JAY M. TYLER v. THOMAS J. TYLER ET AL.
(AC 36164)
DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Sheldon, Js.
Argued March 5—officially released June 17, 2014
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Sommer, J.)
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Bruce D. Tyler, self-represented, the appellant (defendant and cross complaint plaintiff).
Kathleen Eldergill, with whom, on the brief, was Bruce S. Beck, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
Opinion
DiPENTIMA, C. J. The self-represented plaintiff, Jay Tyler, and cross claim plaintiff, Bruce Tyler, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting in part the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants Thomas Tyler, Russell Tyler, John Tyler, and Richard Tatoian.1 There are two claims on
This appeal pertains to an irrevocable trust executed by Ruth Tyler on October 8, 2004, for the benefit of her sons, John Tyler, Bruce Tyler, Thomas Tyler, Russell Tyler and Jay Tyler. The trust named Tatoian as trustee and provided for the termination of the trust upon Ruth Tyler’s death, with the assets of the trust remaining after payment of various expenses to be distributed to her five sons in substantially equal shares. The trust specified, by reference to Ruth Tyler’s will, that the shares allotted to the plaintiffs be reduced in accordance with the debt owed by each to Ruth Tyler. On April 1, 2010, Ruth Tyler died. Due to the value of the trust’s assets and the amount of debt owed, Jay Tyler was not entitled to receive any money from the trust.2
The lengthy and convoluted procedural history of this appeal began on January 28, 2011, when Jay Tyler commenced an action contesting the trust and alleging, among other things, that Thomas Tyler had exerted undue influence over their mother.3 Bruce Tyler, ostensibly a defendant in Jay Tyler’s action, responded by admitting the allegations of undue influence and filing a cross complaint. The defendants denied Jay Tyler’s allegations and pleaded several special defenses. After numerous motions, interlocutory rulings, and amendments to the pleadings, the action ultimately consisted of (1) two counts asserted by Jay Tyler seeking to modify the trust on the grounds of undue influence, conspiracy, and what the court characterized as “tortious interference with the expectancy of inheritance,” and (2) several counts asserted by both Jay Tyler and Bruce Tyler against Tatoian for negligence and breach of various duties.
On April 15, 2013, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a joint objection. Both sides submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of their positions. The defendants also moved to strike certain portions of the plaintiffs’ affidavits and documentary evidence. In a memorandum of decision dated August 22, 2013, the court granted the defendants’ motion to strike some of the evidence.
On the basis of the remaining evidence and memoranda, the court rendered summary judgment on those counts asserted by Jay Tyler seeking to modify the trust, concluding that there was no genuine issue
I
As a threshold matter, we consider whether the ruling from which the plaintiffs appeal constitutes a final judgment for the purposes of determining the subject matter jurisdiction of this court.5 After oral argument, we invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing on this issue.6 We conclude that the ruling constitutes a final judgment with respect to Thomas Tyler, John Tyler, and Russell Tyler, but not with respect to Tatoian.
“The jurisdiction of the appellate courts is restricted to appeals from judgments that are final.
“A judgment that disposes of only a part of a complaint is not a final judgment . . . unless the partial judgment disposes of all causes of action against a particular party or parties; see
Here, the ruling from which the plaintiffs appeal was a partial judgment, as it did not dispose of the entire complaint or cross complaint. Nevertheless, the ruling constitutes a final judgment with respect to Thomas Tyler, John Tyler and Russell Tyler, as it disposed of all the counts asserted against them. See
On the other hand, the court’s ruling disposed of only a portion of the plaintiffs’ counts asserted against Tatoian.7 As the trial court did not make a written determination regarding the significance of the issues resolved by the judgment, neither of our rules of practice conferring final judgment status on a partial judgment applies with respect to Tatoian.
II
We now consider the merits of Jay Tyler’s claim that the court improperly rendered summary judgment on his counts seeking to have the trust modified. Jay Tyler argues that the court incorrectly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Thomas Tyler exerted undue influence over Ruth Tyler. We agree.
We begin by setting forth the well established standard of review. “Pursuant to
“Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court . . . . It is frequently stated in Connecticut’s case law that, pursuant to
Guiding our analysis is the relevant law of undue influence. “Undue influence is the exercise of sufficient control over a person, whose acts are brought into question, in an attempt to destroy his [or her] free agency and constrain him [or her] to do something other than he [or she] would do under normal control. . . . It is stated generally that there are four elements of undue influence: (1) a person who is subject to influence; (2) an opportunity to exert undue influence; (3) a disposition to exert undue influence; and (4) a result indicating undue influence. . . . Relevant factors include age and physical and mental condition of the one alleged to have been influenced, whether he [or she] had independent or disinterested advice in the transaction . . . consideration or lack or inadequacy thereof for any contract made, necessities and distress of the person alleged to have been influenced, his [or her] predisposition to make the transfer in question, the extent of the transfer in relation to his [or her] whole worth . . . failure to provide for all of his [or her] children in case of a transfer to one of them, active solicitations and persuasions by the other party, and the relationship of the parties.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pickman v. Pickman, 6 Conn. App. 271, 275–76, 505 A.2d 4 (1986).
On appeal, the issue before us is whether the evidence submitted by the parties,8 viewed in the light most favorable to Jay Tyler, demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact as to undue influence. In conducting a plenary review of the record, we are mindful that the elements of undue influence are typically questions for the jury. See Salvatore v. Hayden, 144 Conn. 437, 440, 133 A.2d 622 (1957) (“[u]nder proper instructions from the court, the questions of the mental capacity of a testator and undue influence present issues of fact“); see also Hospital of Central Connecticut v. Neurosurgical Associates, P.C., 139 Conn. App. 778, 793, 57 A.3d 794 (2012) (“sum- mary judgment is ordinarily inappropriate where an individual’s intent and state of mind are implicated” [internal quotation marks omitted]). We also note that Connecticut courts have consistently held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of undue influence. See Stanton v. Grigley, 177 Conn. 558, 565, 418 A.2d 923 (1979) (“[w]here there is no direct evidence of influence, a factual foundation supportive of a reasonable inference that, but for the [defendant’s] actions, the testator would have made a different disposition, is sufficient to sustain a finding of undue influence“); see also Lancaster v. Bank of New York, 147 Conn. 566, 573, 164 A.2d 392 (1960) (“[d]irect evidence of undue influence is often unavailable and is not indispensable“).
The court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to three of the four elements of undue influence. Because Jay Tyler had the burden to prove all four of the elements, this conclusion prompted the court to render summary judgment. As they form the basis for the court’s decision to grant summary judgment, we limit our plenary review to consideration of those three elements.9 Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jay Tyler, we are persuaded that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to each.
First, we consider the evidence concerning the first element, a person subject to undue influence. Bruce Tyler’s affidavit recounts specific examples regarding Ruth Tyler’s state of mind during the relevant time period, such as her inability to remember selling a car to one of her sons and her submissiveness in being forced to sell the family farm. This is the type of circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Ruth Tyler was susceptible to undue influence.
Next, we consider the evidence concerning the second element, the opportunity to exert undue influence. The affidavits of both Bruce Tyler and Thomas Tyler discuss Thomas Tyler’s frequent contact with his mother throughout the relevant time period. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that he had the opportunity to exert undue influence over his mother.
Finally, we consider the evidence concerning the fourth element, a result indicating undue influence. Here, the evidence of Ruth Tyler’s previous will, contrasted with her current will and trust, demonstrates a stark difference between how her estate was previously to be distributed and the distribution scheme at the time of her death. These documents constitute sufficient evidence of a result indicating undue influence to warrant submission of the issue to the jury.
None of this is to say that a jury ultimately will be persuaded by the evidence submitted by Jay Tyler. But given that “[i]t is the [trier] [of fact’s] exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses and determine whether to accept some, all or none of a witness’ testimony“; (internal quotation marks omitted) Traggis v. Shawmut Bank Connecticut, N.A., 72 Conn. App. 251, 260, 805 A.2d 105 (2002); we conclude that summary judgment was not appropriate in this case.
The appeal is dismissed with respect to Richard Tatoian. The judgment is reversed as to Jay Tyler’s counts seeking to modify the trust and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.