*1 TURNER, William Cole- a/k/a Julian P. Joseph Spotman,
man, Willy a/k/a Appellee Wyoming,
The STATE of
Supreme Court of Counsel, Schilling, Appellate
Michael H. Defender, Laramie, Wyoming Public Gerald Gallivan, Director, Defender M. Chapin, Program; and Charles S. Stu- Aid Intern, Aid Pro- Wyoming Defender dent brief, appel- (argued), Laramie gram, lant. Gen., A. Gerald Troughton, Atty.
John D. Div., Gen., Stack, Atty. Crim. Deputy Gen., Renneisen, Atty. Chey- Asst. John W. brief, (argued), appellee. enne ROSE, J., Before McCLINTOCK, C. ROONEY, JJ., THOMAS and and GUTH RIE, J.,* Retired.
ROONEY, Justice. Appellant-defendant appeals from a deni- al by the district court of his motion to alleged correct an illegal sentence. Since we find the sentence to legal, have been we affirm.
Appellant was convicted of two counts of
first-degree murder and was sentenced to
count,
death on each
the sentences to run
previous appeal (see
On a
Cloman
574 P.2d
(1978)), this court remanded the case for
resentencing pursuant
6-54(e),
§
1957, Cum.Supp.1975,1 inasmuch as the
(b)
6-54(e), W.S.1957,
in subsection
Section
of conduct as described
section,
person
which was in
shall be
effect on the
convicted
date the verdict was
against appellant
returned
read:
sentenced to
for life.”
* Guthrie, J., Retired,
concurring
specially
“Upon
conviction of murder
the first de-
filed
opinion.
gree, if the
not involve a course
offense does
*2
775
date
potential
of
imposed pursu-
release would be
death sentence
much
mandatory
earlier
W.S.1957,
than if it were to run
6-54(b),
consecutively.
ant to §
Appellant,
thus,
in
would have a
had
been held unconstitutional
substantial
recently
practical
prevailed
appellant
to
To
he
the
prevail,
must establish
counts,
to run consec-
the two
the sentences
fact that
two death
to run
con
utively.
currently
even one—is not as
as
severe
—or
presented
words
issues
the
two
life imprisonment
sentences of
to run
follows:
appeal
him on this
as
consecutively. He fails to do so. Life is
in-
be
Appellant’s
“I.
sentence
May
precious. Appellant’s
in
position
his first
creased,
resentencing, where the rec-
on
appeal was
to
an effort
the
avoid
ultimate
objective
ord
to reflect
information
fails
in sentences —death. The sentence of death
on the
concerning identifiable conduct
is reserved in our
for
criminal code
the most
after the
part
Appellant occurring
the
of
serious of crimes.
severity,
Because of its
original sentencing proceed-
time
the
of
special
procedures
review
and criteria have
ing.
been mandated with
to its imposi
reference
court, upon
“II.
resen-
Whether the trial
6-4-103,
tion. See
6-4-102 and
§§
Appellant’s sen-
tencing,
increased the
prison
tence
it
that
two
when
ordered
terms,
appeal, be served
as amended on
that
the
appellant argues
But
concurrently, i.
consecutively, rather than
to
change in a sentence from concurrent
life
imposed
e.
it
two consecutive
when
is,
facto,
in
consecutive
an increase
ipso
sentences.”
is true if the same sentence
Such
first, we note
issue
Addressing the second
consecutive.
changed
is
from concurrent to
two life sentences
theoretically
that
neither
example, that
argued,
But it cannot be
for
nor
can run consecu-
two death sentences
years
each of two
a sentence of two
on
once,
life
tively.
die
and one’s
only
can
One
consecutively is more
counts to
served
be
Practically, experience
span.
has
one
only
years
of 15
each of
sever than a sentence
the
that on
rare occasions
very
dictates
The
two counts to be served
a
from a death
governor grants
reprieve
converse,
e.,
to death
change
i.
of sentence
effective,
reprieve
sentence. To be
such
previous
imprison
life
from a
sentence of
death
would
to be to both of the two
have
ment, is an
of sentence. See
enhancement
sentences,
concurrently or
whether to run
Henderson,
35 Cal.
People v.
60 Cal.2d
reprieve
and
almost uni-
consecutively,
the
P.2d 677
and
Rptr.
386
life
the
sentence to a
formly converts
Wolf,
(1966).
A.2d 586
N.J.
serving a
practical aspect
The
of
sentence.
violation of due
an enhancement
is a
Such
least,
that,
sentence,
at
is
life
of
process
law unless
is:
occasion, the
Board recommends
Parole
upon objective information
based
years
the
to 25
of the
governor,
to
after 15
conduct on the
concerning identifiable
served,
of
has been
a commutation
sentence
occurring after the
part of the defendant
as 75
years,
a life
to a
of
such
term
sentencing proceed-
time
the
accepts
years.
governor usually
to 85
The
”
* * *
Pearce,
ing.
time allowance
the recommendation. Good
and he
running
prisoner,
then
the
starts
(1969).
35 to 50
serving
could be released after
years.
he has a
life sentence
If
second
Appellant argues that he has been
it,
released to
and
consecutively,
serve
he is
subject to double
virtue of the
jeopardy by
of an
hopes
jeopardy
present
resentence. Double
is
process starts over —with
when multiple punishments
imposed
are
the second
If
eventual
release.
single
offense. North
Carolina
concurrently, the
run
imposed to
tence were
unusually
punishment,
severe
today an
is
when a sentence
supra.
is done
Such
finality,
in its
and in
pain,
unusual in its
after the
sponte
increased
the court sua
existing punish-
No other
enormity.
it. Sullens
its
begun
has
to serve
defendant
States,
upon having his
successful Massachusetts, 177 Murphy set aside. 155, 639, (1900); 44 L.Ed. S.Ct. 245; 1970, Baker, 432 F.2d
Tipton v. 10 Cir. Watson, P.2d 120 Ariz. su-
pra. were considered Appellant’s contentions Rosemary Wayne PERRY, Appellant and refused the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case in which the situation was similar to that of case. The court there VAUGHT, Appellee William T.
concluded: We that the accordingly conclude imposition of the consecutive upon resentencing tences consecu- [after Supreme Court of improper] tive were held death sentences right against appellant’s did not violate (Bracketed jeopardy.” double material
supplied.) Rodriguez, Gillihan v. 551 F.2d were appellant’s
Inasmuch as resentence, we need not upon
not increased him in this raised
consider the first issue
appeal.
Affirmed. GUTHRIE, Justice,
RODNEY M.
Retired, specially concurring. am
I concur with the but unable opinion
to resist some comment.
Although appears to the writer to be
open way and obvious that there is no it has
enhancing penalty, because sincerity,
been apparent asserted with some
I of Jus- repeating cannot resist the words appearing
tice Brennan in his concurrence Georgia,
in the case of Furman v. 408 U.S.
(1972): uniqueness for the only explanation
“The Death extreme is its
of death