Tyler v. CurrierTyler v. Currier
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- McFarland, Lorigan, Henshaw
Id.—Delivery not Affected by Subsequent Bills for Taxes.—After the delivery of the deed the rendering of subsequent bills for taxes for two years, by a real estate firm of which the husband was a member, to the wife, without proof that she paid them, or that the husband personally knew of such bills, is not a circumstance of material importance on the question as to whether title had passed, and the payment of them by her could in no event affect the legal value of the previous delivery of the deed.
Id.—Fire Insurance Policy in Name of Wife.—The taking out of a policy of insurance in the name of the wife after the delivery of the unrecorded deed, on which the husband paid all the premiums, could not affect the validity of the title passed by the delivered deed, whatever effect it might have upon the validity of the policy.
Id.—Deed of Trust for Loan—Execution by Husband and Wife—Provision for Reconveyance to Wife—Husband not Estopped.—Where the husband applied in his own name for a loan, and joined with his wife in executing a deed of trust to secure the same, the fact that the deed of trust provided, in case of full payment of the loan, for a reconveyance to the wife, “her heirs and assigns, at her request and costs,” does not estop the husband from denying that she was the owner of the property.
Id.—Cessation of Trust—Rights of Owner—Enforcement of Deed—Void Trust to Convey to Wife.—Upon payment of the loan in full the trust ceased and the property belonged to the husband as owner, who could enforce a deed to clear his title. The trust to convey to the wife, who was not the owner of the property, was void, and could not be enforced by her.
Edward C. Harrison, for Appellant.
Delivery is a question of intention, to be decided from the circumstances of the case, which here show that the instrument was not intended to be effective until after the grantor‘s death. (Denis v. Velati, 96 Cal. 223, 227; Kenney v. Parks, 125 Cal. 146, 150; Cazassa v. Cazassa, 92 Tenn. 573;1 Devlin on Deeds, 2d ed., sec. 282.) The respondent was estopped by the terms of the deed of trust executed by him. (11 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 392; Bigelow on Estoppel, 5th ed., p. 332; Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1962, subd. 2; Tillaux v. Tillaux, 115 Cal. 663, 667.)
E. W. McGraw, and A. P. Van Duzer, for Respondent.
The evidence proves an absolute delivery of the deed. (Dimmick v. Dimmick, 95 Cal. 323-328.) The subsequent transactions could not impair the title vested in the grantee. (Emmons v. Barton, 109 Cal. 670; Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 453; Ord v. Ord, 99 Cal. 525; Tully v. Tully, 137 Cal. 60; 69 Pac. 702; Burden v. Burden, 10 App. Div. 340; 41 N. Y. Supp. 978; Saffold v. Horne, 72 Minn. 470, 487; Cummings v. Glass, 162 Pa. St. 258; McGee v. Allison, 94 Iowa, 527; Blair v. Howell, 68 Iowa, 619; Dyer v. Skadan, 128 Mich. 348; 87 N. W. 277.2) No estoppel is pleaded or shown. (Newhall v. Hatch, 134 Cal. 273; Pope v. Armsby, 111 Cal. 164; Murphy v. Clayton, 113 Cal. 153.) The deed of trust was a mere security for debt, which ceased when payment was made, and conveyance could be compelled by the owner. (Sacramento Bank v. Alcorn, 121 Cal. 383; Hodgkins v. Wright, 127 Cal. 692; Bostwick v. McEvoy, 62 Cal. 496.) A trust to convey to a third person would be void. (Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 523.3)
1 36 Am. St. Rep. 112.
2 92 Am. St. Rep. 461.
3 84 Am. St. Rep. 70.
McFARLAND, J.—The plaintiff is a daughter and an heir at law, and defendant is the surviving husband, of Emily F. Currier, deceased. The said decedent left a will in which she bequeathed and devised certain property to named persons,
There was no evidence of the undue influence charged, and in his briefs and argument counsel for appellant makes no attempt to sustain the averment on that subject. It is also entirely clear that the decedent signed the deed in question, duly acknowledged it before a notary public, and on December 27, 1895, made actual delivery of it to respondent, who took it and kept it in his own exclusive possession from that time until after her death; and these facts are not controverted by appellant. But the contention, and the only contention, of appellant is, that notwithstanding the actual manual delivery of the deed to respondent and its continued possession by him as aforesaid, still the delivery, for certain averred reasons, should not be considered as, and was not, a delivery in law. We see no ground upon which this contention can be maintained.
The delivery of the deed was fully proven by the testimony of respondent and of the witness George M. Mitchell, who was present at the time of the delivery and made a memorandum thereof. There was at the time no limitation whatever as to the character or purpose of the actual delivery; it was, so far as the evidence shows, unconditional. It was intended by the wife as a deed of gift to her husband, and delivered to him as such. She had told a friend who was a business man that
1. Respondent did not record the deed until after his wife‘s death; and appellant contends that something which he said about that matter in his testimony tends to show that the delivery of the deed was not with intent to pass title. Respondent said: “I did not refrain from recording it at her request. I refrained from recording it for fear that I might die first.” Appellant‘s counsel then said to him, “Your idea was that if it was not recorded she could destroy it and revest herself with the title?” and he answered, “Yes, sir.” There is no merit in this contention. The fact that respondent had the erroneous notion that if he should die before his wife, and that after his death she should get possession of the deed and destroy it the title would revest in her, has no pertinency to the issue of the delivery of the deed. (See Dimmick v. Dimmick, 95 Cal. 323.) And for the same reason the court did not err in sustaining an objection to the question whether respondent took the deed with the understanding on his part that in the event of his dying first the wife could get control of and destroy it and “thus revest herself with the title.” Indeed, the use of the word “revest” assumes that the title had by the delivery of the deed vested in the grantee.
2. The respondent is a physician, and in addition to practicing his profession was a partner with one Mitchell in the real-estate business under the firm name of Currier & Mitchell; and the firm did some business with the decedent. Mitchell also attended to insurance business. After the delivery of the deed Currier & Mitchell rendered an account to the decedent, which included, among other things, taxes on the said lot of land for two years. It does not appear that
3. After the delivery of the deed a fire-insurance policy on the premises was taken out in the name of the decedent. Appellant attaches importance to this circumstance, but it was of no consequence. The respondent paid all the premiums on the policy; it does not appear that the decedent had any knowledge that the policy was in her name; and Mitchell testified that it was through his oversight and error that the policy in existence at the time of the deed was not transferred to respondent. If a policy was taken in a wrong name, that fact might have affected its validity as against the insurance company, but it could have no effect upon the validity of the title which passed by the deed.
4. In 1899, which was after the delivery of the deed, the respondent made application in his own name to the Savings and Loan Society for a loan of two thousand dollars, to be secured by the property here involved. The application was accepted, and, instead of a mortgage, there was prepared a certain form of a deed of trust which has been held by this court to be a valid form of security for loan of the money. (See Sacramento Bank v. Alcorn, 121 Cal. 383, and cases there cited; and Hodgkins v. Wright, 127 Cal. 691.) The deed of trust was executed by the respondent, and also by his wife, the said decedent. It purports to convey the land here in controversy to two trustees; recites that it is intended to secure a loan of two thousand dollars; provides that if the money loaned should not be paid as agreed on the trustees may sell the property and apply the proceeds to the payment
In conclusion, it may be said that the contentions of appellant as above noticed would, under the most favorable view for her side, only constitute some conflicting evidence as to the issue whether the deceased delivered the deed in question to respondent, and do not afford any ground for disturbing the
The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.
Lorigan, J., and Henshaw, J., concurred.
A petition for a hearing in Bank having been filed, the following opinion was rendered thereon on the 26th of June, 1905:—
THE COURT.—Rehearing denied.
The stipulation in the trust-deed as to the payment of the surplus, if any, to Mrs. Currier, should not be held to necessarily estop the husband from claiming the property. What was said in the opinion in Hoeck v. Greif et al., 142 Cal. 119, as to a similar question was not necessary to a decision therein, and, in our view, is not a correct statement of the law.