{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas in favor of plaintiffappellee, Thomas Ulrich. This court affirms.
I
{¶ 2} This case has suffered from a lengthy procedural history. This court summarized this case’s pre-2005 history in Mercedes-Benz’s 2007 appeal as follows:
Appellee, Thomas Ulrich, filed a complaint against [Mercedes-Benz] regarding a Mercedes-Benz automobile, alleging two counts of breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and one count alleging a violation of Ohio’s lemon law pursuant to R.C. 1345.72. [Mercedes-Benz] answered, generally denying the allegations. [Mercedes-Benz] filed a motion for summary judgment, and [Ulrich] filed a motion for partial summary judgment, solely on the lemon law claim. The trial court granted [Ulrich]’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding the vehicle to be a lemon as a matter of law, and entered judgment in favor of [Ulrich] in the amount of $155,675.53.[1 ] The trial court further scheduled the remaining two breach of warranty claims for trial. [Ulrich], however, dismissed the remaining two counts without prejudice.
[Mercedes-Benz] appealed from the trial court’s judgment, and [Ulrich] filed a cross-appeal. This Court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Ulrich v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC [(“Ulrich I”)], 9th Dist. No. 22224,
The parties agreed to allow the matter to go to a jury trial with the magistrate presiding. At the conclusion of trial, the jury entered a verdict in
In its judgment entry, the trial court stated that judgment on [Ulrichj’s request for attorney fees would be entered after a hearing on that issue.
[Mercedes-Benz] filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment. This Court dismissed the appeal by journal entry for lack of a final, appealable order. Ulrich v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Jan. 4, 2006), 9th Dist. No. 22970.
[Upon remand,] [t]he magistrate held a hearing on the issue of attorney fees. On June 29, 2006, the magistrate issued a decision in which he awarded attorney fees to [Ulrich] in the amount of $230,370.09. [Mercedes-Benz] filed objections to this decision of the magistrate. [Mercedes-Benz] also filed a motion for a new trial. On August 8, 2006, the magistrate issued a decision, denying the motion for new trial. On August 9, 2006, the magistrate issued a nunc pro tunc order, in which the magistrate ordered that the caption of the August 8, 2006 entry be corrected to read: “ ‘ORDER’ and not MAGISTRATE’S DECISION.”
On August 28, 2006, the magistrate issued a decision on the jury verdict, in which he recommended that the trial court enter judgment in favor of [Ulrich] in the amount of $160,000.00. This decision did not contain any language as required by newly-effective Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii), “indieat[ing] conspicuously that a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, * * * unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).”
On September 6, 2006, [Mercedes-Benz] filed a notice of appeal. On October 20, 2006, this Court dismissed the appeal by journal entry for lack of jurisdiction. Ulrich v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LL[C] (Oct. 20, 2006), 9th Dist. No. 23401.
On December 1, 2006, the trial court issued a judgment order, ruling on [Mercedes-Benz]’s objections to the magistrate’s decision regarding the award of attorney fees to [Ulrich]. The trial court overruled [Mercedes-Benz’s] objections, noted that [Mercedes-Benz] had not objected to the judgment awarding compensatory damages to [Ulrich], and entered judgment in favor of
(Footnote omitted.) Ulrich v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C. [(“Ulrich II”)], 9th Dist. No. 23550,
{¶ 3} On September 26, 2007, this court reversed Ulrich’s judgment for $160,000 in compensatory damages and $230,370.09 in attorney fees and remanded the matter because the magistrate and trial court did not prepare their decisions in accordance with Civ.R. 53 and allow Mercedes-Benz time to file objections to the magistrate’s decision. Id. at ¶ 16. Upon remand, the magistrate issued a decision recommending that the trial court award Ulrich $160,000 in compensatory damages, $230,370.09 in attorney fees, and costs. On December 26, 2007, Mercedes-Benz filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision, and Mercedes-Benz appealed. This court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. Ulrich v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C. (Jan. 6, 2009), 9th Dist. No. 24548.
{¶ 4} After this court’s dismissal, the trial court entered judgment independently of the magistrate, again awarding Ulrich $160,000 in damages, $230,370.09 in attorney fees, and costs. On March 13, 2009, Mercedes-Benz filed a motion for a new trial. The court denied the motion on April 1, 2009. Mercedes-Benz now appeals from the trial court’s judgment and raises four assignments of error for our review.
II
Assignment of Error Number One
The trial court erred in denying [Mercedes-Benz’s] motion for directed verdict and in entering the jury’s verdict in appellee’s favor, because appellee presented no objective evidence that his vehicle contained any defect constituting a nonconformity as required by O.R.C. §§ 1345.71 and 1345.72.
{¶ 5} In its first assignment of error, Mercedes-Benz argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for directed verdict. Specifically, Mercedes-Benz argues that Ulrich failed to set forth objective evidence of a nonconformity that caused substantial impairment to his vehicle and that Mercedes-Benz was unwilling or unable to fix. We disagree.
{¶ 6} Generally, this court reviews a trial court’s action with respect to a magistrate’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Fields v. Cloyd, 9th Dist. No. 24150,
When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue.
“A motion for a directed verdict assesses the sufficiency of the evidence, not the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” Kane v. O’Day, 9th Dist. No. 23225,
{¶ 7} R.C. 1345.72 contains Ohio’s lemon law and provides as follows:
(A) If a new motor vehicle does not conform to any applicable express warranty and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer during the period of one year following the date of original delivery or during the first eighteen thousand miles of operation, whichever is earlier, the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer shall make any repairs as are necessary to conform the vehicle to such express warranty, notwithstanding the fact that the repairs are made after the expiration of the appropriate time period.
(B) If the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer is unable to conform the motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting any nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts, the manufacturer, at the consumer’s option * * *, either shall replace the motor vehicle with a new motor vehicle acceptable to the consumer or shall accept return of the vehicle from the consumer and refund each of the following:
(1) The full purchase price;
(2) All incidental damages, including, but not limited to, any fees charged by the lender or lessor for making or canceling the loan or lease, and any expenses incurred by the consumer as a result of the nonconformity, such as charges for towing, vehicle rental, meals, and lodging.
It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken by the manufacturer, its dealer, or its authorized agent to conform a motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty if, during the period of one year following the date of original delivery or during the first eighteen thousand miles of operation, whichever is earlier, any of the following apply:
(A) Substantially the same nonconformity has been subject to repair three or more times and either continues to exist or recurs;
(B) The vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for a cumulative total of thirty or more calendar days;
(C) There have been eight or more attempts to repair any nonconformity;
(D) There has been at least one attempt to repair a nonconformity that results in a condition that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury if the vehicle is driven, and the nonconformity either continues to exist or recurs.
R.C. 1345.73. “A nonconforming motor vehicle is one that, from the consumer’s perspective, suffers from any defect or condition which substantially impairs its use, value, or safety and does not conform to the express warranty of the manufacturer or distributor.” Gray v. Chrysler Corp. (Apr. 11, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 20204,
{¶ 8} Ulrich testified that he purchased his Mercedes-Benz CL55 for $120,086.75 in January 2002. Ulrich stored the car for the winter and began to drive it once the weather conditions became more favorable. Ulrich testified that he first began experiencing problems with the car on June 17, 2002, when dashboard indicator lights illuminated for the car’s cruise-control system, electronic stability program, braking system, and tire-pressure sensor. The indicators directed Ulrich to take the car to a dealership. Ulrich immediately took the car to the dealership but turned it off when he arrived. Upon inspection, the dealership failed to find any problems with the car or any stored codes in the car’s control unit that might indicate an electronic signal out of normal operating range. The dealership informed Ulrich that if he experienced problems again, he would have to bring the car in and leave it running for the dealership to conduct its tests. Approximately two weeks later, Ulrich again experienced problems with the car’s cruise-control system and indicator lights. Ulrich testified that the car repeatedly took itself out of cruise-control mode and indicated that the cruise control was inoperable. Ulrich turned the car off several times and restarted it,
{¶ 9} On August 8, 2002, Ulrich’s cruise-control system malfunctioned during the dealership’s normal business hours, so he took his car there. The dealership diagnosed a problem with one of the car’s electronic switches and ordered a replacement part. Ulrich testified that he dropped the car off and picked it up on the same day, August 30, 2002, after the dealership received and installed the replacement part. That night, the start of Labor Day weekend, Ulrich used the car to go to dinner. After dinner, Ulrich was able to open the car’s door with the car’s keyless system, but none of the car’s lights were operational and the car would not start. According to Ulrich, he did not leave any lights on in the car or otherwise forget to do anything that might drain the battery during the time that he finished dinner. Ulrich phoned Mercedes Roadside Assistance. Because Ulrich did not have a regular key for the car with him, Roadside Assistance took him home and brought him back to his car the next day with the key. Ulrich and Roadside Assistance were able to jump-start the car, and Ulrich drove it to the dealership. Ulrich left the car at the dealership and waited until Tuesday, the day after Labor Day, to inform the dealership what had happened. Ulrich testified that Jeff Huckabone, the service manager for the dealership, told him that the vehicle had stored several low-voltage codes and that he wanted to replace the battery to be safe. The battery was on back order, however, so Ulrich left his car at the dealership. Approximately two weeks later, Ulrich called the dealership, and Huckabone informed him that the battery still had not arrived. Huckabone offered to put “a regular acid battery” in the car and indicated that “it should be okay.” Ulrich indicated that he was uncomfortable with Huckabone’s assertion that it “should be” okay and told Huckabone that he wanted to wait for the back-ordered battery. Ulrich was not able to pick up the car with the new battery installed until September 19, 2002.
{¶ 10} The dealership tested Ulrich’s car again on November 13, 2002 for a “diagnosis assistance system output short,” and on November 18, 2002, Ulrich took the car to the dealership for a variety of problems, including tire cupping, rain-sensor malfunctioning, and a loose fuse-box cover. The dealership kept Ulrich’s vehicle until November 27, 2002, while conducting tests that uncovered numerous fault codes in the overhead control panel. Ulrich picked up the car but returned it to the dealership on December 2, 2002, after having rain-sensor malfunctions. Once again, the dealership attributed the malfunctions to a control-panel problem. The dealership replaced the control panel, and Ulrich picked up the car on December 3, 2002. Ulrich testified that he took the car to the dealership again on December 9, 2002, however, after he could not start it
{¶ 11} Ulrich testified that his car lost a great deal of personal value to him because of its continuous problems and that he had no faith that the car would be reliable upon the expiration of its warranty. Ulrich further testified that in his opinion, the resale value of the car had decreased dramatically because, as a consumer, he would be unwilling to purchase a used high-end vehicle with such an extensive repair history. Finally, Ulrich testified that after 2003 he continued to have problems with the car displaying fault codes and malfunctioning when he used the cruise-control and rain-sensor features.
{¶ 12} John Pejnovic, a technician and parts manager at a Bosch authorized service center, testified that he inspected and tested Ulrich’s car during Ulrich’s first year of ownership. Pejnovic testified that he had 13 years of experience working with Mercedes vehicles and that Ulrich asked him to confirm certain problems that he had experienced with his car. Pejnovic testified that he verified several electrical problems with the car. Specifically, Pejnovic found that the autostart feature in Ulrich’s car failed, the wipers started on their own even when the car was turned off, and the car started on its own after Pejnovic shut it off and began stepping out of it. Pejnovic testified that in his experience, the problems Ulrich had with the car were not “normal problems” for a Mercedes-Benz.
{¶ 13} Ira Zahner testified that he was the market manager for Mercedes-Benz during the time that Ulrich brought his car to the dealership for repairs. According to Zahner, he personally approved the replacement of Ulrich’s rain sensors, tires, battery, and overhead control panel, but did so as an act of goodwill rather than out of necessity. Ulrich denied ever speaking to Zahner about these issues. Likewise, Huckabone testified that he was the one who spoke with Ulrich. Nevertheless, Zahner insisted that he had spoken with Ulrich. When Ulrich had problems with his car’s battery, Zahner told him that the battery did not need to be replaced and that even if Ulrich did insist upon a replacement, a lead-acid battery would operate as well as the gel-mat battery that came with the car. Zahner claimed that Ulrich refused to accept anything other than a gel-mat battery. Similarly, Zahner testified that Ulrich’s complaints led
{¶ 14} Mercedes-Benz argues that the court erred by not granting its motion for a directed verdict because Ulrich failed to present any objective evidence that his vehicle suffered from one or more nonconformities. Yet R.C. 1345.71(E) provides that the term “ ‘[nonconformity’ means any defect or condition that substantially impairs the use, value, or safety of a motor vehicle to the consumer and does not conform to the express warranty of the manufacturer or distributor.” (Emphasis added.) This court has previously recognized that it is not inappropriate to consider subjective evidence when determining whether nonconformities exist. Gray, 9th Dist. No. 20204,
{¶ 15} Next, Mercedes-Benz argues that it was entitled to a directed verdict because all of Ulrich’s concerns involved “fit and finish” items that could not constitute nonconformities. Ulrich testified that apart from the issues that routinely caused him to take his car to the dealership, he also experienced other problems with the car that he simply noted and intended to bring to the dealership’s attention at a later date. For instance, Ulrich experienced problems with the car’s cellular phone system. Ulrich specified these other problems were “minor fit and finish type issues” that he did not believe warranted the immediate attention of the dealership. Accordingly, while Ulrich admitted that some of the problems he had with the car were fit-and-finish items, those were not the items with which he was primarily concerned. Ulrich testified, and the repair orders from Mercedes-Benz confirmed, that he repeatedly experienced problems with
{¶ 16} Finally, Mercedes-Benz argues that it was entitled to directed verdict because Ulrich failed to prove that “any alleged problem with the vehicle remained unresolved after a reasonable number of repair attempts.” The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that whether a vehicle ultimately gets repaired is irrelevant under the lemon law. Royster v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (2001),
Assignment of Error Number Two
The trial court abused its discretion when it permitted appellee to add a common-law breach of warranty claim to his complaint at the time of trial, where he had made no such claim in his original complaint or any amended complaint, and he had failed to reinstate two previously-dismissed statutory breach of warranty claims despite numerous inquires from [Mercedes-Benz],
{¶ 18} In its second assignment of error, Mercedes-Benz argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Ulrich to add a breach-of-warranty claim at trial. We disagree.
{¶ 19} Civ.R. 15 governs the amendment of pleadings. Civ.R. 15(A) allows a party to amend his pleading “as a matter of course” before a designated time period and by leave of court or written consent of his adversary after the designated time period. “Civ.R. 15(B) treats issues that were not raised in the pleadings as if they were so raised, as long as they were tried with the express or implied consent of the parties and substantial prejudice will not arise as a result.” McCartney v. Universal Elec. Power Corp., 9th Dist. No. 21643,
{¶ 20} Ulrich’s original complaint contained three counts: two pertaining to the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act and a third entitled “Ohio Motor Vehicles with Warranty Nonconformities Act Manufacturer.” Ulrich proceeded to trial solely on the third count. Ulrich’s third count provided as follows:
*168 36. [Ulrich] re-alleges and incorporates by reference as though fully set forth herein, all paragraphs of this Complaint set forth above.
37. Pursuant to O.R.C. § 1345.72, Manufacturer has been unable to conform the CL55 to the written warranties issued to [Ulrich] by Manufacturer after a reasonable number of repair attempts to said vehicle.
38. Pursuant to O.R.C. § 1345.72(B), [Ulrich] is entitled to a refund of the full purchase price of the vehicle, including all collateral charges and finance charges, and/or a replacement vehicle, plus all attorney fees and costs.
Immediately before jury selection, the magistrate reviewed the claims pending before the court with both parties. Ulrich’s counsel indicated that Ulrich’s third count essentially contained both a lemon-law claim and a claim for contractual breach of warranty. The following discussion took place on the record:
THE COURT: * * * As I understand, the first two counts in [Ulrich]’s complaint have been withdrawn insofar as the Magnusson-Moss Act goes, and we’re here addressing the circumstances of a third count, which is the so-called Lemon Law. Is that correct, from [Ulrich]?
[ULRICH’S COUNSEL]: The Lemon Law and the contractual breach of warranty.
THE COURT: That’s all rolled into one?
[ULRICH’S COUNSEL]: All rolled into Count Three.
THE COURT: Is that [Mercedes-Benz’s] understanding of the matters?
[MERCEDES-BENZ]: Yes, Your Honor. It’s [Ulrich’s] complaint.
Accordingly, Mercedes-Benz’s counsel agreed that the third count in Ulrich’s complaint contained both a lemon-law claim and a common-law breach-of-warranty claim.
{¶ 21} On appeal, Mercedes-Benz argues that the court abused its discretion by allowing Ulrich to proceed on a breach-of-warranty claim. Despite the aforementioned concession from its counsel that Ulrich’s complaint contained a claim for breach-of-warranty, Mercedes-Benz argues that it repeatedly objected to the inclusion of Ulrich’s breach-of-warranty claim at trial. Yet Mercedes-Benz did not raise any argument with regard to Ulrich’s breach-of-warranty claim until midway through trial when the parties and the magistrate were reviewing proposed jury instructions. At that time, Mercedes-Benz’s counsel argued that Ulrich’s complaint did not contain a breach-of-warranty claim. The court reviewed the record and, noting Mercedes-Benz’s concession at the beginning of trial, ruled that Ulrich could maintain a warranty claim. The court did, however, make two adjustments. First, the court limited Ulrich to a claim for breach of express warranty despite Ulrich’s attempt to argue breach of both express and
{¶ 22} Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion by allowing Ulrich to go forward on a claim for breach of an express warranty. Both parties indicated at the beginning of trial that they understood Ulrich’s complaint to contain a common-law claim for breach of warranty even though it was not set forth in a separate count. Mercedes-Benz waited until virtually the conclusion of Ulrich’s case in chief before it argued that the court should disallow a claim for breach of warranty. By that time, Ulrich had already presented the vast majority of the evidence pertaining to the warranty claim. Further, in allowing Ulrich to proceed on a warranty claim, the court sought to accommodate both parties as much as possible. The court limited Ulrich’s warranty claim and allowed Mercedes-Benz to add an affirmative defense. Therefore, it does not appear that Mercedes-Benz was unduly prejudiced by the court’s decision. Radio Parts Co., 178 Ohio App.3d 198,
{¶ 23} Next, Mercedes-Benz argues that the trial court “committed reversible error by substituting one breach of warranty claim for another.” Although we agree with Mercedes-Benz that the trial court misstated the nature of Ulrich’s warranty claim, we do not agree that the misstatement amounts to reversible error. It is clear from the record that Ulrich asserted a common-law breach-of-express-warranty claim at trial after dismissing his original claims for breach of warranty under the federal Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act. In adopting the magistrate’s decision, however, the trial court erroneously referred to Ulrich’s warranty claim as one arising from the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act. Even so, the court’s misstatement had no effect upon its substantive reasons for adopting the magistrate’s decision to allow the amendment to the pleadings. The court agreed with the magistrate for the following reasons:
Here, the Breach of Warranty claim accrued as part and parcel of the Lemon Law claim. First, prior to trial, the parties stipulated that the vehicle was covered by an express warranty. Second, [Mercedes-Benz] was well aware of the Breach of [W]arranty claim/allegations early in this case and the parties did conduct discovery on the issue. Finally, [Mercedes-Benz] was permitted to present the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate in response to the added Breach of Warranty claim.
The court’s reasoning would apply to either a Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act claim or a common-law warranty claim with equal force. Accordingly, there is no evidence that Mercedes-Benz was prejudiced by the court’s erroneous reference to the source of Ulrich’s warranty claim. Id.
Assignment of Error Number Three
The trial court erred when it denied [Mercedes-Benz’s] motion for a new trial.
{¶ 25} In its third assignment of error, Mercedes-Benz argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mercedes-Benz’s motion for a new trial. Specifically, Mercedes-Benz argues that the court should have granted it a new trial on the bases that (1) Ulrich’s “continued extensive use” of his car after judgment is new evidence that the car is not useless to him and (2) Mercedes-Benz was prejudiced by the addition of Ulrich’s breach-of-warranty claim, which allowed him to present evidence of defects and repairs that occurred beyond the one-year period designated for lemon-law claims. We disagree.
{¶ 26} Civ.R. 59(A) permits a party to seek a new trial on nine different grounds as well as “for good cause shown.” Civ.R. 59(A). “Depending upon the basis of the motion for a new trial, this Court will review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny the motion under either a de novo or an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Calame v. Treece, 9th Dist. No. 07CA0073,
{¶ 27} Mercedes-Benz’s argument is structured so as to present an alleged error followed by a list of rule numbers from Civ.R. 59. For instance, Mercedes-Benz’s brief states:
Mr. Ulrich’s continued extensive use of the car shows that his earlier claims and arguments to the jury were misleading as to the existence, nature, seriousness, and effect of the problems with the car, and as to what he would do with it should the jury find in his favor. These misleading claims and*171 arguments improperly influenced the jury. As such, the trial court should have granted [Mercedes-Benz] a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(A)(2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9).
Mercedes-Benz makes no attempt to explain why or how Civ.R. 59(A)’s particular components apply to any of its arguments. Moreover, Mercedes-Benz fails to cite any law in support of its proposition that a car’s continued operability irrefutably demonstrates that the car is not defective. This court will not parse Civ.R. 59(A)’s components and separately apply Mercedes-Benz’s arguments to each one when Mercedes-Benz has not done so. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Nor will this court root out law in support of those arguments on its behalf. Cardone v. Cardone (May 6, 1998), 9th Dist. No. 18349,
{¶ 28} We also find no merit in Mercedes-Benz’s assertion that the court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing on Mercedes-Benz’s motion before denying it. Civ.R. 59 requires a hearing only if a court entertains a motion for a new trial “for a reason not stated in [a] party’s motion.” Civ.R. 59(D). Because the court did not do so, it was not required to hold a hearing before denying the motion. Id. Accord Corbin v. Dailey, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-802,
Assignment of Error Number Four
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding appellee $230,370.09 in attorneys’ fees and costs.
{¶ 29} In its fourth assignment of error, Mercedes-Benz argues that the trial court awarded unreasonable attorney fees and costs to Ulrich. We disagree.
{¶ 30} An aggrieved consumer is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs once he prevails on a lemon-law claim. R.C. 1345.75(A). Further, reasonable attorney fees may be awarded under the lemon law for fees incurred on appeal. Royster,
{¶ 31} Mercedes-Benz hinges the majority of its argument upon the fact that Ulrich was originally awarded $54,763.92 in attorney fees in 2004. A different judge presided over this case in 2004 and determined that $54,763.92 was an
{¶ 32} Mercedes-Benz also argues that the attorney-fee award amounted to an abuse of discretion because “attorneys’ fees were awarded for the preparation of the motion for summary judgment and appellate briefs for arguments that this Court rejected and reversed.” While it is true that attorney fees should not be awarded for work that relates to an unsuccessful claim, that has no bearing on a prevailing claim, see, e.g., Helfrich v. Mellon, 5th Dist. No. 06-CA-69,
Ill
{¶ 33} Mercedes-Benz’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. The trial court also awarded Ulrich attorney fees in the amount of $54,763.92.