4 Mich. 177 | Mich. | 1856
By the Court,
The defendant insists that his proceedings in this case are authorized by the statutes of this State, and therefore there is no error in this case which the Court can notice.
This State was, at the adoption of the code of 1846, divided into four Circuits, and the Judges of the Supreme Court were required to perform the duties of Circuit Judges in the Counties composing the Circuit in which they resided. This code, except as amended by subsequent legislation, has remained in force until now. The Constitution of 1851 provided for a new organization of Courts, and required that the State should be divided into eight Circuits, and that eight Circuit Judges should be elected. The law by which jurisdiction was given to these Courts (6'ess. Lams of 1851, p. 245, § 8), is the same as the section quoted from the code of 1846, with this addition at the close of the section: “ Subject to such modifications as may be provided by the laws of this State.” No essential alterations have been made in the laws regulating process, taking bail, and issuing executions, etc. Section 6, and down to and including Section 22, of Chapter 89, Title 22, provides for and regulates the commencement of suits by summons, capias ad respondendum, and declaration, but imposes no restriction as to the place in which they may be served. Chapter 106, Section 10, authorizes executions to
If there was any doubt as to the true construction to be given to the Act conferring jurisdiction on Circuit Courts in the code of 1838, it would seem that none could be reasonably entertained in reference to the code of 1846,-re-enacted in 1851, and which now governs and regulates the jurisdiction of Circuit Courts.
The Circuit Court for each county sits within and for the same, and is restricted to its local limits. Though their jurisdiction is general over the subject matter of suits, yet, in respect to persons and property, it cannot be exercised beyond the limits of the County. The Circuit Courts of the United States are held within and for each State or district. Judge Washington, in Ex parte Graham (3 Washington C. Ct. R., 459), in speaking of the jurisdiction of those Courts, says : “ This division and appointment of particular Courts
These several Acts of Congress are in striking analogy to laws of our State, to which we have referred, and we consider the views of Judge Washington as applicable in their scope
Judge Story, in Picquet vs. Swan (5 Mason’s R., 41), in speaking of the decision of Judge Washington, says: “I follow with undoubted confidence the course of his reasoning.” He then proceeds to remark upon the same acts, and we shall offer no apology for quoting largely from his opinion. He says : “ The Courts of a State, however general may be their jurisdiction, are necessarily confined to the territorial limits of a State. Their process cannot be executed beyond those limits, and any attempt to act upon persons or things beyond them, would be deemed a usurpation of foreign sovereignty, not justified or acknowledged by the law of nations. Even the Court of King’s Bench, in England, though a Court of general jurisdiction, never imagined that it could serve process in Scotland, Ireland or the Colonies, to compel an appearance or justify a judgment against persons residing therein at the commencement of the suit. This results from the general principle, that a Court created within and for a particular Territory, is bounded, in the exercise ef its powers by the limits of such Territory. It matters not whether it be a Kingdoxn, a State, a County, or other local district. If it be the former1, it is necessarily bounded and limited by the sovex’eignty of the Government itself, which cannot be extx’a-temtorial; if the latter, then the judicial intex’pretation is, that the sovereign has chosen to assign this special limit, short o± his general authority.
From these remarks of Judges Washington and Story, which we have thought to be applicable as well to the laws cited from our code as to the laws of Congress, it would seem that it must have been the intention of the Legislature to confine the exercise of jurisdiction by our Circuit Courts to Counties in which suits might be commenced, and that without some express statutory provision, no judgment could be rendered in those Courts against persons upon whom
The construction we have given is confirmed by the consideration that our present statute is but little variant from Section 4, of Title 1, Part 3, Chapter 3, of the Code of 1838, and that, since the adoption of that code, but one ease (before this) has been brought to the knowledge of this Court, in which an effort has been made to obtain jurisdiction of a person by serving process upon him in a County other than that in which the suit was commenced, and that case, as we are informed, is still pending. The understanding of the profession has been, that original process could not be served (at least in ordinary cases) beyond the limits of a County.
But it is claimed, that if the jurisdiction of the Court was limited to the bounds of Wayne County, the service of the declaration out of the County was a defect of service, and is a mere irregularity, and should have been taken advantage of at the first opportunity, and before the plaintiff below had taken any further steps.
An irregularity is defined in 1 Tidd’s Pz\, 514, to be: “ The want of adherence to some pz’esczibed zuzle or znode of proceeding; and it consists either in omiting to do something that is necessary for the due and orderly conductiizg of a suit, or doing it in an unreasonable manner. Thus the
Tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States decided, in the case of Rhode Island vs. Massachusetts (12 Peters’ R., 657), “ That no Court can, in tbe ordinary administration of justice in common law proceedings, exercise jurisdiction over a party, unless be shall voluntarily appear, or is found within tbe jurisdiction of the. Court, so as to be served with process. Such process cannot reach tbe party beyond tbe territorial jurisdiction of tbe Court; this is a personal privilege, which may be waived at tbe option of tbe party.” Nor would it vary tbe legal result in this case that tbe plaintiffs bad actual notice of this action, for they are not bound to appear. (5 Mason R., 43.)
There can be no presumption in this case in favor of tbe jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, because it is a Court of general jurisdiction, or at tbe least, not an inferior Court in the sense of tbe common law. Tbe question is not here, whether, if tbe facts to give jurisdiction do no appear on tbe record, tbe proceeding wuuld be irregular, but whether, when it does appear on tbe record that tbe Court did not acquire jurisdiction, the judgment is not erroneous.
Tbe record says afterwards, to wit: On tbe 12th day of February, 1855, there was filed in tbe office of tbe Clerk of said County a copy of said declaration and notice of said rule to plead, with a return of tbe Sheriff endorsed thereon, which return is in tbe words and figures . following, to wit: Then follows tbe return of the Sheriff of Lapeer County, as be styles himself, in which be says, “Served tbe within declaration upon James Turrill and
Judgment affirmed.