Case Information
*1 Before W OOD Chief Judge, S CUDDER S T . E VE Circuit Judges .
S CUDDER Circuit Judge
. Tyquan sustained serious injuries upon crashing car while driving ‐ influence. An emergency room doctor treated Stewart and doing so ordered a blood draw, which confirmed he had been drinking. The requested and received the blood test results the hospital’s medical staff. Stewart later sued both for violating ob taining his test results a warrant and hospital’s medical staff violating Insurance Portability and Accountability Act disclosing results. The defendants. af firm.
I
Stewart remember he spent hos pital indeed says he was unconscious. His treating physician, however, said upon arriving emergency room, Stewart relayed been drinking lost con trol car. signed a form consenting treatment. As part determining proper course treatment, doctor ordered draw.
Suspecting alcohol contributed crash, asked medical staff ‐ test results. An diana requires staff who test person’s “for diagnostic purposes” “disclose results test officer requests … results part criminal investigation” regardless whether person “consented otherwise authorized their release.” Ind. Code § 6(a) The showed Stewart was intoxicated, nurses shared police. then arrested prosecutors later charged him misde meanor operating vehicle while intoxicated. pleaded guilty.
Invoking U.S.C. § sued officers, doctor, nurses, and their employers federal court. He ac ‐ cused hospital’s medical staff of violating In surance Portability and Accountability Act, HIPAA, dis closing medical (his results) po lice without his consent. He alleged offic ers and their employer, City of Fort Wayne, violated his obtaining warrant. added claims under negligence, infliction emotional distress, battery, invasion pri vacy. granting defendants’ motions judg ment, court concluded Stewart’s federal claims failed matter law, brought forth enough evidence allow jury decide any claim favor. now appeals.
II
We begin statutory claim HIPAA. concluded statute provides pri vate right action accordingly medical basis. agree.
HIPAA prohibits disclosure records out patient’s consent. U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1 d–7. But nowhere expressly create private action enforce this substantive prohibition. So question becomes whether Congress nonetheless intended allow private award private remedy. Ziglar Abbasi Although addressed issue preceden tial decision, all other circuits considered question *4 4 19 1747 have concluded HIPAA not confer individual en ‐ forcement rights—express or implied. See Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, (5th Cir. 2006); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton Mayberg, 610 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 2010); Wilkerson Shinseki, F.3d 1267 n.4 2010). Those courts reasoned Congress, del ‐ egating enforcement authority to Secretary of Health Human Services, did intend HIPAA include cre ate private remedy. See U.S.C. §§ 1320d–3, –5. Under Supreme Court’s decision Alexander Sandoval Congress’s choices about enforcement authority consequences: “The express provision one method of enforcing substan tive rule suggests Congress intended preclude others.” HIPAA’s focus on those with access med ical information—as opposed individual pa tients—also weighs against finding implied private right action. id. at 289. By prohibiting disclosure sensi tive information, imposes obligations professionals charged protecting out conferring individual privacy rights. Acara at (interpreting U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1, –5, –6, employ ing similar reasoning).
Seeing reason chart different course, now hold HIPAA confers private action. Medical pro fessionals, including treated Stewart, are bound statute’s disclosure prohibitions confidentiality re quirements. But Congress left violations Department Human Services, private plaintiffs. 19 1747 5
III turn next Fourth Amendment claim. The
district court judgment defendant officers on basis they were entitled matter law because they obtained test results statute. urge us affirm basis or on grounds qualified immunity. Agree ing committed error, we choose latter course.
Police enjoy immunity from liability “does violate clearly established statutory or consti tutional which reasonable person would known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting White v. Pauly 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). For be clearly established, it must be “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al Kidd U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified immunity, Su preme Court emphasized, “protects ‘all but plainly in competent knowingly violate law.’” Werner Wall 2016) (quoting Mullenix Luna (2015)).
Like court, identified case es tablishing an officer’s receipt from personnel offends Fourth Amendment. Those cases do address question point other direction. Supreme Court recognized exigent cir cumstances exception permitted order warrantless draw con scious driver involved accident. Schmerber Califor nia 758–59, Earlier this year, Court reinforced extended this same point, holding that, despite reductions needed obtain warrant, warrantless draws from unconscious drivers involved car accidents do offend the Fourth Amendment. Mitchell Wisconsin , 2533–34, 2537–39 (2019).
Against backdrop Schmerber Mitchell cannot say “beyond any debate” police officers’ actions here were unconstitutional. Ashcroft U.S. at 741. Accepting Stewart’s account was unconscious at time draw, had no reason believe Fourth barred police from seeking a doctor ordered purposes driver after collision. these circumstances Stewart cannot establish violated clearly established Amendment, qualified immunity ap plies. Id .; see Wilson Layne U.S. 615–18 (1999) (holding officers’ conduct was reasonable where they fol lowed common practice judicial opinions at prohibited conduct).
Because makes argument City unconstitutional policy, practice, custom, claim against City officers’ likewise fails. Mo nell Dep’t Soc. Servs.
IV owe brief word closing court’s entry judgment claims.
While purporting disagree ruling, refer us any evidence record calling court’s conclusions into question. there fore waived any challenge court’s rejection claims. F ED . R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8)(A); CTL ex rel. Trebatoski Ashland Sch. Dist. n.3 2014).
For these reasons, AFFIRM.
[*] agreed decide case oral argument because briefs record adequately present facts legal arguments, oral argument would significantly aid court. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).