5 A.2d 201 | Pa. | 1939
The commissioners of Northampton County proceeded by petition to strike from the record the reports of the county controllers for the years 1932 to 1936, inclusive, so as to reclaim funds from the various officers named *491 in the reports. Among the reasons offered were that the reports were not filed within the time fixed by act of assembly, nor under the act requiring such reports, nor in the proper office.
The sheriff, whose accounts were involved, applied to intervene for the reason that the reports and judgments thereon were final, to which the commissioners replied that his accounts were never audited by the controllers and constituted a fraud on the county. Other officers likewise sought to intervene but their proceedings are not here involved. The sheriff's application was granted by the court below, whereupon he immediately, under the Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23, attacked its jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings to strike off the reports. The court found that it had jurisdiction and intimated the reports had been improperly filed with the prothonotary. It also stated that, because of the controller's unexplained failure to audit the accounts of officers and the manner of filing, the reports were a fraud on the court.
We need not discuss the question of jurisdiction as we are entirely satisfied that even if a controller's report could be struck off, none of the allegations in the commissioners' petition are sufficient in law for that purpose, and the court below should have dismissed it.
Here the reports, though not filed in time, were duly advertised under the General County Law of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1278, section 345, as last amended by the Act of July 18, 1935, P. L. 1184, section 1.1 As advertised, *492 they furnished an exhaustive statement of the county's fiscal affairs, and every officer connected with the county government, as well as all taxpayers, must be held to have had ample notice of their contents. The commissioners, as taxpayers, and as successors to any prior board, had such notice when they entered on the duties of their office. The Act does not require specific notice to be given to the county commissioners or any other officer. The various officers, and all others in the county, are sufficiently apprised by the advertising required by the General County Law, which was fully complied with. They now propose to uproot all reports for the years mentioned, wipe out the judgments entered thereon, and leave the county, its taxpayers and fiscal officers without any legal statement of the county's financial status. This they ask to be done though accountants or officers affected may have lost or destroyed much of the evidence to sustain their accounts, and also in face of the fact that the commissioners had a complete statutory remedy to correct any mistake in the reports, or to prevent a failure to audit any of the accounts. Such failure, standing alone, does not constitute fraud or collusion between the controller and the officers. If the auditing officer without ulterior motives carelessly neglects or fails to audit any of the accounts of officers, his neglect or failure is not fraudulent in fact or law. *493
The accounts of the sheriff and other officers have concededly not been audited. This is but an example of the too frequent carelessness of public officers in the performance of the duties entrusted to them. No doubt in some counties the idea still prevails, as it did years ago, that it is not necessary to audit the accounts of all county officers who deal with county money. This is not only erroneous, but the neglect is of the most serious consequence to the controllers, or county auditors who perform similar duties.
But, while this Court has frequently asserted the sound policy that public officers must be held to strict accountability, and that technical objections or unnecessary impediments will not prevent the proper investigation of their accounts (Godshalk v. Northampton County,
The presumption from the reports is that the officers' accounts were examined and found correct. If for any reason the county commissioners or taxpayers thought there was material error in the reports, this could have been inquired into by exceptions and appeal to the common pleas under Section 379 of the General County Law. In the interest of establishing a sound financial status and a definitely fixed liability, the law requires those desiring to attack the controller's report to act within a specified time. If no action is taken, the conclusion of the report as affecting each officer whose account is audited is to be treated as a final judgment, and cannot be disturbed by any court unless fraud or collusion *494 appears, or circumstances exist from which there is a natural inference of fraud.
While the petition to strike off does not allege fraud on the part of the accounting officers, the established rule is that where there is concealment akin to fraud, there may be an appeal from the controller's report nunc pro tunc. SeeO'Gara et al., County Comrs., v. Phillips,
Appellee insists that the incorrect recital in the reports of the statutory authority by which they were filed was fatal. The controller stated that the Act of June 27, 1895, P. L. 403, was the effective act; it had been superseded by Section 345 of the General County Law. But this did not cause the reports to be a nullity. The court will take judicial notice of public statutes: Goldberg v. Friedrich,
Considerable stress is placed on the fact the reports were not filed or published during the month of January in each year, although Section 345 specifically states that they are to be made in that month. It does not appear just what caused the delay, but this omission to file within the month of January will not prevent the reports from being valid. See Com. ex rel.Fortney v. Wozney,
The statute directs the report to be made to the court of common pleas. Filing with the prothonotary was filing with the court. He is its appropriate officer. The general practice has been to file the reports of controllers or auditors with that officer. In Godshalk v. Northampton County,
The court below should have dismissed the proceedings as instituted, but under our broad powers we will enter such order. The petition to strike off is denied.
Decree reversed, all proceedings to have the controllers' reports for the years 1932 to 1936 stricken off are dismissed without prejudice, costs to be paid by appellees.
"The controller shall also, annually, within sixty days after the close of the fiscal year, make a report to the Department of Internal Affairs of the financial condition of the county in manner and form required to be made by the auditors of the county under the provisions of section three hundred sixty-four of this act, and subject to the penalties provided in said section for refusing or neglecting to make said report."