43 S.E.2d 259 | Ga. | 1947
1. A court of equity has jurisdiction, on petition, to which minors are parties, plaintiffs or defendants, to render during term decretal orders authorizing guardians to sell the property of their wards for the purpose of reinvestment.
2. Where, as here, the court of equity had jurisdiction, on application of a foreign guardian, to order the sale, for the purpose of reinvestment in United States bonds, of lands in this State belonging to his wards, and upon a hearing the judge entered an order for such sale, jurisdiction was properly retained for the purpose of passing upon the claim of a petitioner for intervention to a just and reasonable compensation for producing as a buyer, upon request of the guardian, the person to whom the guardian sought to sell with the approval of the court.
3. The petition for intervention was not subject to the grounds of objection: 1. The contract which the intervenor sought to set up was not such a contract as the law authorizes a guardian to enter into. 2. It did not appear from the allegations of the petition for intervention that the contract therein alleged had been approved by the Ordinary of Catoosa County, Georgia, and without such an approval the contract is not enforceable. 3. The petition for intervention seeks to add a new and distinct cause of action. 4. It seeks to add a new and distinct party to the original proceeding.
On February 3, 1947, Fay Prigmore filed a petition for intervention in the proceeding and alleged the following: He is a real estate broker with offices in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The property sought to be sold by the guardian of the wards was listed with him for sale, and he made bona fide efforts to sell the same and showed it to Rex A. Richey as a prospective purchaser. The contract of sale which the guardian was undertaking to carry out is the direct result of the showing of the property by the petitioner to Rex A. Richey, and the petitioner is entitled to the reasonable real estate commission or compensation for his services in connection with the proposed sale. The usual and customary real estate commission for the sale of farm lands is 10 percent of the sale price, and such commission is a just and fair compensation to the petitioner for his services; and since the property belongs to minors who are wards of the court, the amount of compensation or commissions to be allowed the intervenor should be fixed by the court.
The minors, by their guardian and guardian ad litem, filed objections to the allowance of the intervention upon the following grounds: 1. The contract which the intervenor sought to set up was not such a contract as the law authorizes a guardian to enter into. 2. It did not appear from the allegations of the petition for intervention that the contract therein alleged had been approved by the Ordinary of Catoosa County, and without such an approval the contract is not enforceable. 3. The petition for intervention *379 seeks to add a new and distinct cause of action. 4. It seeks to add a new and distinct party to the original proceeding.
The trial judge, after entering an order allowing the guardian to sell the property for the purpose of reinvestment, entered an order overruling the motion to disallow the intervention and allowed the same, and the exception is to that judgment.
The first and second grounds of objection to the allowance of the intervention may be disposed of together. The first objection, that the contract with the real estate agent Richey is not one which the guardian could legally enter into, is obviously without merit. By the Code, § 49-213, it is provided that "Guardians may make contracts for labor or service, for the benefit of the estates of their wards, upon such terms as they may deem best." Certainly finding a purchaser for property is rendering service to one for whom it is sold. It is further provided in the said section that "all such contracts made in good faith shall be a charge upon and bind said estates whenever the same shall be approved by the ordinary of the county." Manifestly the "county" here meant is the county wherein jurisdiction of the guardianship lies. The Ordinary of Catoosa County, Georgia, would not, as conceived by the plaintiffs in error have jurisdiction of the guardianship here, since it is shown by the record that the guardian and wards were all domiciled in Hamilton County, Tennessee, and the appointment of guardian was properly made by the County Court of the County of Hamilton in that State. It was not essential, however, that the contract here involved be approved only by that court. Here is presented the case of a foreign guardian coming into a superior court of this State — as authorized by acts of the legislature codified in the Annotated Code as §§ 49-203 and 49-204 — a court which on its equity side has had jurisdiction over the persons and property of infants from a very early period, a jurisdiction which is broad, comprehensive and plenary. Richards v. EastTenn., Va. Ga. Ry. Co.,
In Ethridge v. Pitts,
It is clear, therefore, that, where a ward is brought into the jurisdiction of a court of equity, such court may order or approve a sale of the ward's property for reinvestment, notwithstanding the fact that by the Code, provision is made for approval by the ordinary of contracts made by a guardian.
Nor is the petition for intervention subject to the objections that it seeks to add a new and distinct cause of action and party. The proceeding here is not one at law but in equity, and the intervention, when allowed, does not alter its nature. The intervenor *381
takes the case as he finds it. Continental Trust Co. v. SabineBasket Co.,
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.