Eddie J. Craig, a Texas resident, was injured in a January 29, 1999 truck collision in Fulton County, Georgia, in the course of his employment with Tyson Foods, Inc. As of April 3, 2002, Tyson Foods had paid Craig $97,840.43 in injury-related benefits under the Texas workers’ compensation law. Texas Labor Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. Craig and his wife brought a negligence action in Fulton County against the driver and owner of the other vehicle involved in the collision. Tyson Foods intervened in that action in order to assert a subrogation claim for the workers’ compensation benefits it had paid to Craig.
Craig settled his claim against the alleged tortfeasors for $160,000. Of that amount, $97,840.43 was paid into the registry of the trial court pending resolution of Tyson Foods’ subrogation claim. Craig asked the trial court to rule that Tyson Foods was not entitled to any share of the settlement proceeds. Tyson Foods then moved to enforce its subrogation claim. The trial court granted Craig’s motion and denied Tyson Foods’ motion. Tyson Foods appeals from that order and claims the trial court erred in (1) failing to give full faith and credit to the Texas workers’ compensation statute, and (2) finding that Tyson Foods could never prove Craig had been fully compensated under the Georgia workers’ compensation statute. For reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In
Sargent Indus. v. Delta Air Lines,
the Georgia workers’ compensation rule of law applies . . . when the injury occurred in Georgia, and the plaintiff was eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits in Georgia, even though the employment relationship may have been *444 localized in another state and the plaintiff may have been eligible for such benefits in another state.
Similarly, “when the underlying situation involves an employee who was injured in one state and qualifies for workers’ compensation benefits in that state but claimed and received benefits in another state, the law of the place of the tort applies.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.)
Maryland Cas. Ins. Co. v. Glomski,
Tyson Foods attempts to distinguish Glomski and Sargent by showing that those courts were presented with conflicting and competing workers’ compensation schemes; that Georgia and Texas workers’ compensation law are not in conflict because they both provide subrogation rights for persons paying workers’ compensation benefits; and that, accordingly, under the “full faith and credit” and “comity” provisions of Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution and OCGA § 1-3-9, respectively, we should give effect to Tyson Foods’ subrogation rights under Texas law. We disagree with the initial premise of this argument because the subrogation rights provided by the Texas workers’ compensation law and under OCGA § 34-9-11.1 (b) are in fundamental conflict.
Under Texas Labor Code Ann. § 417.002 (a), “[t]he net amount recovered by a claimant in a third-party action shall be used to reimburse the insurance carrier for benefits, including medical benefits, that have been paid for the compensable injury.” In other words, the “first money” of any recovery, after reduction for attorney fees and expenses, goes to the payor of workers’ compensation benefits. See
Texas Workers’ Compensation Ins. Fund v. Alcorta,
Georgia law, as codified in OCGA § 34-9-11.1 (b), takes a different approach. Only if the injured worker has been fully and completely compensated for his injuries may the employer or the employer’s insurer enforce a subrogation lien on the injured employee’s recovery in a third-party action.
Canal Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
The trial court also correctly found that, because Georgia law applied and Craig’s workers’ compensation benefits were not paid under Georgia law, Tyson Foods had no subrogation right against Craig’s settlement. “OCGA § 34-9-11.1 (b) plainly provides the employer or insurer a right of subrogation limited to benefits paid under the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act.”
Johnson v. Comcar Indus.,
Judgment affirmed.