*1 Betty Umphrey, Wallace UMPHREY and wife; Horn;
husband Diane M. Stoke, Dorothy
John E. C. Stoke and wife;
husband E. Rower and Don Rower, wife;
Irene husband and Gene Morgan Morgan,
F. hus Donna J. wife; Wayne Frovarp
band and H. wife; Frovarp,
Thelma husband and Evans, Jr.,
Fred L. and Vivian M. Ev
ans, wife, husband and Plaintiffs-Re
spondents,
Gary R. and Kathleen A. SPRINKEL wife;
Sprinkel, husband and Northwest Inc., Estate, Defendants-Appel
Real
lants.
Nos. 13601.
Supreme Court Idaho.
Oct. 1983. Rehearing Dec.
On *3 d’Alene, Brown, for de-
R. Romer Coeur Sprinkels. fendants-appellants Smith, Sidney & E. Smith of McCabe Hosack, d’Alene, and G. Martin Web- Coeur Lukins, Shine, Annis, McKay, Van er Rein, Wash., Spokane, for defend- Martin & ant-appellant Real Estate. Northwest L. Michael Verbillis and Norman Gis- J. sel, d’Alene, plaintiffs-respon- for Coeur Umphrey, et dents al. Wilde, d’Alene, plain-
Larry A. Coeur tiffs-respondents Hannas.
SHEPARD, Justice. appeal a This is an for fraudu- defendants-appellants against made in the sale of misrepresentations lent part, reverse property. We affirm real remand. part, Gary defendant-appellant interest in a a one-half Sprinkel purchased acres, known as of land about parcel His father and Mountain Ranch. Lone purchasers of the other mother were property was a interest. On one-half been drilled as an Originally it had well. feet, it depth but never to a oil well oil, to a it was converted any produced shortly before 400 feet well at about water bought property. At Sprinkels purchase Edward Sprinkels’ time of land adjoining piece Brown owned pursu- using from the well water in 1961 right to him to a sold ant water the then gave owners Lone Mountain Ranch. REPA up on the idea of a master sole system. residence on Lone Sprinkel Mountain water next a formulated also used water The plan, Ranch well. apparently without consultation with supplied at well, well that time no other users or existing the two users of put residence, uses. the surround- system a water for the Lone Mountain acres, ten ing rights using “all ... water tracts the well on property, his appurtenant system used thereon or thereto” were give water he would then to REPA Antrims, operate. deeded to the who also obtained Expansion of the capaci- well’s house, beyond ty existing an easement for access to the well required two users property casing well itself retained that the well perforated. REPA Sprinkels. Approximately two members possibility, discussed the re- but March, years accompanying jected later that land and it in meeting because Hannas, rights potential liability sold to one water existing users *4 in plaintiffs perforation destroyed of the this action. The extent the well if the well’s right capacity. Sprinkel retained the Sprinkels began of the water Meanwhile in- well, any, conveyance stalling system using in the if after that a water the well. At directly existing and not at issue in this trial he contended that unclear the two had one-third in lawsuit. users interests the well’s only, while equipment rights he retained all Sprinkel bought Gary In defendant to the water in well. shares in defendant Real some Northwest Company. Sprinkel attempted grant Later he his Estate obtained had each license purchasers associate broker’s and one-half own- of the user tracts a Vzoth Estate, Inc., ership water, in as Northwest Real interest in the well in the event that posts as an accept well officer director REPA did not A well. water 1970’s, company. early system eventually In the be- constructed, he was awith gan separate the Lone pump market Mountain Ranch from and inferior to that property. Lone Mountain Ranch sub- existing was used two water users. into 40-acre tracts” divided “investment REPA did not take over the well and even- ten-acre “user tracts” and listed for tually Sprinkel’s disbanded. At trial evi- Sprinkel’s prospec- purportedly with sale Northwest. dence plain- showed that the stated that user tracts would have using tus tiffs were more water than were good year-round road” “domestic “a households in surrounding communities. supplied prior evidence, REPA water ... available Plaintiffs’ however, indicated that 1st, 1973.” to June there was insufficient daily, water to bathe toilets, to flush their to wash dishes and acronym Ramsey Envi- REPA is an clothes, provide or to water for their trees Protection Association. It was ronmental gardens. Their evidence also showed up land of local owners desirous of made only that when two households used the securing supply a for the water area. well, water had be rationed if used to in part was formed the latter REPA gardens. water lawns and incorporated March, 1972, in and was Gary Sprinkel moving plaintiffs as its purchased with force all “user tracts” president. The original first idea eight within the first months of 1973. large a supply purchases water to area of some 5000 These apparently were land sale September, 1972, Sprink- to 6000 acres. requiring continuing contracts payments to el a letter from Sprinkel. received the Farmers Home bought Plaintiffs-Hannas three informing tracts, Administration him totalling acres, investment, that REPA as an any grants would not receive or prior federal in purchase addition to their of the apply any loans. No effort was made to surrounding purchased house and ten acres and, date, agency federal other from the Antrims. Plaintiffs-Rowers bought District, Plaintiffs-Morgans acres. are read a limited number bought acres. The other five five families of stock the start of instructions before plaintiffs bought who are ten acres each. proceedings. Instruction No. stated that sales, Sprinkel of these some acted di- party asserting the truth of a fact must agent; others, rectly as the real estate proposition probably show that the is more employees of various Northwest acted as not, preponderance true than a of the evi- agents. purchased Plaintiff-Horn her tract objected dence instruction. Defendants mother, employee with her of another grounds on the that in instruction a company, acting as real estate the realtor. proof fraud case the burden of is clear and convincing The court for road evidence. overruled Sprinkel contracted construction objection May grounds or June of that this the contractor on the topsoil twelve from the stripped inches preliminary instruction to orient the jury roadway replaced area and it designated and that he them at would instruct (rock pit varying inches of run with six of the close trial that the elements of fraud up than % of an inch to 12 size from less require convincing clear and evidence. diameter). The contractor testi- inches This was done Instruction No. 10. In- county specifications required six fied that repeated struction No. 7 was not at the rock, Sprinkel of crushed but inches more close trial. did that further work. not authorize times defendants moved several Sprinkel, contend that All suit, claiming it was dismissal barred *5 acting his di- agents of Northwest under year the two of limitations for statute representations rection, made fraudulent malpractice rather than professional the adequacy of the road and water the about year This three limit for fraud. motion August filed supply. The Hannas suit on Sprinkel, denied. the court was As to be- 6, 1975, plaintiffs remainder of the and the that, selling his lieved because he was own days a later. On the 16th of filed suit few malpractice property, stat- professional the against August, Sprinkels the filed suit the Northwest apply ute did to him. was Hannas, seeking of con- forfeiture the land Sprinkel and in- found to be too tied to payments, to make a notice tract for failure conduct, continuing in a course volved 1, having July been on sent forfeiture as the motion to and the court denied 1975, October, the cases were 1975. Northwest as well. consolidated. objected to Instruction Both defendants of defendant-Northwest Upon motion jury they the could No. which told Estate, court the the ordered that Real “special consequential” damages segregated from the fore- be fraud cases fraud, asserting they defendants if found suit, the former to tried with be closure with the conflicted out- that the instruction pretrial en- An extensive order was first. damages. The court over- of-pocket rule of 18, 1979, framing April the admitted tered that grounds the the objection this on ruled facts, as as well the exhibits disputed and damages to to com- plaintiffs were entitled to which were and those there admitted 2nd, road granted repair of the and May pensate them for the objections. On working. to exclude from the fraud keep system motion North- Hanna’s water notice of forfeiture evidence Sprinkel objected case Instruc- and also west grounds that the Sprinkel, on the sent 24A, jury prop- No. told the tion injecting and segregated that trials was element of er nonperformance into the trial the issue price contract and the difference between deciding jury unduly confuse would use they could actual value and that fraud. the issue of repair determining reasonable cost Appellants asserted that the difference. jury on began with selection trial land,” repairs to “raw and no can be made In the First Judicial November that duplicative this instruction of In- actually was submitted to the court were those objection struction No. 24. This over- during made were not a deliberation ruled without comment. Commenting on the diffi reconstruction. attorneys distinguishing culty com have argument, closing attorney his pensatory punitive damages, the court proposed other than the Hannas entirely proper said he that believed it jury they away profit take to consider the calculations to case Sprinkel from imposing puni- a means as “clarify purpose the verdict not for the tive suggested He con- impeaching verdict.” court then sider profit Sprinkel on obtained compensatory category only in the left subdivision, entire Lone Mountain Ranch price between difference contract actu including parcels the 40-acre investment value, consequential damages. al All not at attorney issue in this case. The damages, including objected Northwest other classification of grounds fees, parcels supplied the 40-acre out-of-pocket attorney’s “person were not to with part (which water and were not of this suit. mental” court charac The court objection, stating overruled the anguish”), and the lh terized “mental up jury “it’s remember the evi- fees, contingency attorney’s were shifted dence.” closing argument, In his North- punitive damage heading, under the as the west’s attorney did not issue of address the support was “clear” evidence those ele punitive damages. Sprinkel’s attorney did designated “puni The amount ments. respond claim, punitive damage but ($6,812.50each) damages, tive” the court argument made concerning no the 40-acre clearly attempt determined was to take parcels. investment Sprinkel’s profit some the Lone Mountain The total subdivision. amount of 8,1979,
On December jury back came changed. with awarded was not On unanimous verdict for each plaintiffs. request March entered At the the court another of Northwest’s counsel, polled. reducing $14,- recovery by The court order Hanna’s then asked all to remain in the had which amount the awarded as *6 room attorneys while the examined the ver- anticipated profits. loss of This reduction dict objections forms. No were made. On longer appeal. is no at issue on 12th, December the moved to Defendants moved for a clarify” “amend and the verdict based grounds and a N.O.V. new trial on the that jurors’ affidavits. Attached affi- to those by the the action was barred statute of davits computations jur- were used the again limitations. This motion was denied. ors in arriving at their verdict. All these forfeiture, In the action for which was identical, of exception with the one abeyance cases, pending held the fraud juror computations whose slightly. varied summary judgment the court entered plaintiff affidavits also stated that Sprinkel against 18, 1980, Hanna was Hanna on March awarded an additional sum for profits. loss of anticipated thereby declaring the contract to be forfeit- ed. 20, 1979, On December entered
an amending order verdict Sprinkel ap- Defendants and Northwest giving judgment plain- in favor of all the peal, asserting assignments of numerous jointly severally against tiffs defend- error. ants. face The court believed from the of
the verdict that the as to confused I. opposed what constituted Appellants punitive argue first as real had that estate that the agents spent a time in considerable amount of and brokers are covered calculating professional malpractice The calculations statute of limita- 706 §
tions, 5-219(4), performance professional that I.C. this statute of service. of with two-year applies its limitation rather part of We decline that fraud is to hold fraud, than the statute of limitations for ordinary profes- of performance of course § 5-218(4), three-year I.C. with its limit and sional Hence we believe that services. upon discovery of the accrual fraud. We scope does of fraud fall within disagree. particularly statute. true since the This is itself fraud in a statute mentions different Assuming, deciding, without that context, by providing that fraudulent con- agents profes real and brokers estate are wrongful of act” shall cealment “the toll § 5-219(4), purpose sionals for the of I.C. statute To hold of limitations. that hold that an nevertheless we action for fraud, appel- “wrongful act” includes misrepresentation fraudulent does not fall request, produce lants an anomalous would protective pro within the embrace of the legislature result that could not have malpractice statute. fessional As this i.e., intended, underlying fraud that before, gist Court has stated of a “[t]he limitations, would not toll the statute malpractice negligence action is ...” but fraudulent concealment Howard, 412, 416, Trimming v. 52 Idaho gov- principal fraud would rule do so. The (1932). An 16 P.2d 662 action for erning give statutory interpretation is fraud or deceit involves more than mere intent. Gavica v. legislature’s to the effect action, tort negligence. While it is a it is Hanson, (1980); 101 P.2d 861 Idaho 608 tort, more in the nature of an intentional 87, 481 Dooley, v. Summers 94 Idaho P.2d speaker knowledge requiring that the have (1971). construing a statute this falsity representation’s ignorance used, truth, may language its as well as intent the Court examine See Faw v. representation upon. relied interpreta- proposed reasonableness of Greenwood, 387, 613 101 Idaho P.2d 1338 tions, policy behind the statutes. King, (1980); Smith 100 Idaho Hanson, supra; Gavica v. Summers v. (1979); Siqueiros, Mitchell v. P.2d Dooley, supra. Language of a particular (1978); gener see in a section need not be viewed vacuum. ally W. Prosser, Handbook the Law applicable And all sections statutes must Torts, Ed.1971). (4th at 683-736 addi together be construed so as determine tion, plaintiff prove must all elements Magnuson v. Ida- legislature’s intent. convincing op clear evidence as Comm’n, ho State Tax posed stringent preponderance less (1976). P.2d ordinary standard used in the evidence Greenwood, negligence cases. Faw v. su therefore, hold, We action Hence, pra; King, supra. Smith v. we fraud or is covered the statute deceit *7 fraud that an action for and deceit believe § fraud, 5-218(4), of limitations for I.C. purview malpractice of a is not within the limitations rather than statute of for the action. § 5-219(4). professional malpractice, I.C. decision, legislature policy The has made a Neither do we believe that the approve, provide of which we to accrual legislature produce intended to a different upon of the cause of for fraud dis action by language choice of I.C. result its covery constituting the the facts fraud. § portion 5-219(4). pertinent of that The upon realization This is founded the ‘professional term provides, statute “[t]he fraud, an intentional and often orchestrat malpractice’ used herein refers as scheme, ordinarily ed more difficult to perform wrongful acts or omissions the negligent injury. discover than a Our hold ance While professional services ...” legisla ing today is consistent with misrepresentations conced fraudulent are ture’s clear to afford victims of intent by edly wrongful, the statute to be covered more to discover the course fraud time which must be in the acts or omissions jury’s The exploita- contingency attorney’s led fees. machinations which to their lumped damages tion. verdict all of these into damage compensatory category except brought These actions all were within $6,812.50 each under the years plaintiffs purchased their three after punitive. examining category After any lots. of dis- Under conceivable date affidavits, the court shifted the fraud, covery of the defendants statute out-of-pocket fees, personal attorney’s of limitations has not run on their claims. § 5-218(4). damages, contingen- and mental and the Vs I.C. cy punitive damage fee amount into the
II. plain- category. The total amount due each by major issue second raised changed tiff was not this action. appellants propriety concerns the parties agree rule in that the shifting
trial
certain ele
court’s action
may
Idaho is
consider
ments
from the
that courts
affidavits
was,
damage category
punitive damage
clarify
order to
what the verdict
appellants argue
category.
Initially
that it
impeach
but not to
the verdict. Glennon
was error for the trial
to use
court
732,
(1932);
Fisher, 51
v.
enable filed the to reflect true elements of from improper the to Speaking verdict. directly, this court proper category. the worthy It is of note Drainage District v. No. 2 Extension changed that the court none of those indi- Co., 847, Ditch 32 Ida. 182 said Pac. they vidual amounts as were shifted from page at 325: another, one category to nor was there change question impeaching
‘This is not a in the final a awarded each verdict, correcting plaintiff. but it to conform to The court’s action thus seems was actually upon what jury’s found and intended to less the intrusive verdict than by be returned jury. approved by the The rule is that this Court in prior two may permit the court jury fortify the to Drainage cases. Dist. No. 2 v. Exten- Co., its verdict or to by show the affidavits of supra, sion approved Ditch this Court jurors they the the verdict which found amending the verdict to increase the dam- return, intended may to and this ages to awarded conform to the intent ” done after discharged.’ have been jury. Fisher, the In Glennon v. supra, approved amending this Court the verdict Here, the jurors affidavits of all twelve defendants, against from each of four $125 that a clearly show jury unanimous intend- joint to liability. $500 severable compensate ed the for the enu- those the two cases defendants’ financial damages they merated had suffered at the liability greatly the was increased. Under hands defendants. items Those facts of instant case the the defendants’ the court shifted away from Hence, liability change. total did not we damages into the punitive realm of dam- unique believe that under circumstanc- ages could properly not be denominated as case, by the court es did not err compensatory damages under laws of verdict, clarifying except amending given. this state or under the instructions (see VI, infra). as set forth herein section only method The which court could jury’s effectuate intent to award dam-
ages injuries for those include them III. punitive damages. Appellants next assert improperly excluded evidence of began
This trial on November notice of that had been sent and a verdict forfeiture was not until De- returned 8,1979. plaintiff disagree. Hanna. We We first dispute cember consumed six- trials for fraud severed days teen seventeen note that the time and trial resulted a trial action motion transcript over 2750 the foreclosure Northwest, pages. As the court did receive the defendant defendant Sprinkel objection. Appellants motion amend the after the no verdict until made discharged, that, judge although chose to claim the actions were tried salvage this substantial of time separately, investment the forfeiture should have been jurors litigants calculating effort considered in altering the disagree. verdict to conform to unan- fraud. We intent jurors. imous Because In the recent case of Nelson v. Arm- discharged, had been the court did not (1978), strong, 99 Idaho P.2d choice, preferable, have the which we deem that, unanimously in an this Court held sending back to correct its own a joined action in which fraud claim is with verdict, Johnson, as was done in Brown v. action, deficiency the trial court “should (1970). 2d When Utah P.2d 942 [plaintiff’s] damages calculate verdict, they returned their mis- regard unpaid fraud without balance takenly, that it re- honestly, but believed Id., contract.” at decision, but, shown flected their Bangart, P.2d at Accord Lamb affidavits, actually their it did not. (Utah 1974). Hence, the no- tice of was irrelevant to Hanna’s power court was within to make forfeiture its action moving for fraud and to therefor the ministerial correction of certain
709 properly and was Any excluded. deficien- V. in the cies amount due the seller are be challenges Appellant Sprinkel also separate calculated and in a considered ac- by of offered sufficiency the evidence
tion, here, counterclaim, as or in a as in carry respondent Horn to her burden Diane Armstrong, v. supra. Nelson on the principally relies proof. Sprinkel of realtor mother acted as
fact that Horn’s
pur
in which Horn
for the transaction
IV.
Ranch.
parcel of Lone Mountain
chased a
appellant Sprinkel argues
Next
representations
The record shows that
by giving
that
trial court erred
an
were
supply
the road and water
about
jury,
objection
instruction to the
his
over
at
of
by
agent
directly to Horn
made
beginning
trial,
which stated that
spoke
that she
defendant
Northwest and
party
proof
with the burden of
had to
is
There also
Sprinkel about
water.
carry
by
that
preponderance
burden
a
of
mother, acting as her
Horn's
evidence that
plaintiff
the evidence. The
in a
case
fraud
misrepresentations
agent, received
proving
of
all
bears
burden
of
elements
to re
passed
them on
the defendants
by
and convincing
fraud
clear
evidence.
could
found
spondent
have
Horn.
Greenwood,
v.
387,
made,
Faw
101 Idaho
613
that
representations were
that those
(1980);
false,
1338
King,
P.2d
Smith
in
they
v.
100 Idaho
defendants
were
that
331,
(1979).
just
gave
heard.
general
the court
ac
difference between the
ground
then
spe
rules and
instructed more
purchase
value
the land
tual
cifically
stringent
that the more
burden
conse
price.
These
awarded
proof applied
nine essential elements
by the
quential
borne
relate
costs
fraud.
have
Other courts
concluded
plaintiffs maintaining
repairing
general
that such
instructions followed
v.
system.
road
the water
Jensen
specific
more
instructions on the burden of Bledsoe,
(1979),
error,
proof do not constitute reversible
this Court concluded that
trial
given
even when both are
at the close
properly
having
included the cost
well
Saxton,
the evidence.
243 Ga.
sewage
system
Freeman v.
disposal
drilled and
install
(1979);
part
plaintiff’s
representations. consequential involving The relatively unsophisti- dam- viewed as ages here are no They represent different. purchasers property cated of real who were expenditures plaintiffs money deliberately scheme, led into a fraudulent attempting bring and labor in the road profit. jury justi- conducted for up represented to the standard it was to be. taking in fied into account the defendants’ effect, expenditures these increased the property entire scheme to sell at Lone purchase price plaintiffs paid and Ranch, Mountain which was only not their properly therefore were awarded as com- area, just subdivision in the rather than pensatory damages as an element of the portions fraudulent of the scheme at issue purchase price difference between the deterring this suit. The chances of fu- property. Indeed, the actual value of their accordingly materially ture misconduct are reported Professor Prosser has that in the Clark, Dodge, increased. Boise Inc. v. su- minority of states which follow the out-of- pra; Stolworthy, supra. Cox v. pocket damage cases, remedy in fraud Idaho, recovery consequential does It is well established this Prosser, permitted. is W. Hand- punitive damages may that state be award Torts, (4th book on the Law at 735 ed. when ed the defendant has committed 1971). Co., Jolley Puregro supra; fraud. v. appellants argue Next that the court Clark, Dodge, supra. Boise Inc. v. Here a permitted Umphrey’s should not have coun- misrepre unanimous found fraudulent argue jury, objection, sel to over Hence, punitive damages sentations. are Sprinkel’s profit on the entire Lone Moun- appropriate. plaintiffs The various tain Ranch away, should be taken rather awarded from merely profit parcels than on the ten at $4,200 $14,000 punitive dam over Appellants issue the lawsuit. contend $21,000 $30,000.1 In ages Jolley v. argument this caused the to un- Co., supra, and Puregro Cox v. Stolwor duly inflate the thy, supra, it was stated that when exem justified, plary punitive damages are general purpose primary plaintiffs should at least receive the cost of punitive damages an award for behind is to fees, fees, expert litiga attorneys witness happening again deter similar conduct from costs, expenditures made tion and other Hanson, in the future. v. 101 Ida Gavica plaintiffs. Here it is clear from the (1980); Pureg ho P.2d 861 Jolley 608 v. plaintiffs did award affidavits that the Co., (1972); P.2d ro However, attorneys’ additional their fees. Stolworthy, Cox v. 94 Idaho 496 P.2d in certain exemplary can be made (1972). exemplary A determination of Jolley Puregro circumstances. v. limited damages requires an examination of the Co., Stolworthy, supra.2 supra; Cox v. total circumstances of the case. Boise of those situations which additional Clark, 902; One Dodge, Inc. v. appropriate are is when the defend (1969). awards A defendant’s financial P.2d 551 prac engaged deceptive business determining ant may be considered in status danger operated profit posing any tices damage award will have whether general public. Dodge, Inc. v. Boise Stolworthy, effect. v. su- deterrent Cox Clark, supra? Stolworthy, importantly, supra; case could Cox pra. More awards to the can be Frovarp 1. The ultimate 5,609.00 21,618.50 27,227.50 6,200.00 21,815.50 Evans 28,015.50 as follows: summarized $189,748.10. for a total 14,822.00 45,489.15 60,311.15 Hanna Compensatory Plaintiff Punitive Total Damages Damages Damages Umphrey 6,200.00 21,815.50 28,015.50 5,650.00 21,632.50 Horn 27,282.50 Hanna, damage punitive award to as not- Stoke 5,556.80 21,534.50 27,091.30 $14,800. before, was reduced ed 5,200.00 21,482.50 Rower 26,682.50 Stolworthy, supra, Although was recent- Cox v. 4,262.50 21,170.80 25,433.30 Morgan out-of-pocket practice falsely category believe
We
defendant’s
ed in its
of conse-
representing
quential
an amount
building lots would be
of between
$1,550
$1,500
*11
supplied
per plaintiff,
adequate
with
and access
which
water
of the
squarely
deceptive
amount each
had advanced
falls
within the
ambit
begin
attorney’s fees to
practices in
for
lawsuit.
which
award of
business
According
computations
in
punitive
set out
damages is authorized.
additional
affidavits,
for
jurors’
those advances
argued
remaining question
attorney’s
incorporated
fees were also
into
is
appellants whether those
dam
additional
figure
plaintiff,
their final
for each
from
ages
testimony
are excessive. The
showed
figure
computed
then
an
plaintiffs,
these
of rather
all
modest
attorney’s
additional one-third add-on for
means, were induced to
to these
move
lots
Thus,
attorney’s
fees.
fees award was
country, only
they
in
to find that
had
duplicative
re-
improperly
and should be
inadequate
They
water.
could not flush
duced.
days
gar
toilets for
their
at a time. Their
addition,
$6,500
trees,
added
and fruit
typical
dens
amenities of
plaintiff
to the award for each
in
country living,
the conse
withered and
from lack
died
quential damages category
Having
investments,
for “mental”
water.
made
their
damages, although
they could not
had not been
afford to move elsewhere
instructed
that issue
the court. The
unhappy
had to remain
under these
general
living
recovery
rule
had
conditions.
cannot be
Given the nature of the
anguish
for mental
in
As
injury
fraud cases.
purchasers
inflicted on these
and the
§ 141(f) (1943):
stated in
C.J.S.
37
Fraud
that the
or
possibility
defendants
someone
position,
else
defendants’
with substan
“[Rjecovery cannot be
had
an action
parcels of land to
tial
subdivide
injury
plaintiff’s
for
for
feelings
deceit
state, might
misrepresent
feel tempted to
public disgrace
incurred through be
parcels
water available for their
ing
through
representa
deceived
false
injury
pur
similar
on other innocent
inflict
tions,
anxiety, worry,
or for
and harass
chasers,
exemplary damage
the additional
arising
fraud,
annoy
ment
or from
were not
See Boise
awards
excessive.
inconvenience.”
ance or
Clark,
Dodge,
supra,
Inc. v.
which this
jurisdictions
A
follow
a
number
this or
upheld jury’s
puni
a
of total
Court
See,
Slonim,
e.g.,
similar rule.
Moore v.
$12,500
damages
compensatory
tive
(D.C.Conn.),
524
F.Supp.
affd,
426
562 F.2d
$2,050
case,
damages of
in a similar
al
Cir.1977)
(2nd
(damages
38
for
dis-
mental
though
day-to-day living
conditions of
ordinarily
tress
available in
not
a cause
nearly
injured parties were
as dra
not
fraud);
action for business
Kantor v. Com-
matically
puni
affected. Here
none
Corp.,
F.Supp.
et Press Books
187
321
damage
times
awards were six
tive
(S.D.N.Y.1960) (damages for
an-
mental
award,
Dodge.
as in Boise
fraud);
guish not recoverable in action for
Hence,
damage
punitive
while these
Brown,
Sierra National Bank v.
18 Cal.
insubstantial,
are far from
awards
App.3d 98,
Cal.Rptr.
(1971)(mental
95
742
be characterized as excessive.
cannot
an
distress
element of
however,
agree,
fraud);
1,
defendants-
Ziegler,
We
with the
v.
291
Chandler
88 Colo.
(instruction
(1930)
appellants’
allowing
contention that certain
P. 822
addition-
jury have been
annoyance
awarded
al
and inconven-
Specifical-
error);
duplicated
inappropriate.
or are
ience
to constitute
held
reversible
Crockett,
45,
record
includ-
51 Hawaii
P.2d
ly, the
indicates
Ellis v.
451
Verdes,
ly
part (Cheney
general
Palos
tive
and not to the
overruled
v.
law
661),
punitive damages
such action
P.2d
announced in Cox v.
Stolwor-
only
puni-
thy, supra,
to the measure of allowable
and reiterated herein.
related
fraud,
of the court below is af-
(1969)(in
may
cases of
there
except
respects
in all
its award of
firmed
recovery
anguish
no
for mental
or humilia-
regard
damages, and in that
is reversed.
inflicted);
intentionally
tion not
Harsche
remand, the trial court is instructed to
(1953) On
699,
continued
adherence
the rule makes lit-
entire
remand
matter for an
new trial
Schultz,
tle sense.”
resulted trial court from the fact that the
did consti- as to what instruct compensatory damages
tuted
in this case.
Co.,
Shields v. Morton Chemical
(1974),
even each the instructions improp-
to the jury proper, in effect an
er grouping of them constituted reversible
error. How more we re- much so should
verse the be- this case instruct, adequately
cause of the failure to
the obvious confusion found both Court,
trial court and this and the rework-
ing verdicts based affidavits notice, jurors, taken without when the party opportunity
other denied
attempt to the same elicit information
open court, partic- parties both where could
ipate.
Accordingly, I dissent. WOODVINE, L.
Richard
Claimant-Appellant, DAIRY, INC., Employer, and
TRIANGLE Compa-
Argonaut Insurance Northwest
ny, Surety, Defendants-Respondents. *16 14436.
No.
Supreme of Idaho. Court
7,May 1984. July
Rehearing Denied