Tyson v. LanierTyson v. Lanier
Murray W. Overstreet, Jr., and Russell S. Thacker, of Thacker & Thacker, Kissimmee, for appellees.
Paul & Sams, Miami, M.W. Wells, R.F. Maguire, Jr., of Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, Orlando, Doyle E. Carlton, of Mabry, Reaves, Carlton, Fields & Ward and Counts Johnson, Tampa, amici curiae.
TERRELL, Justice.
October 7, 1960, petitioners filed complaint in the Circuit Court of Osceola County, Ninth Judicial Circuit, alleging that their lands were not legally assessed for the year 1960 and praying that the court issue a mandatory injunction directed to respondents requiring them to reassess said lands as required by
Respondent appealed from this judgment to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, and petitioners cross-appealed. The district court of appeal reversed the chancellor in a 2-1 decision, Judge White dissenting. We are confronted with both an appeal and a petition for writ of certiorari from the decision of the district court of appeal.
Petitioners, who are also appellants, seek review by appeal on the theory that the district court of appeal initially passed upon the validity of
Section 4(2), Article V, Florida Constitution, with limitations clothes this court with jurisdiction where the constitutionality of an act is brought in question. Does
Judge White pointed out in his dissent that the effect of the court‘s judgment of reversal is to strike down a legislative act that is essentially clear in its provisions and clearly within the enacting power of the legislature. The majority opinion of the district court of appeal said in effect that to adopt the interpretation of
In discussing the statute [
“In Florida, Article IX Section 1 [F.S.A.] of our Constitution requires a uniform and equal rate of taxation and further requires a just valuation of property. We will therefore attempt, with reference to these two requirements, to test the constitutionality of the construction given by the lower court to § 193.11(3).”
It is true that the effect of the opinion of the district court of appeal was to render the circuit court‘s interpretation of
We do not overlook the fact that the district court of appeal rather than the circuit court passed initially on the validity of the statute. See In re Kionka‘s Estate, Fla. 1960, 121 So.2d 644, particularly Justice O‘Connell‘s specially concurring opinion where the question of who is the initial interpreter of an act or constitutional provision is thoroughly discussed.
In his final decree the chancellor found in terms that no constitutional question was involved. The district court of appeal found that the chancellor‘s interpretation of the act was of “doubtful constitutionality” and in his dissenting opinion Judge White said that “despite protests to the contrary, the majority interpretation of the act is composed squarely in constitutional perspective because there are constitutional aspects that cannot be avoided.” We do not discuss these views except to say that they leave the law in a state that needs clarifying. In the main we think the interpretation of the act by the chancellor was correct and the interpretation of the district court of appeal was wrong in part but account of the confused state in which they leave the law, tax assessors over the state would not know how to perform the duties imposed on them. It does seem that if there ever were a case which requires this court to assume jurisdiction and clarify the law, this is it.
As to jurisdiction by certiorari, in Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Fla. 1961, 128 So.2d 594, we held that if this court has jurisdiction on any ground, it may dispose of the case on the merits. It may be that in view of the foregoing discussion jurisdiction on the conflict theory is difficult to determine, but on the theory that the decision affects a class of constitutional officers, that is to say, tax assessors, it is clear.
In State v. Robinson, Fla. 1961, 132 So.2d 156, we had a case similar to this in that it involved a single justice of the peace. The taxing officers of Osceola County are parties to this suit but it involves indirectly all taxing officers throughout the state. Since tax assessors are constitutional officers and it affects their duties, jurisdiction on that ground could hardly be successfully challenged.
So much for the point of jurisdiction. What has been said will certainly reveal the state of law on that point and the necessity for its clarification. Hence the reason for this court to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of properly interpreting the act,
Petitioners and respondents have argued a number of questions to support their contentions but after all is said, we think there is only one question here and that is resolved by a correct interpretation of
“The District Court of Appeal erred in holding that Section 193.11(3), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional when construed as providing that, for purpose of valuation for tax assessment, agricultural lands are classified in a real property category separate and distinct from other types of real property.”
The title to Chapter 57-195, Acts of 1957, from which
“An Act relating to the assessment for taxes of lands used for agricultural purposes; amending Section 193.11, Florida Statutes, by providing for assessment of such lands upon a valuation per acre as agricultural lands.”
Section 193.11(3), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is as follows:
“All lands being used for agricultural purposes shall be assessed as agricultural lands upon an acreage basis, regardless of the fact that any or all of said lands are embraced in a plat of a subdivision or other real estate development. Provided, ‘agricultural purposes’ shall include only lands being used in a bona fide farming, pasture or grove operation by the lessee or owner, or some person in their employ. Provided shed nurseries, or nurseries under cover, shall not be termed agricultural and shall be excluded from this law. Lands which have not been used for agricultural purposes prior to the effective date of this law shall be prima facie subject to assessment on the same basis as assessed for the previous year, and any demand for a reassessment of such lands for agricultural purposes shall be subject to the severest scrutiny of the county tax assessor to the end that the lands shall be classified properly.”
Section 1, Article IX, Florida Constitution, provides:
“The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation, * * * and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes.”
Section 193.11, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides:
“(1) * * * The county assessor of taxes shall assess all property at its full cash value. * * *”
We quote said constitutional and statutory provisions in full because they determine the purpose of the legislature in passing the act under review. The primary guide to statutory interpretation is to determine the purpose of the legislature. That purpose is rarely expressed clearer than it is in
We construe
Careful examination of this statute reveals nothing but an effort on the part of the legislature to classify agricultural lands for tax purposes; it defines what constitutes agricultural lands, points out exceptions to them and gives taxing officers other leads to a correct assessment. We find nothing in the act inconsistent with the requirement of
The foregoing and other provisions of
The lower court also fell into error in holding that “full cash value” had reference to value for any and all potential uses. This interpretation ignored the legislative classification of agricultural lands for tax purposes on the basis of actual use which the legislature was authorized to make. It further ignores the power given the legislature in
In State ex rel. Atty. Gen., v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409, 416 (1933), this court said:
“The organic requirements for ‘a uniform and equal rate of taxation’ and ‘a just valuation of all’ property, do not forbid but contemplate proper classification of property in making just valuations for taxation. * * *”
That is exactly what the legislature did when it enacted
The terms and purpose of
When the concept “just valuation,” “full cash value,” “uniform and equal
Since we think there is nothing here but a question of interpretation, we have not discussed the doctrine that decision on constitutional grounds was necessary to determination of the cause and whether the opinion says so or not, such a finding was inherent in the judgment. Harrell‘s Candy Kitchen v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, Fla. 1959, 111 So.2d 439; Townsend v. Beck, 140 Fla. 553, 192 So. 390; and In Re Brown‘s Estate, Fla. 1960, 114 So.2d 522, and 117 So.2d 478.
We have examined every other question treated by petitioners, as well as those treated by respondents, and we think we have jurisdiction of the cause. We find that
ROBERTS, C.J., and CALDWELL, J., concur.
THORNAL, J., concurs specially.
DREW, J., dissenting.
THOMAS and O‘CONNELL, JJ., dissent and agree with DREW, J.
I concur with opinion by Justice TERRELL for the reasons stated in my dissent in Franks v. Davis, Fla., 145 So.2d 228.
A rehearing was granted in this cause. Upon further consideration of the record, briefs and arguments of counsel for the respective parties, we adhere to the prior determination of said cause and to the opinion previously filed herein. Certiorari should be and is hereby granted and the judgment of the District Court of Appeal is quashed.
ROBERTS and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
THORNAL, J., concurs specially with opinion.
DREW, C.J., dissents with opinion.
THOMAS and O‘CONNELL, JJ., dissent.
I concur in the order denying rehearing for the reason stated in my agreement to the original judgment herein.
I withdraw my original dissenting opinion and, after rehearing granted and oral
I agree that certiorari jurisdiction1 is clear on the theory that the decision of the district court2 in this case affects a class of constitutional officers because it construes a statute prescribing the duties of county tax assessors. In addition, the case presents a novel problem of appellate review in the companion appeal because of the initial treatment of constitutional principles in connection with a decision which purports to turn on statutory interpretation rather than validity.
The critical terms of the act construed,
The fundamental controversy, in my opinion, is controlled by the same reasoning and authority upon which the majority opinion was predicated in the recent decision in Franks v. Davis, Fla. 1962, 145 So.2d 228.
The controlling organic provision is
“The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation, except that it may provide for special rate or rates on intangible property * * * and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The classification effected by the statute here involved is not, in fact, a classification of land on the basis of any inherent characteristic but instead is a “classification” of taxpayers or owners of taxable realty so as to single out those who choose or are able to subject their land to agricultural use and accord to that group alone the right to have the “just value” of their property determined on the basis of actual use rather than on the basis of the same criteria controlling the valuation of other property.
Whatever might be the validity of an act which classified taxable realty generally on the basis of actual use, an inequality is obvious when a law requires, as does this statute, a different assessment basis for parcels of land having identical salable or market value, whenever one parcel may be subjected to agricultural use. In any event, nowhere in the voluminous record at bar is there any effort to justify the classification attempted by demonstrating that the purpose of the act, i.e., to prevent consideration of potential uses in addition to actual use, has a unique relationship to the particular class affected, or that no other property shares the need for protection from market considerations for assessment valuation purposes.
The net effect of such a provision is to exempt, in the case of lands currently used
Neither does the legislative power include, under the direct ruling in the Franks decision, supra, the right to achieve indirectly that which cannot be done directly under the constitutional requirement of uniform rate:
“If rates cannot be varied directly, however, neither can that result be achieved indirectly by manipulation of the assessment basis upon which levy is made. Such is the recognized intendment of our provisions for a ‘uniform and equal rate of taxation’ as well as a ‘just valuation of all property,’ construed as securing equality of burden for ad valorem taxation in this State.”
The express provision of our Constitution is that the sole property classification for which a different or special rate may be provided is that of intangible property. It is difficult indeed to see the necessity for this specific grant of the power of rate variation if the statutory classification at bar should be sustained.
For these reasons I can only conclude that the legislative power of classification in the execution of the constitutional mandates of “just valuation of all property” and provision for a “uniform and equal rate of taxation,”
Examination of the entire text of this statute,
The acreage assessment feature of the statute can be sustained, I think, only if we hold, as seems reasonable, that it relates solely to an assessment technique within the legislative prerogative and does not directly or materially affect the principles of valuation which control the assessor‘s determination of the just value of full cash value of this and other property.
The burden of taxation in the world in which we now live is one of concern to every citizen — not just those who own agricultural lands. The owners of resort hotels and businesses, operating in seasonal periods, are a class that inevitably have problems peculiar to them. Developers of large real estate subdivisions who hold lots for resale are another. The list is endless. A strict application of the ancient concept of equality and uniformity — buttressed by a myriad of court decisions and constitutional provisions — is the only way to prevent a complete erosion of these basic concepts in an area that has plagued men from time immemorial. We cannot — and must not — in my humble judgment make fish of one and fowl of the other.
With the utmost respect for and deference to my esteemed brothers I must — and do — dissent from the majority view.
The opinions already of record in this cause contain full treatment of the many arguments and prior decisions which enter into a fair interpretation of the applicable constitutional provision. Upon a full consideration of the numerous cases cited in the majority and dissenting opinions of the district court, I would approve the ultimate disposition of the cause by that court, which reversed the decree of the chancellor, and would discharge the writ heretofore issued in these proceedings.
THOMAS and O‘CONNELL, JJ., concur.
Notes
“(3) All lands being used for agricultural purposes shall be assessed as agricultural lands upon an acreage basis, regardless of the fact that any or all of said lands are embraced in a plat of a subdivision or other real estate development. Provided, ‘agricultural purposes’ shall include only lands being used in a bona fide farming, pasture or grove operation by the lessee or owner, or some person in their employ. Provided shed nurseries, or nurseries under cover, shall not be termed agricultural and shall be excluded from this law. Lands which have not been used for agricultural purposes prior to the effective date of this law shall be prima facie subject to assessment on the same basis as assessed for the previous year, and any demand for a reassessment of such lands for agricultural purposes shall be subject to the severest scrutiny of the county tax assessor to the end that the lands shall be classified properly.”
“(1) The board of county commissioners of any county in the state is hereby authorized and empowered in its discretion to zone areas in the county exclusively used for agricultural purposes as agricultural lands; provided said lands have been used exclusively for agricultural purposes for five years prior to such zoning.
* * * * *
“(4) For the purpose of this section, ‘agricultural lands’ shall include horticulture, floriculture, viticulture, forestry, dairy, livestock, poultry, bee and all forms of farm products and farm production.
“(5) The county tax assessor in assessing such lands so zoned and exclusively used for agricultural purposes as described and listed shall consider no factors other than those relative to such use. The tax assessor in assessing land within this class shall take into consideration the following use factors only: The cost of the property as agricultural land, the present replacement value of improvements thereon, quantity and size of the property, the condition of said property, the present cash value of said property as agricultural land, the location of said property, the character of the area or place in which said property is located and such other agricultural factors as may from time to time become applicable.
“(6) The board shall keep a record of such lands so zoned for tax purposes only and restricted for agricultural lands and shall remove such zoning restrictions whenever lands so zoned are used for a”