This cause having been tried at a former term of this court before a jury, a verdict was returned for the plaintiffs, finding for them a certain portion of thé 150,000 acres of land, which is supposed to be about one-half of the amount demanded in the declaration of the plaintiffs. Upon the return of the verdict, and before any judgment was entered thereon, a motion for a new trial was made by the plaintiffs, and to set aside the verdict, upon two grounds:
*183 “(T) Pcenrsc the finding of tlio jury in locating tlie flflh line of the survey from I) io 11, as laid down on tlie trial map, and not from D io K, was contrary to tlie law and evidence, and contrary to tlie court’s instructions. (2) Because tlie court erred, in admitting the reports of Surveyors Lylirook and Yawter.”
The first reason assigned for sel ting’ aside the verdict involves two questions: (a) Whether the finding of the jury was contrary to the law its given to them in tlie instructions of the court; (b) whether the verdict of the jury was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
I will consider first, the ground assigned in support of the motion, that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. It is a well-settled principle of law that, where a jury returns a verdict that is clearly against the weight of the evidence, 'it is the duty of the court to set the verdict’ aside and award a new tidal. It is equally well settled that the verdict will not he set aside, as being contrary to the evidence, where there is a slight preponderance of evidence against the verdict. When the conclusions of a jury are founded on insufficient evidence, or contrary to the instructions of the court, or arrived at by compromise or lot, these are always grounds for setting aside (he verdief. These a,re well-settled principles of law, and it is not necessary to cite authorities io sustain tills position. Upon a motion for a new trial the court is to weigh the evidence, where it is conflicting, and if. in its judgment, it is manifest that the weight: of the evidence is against the verdict as returned by the jury, its plain duty is to set it aside. While it is conceded that it is the province of the jury to find the facts, it is nevertheless the duty of the trial judge to see that fix' action of the jury is intelligent and just in the exercise of this function. This is a judicial discretion with which every court is invested, and which gives the trial judge a salutary supervision over the verdict of a jury; but it is a discretion wdiicli should not be abased, and should only be exercised to further the ends of justice. Adopting’ the principles of law as announced, for my guide, T will proceed to discuss the evidence, which is somewhat conflicting, upon the vital question of the location of the survey upon which the jury returned its verdict.
It is to bo observed that the survey made in this case bears date in 1791, and the grant, was issued upon it the 20th of March, 1795. The survey was made when the country in which the land lies was a dense wilderness, and at a time when it was not actually inhabited either by the white men or Indians, but when it was subjected to the incursions and depredations of the Indians who occupied, and had nearly the supreme control of, the country adjacent to the lands involved in this controversy. This is not only an historical fact, hut: there is evidence in this cause tending to show that such was the condition of the country at the time Taylor made his original survey filed in this case. 1 allude1 to this merely to show the difficulties which surrounded the surveyor when he made1 this survey. There is evidencie in this cause of a tradition that (existed in this country that tends to show that while1 Taylor, the surveyor, was surveying the lands in controversy, he was unable to complete his surveey for thee reason that he1 was driven off by the Indians when he was running the sixth liue of the survey.
In locating lands the general rules are: Resort is first had to natural boundaries, next to artificial marks, then to adjacent bounda-
In the fifth call of thfe Patterson survey, Taylor calls for running . down Elkhorn Fork to the mouth of the North Fork, to a poplar and
The next line of Taylor’s survey calls for N., 10*° W., 880 poles, running down Elkhorn Fork to the mouth of the North Fork, to a poplar and maple. The plaintiffs claim that, this line^ on the trial map runs from D to E, while the jury finds the line to run from B to B. The plaintiffs say that the establishing of the line from D to E is against the weight of the evidence, being a clear departure from the true lines of the survey, as called for in Taylor’s original survey, and which is laid down upon his .original survey as running from B to E. This is a vital question, and involves a discussion of the evidence, to determine whether the weight of the evidence is against .the verdict of the jury in fixing the corner at the end of the fifth line of the survey at E, instead of E. Upon this question I will first look at and consider the copy of the original plat made by Taylor,' and ascertain from it, if I can, where he located the line on his map, and try to follow his footsteps.
The plat of Taylor discloses the fact that the fifth line of the survey, as laid down upon it, runs from B to E, as laid down upon Cole’s map. This line, as run by the surveyor in this cause, conforms nearly in both course and distance to the line of Taylor, which he, made as the fifth line of his survey over 100 years, ago. In fact, the exterior lines of the 150,000 acres, as run by the courses and distances called for in Taylor’s survey, and laid down on the trial map, prove a most strik-, ing resemblance between Taylor’s plat, filed in the land office September 18, 1794, and the survey as laid down on the trial map. Taylor’s survey has 11 lines. 'Cole’s plat shows 11 lines run by the courses and distances as called for in the original survey. The land embraced in the survey is about the same. It is a most significant fact that the shape and form of Taylor’s survey is so accurate that his tracks, after the lapse of a period of 100 years, could be followed by the surveyor in this cause. I am unable to perceive any. reason that can be or has been assigned in support of a verdict that makes an entirely new plat for Taylor. It cannot be said that the line that the jury made from B to E corresponds with the call of the patent, for
Twill now examine the evidence, independent of Taylor’s map, and try to determine whether the corner called for at the end of the fifth line is at E or R. it is to be observed that (lie entry, survey, and patent all call for a maple and poplar at the end of the fifth line. If I adopt the course and distance as called for in Taylor’s survey, flu; magnetic line runs to the point E, but not to R. As I have before said, this is a vital question, and it becomes necessary to analyze the evidence offered, to determine which of the two corners — the one at E or the one at R — is the corner called for by Taylor, and tends best to execute the design of the -surveyor when he made the plat, in 1794. The corner at E is reached by course n-nd distance, hut tin; corner at; R is in conflict witli both course and distance, and in fact rejects both. But it is claimed by the defendants that the fifth line calls to run down Elkhorn Fork to the mouth of the 'North Fork. The call, “running down Elkhorn Fork to the mouth of the North. Fork,” is descriptive, and not locative; and, though Taylor calls for “running down Elkhorn Fork to the mouth of (.he North Fork,” yet, if by an actual survey the corner called for at the end of the fifth iine is found, being a loeative call, though ■ it conflicts -with the descriptive call to run down Elkhorn Fork to tlie mouth of the North Fork, it follows that the line must be run without regal'd to the descriptive call, so as to reach the corner found as called for, and thb descriptive call should he disregarded. It is certainly reasonable to suppose that the topography or face of the country, in regard to the course of sireams, would materially change iu a period of 100 years. There is some evidence in ibis case tending to show that the courses of the streams have changed very much since Taylor made his survey. There is, however, a most striking resemblance (with one exception)
I will now consider the evidence offered by the defendants to support their contention that the corner called for in the fifth line of the survey stands at R, instead of at E. Tn this connection it is, to be observed that the entry, survey, and patent of the 150,000 acres are older than the entry, survey, and patent of the 500,000 acres under which the defendants claim. While it is true the fifth call of the 150,000-acre survey calls for a poplar and maple at the same corner to a survey of 500,000 acres with Wilson G. Nicholas, and lines thereof, yet, the Patterson survey being the elder, if it can he established by its lines and corners, and those lines and corners are in conflict with any coterminous or adjoining survey, then the lines and corners of that coterminous or adjoining survey must be bounded by the lines and corners of the Patterson survey, it being die elder, and the course and distance of the coterminous survey must give way to the lines of the elder survey. This principle of law is so well settled that the court deems it unnecessary to cite authorities to sustain the position. In order to sustain the contention of the defendants that the point R on the trial map is the end of the fifth line of the Patterson survey, the weight and preponderance of the evidence submitted to the jury must support that contention. In this connection it must be borne in mind that both the 480,000 and the 500,000-acre tracts have been subjected to a great deal of litigation, which resulted in surveys having been made at various times to ascertain those lines. A man by the name of Hector claimed one of those tracts a great many years ago, and had the lines run with a view to finding the corners of the 500,000-acre tract. It is apparent from the evidence that very little, if any, effort was made to find out the true boundaries of the 150,000 acres; but the surveyors appear to have assumed, in running
Lybrook seems to have been the earliest surveyor who ran the 500,000 acres, running what he supposed to be the boundaries of the 500,000 acres, but he did not at that time commence at the beginning corner of the 150,000 acres; for he was running the 500,000 acres, at which time Hector was with him. He stated that he found a maple and poplar, anciently marked as a corner, in a small bottom on the northwest side of the fork, and about 35 or 40 poles from the junction of the two forks. He does not state whether the trees Avere blocked to show that the age of the marking corresponded Avith 'the date of the survey. He does not state whether the marks upon the trees corresponded with the lines called for in the Patterson survey. Andrew G-. Milam testifies that he saw a marked maple and poplar at the point R when he was about 8 years old; that he showed them to James Hector. But he does not know what they Avere marked for, nor does he state whether they were anciently marked at that time. Daniel Harmon says he saw a marked poplar at It in 1843; that, at the time he saw the poplar, Kiáh Harmon, an old surveyor, and James Hector were there, and that Kiah Harmon stated that it was the corner of the 150,000 acres and the 500,000 acres; but he does not state how he knew the fact that it was the corner of the 150,000 acres. There is nothing in his evidence tending to show that he was familiar with the lines of the 150,000-acre survey, or that he knew that that was a common' corner of the 150,000 and the 500,000 acres. His statement does not show that he ever ran the lines by the calls and courses of the 150,000 acres. He does not say that these trees were marked to correspond with any line called for in the 150,000 acres. He does not
iu analyzing the evidence offered by the defendants to which I bare just referred, it is to be observed that the fifth call of the 150,000-acre survey speaks of running down to the mouth of the North Fork, to a poplar and maple. Not a single witness introduced by the defendants testified that the poplar and maple they speak of were found at the mouth of the North Fork. In Lyhrook’s report of a survey of the 500,000 acres, lie stales, “by running N., 80° E., 3,0(50 poles, that near the mouth of the North Fork he found a poplar and maple, anciently marked as a corner, in a small bottom thirty-five or forty polos from the junction of the two forks”; but he says “the marks did not com-
In connection with the foregoing testimony, it is claimed that the persons from whom the plaintiffs derive their title, as appears from the deed of Ghitty, and Britton’s report or map made for Thompson, IaegePs vendor, have heretofore recognized the corner at E as a corner of the survey of 150,000 acres. I do not regard this as a controlling fact. It only tends to show that in the wilderness of that country, and the confusion that exists among these old lines, the owners of these lands are often mistaken as to the true location and extent of their boundaries. That fact does not prevent the present owners of the land from setting up the true boundaries of their survey, and their rightful claim to the lands embraced by them. Mistakes of-this character have often occurred, and the courts have held that where'a man has been ignorant, in the first instance, of the true boundaries of his land, and has recognized a boundary that after-wards he found he was mistaken in, that fact does not debar or prevent the assertion of his rights to the land embraced, to the full extent of his boundaries.
It will be observed that I have discussed and considered .the evidence offered by both plaintiffs and defendants as to the vital point in this case, — whether the corner at E or the corner at R is the correct corner of the survey, — and upon which this motion for a new trial mainly depends. Considering the weight and preponderance of this evidence in support of the verdict of the jury, it is apparent to my mind that there is no evidence offered by the defendants here which tends to overthrow the fact that the original map of Taylor is in conflict with the position taken by the jury as to the corner at D. Following the lines of Taylor’s survey, you cannot by course and distance reach the point B. There are marks upon the corner tree claimed to be at B, but there is no satisfactory proof to show that these marks correspond with the course and distance called for in the fifth line of the Patterson survey. In fact, only one witness states that they appear to be marked for the lines of the Patterson survey. This is a remarkable fact.. Taylor seems to have marked, as far as he ran, the corners called for at the end of the course and distance of each line of his survey. The jury has established the fact by its verdict that D is a corner of the survey, and it is inconsistent with this finding to find that B is the next corner of the survey. As we have seen, the fifth call of the Patterson survey is N., 10° W., 880
It is claimed by the defendants that a descriptive call of “running down Elldiorn Fork to the mouth of the North Fork, to a poplar and maple,” is inconsistent with the location of the corner at E. But, as I have heretofore said, this descriptive call must be disregarded when a locative call can be found which must control it. In this connection it is to be observed that the descriptive call does not support the contention of the defendants, because, when you run from the point 13 towards the point R, even as the North Fork exists to-day, the line from D to R does not run down the North Fork, but crosses the North Fork at a point very close to the point D on (he trial map; and when you reach R you do not find any maple and poplar at the mouth of the North Fork, but the poplar and maple claimed by the. defendants to be the corner at the end of the fifth line are at a distance of one-eighth of a mile from it, which poplar and maple, as I have before stated, were not marked to correspond with the fifth line of the Patterson survey. This contention of the defendants that the comer is at R is not supported by the great weight of the evidence in this canse. All the evidence offered by the defendants in support of that position is of that uncertain and unreliable character that we so often encounter in establishing the lines of these old surveys which were made in the last century, when the country was a wilderness, and when it was unsafe to make surveys, by reason of the fact that the
I ha ve endeavored to analyze and discuss freely the evidence in this case, offered by both plaintiffs and defendants, and I have labored, in the discussion of it, to see if I could justify the verdict of the jury, and if it was consistent with the great weight and preponderance of evidence; but when I find that the jury established the corner at D, and that the course and distance called for by Taylor’s survey take you lo E, and that there is a great mass of evidence in the case that shows that a corner was found at that point and marked to correspond, not only with the line running from D, but with the line running from E to F, and that Taylor calls for a corner at. what is known as the point E on the triakmap, at ox* near the point where he located the month of the .Xorth Fork on his map, and that all the evidence in this case tends to show that the corner at E was never found to be the corner of any other survey, although since the commencement of this litigation a great deal of research has been made to account for the existence of that corner; that the location of the line from 1) to E conforms to the entry, survey, and plat of Taylor, while the loca!ion of that line from D to B in no respect harmonizes with it. — then I conclude that the great weight and preponderance of evidence in this case are against the verdict returned by the jury. I confess to great, reluctance in disturbing a verdict of a jury, and, in the course of a long experience, I have rarely done it; but I have a duty to perform in regard to tins motion, and, in the light of the evidence that exists in the case before me, I feel it to be a conviction of conscientious duty to set aside this verdict, for the reason that I believe the weight of evidence largely preponderates in favor of the location of the 150,000 acres as embraced by the purple line as laid down on the trial map.
Tn the case of Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 22 L. Ed. 780, Justice MIHer lays down the rule that:
“It is the duty of n court, in its relation to the jury, to protect parties from unjust verdicts arising from ignorance of tlio rules of law and of evidence,*196 from impulse of passion or prejudice, or from any other violation of lawful rights in the conduct of a trial. This is done by making plain to them the issues they are to try; by admitting only such evidence as is proper in these issues, and rejecting all else; by instructing them in the rules of law by which that evidence is to be examined and applied; and finally, when necessary, by setting aside a verdict which is unsupported by evidence or contrary to law. In the discharge of this duty, it is the province of the court, either before or after the verdict, to decide whether the plaintiff has given evidence sufficient to support or justify a verdict in his favor, — not whether, on all the evidence, the preponderating weight is in his favor (that is the business of the jury), but, conceding to all the evidence offered the greatest probative force which, according to the law of evidence, it is fairly entitled to, is it sufficient to justify a verdict? If it does not, then it is the duty of the court, after a verdict, to set it aside and grant a new trial.”
In the case of People v. Knutte, 111 Cal. 453, 44 Pac. 166, and also People v. Lum Yit, 83 Cal. 130, 23 Pac. 228, the court held;
“While it is the exclusive province of the jury to find the facts, it is nevertheless one of the most important requirements of the trial judge to see to it that this function of the jury is intelligently and justly exercised. In this respect, while he cannot competently interfere with or control the jury in passing on the evidence, he nevertheless exercises a very salutary supervisory power over their verdict. In the exercise of that power he should always satisfy himself that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to sustain the verdict found, and if, in his sound judgment, it is not, he should unhesitatingly say so, and set the verdict aside.”
If the principle of law as laid down by the supreme court of the .United States, as well as by the court in California, in the cases cited, is correct, and.which I understand to be the law of this state regulating motions for new trials, I cannot conscientiously avoid granting the motion for a new trial in this case.
The court having reached the conclusion to award a new trial upon the ground that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, it is unnecessary to notice the other grounds assigned for the motion. For the reasons assigned, the court is of opinion to set aside the verdict, and will grant a new trial upon the payment of the costs of the trial of the term.