14 S.C.L. 261 | S.C. Ct. App. | 1825
The degree of confidence with which the defendants counsel has pressed his claim for a new trial, in this case, has excited something more than ordinary attention iu the court to discover if possible whether the motion really possesses the merit which has been supposed. But it has not appeared to us in the same point of view in which It has pre
The second ground, contains a very well settled rule of law, that the declarations of a person shall not be received in support of his own title. But the declarations of a party when accompanied by an act may be received as explanatory of that act, as constituting a part of the res gestee. The plaintiff had produced in evidence an acknowledgment of the witness, that he would become his tenant, thereby admitting the right of the land to be in him. The defendant had a right therefore, to give in evidence his declarations as to his motives' and the manner of his tenancy as explanatory of that act. The defendant could not have called Spear as a witness, because he had an interest in supporting his title, as it went to discharge a debt which he would otherwise have continued liable to pay.
3rd The plat of resurvey was not offered as evidence of title but as defining the extent of defendants possession.And for that purpose it was certainly admissible.
6th. With regard to the sixth ground, it is a very familiar principle that a record cannot generally be given in evidence to affect any hut such as are parties or privies to it. But there are exceptions to that rule; as when it consitutes a link in a chain of title, or goes to establish a collateral fact. In the case now under consideration, the plaintiff claimed tinder Spear, under whom the defendants claimed as his tenant, and contended therefore that defendants could derive no title from him. To rebut that evidence the record was produced to shew that Spear had actually been divested of his right before he acknowledged the right of the plaintiff. It was not offered as evidence of defendant’s title, but to shew that, from the circumstances of the case, and the relation in which Spear stood to the parties, at the time, his acknowledge-ments could neitherweaken the title of one nor strengthen that of the other.
7th. There does not appear to he any thing in the instructions of the judge to the jury which will’authorize the interposition of this court.
8th. With regard to the verdict, it belonged to the jury to determine the extent of the defendant’s possession. No colour of title is necessary to give a party a right by possession. The object of the law is to quie' persons in their possessions. After the quiet enjoyment of land for five years, the law presumes a title in the occupant, which may have been lost by accident. The possession is substituted in the place of title. Color of title, I think, at best, a far-fetched figure, and difficult to define; perhaps, however, it is the best that can be used iur reference to the subject to which it is applied. I think that in its common acceptation it is understood to mean any semblance of title by which the extent of a man’s possession can be ascertained. An actual deed from a person who has no right conveys nothing. It is not exclusive evidence of pos
Upon the whole, the court do not see any ground upon vbich the plaintiff can claim a right to a new trial. The
The motion therefore must be refused.
A. fV. Thompson, for the motion.
Earle and Henry, contra.