U.S. Bank National Association, Respondent, v Harbinder Singh Sachdev et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.
Appellate Division, Second Department
May 13, 2015
2015 NY Slip Op 04118 [128 AD3d 807]
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected through Wednesday, July 1, 2015
Sheldon May & Associates, P.C. (Stim & Warmuth, P.C., Farmingville, N.Y. [Glenn P. Warmuth], of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants Harbinder Singh Sachdev, Jagdish Kaur Sachdev, Baljit Sachdev, Harbinder Singh Sachdev and Kawaljeet Ahuja, as coguardians of Jagdish Kaur Singh Sachdev, appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), entered February 27, 2013, as granted those branches of the plaintiff‘s motion which were to confirm a referee‘s report dated December 1, 2009, and for leave to enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale, and denied those branches of their cross motion which were, in effect, to vacate their default in appearing and answering the complaint, to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer pursuant to
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In support of that branch of their cross motion which was to vacate their default in appearing and answering the complaint and to compel the plaintiff to accept a late answer, the appellants were required to provide a reasonable excuse for their default and demonstrate the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see
As the Supreme Court correctly determined, the appellants failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider whether they demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Lafazan, 115 AD3d 647, 648 [2014]; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Palma, 114 AD3d 645, 645-646 [2014];
The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiff‘s motion which were to confirm a referee‘s report dated December 1, 2009, and for leave to enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale, and properly denied those branches of the appellants’ cross motion which were, in effect, to vacate their default in appearing and answering the complaint, to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer pursuant to
