86 Va. 300 | Va. | 1889
delivered the opinion of the court.
This appeal is the sequel to Staples v. Turner’s Adm’r, 29 Gratt., 330. It appears from the record that in November,
After the cause went back to the circuit court, the “defendants in the original bill filed a cross-bill, insisting that the above-mentioned sum of $964 01 was due from Staples individually, and praying that a decree be rendered against him in their favor for that amount. The 'cause was again referred to a commissioner, pursuant to the mandate of this court, and a decree was finally rendered confirming the commissioner’s report, ascertaining a balance due to Staples individually by Turner’s administrator of $235 43, and to Turner’s estate by Staples as executor of $1,078 99. And from this decree an appeal was allowed by one of the judges of this court.
"We are of opinion that there is no error in the decree. It
The decree of the circuit court was declared to be erroneous, because it proceeded “ upon the idea that Samuel G. Staples is personally liable for the whole account, although it was-agreed that he should only be bound for what was charged against him individually, and because it dissolved the injunction for $964 01, which was the balance due [R. Turner’s admin- , istrator, in the opinion of the circuit court, upon the whole account, individual and fiduciary.”
It is true nothing was said either in the opinion or the decree of this court as to the W. R. Staples, Mendeuhall, Hairston, and Kellogg tickets, but the principle was none the less firmly settled that Samuel G. Staples was liable only for what was charged against him individually in the settlement above mentioned; and whether right or wrong—as to which we express no opinion—this view is conclusive of the matter,' since the rule, as laid down in Campbell’s Ex’ors v. Campbell’s Ex’or, 22 Gratt., 649, and in numerous subsequent cases is, that it is not competent for this court to review one of its own decrees rendered at a previous term, even though error therein be apparent. The decree complained of must, therefore, be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.