Turner v. StateTurner v. State
George Turner raises numerous constitutional challenges to
Further, we cannot agree that the Act violates the separation of powers clause by infringing on the ability of prosecutors to engage in plea bargaining. There is no constitutional right to plea bargaining. See Fairweather v. State, 505 So.2d 653, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). In addition, because the prosecutor does retain some discretion under the Act as to whether to treat a pаrticular defendant as a prison releasee reoffender, see Woods, 740 So.2d at 25 application of the Act is simply another faсtor about which to negotiate.
We also reject appellant‘s argument that application of the Act сonstitutes cruel and unusual punishment.1 We do not find that imposition of the maximum sentence provided by statutory law constitutes cruеl or unusual punishment, because there is no possibility that the Act inflicts torture or a lingering death or the infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain. See Jones v. State, 701 So.2d 76, 79 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1014, 118 S.Ct. 1297, 140 L.Ed.2d 335 (1998).
We reject as well appellant‘s argument that the Act does not bear a reasonable rеlationship to legislative intent. As indicated in the preamble to Chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida, the intent behind that Act is “to prevent prison releasees from committing future crimes,” and the mandatory sentencing provisions of the Act certainly seek to further that intent. Further, we do not read the references in that preamble to “violent felony offenders” as reflecting the legislature‘s intent that the Act reach only those defendants with a prior record of violent offenses. Reading the prеamble in full leads to the obvious conclusion that the legislature‘s primary aim is to reduce recidivism in general. Compare King v. State, 557 So.2d 899 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
Finally, appellant argues that the Act denies due process of law because it gives the victim of an offense the authority to preclude application of the Act to the defendant who committed the offense(s) against that victim. See
This argument was raised, sua sponte, by the court in Speed v. State, 732 So.2d 17, 19 n. 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), where it stated:
We do have one profound reservation in regard to the Act, but it is not based on separation of powers but rather on substantive due process. Our concern is prompted by the provision in subsection (8)(d)1.c. of the Act which apparently givеs the victim of the crime an absolute veto over imposition of the mandatory prison sentences prescribed by the Act, in this case a fifteen year sentence. Thus, the punishment of the offender will vary from case to case based uрon the benign nature, or susceptibility to intimidation, of the criminal‘s victim. Should an armed robber be punished less severely because his victim happens to be forgiving rather than somewhat vindictive? Moreover, this provision of the Act promotes harаssment and intimidation of the victim. Apparently this due process argument in regard to a victim veto has not been raised in any оther case involving the validity of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, nor has it been briefed or argued in the instant appeal. We therefore do not determine its viability here.
We cannot agree that a due process violation is posed by
We also reject appеllant‘s argument that any deference to a victim‘s preference under
As in Woods v. State, supra, we certify the following question as one of great public importance:
DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?
AFFIRMED.
KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.