76 S.W.2d 960 | Ark. | 1934
This is a suit brought by the U-Drive-Em Corporation et al., against Earl R. Wiseman, as Commissioner *1164 of Revenues, alleging the invalidity of 31 of act No. 11, approved February 12, 1934.
A rather lengthy complaint was filed in which the plaintiffs alleged that various taxes and licenses have grown heavier and heavier and greater and greater until the passage of act No. 11, including the said 31, which has imposed a burden upon the plaintiffs, and which, added to the other burdens already carried by taxicab operators, means that they cannot exist or continue to do business; that 31 discriminates grossly between taxicab operators and in favor of buses using streets of cities and towns, and buses using State highways, and the ordinary automobiles used for business and commercial purposes. It is also urged that the State at one time surrendered its right to impose the collections now insisted upon, and that cities and towns have been permitted, under the laws of the State, to impose taxes or assessments by way of regulatory ordinances, and that, if the present alleged discriminatory taxes are insisted upon, as said 31 is construed by the defendant Commissioner of Revenues, that part of 31, imposing taxes so insisted upon, is void as being in contravention of Amendment No. 14 of the Constitution of the United States and 21 of article No. 2 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, and therefore void; that the enforcement of the tax insisted upon by the Commissioner of Revenues would deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws, contrary to Amendment No. 14 of the said Constitution and 18 of article 2 of the State Constitution.
It is unnecessary to set out more fully the effect of the complaint, demurrer and answer, as set forth in the pleadings. Proof was taken and exhibits were made to the testimony of witnesses, the effect of which proof is to show that several of the plaintiffs, according to statements filed, were not only not making any money or profits in the operation of their taxicabs, but that they were taking losses as they carried on their several businesses. *1165
This proof will not be set forth except as it becomes pertinent in the discussion of the questions argued as necessary to conclusions reached in this opinion.
This is a class suit affecting all taxicab operators in the State. A history of the legislation affecting the highways in the State is not necessary. It is sufficient to say that at the time of the enactment of act No. 11, approved February 12, 1934, the State had defaulted in its bond payments and the interest thereon, and it became necessary to refund the bond issues, and at the same time to provide a method to meet accruing liabilities. It must be conceded at this time that the bonded indebtedness was excessive as compared with the State's ability to pay, and the necessary effect of such conditions was to impose somewhat onerous burdens upon those subject to taxation to save the State from future and further defaults in its indebtedness. It was necessary that, in addition to the tax on gasoline or motor fuel, there should be a tax on motors or automobiles, trucks, buses, etc.
Section 31 classified motor vehicles and imposed a tax upon these classes to be collected by the Commissioner of Revenues. One of the classifications, that being the one about which appellants are complaining, provided that "automobiles equipped with pneumatic tires used for the transportation of persons for hire shall be charged a fee of 45 cents per horsepower generated or developed by the motor propelling such vehicle, and in addition there shall be charged a fee, based upon the gross weight of the vehicle of $1.50 per hundred pounds or fraction thereof." The tax so imposed is substantially higher than the tax imposed upon the same automobile or same type of motor vehicle when not so used to transport persons for hire.
It is strongly urged by appellants that the classification made by the State is unfair and unequal. For the purposes of argument, that proposition might be conceded, and, even if that were true, it would not be a real reason for declaring 31, or any part of it invalid. It is a principle very generally recognized by all of the courts that almost any system of taxation results in many inequalities and perhaps unfairness to particular classes, *1166 and very frequently seriously affecting individuals composing a particular class. This arises more often, not out of the law itself, but out of the peculiar conditions under which classes, or individuals, may find themselves in their manner of doing business or location, rather than out of the classification.
This is illustrated in the brief filed for appellants in this case. They argue the fact rather seriously that they confine their operations to the streets of cities and towns, as distinguished from the system of State highways. It should be observed, however, that classification in itself does not confine them to the municipalities. They urge also that they are subject to licenses or taxes in the respective cities and towns in which they operate, and that these taxes or licenses are burdens; that they pay other taxes to the cities, municipalities, schools, etc., and that argument suggests, when considered, the fact that the burdens imposed by said 31 are seemingly oppressive only by reason of the fact that there are other exactions, no one in itself which, as distinguished from the others, might be considered excessive.
Appellants recognize in their brief that the State has power to tax, but they ask us to construe 31 aforesaid so as to grant relief from what they urge is an overburdensome rate of taxation.
There is no ambiguity in said 31. The language used, when given its ordinary meaning, is clear and understandable, and there is nothing to invite construction or interpretation. To attempt to read into this section any meaning, other than that which is clearly set forth upon its face, would be an invasion by the court of the legislative field, a course of action we feel unauthorized and unwilling to pursue. Our province can go no further than try to determine the legislative intent and to give effect to it, but in no instance shall we attempt to defeat the legislative intent so clearly expressed, and when it is not in violation of public policy as defined by the Constitution.
But it is urged that the act as written, if enforced by the Commissioner of Revenues, will be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United *1167 States and of 21 of article 2 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.
Section 31 is not in conflict with either the State or United States Constitution. We call attention to a most recent case, decided by the United States Supreme Court, A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,
This court in the case of Fort Smith v. Scruggs,
This court said, in the case of Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie,
It is unnecessary to pursue this argument further than to call attention to the case of Fitzgerald v. Gates,
It necessarily follows that the decision of the chancery court is correct. It will therefore be affirmed.
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