In December, 1976, U-Haul Company of Western Georgia purchased a warehouse building and the land on which it was located in Atlanta, Georgia. Prior to this purchase there was no connects n between U-Haul Company of Western Georgia and the building in question. The three lower floors of the warehouse had been completed in 1949. The architect for that original portion of the building was Stevens & Wilkinson, preparing the architectural and engineering plans in 1948. Its successor architectural firm is Stevens & Wilkinson, Architects Engineers Planners, Inc. Later in 1953 Abreu & Robeson, Incorporated, served as architect for an addition of three floors to the warehouse building. The construction of this addition was completed in 1954.
In April, 1979, the exterior walls of the warehouse building were first noted to contain several cracks and to be “out of plumb” and to have bowed outward. The extent of the structural problems was such that the building was evacuated and the building is being refurbished at owner’s expense.
U-Haul Company of Western Georgia, the owner, brought this action against the defendant architectural firms alleging that the structural problems of the walls of the warehouse were due to certain design defects described as “the complete absence of horizontal relieving joints and of vertical control joints in the exterior walls.” Plaintiffs complaint alleges that the defendant architectural firms were jointly and severally negligent in performing their professional services in preparing plans and specifications for the warehouse building and as a result thereof plaintiff has suffered damages which this lawsuit seeks to recover.
Defendants jointly filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitation. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted, and plaintiff appeals. Held:
Defendants rely upon the provisions of Code Ann. § 3-1006 (Ga. L. 1968, p. 127) in that more than 8 years have passed since the substantial completion of the warehouse building and the improvements thereto. Plaintiff contends that Code Ann. § 3-1006, supra, is inapplicable to these circumstances as such an application would be retrospective. See
Jaro, Inc. v. Shields,
A retrospective application would be one which destroys or impairs vested rights.
Bullard v. Holman,
The trial court did not err in applying Code Ann. § 3-1006, supra, under the circumstances of this case. The time limit for the initiation of this action having passed, the trial court was correct in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
