tax exempt status an institution of purely .as 1. How North Star factors Const, should public charity X, under Minn. art. be used? 272.02, § 1 and Minn.Stat. subd. 7 (2006). I argued As concurring opinion *18 I appreciate Croixdale, by the caution stated the Inc. Washington, of majority that not to apply we are the “over- six factor of test North Star de- ly rigid signed reliance on the six North provide guidance Star to determining factors,” I with agree majority’s and whether activities were not tradition- criticism of our past ally some of being cases for viewed as charitable nev- could having I am disappointed done so. But ertheless as qualify charitable. that, (Minn.2007) ultimately, majority (Hanson, J., does not N.W.2d and, instead, regresses Star, heed caution concurring). In North we observed a just that, to strict application of one of although the six an assessment organiza- of relying North Star on some of tions that deal with traditional charitable factors — children are safe and by ing parents made use of that their undertakings could be factors, engaged developmental appropriate are six Rain- From this I conclude that activities. decisions has been tendency of our [t]he surely are is services that providing bow tradi- where these to sustain traditionally as “charitable.” regarded objectives being are tionally “charitable” furthered, prof- so as no individual long Further, organized is so that Rainbow are ownership “charity” of the its from ownership from profit no individual can undertaking long and so as realized Although persons in control of its assets. by which the needs subterfuge not a nonprofits may have abused the non- some favored few are accom- of a select and extracting profit status excessive sala- modated. benefits, clearly has not oc- ries and Star, 6, 236 at 757. curred at Rainbow—where the Executive N. 306 Minn. at $29,000 in salary only drew a Director objectives no that the There is doubt Although acquired Rainbow has 2005.12 qualify traditionally as charitable. Rainbow assets, may only used some those assets traditional In North Star we identified the benefit of its charitable services “edu- undertakings including and, dissolution, they go on could not young promotion and the people” cation of trans- benefit individual but must be “moral and educational welfare of the tax-exempt ferred to another 5-6, at 756-57. youth.” Id. although may have nonprofits And some incorporation state Rainbow’s articles of nonprofit abused their status offer- also exclusively for “organized Rainbow only and their a select ing services charitable, scientific, literary, or education- few, clearly has not occurred favored section purposes meaning al within the at Rainbow—where the is welcome 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code” basis, re- nondiscriminatory a with no on Rainbow specific purposes that the and can use the strictions who services. away of children are “to care fact, significant percentage par- a meaning home within the of section their whose children are served at Rainbow ents 501(k) Revenue Code.” One Internal qualify income coun- are low receive pur- on these expanded Rainbow witness Although works ty assistance. is en- by explaining that Rainbow poses them ob- parents help with low income “healthy develop- in providing for gaged assistance, it also ser- provides tain young they so that can be ment of children or lower vice to some children with no later school and in life” successful in the tax court deci- fees. statement for children providing “safe environment majority opinion that Rain- working.” sion and parents in when the[ir] to be scholarships” may be se- gov- “offers no explained That witness also bow true, mantically but uncontradicted placed high value on child ernment Director services, testimony of Rainbow’s Executive a small investment because has taken children with- to low families was that Rainbow child care assistance income than payment lower high payment social and economic out produce will rate, off that Rainbow writes return, going have con- allowing parents taxes, dollars in unclaimed thousands of sistency employment, “several year.” community, payments every assur- child care contribute while *19 $23,000. $43,000 salary and in 2004 was Director's 12. The Executive subject year property, was the first at the Star, analysis Under North could and effort required to obtain them. Rain- right there and tax exemption end should bow’s Executive Director testified that it requests But limited recognized. private be the tax court its did not donations to two annual analysis fundraising events end the there. The court because it made was concerned that it not “burn out thorough [its] and reasoned of all review of the participants because there are many so North The tax Star factors. court found fundraisers [for] schools and extracurricu- nonprofit that Rainbow was a corporation programs” lar hoped and it to reduce the exempt that is from federal and state in- spent time fundraising so that it could taxes; come profit has not realized a spent maximize the time serving the chil- any year; expenses by meets its multiple dren. funding fees, mechanisms include fundraisers, grants, cash and By focusing in-kind dona- only on the fact that a chari labor, ty charges fee, tions of government payments; the majority dilutes the goal reasonable, of tax pays exemption. That compensa- goal non-excessive is to encourage because, charitable services employees; provides tion to its as services to Star, observed North “people will general public, including low income benefit in an economic sense from char families; [a] uses its resources to ben- itable undertaking” that, among other efits equally to all of the users of its things, provides an education that will en services; provides a service that has young person able a to “add more to the been recognized by the state being im- well-being of a society than one who is not portant increasing availability of af- — so advantaged.” 306 Minn. at fordable child care services for low income N.W.2d at 757. A charitable undertaking families. The tax court found that Rain- only can contribute to the well-being of bow satisfied all but factor three and society if it has adequate funding sup granted exemption.13 The tax court’s port operations. From perspec persuasive decision is and should af- tive, it should not matter whether firmed. funding fees, is in the form of grants, The majority opinion only considers fac- private donations, public payments or tor three —whether some combination of these. The state’s service a fee—to be fundamental to legitimate concern with the use of fees for But, the concept as North Star part of funding is that it not produce years ago, established the essence of a earnings, excessive support excessive com charity lies in the nature of the service pensation, or enable provided, not in funding mechanisms serve a select and favored few. The rec used support that service.14 pay- The ord does provide any basis for having ment of fees for a charitable service is but those concerns about Rainbow. one funding Indeed, -mechanism. many 2. “considerably What
charities are well advised to increase the reduced rates”? portion of their funding that self-sup- porting they so can avoid both the uncer- majority opinion states that a chari- tainty private donations and ty the time “provide must a substantial proportion below, 13. As discussed I witness, conclude that the tax county's Even the a former asses- applied court narrowly sor, factor three too acknowledged that "charity” that low that factor three was also met. But even if income families receive from Rainbow is the met, factor three grant was not of tax provides. service it appropriate based on the other five factors. *20 majority’s recipients requirement meet the goods and services” of its considerably “considerably rates below market”? at reduced charge of “free And, the rate” be majority opinion then reduces should “market based rates.” The by nonprofit or- charged a formula that the actual rates principle simple Rainbow) (like published ganizations, typically rates which compares Rainbow’s cost, benefiting operate care centers to at low from volun- rates of other child two part a rate.” teer and donations to cover of “market labor establish If nonprofit organiza- their one expenses? gives of decisions such prior None our by private tion is to subsidize its rates able Instead, factor three. our prominence to donations, do those rates never- subsidized only as factor three recognize decisions “market”? represent theless Can Further, multipart test. part one of a say is at if it that a rate “market” does two alternative those have identified cases nonprofit operating recover even the low satisfy factor three —market measures to expenses, organization operates at a Croixdale, Inc., 726 N.W.2d E.g., or cost. loss, only stay can in generally framed factor at 494. We have private operation because receives dona- in re- three terms of whether up operating tions make the shortfall “considerably rate at a less ceive services income? Cmty. value or cost.” Mem’l than market Minn., Osakis, the true “market rates” are Perhaps Inc. v. Home (Minn.1997) by a for-profit those that would be Douglas, omitted). But did (internal corporation. Wing Red not have quotation marks any for-profit child care centers and thus dispute There is no that Rainbow’s rates true rate. there no evidence of a market cost, operated are below because it has Finally, any comparison of of other rates every year a of its existence. Fur- loss providers adjustments make for the should ther, I conclude that Rainbow’s would oper- levels incurred each differing cost value rates are below market of its also and, importantly, ation dif- perhaps more services. type quality in the ferences A. slight- What are “market rates”? Rainbow is provides. services each day ly than one of the care centers larger artificiality We must be candid about nearly large twice as the other. rates” determination “market largest And next center has the benefit County. provides Goodhue ser- facility. located a church As being Wing, only three child vices Red where result, that Rainbow expect one would had been licensed on the as- care centers needs, greater space and staff would have years in ques- sessment dates for tax greater correspondingly with insurance sampling a small estab- tion.15 This is costs. Further, all lishing “market.” three Further, tax-exempt capable This Rainbow’s staff nonprofit, organizations. As validity providing greater range services. questions raises several about market Director of Child Care determining simply rates Executive testified, Program child Referral comparing the rates of other care Resource’s English-and Spanish- if all three were to Rainbow has both example, centers. For staff, rates, the other two cen- charge equal speaking all three be de- whereas would only He English-speaking none could ters have staff. nied because A center was added in after those tax assessments. fourth *21 important was an confirmed this fac- lished through a rather process. tortured growing Hispanic population. tor with the When Rainbow operations commenced at Further, explained he Rainbow’s staff subject 2003, property in the maximum experience training has and serve a rates were frozen at 2002 levels. Act of range special needs. greater This wit- 5, 2003, 14, 9, 34, § June ch. art. emphasized also Rainbow’s ness infant 1751, Minn. Spec. Laws 1st Sess. 2137-38. larger, program being licensed for Those rates remained frozen at 2002 levels 16, up to while each of the other two were Id. 30, through Then, 2005, June only toup explained licensed for 8. He legislature set the maximum rates for always shortage there is of infant care period 1, 2005, July through December expensive because is more 31, 2005, for counties like Goodhue at the brings in less revenue due to the greater of the 100th percentile of the rates higher givers ratio of care to each infant. shown in a provider survey rate Department rates identified in of Hu- Given these differences between man Services Bulletin No. type quality 03-68-07. Act provided, of the services 14, July 2005, Sess., 4, Spec. 1st ch. the rates of the other two art. centers cannot 3, 1,§ 2454, 2005 Minn. fairly Laws represent be said to 2525-26 market rate (codified 119B.13, § so, Minn.Stat. for Rainbow. Even subd. Rainbow’s rates 1(a) (Supp.2005)). Commencing compare favorably January to them. hourly Its 1, 2006, the maximum rates daily were increased rates are or below the other to the lesser of the 75th every percentile two in for age category. Although like- care arrangements weekly county higher rates are somewhat or the some previous year’s rates categories, for like-care only arrange- reflects a difference in Id. ments percent. increased degree 1.75 given parents discount 2006, legislature who increased are able to commit to full the maxi- weeks. mum rates in counties like Goodhue to the The majority recognize does that Rain- rates arrangements like-care in the bow’s rates are county’s less than the max- county 1, 2006, January effective increased imum questions authorized rates but percent. 2, 2006, six Act of June ch. whether the tax court was correct in con- 282, 2, 2,§ art. 2006 Minn. Laws cluding county’s maximum rates (codified 119B.13, at Minn.Stat. represent “actual market rates.” I con- 1(a) (2006)). subd. From this history, I county’s clude that maximum author- would conclude that the maximum rates ized actually rates are below market rates through 2006 were well below the and that support this would the conclusion market rate. that Rainbow’s rates were well below mar- ket. event, In any Rainbow’s compare rates
The maximum rates for Goodhue County favorably to the maximum rates authorized provided in the record are those effective with the most relevant compari- July 2006. Those rates were estab- sons being the full day weekly rates: *22 suggest noted It seems counter-intuitive to comparisons all of the Based on tax above, that the court rates above might I would conclude that Rainbow’s be either the case it found when operat- understated cost it has market or above where just were below rates “at or Rainbow’s existence. ed at loss its entire I rates.” conclude market would neverthe- provider expected Should considerably were below Rainbow’s rates rates, its at an even operate less reduce and, Rainbow sat- accordingly, that market loss, hope and be able greater that will three. isfied factor larger by private up to make shortfall shows donations? Because the evidence below cost? B. Are Rainbow’s rates pays that Rainbow reasonable salaries of the difficulties in determin- Because appropriate operating expenses, incurs rates, have market our decisions ing fact that its rates still do not cover are to an alternative measure: turned that the suggests rates are sufficient- costs This alternative the rates below cost? to meet three test. ly below cost the factor present the difficulties measure does specifically, comparison More comparison in the between or- inherent (loss) is as operating income different Rainbow’s that offer somewhat ganizations have follows: different costs. services in 273 Minn. 140 N.W.2d County, calculations include revenue
These (1966) a nurs- (granting County; by made Goodhue payments though ing home even the resident Community; the Prairie Tribal Island county and primarily by paid Wisconsin; County, and the Minne- Pierce Administration). es- This is the Veterans Program. According to our Food sota Pro- true of the Minnesota Food pecially law, appro- more payments these case for fees which does not reimburse gram, See, e.g., priately treated contributions. for the parents, but instead Corp. Hous. Rio Vista Non-Profit of meals served. cost Ramsey, (Minn.1979) assis- (holding the rent out payments Food Taking Program by government losses paid tance federal would increase the of revenues $24,000. all Taking for the another year treated as a “donation” should be each test); payments As- out of revenues government factor of North Star second $90,376 Homes, increase losses another Inc. Medicine would sembly v. Yellow 2004; 2003; $147,614 $121,663 MEYER, Justice dissenting. join I in the dissent of Justice Hanson. measure, Using alternative Rain- considerably bow’s rates were below cost satisfy factor three of the North Star
test.
PAGE, dissenting. Justice join
I in the dissent of Justice Hanson. Minnesota, Respondent
STATE ADICKES, Appellant.
John Albert
No. A06-1558. Appeals
Court of of Minnesota.
Dec. Swanson,
Lori Attorney General, St. Paul, MN and Kelly, Thomas Wright N. County Attorney, Larson, Elizabeth L. As- sistant County Buffalo, MN, Attorney, respondent. Stuart,
John Defender, M. State Public Maravigli, Paul J. Assistant Public Defend- er, MN, Minneapolis, appellant. Considered and by HUDSON, decided WILLIS, Presiding Judge; Judge; and MINGE, Judge.
OPINION HUDSON, Judge. appeal from a conviction of driv-
ing violation license, of a restricted ap- pellant John argues Adickes that he can- not be convicted violating the restricted- license statute because he did not have a driver’s license at all on the date of the