215 Mass. 57 | Mass. | 1913
This is an action of contract to recover an instalment of pension alleged to be due under St. 1912, c. 723. All the requirements of that act have been complied with. The single question is whether this statute was passed and became a law of the Commonwealth or was vetoed by the Governor.
In the official edition of the Acts and Resolves for 1912 (see R. L. c. 9, § 1), which is the evidence of the laws enacted during that
The language of the Constitution, (c. 1, § 1, art. 2,) so far as now
After a bill has been passed by the Legislature, it must be presented to the Governor for revisal, and then there are three ways and only three in which it may become a law: first, by the approval of the Governor manifested by his signing the same; second, by a passage of the bill after consideration of it, notwithstanding objections made by the Governor by a vote of two thirds of each branch of the Legislature; and third, by a failure on the part of the Governor either to approve or disapprove within five days after it shall have been presented to him, when it shall have the force of a law. It is contended by the plaintiff that the bill became a law in the third way.
The duty of revisal of acts passed by the legislative department of government, which is vested by the Constitution in the Governor, is a personal duty. It must be performed by him alone, and cannot be delegated. It is a high prerogative. It enables the single executive officer chosen by all the people to interpose his judgment against that of their representatives in the legislative department, and to compel a consideration by them again of the wisdom of the proposed law. It permits them to enact a law against his objections only by a two thirds vote of each legislative branch, instead of by a majority vote as is the rule touching ordinary legislation. It is a power conferred by the Constitution itself.
The computation of time from a date or from an event or act done excludes the day of the date, Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502, and also excludes Sunday when the time limited is less than a week, Cunningham v. Mahan, 112 Mass. 58, unless a different intention is manifested in the statute or writing to be construed.
These general rules apply to the interpretation of the clause of the Constitution now under consideration. The circumstances of the present case do not require a determination whether legislative or calendar days are intended by the Constitution. See Opinion of the Justices, 3 Mass. 567. Nor need it be decided whether, if seasonable notice was given by the Governor to the branch of the Legislature in which the bill originated of his intention to return it with his objections to it or to its clerk, it would be necessary for that branch or its clerk to arrange for the reception of such communication from the Governor within such time on the last of the five days allowed as would enable him in the exercise of the discretion vested in him to complete necessary investigations, conclude deliberations, and formulate objections. The facts disclosed on this record are that without such notice and after the branch of the Legislature in which the bill originated had adjourned for the day, and after the usual and reasonable time for closing the office of its clerk had come, and after it in truth was closed and no one was there, the veto message was placed on the clerk’s desk. The clerk’s office was closed on the day in question not earlier than was reasonable. This would be the presumption, and it appears from the agreed facts.
The language of the Constitution which we have quoted is that if the bill "shall not be returned by the governor within five days after it shall have been presented, the same shall have the force of a law.” The word “returned” in this sentence must signify
Without deciding that the bill must be returned to the House when in session, (as that point is not necessarily involved,) it is at least essential that in order that the bill be returned to the House in' which it originated, it likewise should be placed in the actual custody of the House, or at least of its clerk or other duly authorized officer. The constructive return which might be assumed under some conditions to flow from placing the bill within a room under the jurisdiction of the proper branch of the Legislature, but in the absence of any person representing it, cannot be treated as a return of a bill with the objections of the Governor in writing in the constitutional sense.
The requirement of the Constitution was not met by putting the bill with the message in the office of the clerk of the House when no one was there under the circumstances narrated. See In re Public Utility Board, 54 Vroom, 303.
It follows that the bill was not vetoed, and, not having been returned with the objections of the Governor to the House in which it originated within five days after it was presented to him, it had the force of law. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
So ordered.