delivered the opinion of the Court.
On 7 and 8 June 1982, the appellant, Ernest Turner, was tried by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore wherein he was acquitted of the charge of assault with intent to maim and convicted of assault. On 2 July 1982, he was sentenced to a term of ten years, promptly generating this appeal with the following questions being presented:
1. Did the trial court err in prohibiting Appellant from explaining that a prior conviction was the result of a guilty plea?
2. Did the court’s instructions to the jury contain plain error material to Appellant’s rights?
3. Did the trial court err in imposing sentence for an offense of which Appellant had not been convicted?
4. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction?
1.
During cross-examination of the appellant, the prosecutor extracted from the appellant the fact that he had previously been convicted of robbery. On re-direct examination of the appellant by his counsel, the following colloquy occurred:
BY MR. QUISGARD:
Q When you were 16, you pled guilty to that robbery or have a trial?
MR. SCHER: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I’ll sustain the objection. Strike it.
MR. QUISGARD: Your Honor, for the record, let’s approach the bench.
(Whereupon, counsel approached the bench and the following conference ensued:)
MR. QUISGARD: He’s the proud possessor of the certified copy of the docket entry. It says he pleaded guilty.
*369 MR. SCHER: I am going to ask — Mr. Quisgard knows it’s properly admissible.
THE COURT: The only question, it’s a conviction. Doesn’t make a difference whether it’s a guilty plea.
MR. QUISGARD: It bears on his credibility. He did wrong and admitted it.
MR. SCHER: You can’t go beyond the conviction.
Turner now professes that this ruling was error on the part of the trial judge. He argues that, becausе the witness’ prior conviction was introduced for the purpose of impeaching his credibility, he is entitled to counteract this attack by evidence establishing good character. Defense counsel contends that "If Appellant had admitted his involvement in the prior offense by pleading guilty in those proceedings, that fact would certainly go toward establishing his good character for truth.” We do not see things that way.
Hаd the trial judge allowed the proposed question regarding the guilty plea to be answered, we might in this case be faced with the doctrine of "curative admissibility” discussed in the matter of Robinson v. State,
it is not permissible, however, for a defendant to contrast a guilty plea in a prior case with his defensе of the instant case, for that bears not on his credibility, but rather tends "to create an inference of innocence with respect tо the charges in the present case” .... [Emphasis in original.]
The Court went on to say in Middleton, supra,
The fact and circumstances of appellant’s guilty plea to an unrelated prior offense have little if any bearing on the issue of his present credibility. Trial*370 counsel’s transparent attempt to use appellant’s self-serving explanation of the previous episode to buttress his account of the instant robbery was improper.
Admittedly, the defendant is рrivileged to explain the circumstances of a conviction, so long as he does not attempt to show he was not guilty of the offense after he had been impeached by evidence of a prior conviction. Brooks v. State,
Although these contentions were not preserved by objeсtion on the part of the appellant, he urges that we entertain them because the court’s instructions to the jury contained plain еrror. He first attacks the trial court’s instruction on the concept of "reasonable doubt.” It seems that the appellant complains because the instruction in question does not contain the term "without hesitation.” We have examined the record regarding this allegation аs to the "materiality of the error in the context in which it arose, giving due regard to whether the error was really technical, the product оf conscious design or trial tactics or the result of bald inattention,” and conclude that in light of these factors that the error, if any there was, is not plain error "vitally affecting his right to a fair and impartial trial,” and therefore does not justify our intervention under Rule 757 h. State v. Hutchinson,
The appellant is also critical of the instruction which advised the jury that "a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts and this is the law as to аssault, assault with intent to maim and the ingredients of those various offenses.” He alleges, and properly so, that the Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana,
We therefore hold that, because these alleged errors were not objected to by the appellant or considered by the trial
3.
An examination of the record reveals that this issue is not preserved for our review and we shall decline to do so. Md. Rule 1085.
4.
This contentiоn, having been raised at the express request of the appellant, has caused us to review the record. In our view there is more than suffiсient evidence, if believed by the jury, to sustain the convictions handed down by that body.
Judgment afñrmed.
Costs to be paid by the appellant.
Notes
. The Supreme Court did not consider the question of whether such an instruction could be harmless error. A constitutionally sound instruction would read: "one may infer that a man intended the natural consequences of his acts, etc.”