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Turner v. United States
684 A.2d 313
D.C.
1996
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*2 ammunition. The Glock seventeen rounds of FARRELL, and Before SCHWELB gun within definition 17 was a machine MACK, Judge. Judges, Associate Senior 22-320HC).1 6-2302(10) §§ bag marijuana in police a The also found his shoe. FARRELL, Judge: Associate trial, Following appellant was a bench II. marijuana guilty possession found his for Appellant conviction contends (D.C.Code 33-541(d) (1993)), possession of (UF) unregistered possession of an firearm (machine (id. § 22- prohibited weapon gun) a for merged possession with his conviction 3214(a) (1996)), carrying a pistol a without (a)-machine (PPW gun). prohibited weapon a (id. 22-3204(a)), possession an license The law on He is mistaken. now-familiar (id. 6-2311(a) (1995)), unregistered firearm subject recently this was summarized unregistered possession of ammunition Supreme Court: (id. 6-2361(3)). gun arose convictions may “prescrib[e] greater Courts Only possession firearm. legislature punishment intended.” than appeal re appellant one on makes in com- principles In accord rooted with quires he that his con discussion: contends jurisprudence, mon law and constitutional presume statutory pro- for two

victions we that “where offense,’” a proscribe the visions ‘same weap firearm and impose two does not intend to merge firearm/weapon is a because the punishments that offense. gun, gun and a century deter- For over half we § 6-2312. We under D.C.Code pun- mined whether a defendant has been reject remain contention by ap- twice the “same offense” ished arguments, except agree with we plying the forth rule set (and government) him the sentence U.S. sentencing hearing pronounced orally at the If “the 76 L.Ed. 306 Judgment differs from that recorded on a viola- same act transaction constitutes Order, requires and Commitment statutory provisions, tion of two distinct of the two. remand conformation applied to determine wheth- the test be only one is offenses or er there are two requires proof of a provision whether each I. Ibid. fact which the other does not.” Appellant passen front-seat —, Rutledge v. United traffic ger police stopped in a car that for a omitted).2 (1996) (internal While police smelled citations

violation. officer When explain subse- Appellant’s argument ”[i]n 2. The Court went on to that he established test, possession" of the firearm applications defense of "innocent often quent we have no law has merit. Evidence as matter of define concluded that two statutes been established that he had weapon offense,' typically because one is a lesser ‘same arrested, a fact for over four hours when (cid:127)— at-, offense of the other.” included attempted flight along trial with his —the which— his judge properly could Bad inconsistent way story police on his station he was See, e.g., when arrested. surrender Hines v. United rifle; presumption against allowing multiple “the Short-barreled punishments for the same crime validly registered Pistol not Congress clearly if overcome indicates that it registrant prior current them,” impose intended to allow courts to id. September certain enumer- [with (citations omitted), at-, 116 S.Ct. at exceptions]. [Emphases ated added.] *3 party points neither to such an indication in gun registered, Because a machine case, Blockburger apply this and so we character, appellant changes asserts UF test.3 elements, losing one of its when (a) requires proof PPW of a fact that UF gun charged: of a machine then (a) statute, PPW does not. The charged (he says) “proof merely that the defendant here, provides person “[n]o shall within possessed weapon such a is sufficient as a possess any of Columbia machine registration matter of law to make out the 22-3214(a). gun_” § gov- violation.” prove appellant ernment thus had to Appellant confuses an element of the of- knowingly intentionally possessed a ma- Jury by fense proved. with the manner which it is gun. chine See CRIMINAL Instructions 6-2312(a) Section does not convert UF into a COLUMBIA, No. 4.72 A FOR THE DISTRICTOF (4th ed.1993).4 applications. different crime in some It does The UF statute, contrast, all, possessory not a define offense at but require proof does not the defendant simply prohibits registration issuance of a possessed gun any a machine or other enu- certificate for the enumerated firearms. Its merated It punishes firearm. act of be that of a machine firearm, “possess[ing] any control[ling] or effect gun statute, only violates the UF but that is person unless the ... registra- holds a valid government having because it relieves the tion certificate for the firearm.” D.C.Code prove means, 6-2311(a) non-registration by added). the usual § A “firearm” (emphasis ie., See, non-registration. a certificate of “any will, weapon includes which or is de- States, e.g., supra Townsend v. United note signed remade, redesigned, made or readi- 559 A.2d 1319. Instead introducing ly restored, to, converted or and intended (as ease), such a certificate it did in expel projectile projectiles by the action government 6-2302(9). presumably may explosive-” § of an ask the trial Id. On 6-2312(a)’s hand, judicial § court to take proof other notice of besides that the defen- possessed firearm, dant ban and rest on that non-registra- requires proof See, e.g., tion. Strong, the firearm was W. not John McCor- (4th defendant in the District of Tyree Columbia. mick on Evidence ed.1992); States, (D.C.1993); v. United Poulnot v. District 629 A.2d Colum- cf. Jury bia, (D.C.1992) (doctrine Criminal Instructions the Dis- judicial (a) essentially expression notice “is Columbia, No. 4.73. PPW re- trict “ sense,” shortcut, ‘judicial doing common quires no of that fact. Under Block- therefore, away necessity ... burger, with the formal of evi- the two crimes are not the necessity dence because there is no real “same offense.” (citation omitted)). it’” But this does not Appellant argues contrary by point- government relieve the of the burden of 6-2312(a), provides: proving non-registration. The elements of A certificate shall not be fixed; they depending UF are are not fluid issued for a: identity on the possessed. of the firearm

(1) shotgun; Sawed-off Appellant’s reliance on Whalen v. United gun; Machine Supreme prove This court’s decisions follow operabil 4. The also had to See, merger analysis. (a), e.g., Byrd ity Court's gun v. United of the machine to convict under PPW (D.C.1991) (en banc); (D.C. Washington 498 A.2d 247 (embodying something require. also D.C.Code 23-112 UF does not Town test). send v. United 559 A.2d 1319 Furthermore, (1980), argument logical- help L.Ed.2d does not him. ly all of firearms would have include purposes cumulative Whalen held 6-2312(a), just guns. §in not listed punishment Jeopardy under the Double any validly regis- “[pjistol include not These Clause, felony murder the crime subsumes registrant in District tered to the current its and makes one of elements commission of 24,1976”5 surely prior September (there —which underlying rape), crime which oth- pistols most to be embraces now found not be Id. erwise would the “same offense.” Appellant’s position District of Columbia. (a)- 1439. UF PPW merges UF-pistol with the would mean similarly do not become the carrying pistol a license crime of without just guns same because machine can- offense (D.C.Code 22-3204(a)) in cases both where registered. The elements UF re- rejected charged. are But this court has distinguish main it from the same PPW merge under *4 these crimes (a) regardless type pos- of firearm Blockbwrger, part registra- in because “the principle sessed. Nor does the we con- requires non-registra- of tion offense “[ejaeh provision strue of statute ... so [a] tion the offense not.” license does give provi- to to all as effect of the statute’s 23; Tyree, Irby see also v. Unit- sions,” Morrissey, District Columbia v. of States, 11 ed 766 n. (D.C.1995) (citation omit- A.2d so, necessary say Though hardly it is to ted), 6-2312(a), appellant. aid Section be- appellant’s argument the ex- logic of would insuring sides that no will issue tend further. forth still Section 6-2313 sets firearms, the listed allows one means of variety than nature of conditions other the prosecution, to replace another in a UF person firearm that disable the explained give as above. We thus full effect registering a firearm. These include minori- reading into it the section without ty, previous a crime violence conviction for redefining in purpose much broader UF offense, weapons drug or recent convic- specific applications. tions, acquittal by insanity reason of recent involuntary a men- legislature recent commitment to excluded machine “[W]hen institution, appellant’s tal Under others. guns from those firearms which lawful any theory, if of these caused conditions ly registered, be ‘con registered, to be defendant’s firearm not primarily power cerned with the inherent fire non-registration cease to an ele- would weapons....”’ of certain United States just in the case machine ment of UF as (D.C.1995) Woodfolk, A.2d guns, merge another and UF would with (footnote omitted) Fesjian (quoting v. Jeffer Blockbwrger prohibiting possession. offense son, (D.C.1979)), cert. de A.2d support — does not this wholesale restriction nied, —, 116 S.Ct. U.S. - punishment for UF related cumulative (1996). Barring registra their L.Ed.2d 231 weapons offenses. part legislature’s tion was concern reasons, Title 6 broaden and increase limita “to hold that For these we (a)- separate tions on firearms within the District.” sentences for UF PPW Townsend, may scarcely It at 1321. stand. to 6- harmonizes with concern read III.

2312(a) removing le as these of UF thal reach Appellant contends his sentence simply another it also violates statute. prison year of mari one machinery because, screw of juana “turn[s] the must be after he reversed tighter,” ... Gore v. United committed the offense but before trial 1280, 1283, sentencing, L.Ed.2d 1405 District of Council (1958), maximum weapons. of such Columbia reduced the sentence on the pertain weapons Metropolitan police only exceptions 5. The issued and to retired officers. special employees, police similar officers and (a quote days prison. to 180 at 314 direct from the recent Su offense 33-541(d) (1993 Supp.1996). Rutledge United preme Court decision & U.S. argues He he should receive benefit (1996)) is, pre- though change “Courts legislative of the law even L.Ed.2d 419 punishment legisla greater than the scrib[e] he on is silent effect relies its intended brings ture intended.” first sentence on crimes committed before the effective sage observation Appellant’s by mind the of Mr. Justice date. is foreclosed makes Douglas, common sense often Holiday “[A]nd our decision in recent (D.C. 1996) good Peak v. (holding 683 A.2d 61 law.” 613, 615, mandatory-minimum elimination of pain drug for certain of The second sentence makes us sentences non-violent fully majority, in a rush to applicable is not committed aware fenses offenses (ie., Blockburger analysis “that repealing embrace a before effective date of the requires proof light each statute of a fact that legislation, of the federal and District statutes”). not”), “savings adequately has not dealt other does Columbia against allowing mul presumption with “the tiple punishments for the same offense” IV. at —, (Rutledge, concedes, As the the sen legislative *5 Judgment tence recorded on the and Com States, City Blockburger Council. v. United Order pro mitment differs from the sentence 299, 180, 284 52 S.Ct. 76 306 U.S. L.Ed. orally by January judge nounced the trial (1932). 5, As pronounced “[t]he 1995. sentence open judgment court constitutes the actual Background A. court,” States, Davis v. United 397 A.2d (D.C.1979),6 951, 954 the case must be re- barring In to prosecu addition successive for judge manded a correct tions, issue Jeopardy the Double Clause Judgment and Commitment in con- Order protects Fifth Amendment individuals formity pronouncement. with the oral multiple punishments for the same offense.1 Dixon, 688, See States v. United 509 U.S. respects, judgments ap- In all other 694-96, 113 2849, 2855,125 556 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d pealed from are (1993); Pearce, North Carolina v. 395 U.S. Affirmed. 711, 2072, 717, 2076-77, S.Ct. 89 (1969). Nevertheless, may 656 an individual MACK, Judge, Senior dissenting: arising be convicted of more than one offense fashion, scholarly colleagues reject my In single from a transaction if this is consistent argument enacting legislature’s that convictions for with supra, of an firearm respective — Rutledge, and statutes. at —, also, merge. 1245; weapon In U.S. 116 S.Ct. at pedantically perfect commentary, Woodward, that e.g., how- v. United States 469 U.S. ever, 105, 108, 611, 612, two sentences surface which motivate 105 S.Ct. 83 518 L.Ed.2d is, curiam) Blockburger this (per (describing dissent. first sentence “The single Congress arose determining convictions as a rule for whether Majority op. (emphasis permit at punishment). 314 intended to cumulative firearm.” added). sentence, Majority op. may The second charge “While the a defen- at -, 1245; Judgment 6. written "[T]he and Commitment Or U.S. 116 S.Ct. at United Ball v. only 1668, States, 856, 864-65, der is intended the oral memorialize U.S. 470 judgment." David v. 579 A.2d United (1985); Byrd L.Ed.2d 740 1172, (D.C. 1990). 386, banc); (D.C.1991) (en 1273, Robinson v. United Contrary thought, to earlier schools even (D.C.1985); Doepel prohibition concurrent against multiple punishments sentences violate the 1037, 449, denied, (D.C.), cert. po- 580, L.Ed.2d 483 S.Ct. consequences collateral attach to tential that - Rutledge, criminal convictions. See 55 L.Ed. includ greater with both a and a lesser U.S. dant (1911)). may prosecute those offenses ed offense and trial, single the court not enter at a Burger, writ- In March Justice Chief court, separate impose cumulative while a convictions for a unanimous held leg charged under two convicted felon could punishments for both offenses unless receiving possess- and criminal statutes with punishment.” has such islature authorized firearm, he not be con- ing the same could Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F.3d United States v. punished two offenses. victed (11th denied, Cir.1993), cert. U.S. supra note 128 L.Ed.2d 59 S.Ct. assump- that told us “[t]he at 1671-72. Ball Kaiser, (citing F.2d United States rule is underlying tion (11th Cir.1990)) added). 1300, 1303 (emphasis pun- Congress ordinarily does not intend to government’s view of the assertion under ish the same offense two comparison appellant’s analysis converts the id., statutes,” “Congress seems prohibitions into a “fact- of the PPW and UF who clearly recognized that a felon it, inquiry” rather than an “elements” based also possess must receives firearm one, briefly subjecting per- I think it instructive allude had no thus intention to two same present-day cases son convictions earlier and the evolution of 862,105 Id. at act.” concepts. Only recently, year, Mr. March Supreme Court of In November Stevens, unani- speaking another Justice oral rais- the United States heard court, presumption us of the mous reminded alia, ing, an ac- inter the issue whether statutory provisions pro- “where two (who open bags, re- cused had torn mail offense,’ does scribe the ‘same morphine quantities hydrochloride, moved punishments for impose not intend to two purchaser) made a sale to Rutledge, supra, offense.”3 be convicted under both two sections *6 (citations omitted). -, at 1245 S.Ct. 2 selling Act of the Harrison Narcotic argu- rejecting government’s repeated In the drugs that in the were neither transferred charge participation in a con- ment that (2) pursuance original stamped package, spiracy, charge continuing and a a criminal Blockburger, supra, 284 of a written order. others, enterprise would “in concert” little more at 181. A S.Ct. punishment on both support conviction and later, Mr. Justice Sutherland than month counts, Mr. Justice Stevens stated affirming (writing for unanimous court in Blockbur- straightforward application the convictions)

the announced: conspiracy led ger test to the conclusion did define a defined in one count not as applicable same The rule is that where the continuing the criminal offense from act or constitutes a violation transaction in the other enterprise “in concert” definition provisions, statutory the test two distinct and, count, the the latter offense was since applied there to be to determine whether two, “appropriate” it the more serious of only one, is whether are two offenses or as includ- conspiracy a lesser to characterize provision of a fact requires proof each continuing enter- ed offense the the not. other does (thus punishment). prohibiting dual prise at-, supra, Blockburger, supra, Rutledge, 284 U.S. at States, 220 at 1247.4 (citing v. United Gavieres codify holding §§ more of Blockbur- 696. little ger. than 2. Then codified as 26 U.S.C.A. Act, Byrd, supra, 598 A.2d at 387. Drug incorporated in the Food and Now §§ etseq. U.S.C.A. application clarifying proper this "ele- 4.In analysis, stated: Justice Stevens further ments” government’s position in reject would century we determined For over half a reliance Crawford punished twice has been whether defendant (D.C.1993), D.C.Code by applying the rule set the “same offense” statutory presumption favors establishes a v. United forth in provision does consecutive That code sentences. L.Ed. 306 S.Ct. view, my In by these landmark decisions weapons 134 L.Ed.2d 231 These in- (as Supreme reasoning operable gun. Court well as our clude an machine Id. at 1149 10; Byrd, supra) the en bane decision Washington nn. 8 & v. United (D.C.1985) support (citing conclusion the instant case Curtice (D.C.1985)). strictly legislative whether we look 488 A.2d 917 UF, straightforward Blockburger to a To be convicted of an accused must analysis, appellant’s knowingly intentionally possess convictions and sen- un- possession prohibited by law, tences on both A gun, of a firearm. 6-2312(a). weapon registered. of an firearm are in violation Jeopar- of the Double language statutory provisions The dy Clause.5 instances, suggests singular. In both “possession” prohibited crime is one of of a B. Discussion Moreover, weapon. “prohibited the terms Legislative Intent weapon” “unregistered suggest firearm” singularity. Possession is question of whether the prohibited both under the stat- PPW UF intended for both PPW and UF convictions prohibits utes. PPW of all to ensue from a single by act is determined operable firearms or destructive devices. examining plain meaning applica- UF, Similarly, light outright prohi- language legislative ble and the history sup- pursuant bition of certain firearms porting each my statute’s enactment. 6-2312, bars the view, language suggests alone “any destructive device” or firearm unless it necessarily two statutes share the same registered. Therefore, UF, is notwithstand- meaning, 861-63, see 470 U.S. at title, essentially prohibit- its is a statute and are the “functional ing possession by general population; equivalent” other, of each Byrd, supra, (and required permis- Thus, they A.2d at 391. could not have sible) only specified exceptions few apply been intended to mutually to a here,6 inquiry relevant to our both statutes act. essentially prohibit thing posses- the same PPW, To be convicted of an accused must sion of a firearm or destructive device knowingly and intentionally possess one of general population. enumerated or some object other fits the Legislative history, definition interpreted through *7 weapon. law, See United States v. identity ease further establishes the of Woodfolk, 1145, (D.C.1995), 656 A.2d purpose respect with to the PPW and UF denied, U.S. —, cert. 1286, PPW, part statutes. which is coded as a of (1932).... Ohio, subsequent 161, 167-68, applications the 432 U.S. 2226- of test, (1977) we have concluded (Blockburger applica- that two 53 L.Ed.2d 187 often offense,” statutes typically the ‘joyriding’ “same be- tion confirmed that "offense of awas define cause (parentheti- one is a lesser included the lesser included offense of auto theft” offense of omitted)). other. cal - -, Rutledge, supra, U.S. at 116 S.Ct. at added). (emphasis Only qualified organizations police or retired officer(s) eligible registration are to receive a Rutledge, supra, 5. See also - U.S. at -n. certificate, Also, 6-2311(a)(l)-(2). § D.C.Code (citing, e.g., 116 S.Ct. at 1245 n. 6. officers, (2) certain law enforcement individu- 861-64, 1671-73) ("mul 470 U.S. at 105 S.Ct. at license, holding als a dealer’s nonresidents tiple prosecutions were barred because statutes activities, participating in lawful recreational ‘receipt’ ‘possession’ directed at and of a firearm unregistered possess weapons that would offense,’ amounted to the 'same in that of require registration otherwise certificate to be receipt 'necessarily' posses l(b)(l)-(3) included of legally possessed. § D.C.Code 6—231 sion”); added). Whalen v. United (emphasis following The section 691-95, 1432, 1437-40, (D.C.Code 6-2312) simply require § serves to (1980) ("two punishments imposed could not be by groups these excluded would rape felony predicated because permitted murder otherwise be under D.C.Code 6- ”); rape possess weapons. the were the 'same offense' Brown v. 2311 to those limit, (The prohibit, goal being Act of each Control of ultimate Title Firearms by prohi- possession of firearms the Congress enacted to enforce a and control the Thus, against carrying particularly danger- the UF statute bition District of Columbia. of an extension weapons appropriately within the District Columbia can be considered ous “strengthen existing the it is one and was intended to of the statute PPW possession tighten tighten over the law controls handful enacted the of subsections Woodfolk, supra, dangerous weapons.” in the Dis- dangerous weapons control over added); (emphasis Columbia, previ- A.2d at particularly those trict of Townsend A.2d ously “prohibited weapons,” see deemed (D.C.1989). The Firearms Control §§ et This conclusion seq. 22-3201 D.C.Code years Act later Regulations was enacted by report is further evidenced the Council’s City by District Council of Columbia of the Firearms regarding the enactment limi- primarily to “broaden and increase the Act, it referred to Regulations Control where the District above tations on firearms within that re- multiple as “a statutes D.C. statute provi- beyond existing criminal code quired registration of all firearms within the Townsend, contained in Title 22.” su- sions District, outlawed added); (emphasis A.2d pra, 559 at 1321 firearms, regis- specifically stated that D.C.Code 6-2301. tration could not be issued certificates Woodfolk, supra, 656 A.2d at guns,” machine statute, part as a The UF enacted added), (emphasis as well as 1148 & n. 6 supplemental legislation, addresses the latter §§ collectively to 6-2311 referring City dangerous Council’s concern over seq. of the et as one violation. See Council guns in increase in the number and use of Columbia, on the Judi- District of Committee District,7 Cissel, Kuhn v. ciary, Fire- Report on Bill No. The (D.C.1979), by tracking ownership arms Act of Control generally those that are restricted legiti- isolated class deemed legisla- would conclude such,8 those mate use for which includes surrounding history tive the enactment weapons prohibited by D.C.Code (i.e., prohibitions the same PPW and is UF firearms). (i.e., prohibition registerable to limit the of firearms issuing against registration certificates for District) plain meaning of the lan- as is the guns similarly part is Fire- statutes, it with guage is inconsistent Act and Regulation arms Control was enact- to convict and prohibit of the District from ed residents an individual found sentence guns power a fire deemed possessing single PPW and under both dangerous legislature. Woodfolk, su- relationship PPW and UF UF.9 The between Fesjian (citing pra, 6-2312) Jef- (taking account into (D.C.1979)). ferson, 399 applied “so and intertwined” when intimate act if UF is not to a Legislative descriptions purposes statutes, of- included otherwise considered lesser PPW and well as *8 (as may pursuant it to guns, fense well be on machine inter of PPW added absolute ban certainly alia, “possess” Rutledge), it is its “functional The term is are instructive. statutes, Byrd, supra, 598 A.2d at equivalent.” See to all these with the common of dealers; (4) (the deadly weapons predecessor Regulate 7. See firearms, statute, 6-2311). (5) de- current UF it more difficult for Make devices, and to move in ammunition structive therein, set forth 8. D.C.Code 6-2301. As of Colum- within the District illicit commerce Regulation purpose Control Act of Firearms bia. is to: (1) Require registration of all firearms that many where the there are cases 9.I note that citizens; by private owned are (2) proved PPW and UF could be elements of both persons may types Limit involved, yet rarely are both stat- from the facts lawfully possess; (3) See, charged. e.g., Wilson v. United utes fact in qualified persons only are al- Assure that A.2d 1002 firearms; possess lowed Moreover, ing, drug supra, transferring it without 391. as defies reality legislature purchase to conclude that did the existence of a order. Each punish posses- required proof of a fact intend the same criminal statute Blockburger, supra, sion under two statutes. other did not. See at 181. U.S. at Comparison 2. Elements case, In the instant we have no such re approach Byrd, Consistent with our quirement. government proved the Once the where we held that the did not gun, prohibited of a machine un an intend individual to be convicted of and provisions, der the no two further receiving sentenced for violations both sto- gun was Since a machine needed. property len and theft each arose when law, as a matter of no act, the same criminal nevertheless but ex- My nonregistration required. Blockburger, Byrd, supra, amined colleagues concede that is 390-91,1 “boiler-plate turn to address having relieved to introduce a certificate of i.e., litany” Blockburger, the test of wheth- court, Presumably nonregistration. provision “proof’ each requires er of an addi- counsel, request or without a take Applying fact not. tional the other does judicial notice of fact that a machine well, I test would reach same result. unregisterable. Strong, is John W. logic Blockburger has withstood the at 413-14 McCormick on Evidence only it test time. Not has resolved diffi (4th ed.1992). event, any only In questions arising myriad cult cases and necessary one of the elements of PPW is circumstances, varying factual but it has also statute, establish a violation of the UF it is made accommodations there are indi- where “appropriate” to characterize UF as a lesser legislative Woodward, cia of intent. See su Rutledge, included offense of PPW. su Cf. 108, 105 Thus, pra, 469 U.S. at S.Ct. at 612. pra, U.S. at this has been true where two offenses are I would hold that conviction and sentenc- “intimate and intertwined” “the same act ing the same act is barred (Byrd, supra, course of conduct” provision Jeopardy Double 391), where “one is a in [offense] lesser respectfully Constitution. dissent.11 (see cluded offense of Rutledge, the other” at —, 116 S.Ct. at (see process rights where due are at issue (10th Dalton, States v. F.2d

Cir.1992)).10 important

It is to remember that what has “elements-compari-

been characterized as the only

son” arose purchaser,

context of a made to a sale separate requiring gov-

but violations prove

ernment the elements of distinct i.e., prohibitions against the statutes — lift- original drug pack- narcotic from its Dalton, Appeals F.Supp. Subsequent to a.Block- Tenth Circuit Court of process rights found that burger analysis, due were Court found that this possessing violated when he (which was convicted of essentially charge the same as our PPW transferring gun, statute) offense as was the same *9 appellant of a crime he "was convicted (which transfer of an firearm (another perform” could not statute made ma- statute). essentially our the same as Id. at Dalton, guns unregisterable). chine Thus, prosecutions for both were 354-55. F.2d jeopardy. Id. barred double Court, On remand to vacat conviction, ed charged appellant then issues, join my colleagues As to the other possession and transfer affirmance. Dalton, gun. a machine States v.

Case Details

Case Name: Turner v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Oct 17, 1996
Citation: 684 A.2d 313
Docket Number: 95-CM-59
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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