43 A.2d 385 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1945
Argued April 10, 1945. The extent of claimant's dependency is the sole issue *413 in this case. The referee found that claimant was totally dependent upon her deceased son at the time of his death on December 16, 1942, as the result of an accidental injury in the course of his employment with defendant. The Workmen's Compensation Board affirmed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and award of the referee. The court of common pleas dismissed defendant's exceptions and entered judgment on the award in favor of claimant against defendant and its insurance carrier. Defendant and its insurance carrier have appealed.
Appellants admit that claimant was partially dependent upon the earnings of her deceased son. See Kloskowski et ux. v. HudsonCoal Co.,
Dependency is gauged by the condition existing at the time of the accident. Norris v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. et al.,
The existence of other children does not preclude a finding of total dependency upon a deceased child. We have said that the phrase "totally dependent" is equivalent to "without any other source of income or livelihood." Kloskowski et ux. v. Hudson CoalCo., supra,
Claimant, at the time of the accident, was head of the household, which consisted of herself, Ronald, the deceased son, a daughter, Mildred, 18 years of age, and a son, Eugene, 13 years of age. Eugene was attending school, and Mildred had been unable to obtain any employment. In addition, there were three children who were not at home. Delmar, an unmarried son, was serving as a private in the United States Army, and at the time of his induction was not at home and had not been contributing to claimant's support; Fred, a married son, was supporting his own family and did not contribute to the support of claimant; Grace, a married daughter, maintained her own home. Appellants do not urge that the married son and the married daughter are possible untapped sources of income.1 As to Delmar, he had not contributed to claimant's support *415
before he entered the army as his income was only sufficient to maintain himself. He has made no contribution to his mother's support since his induction. Payment of an allowance in his case would be dependent upon his acquiescence even if the necessary requirements were fulfilled, and under the circumstances an order of support against him would not be enforceable. See Act of Congress of June 23, 1942, c. 443, Title I, §§ 103, 104, 56 Stat. 381, as amended October 26, 1943, c. 281, §§ 3, 4, 57 Stat. 577,
It appears that claimant received $42.20 a month from the Mothers' Assistance Fund prior to the employment of Ronald, the deceased son. It was discontinued before the accident, and apparently it was not resumed until after the death of the son, and then on the basis of $4.70 per month. Appellants contend that she received the $4.70 per month during the time that Ronald was employed. The testimony does not clearly indicate such payment; but, regardless of whether this trivial relief payment was made or not, it is not a determining factor as to the extent of claimant's dependency upon the deceased son Ronald.
In the absence of any other available source of income, the compensation authorities were warranted in their determination that claimant was totally dependent upon her deceased son.
Appellants, in support of their contentions, rely on *416 Kovatch et ux. v. Durkin et al.,
Judgment is affirmed.