U.S. Bank, N.A. v. MetzgerU.S. Bank, N.A. v. Metzger
For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Robert C. Folland, Yevgeniya Brener, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, 41 South High Street, Suite 3300, Columbus, OH 43215
For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Marc E. Dann, Grace Doberdruk, The Dann Law Firm, P.O. Box 6031040, Cleveland, Ohio 44103
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Charles Metzger (“Appellant“) appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court denying his motion to vacate a foreclosure judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-1 (“the Bank“). Appellant initially contends that the foreclosure judgment was void because the Bank lacked standing. Yet, this court has ruled and the Supreme Court has recently confirmed in Kuchta that the type of “jurisdiction” at issue when standing is lacking is not that which renders a judgment void.
{¶2} In the alternative, Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted him relief from judgment under
{¶3} However, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
{¶4} On April 23, 2008, the Bank filed a complaint against Appellant seeking to collect on a note and foreclose on a mortgage due to an unpaid balance of $149,962.31 plus interest from December 1, 2007. The note, mortgage, and assignment of mortgage were attached to the complaint. The October 2005 note was payable to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide“) as the lender and contained no indorsement to another party.
{¶6} Appellant did not file an answer or appear, although he was served by a special process server on May 19, 2008. The Bank sought default judgment, which was granted on August 8, 2008. Various orders of sale were sought and withdrawn by the Bank. The first sale was withdrawn after Appellant filed for bankruptcy on October 20, 2008. The bankruptcy court thereafter granted the Bank‘s “Motion for Relief from Stay and Abandonment,” noting that no response to the Bank‘s motion had been filed by Appellant, his counsel, or the trustee. In January of 2009, the Bank filed the bankruptcy order in the present case in order to reactivate the docket. A sale was set for the fall of 2009 but then withdrawn. Another sale was set in 2010 but withdrawn on September 9, 2010 in order to ascertain eligibility for loan modification.
{¶7} It was not until after the Bank‘s May 7, 2012 notice of sale that Appellant made his first appearance in the case. He filed a motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment on May 16, 2012. As a threshold issue, he alleged that the Bank lacked standing and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based upon his assertion that the Bank was not entitled to enforce the note. This argument was based upon his observation that the note attached to the complaint was payable to Countrywide and was not indorsed to another party.
{¶8} Appellant alternatively asked the court to vacate the judgment under
{¶9} As to “any other reason justifying relief,” Appellant asserted that the Bank failed to comply with a condition precedent to foreclosure by not providing notice of acceleration. Appellant filed an affidavit stating that he did not recall receiving the required acceleration notice. At the 60(B) hearing, he testified that he did not recall receiving the notice and also that he did not receive the notice. (Tr. 19, 21). On the topic of timeliness, the motion generally stated that the request was timely filed after Appellant discovered these issues.
{¶10} The Bank responded that it was entitled to enforce the note. It urged that an assignment of mortgage was sufficient to transfer the note as the record shows the parties intended to transfer both. The Bank stated that Appellant lacked standing to challenge the mortgage assignment as he was neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of the pooling and servicing agreement. In addition, the Bank argued that proof of notice of acceleration is not required in order to receive default judgment and the debtor was required to raise this issue in the action to preserve it.
{¶11} The Bank emphasized that (B)(5) is for use only in extraordinary circumstances and only when one of the more specific grounds does not apply. The Bank also insisted that the motion was not timely filed, stating that the allegations were apparent at the time the foreclosure action was filed. The Bank pointed out that Appellant specified no reason for waiting 3.75 years after default judgment was entered and more than four years since the foreclosure action was filed.
{¶12} In reply, Appellant stated that language in the mortgage assignment purporting to transfer the note with the mortgage was insufficient to negotiate the note, urging that a note payable to another must be indorsed to the Bank or indorsed in blank in order for the Bank to be a holder. Appellant additionally argued that he can raise an invalid assignment to defeat the Bank‘s claim of ownership. He also
{¶13} On April 7, 2014, the magistrate denied Appellant‘s motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment. Appellant filed timely objections to the magistrate‘s decision, raising in relevant part the void judgment argument and the three aforementioned
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
Appellant‘s first assignment of error contends:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT VACATING THE JUDGMENT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.”
{¶14} A court has inherent authority to vacate a void judgment. See Westmoreland v. Valley Homes Mut. Hsg. Corp., 42 Ohio St.2d 291, 294, 328 N.E.2d 406 (1975), citing Staff Note to
{¶15} In Schwartzwald, the Bank filed the foreclosure action before it obtained “an assignment of the promissory note and mortgage.” Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 2. The debtors argued to the trial court that the Bank lacked standing to sue, but the trial court and the appellate court disagreed with the debtor‘s position, essentially
{¶16} The Ohio Supreme Court ruled, however, that standing was required in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court. Id. at ¶ 24. A lack of standing is thus determined as of the time the complaint was filed and cannot be cured by a later assignment of a claim. Id. at ¶ 24, 39. The Court ruled that because the Bank “failed to establish an interest in the note or mortgage at the time it filed suit, it had no standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court.” Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶17} Appellant believes the Schwartzwald holding supports his argument that a lack of standing is the type of jurisdictional defect that can be raised at any time. He asserts that the judgment in such a case is void ab initio rather than voidable.
{¶18} As the Bank points out, this court has previously ruled that a lack of standing does not make a judgment void. Bank of Am. N.A. v. Miller, 7th Dist. No. 13CA894, 2014-Ohio-2932, ¶ 25-33 (holding post-Schwartzwald that a lack of standing to initiate a foreclosure action does not render the judgment void), citing Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Finney, 10th Dist. Nos. 13AP-198, 13AP373, 2013-Ohio-4884 (default judgment not void for lack of standing). See also CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Fishel, 7th Dist. No. 11MA97, 2012-Ohio-4117, ¶ 6 (holding pre-Schwartzwald that “a lack of standing to initiate a foreclosure action does not raise a question of subject matter jurisdiction and does not void an otherwise valid judgment.“).
{¶19} The Supreme Court has recently confirmed these holdings in Bank of America, N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St. 3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040. In that case, the assignment document transferring the note and mortgage was not signed until after the complaint was filed. Id. at ¶ 2-3. The debtor raised the issue to the trial court but did not appeal and then sought relief from judgment, arguing the judgment was a void judgment or it was voidable for fraud under
{¶20} In disposing of the void judgment argument, the Supreme Court reiterated that the term “jurisdiction” can be used to speak of: (1) subject matter jurisdiction, (2) personal jurisdiction, or (3) jurisdiction over a particular case. Id. at ¶
{¶21} “A court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.” Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75 at ¶ 19. The Kuchta Court pointed out that a foreclosure action is within the common pleas court‘s subject matter jurisdiction and concluded that a lack of standing would not eliminate subject matter jurisdiction or cause a foreclosure judgment to be void ab initio. Id. at ¶ 20, 22-24. Thus, Appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶22} As Appellant cannot use a motion to vacate a void judgment to contest standing, he alternatively seeks to utilize the procedure for vacating a voidable judgment under
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
{¶23} Appellant‘s second assignment of error provides:
{¶24} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT CHARLES METZGER‘S 60(B) MOTION TO VACATE.”
{¶25} Pursuant to
{¶26} A party may seek relief from judgment on grounds of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
{¶27} To prevail on such a motion, the movant must demonstrate: (1) that there is a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) entitlement to relief under one of the five grounds; and (3) that the motion was timely. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 150, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). Each of these three requirements is mandatory. Id. at 151.
{¶28} On the first element of the GTE test, the movant need only allege a meritorious defense and need not prove that he will prevail on that defense. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 520 N.E.2d 564 (1998). Appellant‘s alleged merit defenses are: the Bank was not entitled to enforce the note; the assignment of mortgage was made in violation of a pooling and servicing agreement; and he was not provided notice of acceleration prior to the 2008 foreclosure action.
{¶29} On the second element of the GTE test, Appellant proceeds under
{¶30} Notably, the grounds for relief asserted by Appellant are the same as his merit defenses. He urges that the Bank failed to provide notice of acceleration justifying relief from judgment under (B)(5). He also raises fraud upon the court,
{¶31} Essentially, Appellant is claiming that if a debtor later becomes informed that he may have been able to assert certain defenses in the foreclosure action that should have been apparent but were unknown to the debtor at the time it was filed, he can ask to have the foreclosure judgment vacated after someone educates him on the popular prevailing foreclosure defenses. But, all of the issues he raises were in existence at the time the complaint was filed. Importantly, the claim as to the unendorsed note was apparent on the face of the complaint. The alleged 2008 violation of the pooling and servicing agreement occurred by the assignment of mortgage after a 2006 trust closing date, which assignment was attached to the complaint. This assignment incorporated into the complaint purported to transfer both the mortgage and the note, making that issue evident. And, at the time the action was filed, a defense as to any failure to send notice of acceleration would have been apparent as well.
{¶32} In Kuchta, after arguing that a lack of standing rendered a judgment void, the debtors alternatively proceeded under
{¶33} The Court explained: “the fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct contemplated by
{¶34} We need not address whether this portion of the Kuchta holding extends to the
{¶35} As to timeliness, Appellant‘s motion merely stated that a motion filed under
{¶36} His reply brief, which is not the place for raising new arguments, claims that the motion was made within a reasonable time after faulty securitization became public, without specifying how this made his May of 2012 motion timely. His reply also points to his testimony at the
{¶37} The Bank urges us to recast Appellant‘s claims as grounds for relief only under
{¶38} On this topic, the notice of acceleration defense did not involve an allegation of fraud upon the court, and Appellant did not establish that this defense constituted a substantial reason as required when using
{¶39} Assuming arguendo Appellant was permitted to proceed under
{¶40} As aforestated, the defenses were evident at the time the complaint was filed. Some were evident on the face of the complaint. In addition, Appellant filed for bankruptcy in the fall of 2008 and did not object to the Bank being released from the bankruptcy stay in 2009 in order to proceed on its judgment in this case. Merely because the property had not yet been sold did not make his motion timely.
{¶41} In our LaSalle case, a debtor filed a
{¶42} In another case, the debtor alleged the bank lacked standing and asserted fraud upon the court due to the bank‘s claim that it was entitled to enforce in the complaint. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Fishel, 7th Dist. No. 11MA97, 2012-Ohio-4117. This court ruled that a motion to vacate filed eighteen months after the entry of default judgment was unreasonable in that case. Id. at ¶ 14 (even if the matter could proceed under (B)(5) as opposed to (B)(3), which we believed would have been the more appropriate division).
{¶43} Similarly, the trial court was within its discretion to find the 3.75 year delay unreasonable under the facts of this case. In accordance, Appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled. The trial court‘s judgment denying Appellant‘s motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment is hereby affirmed.
Donofrio, P.J., concurs.
Waite, J., concurs.