UDGAWA
The alien applicant is a native and citizen of Japan who arrived at San Francisco, California on April 17, 1973, and sought admission as a nonimmigrant treaty investor. He was denied admission and an exclusion hearing was held on April 20, 1973, at which time the immigration judge found the applicant excludable under section 212(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The applicant has appealed that decision. The appeal will be dismissed.
Upon his arrival in the United States the applicant was in possession of a Japanese passport and a nonimmigrant treaty investor visa apparently issued by a United States consular official in Japan. At his hearing it was established that the applicant is a cook or chef specializing in the preparation of Japanese tempura meals. He is in the employ of a Japanese corporation which, through various corporate holdings, is the sole owner of a Japanese restaurant in San Francisco where the applicant had expected to work.
The applicant appears to have had at least one full year of schooling and two years’ practical experience as a cook. During the last six months of his work experience in Japan he had specialized as a tempura chef and had supervised the activities of several other cooks. The applicant had been expected to remain in the United States for as long as two years, during which time he
The applicant seeks admission as a nonimmigrant treaty investor. Section 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) of the Act defines a treaty investor as:
an alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the provisions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and the foreign state of which he is a national, and the spouse and children of any such alien if accompanying or following to join him:
(i) . . .
(ii) solely to develop and direct the operations of an enterprise in which he has invested, or of an enterprise in which he is actively in the process of investing, a substantial amount of capital. . . .
The applicant has indicated that he has no funds or other property invested in any of the interrelated corporations involved in this matter. The corporation which employs him is the investor in this case, and for section 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) to have any real meaning in a world dominated by corporate entities, it must be construed in a manner which would permit appropriate agents of a corporation to obtain this nonimmigrant status. Consequently, it would be appropriate to admit this applicant as a nonimmigrant treaty investor, if he qualifies as an individual who intends “solely to develop and direct” the operations of the enterprise.
At present the regulations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service do not confront the question of who may qualify for treaty investor status. It appears, however, that a reasonable construction of section 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) is contained in
(a) An alien shall be classifiable as a nonimmigrant treaty investor if he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he qualifies under the provisions of section 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) of the Act and that: (1) He intends to depart from the United States upon the termination of his status; and (2) he is an alien who has invested or is investing capital in a bona fide enterprise
and is not seeking to proceed to the United States in connection with the investment of a small amount of capital in a marginal enterprise solely for the purpose of earning a living; or that (3) he is employed by a treaty investor in a responsible capacity and the employer is a foreign person or organization of the same nationality as the applicant.
While this regulation could be subject to varying interpretations, we construe it to mean that an alien such as the applicant will qualify as a “treaty investor” if he has the necessary intent to depart and if he meets the conditions imposed by subdivision (3) of the quoted portion of the regulation. Since the evidence adduced at the hearing indicates that the applicant possesses the requisite intent to return to Japan, the remaining issue in this case is whether he can be considered to be “employed . . . in a responsible capacity. . . .”
The notes to
Highly trained technical and managerial personnel employed by firms having the nationality of a country which has entered into a treaty with the United States providing for the investor classification are entitled to treaty investor status if:
(a) they are employed in a managerial capacity, or
(b) they are highly trained and specially qualified technical personnel required in the United States for one of the following purposes:
(1) establishment of the enterprise,
(2) training or supervision of technicians employed in manufacturing, maintenance and repair functions, or
(3) the continuous development of product improvement and quality control.
Section 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the State Department regulation (
In section 212(a)(14) of the Act Congress has evinced a desire to protect American labor from excessive job competition which might be generated by the presence in the United States of numerous skilled and unskilled alien laborers. Nevertheless, aliens who do not desire immigrant status, and who may be needed to
Whether the applicant could qualify as a nonimmigrant under either of these provisions is not before us; however, the existence of this statutory scheme convinces us that Congress did not intend that skilled alien laborers or aliens occupying minor managerial posts should be eligible for treaty investor status. These job positions can be readily held by American workers without placing in jeopardy a United States investment made by a foreign firm. Although it would seem appropriate under certain circumstances for a foreign corporation temporarily to utilize the services of skilled alien workers, the jobs in which they would ordinarily be employed are not of such significance to the actual investor that treaty investor status should be accorded to these individuals. Skilled alien employees should be required to enter in a nonimmigrant status that will afford some measure of protection to American labor.3
The applicant is concededly an individual with a fair degree of specialized training who would be expected to function in a modest supervisory role. However, his proposed position at the restaurant also entails duties characteristic of skilled laborers, and the job is
The employment of aliens in this type of position cannot be characterized as designed solely for the development and direction of the investment. Rather, the continued use of foreign workers may function as a means of securing adequate help at less than the prevailing United States wage standards for jobs of comparable complexity. There is substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the applicant‘s employment in the United States was not required because of a shortage of qualified United States chefs, but because of the restaurant corporation‘s unwillingness adequately to compensate those available American workers.
Although it has not been clearly established that the applicant‘s employer desires to continue importing foreign labor, we are unable to hold that the applicant will be employed in a responsible capacity within the meaning of
In exclusion proceedings the applicant has the burden of proof to establish that he qualifies for admission under the claimed status. Section 291, Immigration and Nationality Act. We find that the applicant has not shown that he is employed in a responsible capacity, and therefore that he has not demonstrated his entitlement to admission as a nonimmigrant treaty investor. Since the applicant has failed to establish that he is entitled to nonimmigrant status, he is presumed, under section 214(b) of the Act, to be an immigrant. He is thus excludable under section 212(a)(20) as an immigrant not in possession of an immigrant visa or other appropriate documentation.
Finally, the approach we have adopted in this case is consistent with the result in Matter of Kobayashi and Doi, 10 I. & N. Dec. 425 (Deputy Assoc. Commr. 1963). We recognize that our decision is in apparent conflict with Matter of Tamura, 10 I. & N. Dec. 717 (Reg. Com. 1964); however, we are not bound by Regional Commissioners’ rulings.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.