Lead Opinion
{¶ 2} On July 24, 2004, the Turners filed a complaint for personal injury against Mr. Buddie based on a car accident in which Mr. Turner was injured. Judge Lynette McGough was assigned the case. Mr. Buddie admitted to negligence, leaving damages as the sole issue at trial. On October 24, 2005, the issue of damages was tried to a jury with Visiting Judge Judith Cross presiding. After a two day trial, the jury returned with a verdict in favor of the Turners in the amount of zero dollars. On November 8, 2005, the Turners moved the court for a new trial ("Motion for New Trial"). Defendant responded to the Motion for New Trial on November 22, 2005. On December 1, 2005, Judge McGough, on behalf of Judge Cross, denied the Motion for New Trial ("Denial Order"). The Turners timely appealed the Denial Order, raising one assignment of error.
{¶ 3} The Turners assert that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Motion for New Trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence without articulating the basis for that denial including citations to the record. The Turners assert that medical bills introduced into evidence at trial are prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of at least one element of damages that should be properly awarded to them.
{¶ 4} The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.Sharp v. Norfolk W. Ry. Co. (1995),
{¶ 5} Among the reasons listed in Civ.R. 59(A), a new trial is warranted upon a finding of excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. Here, the Turners assert that the damages awarded by the jury were inadequate given the medical bills admitted into evidence and the uncontroverted testimony of their experts.
{¶ 7} The Denial Order indicates that Judge McGough, the judge assigned to the case, was signing the entry for Judge Cross, who sat as a visiting judge on the date of trial. There is no indication that the entry reflected any other opinion than that of Judge Cross based on her review of the evidence as presiding judge at trial.
{¶ 8} The trial court is only required to set forth the basis for its decision where it grants a motion for new trial. Antalv. Olde Worlde Products, Inc. (1984),
{¶ 9} We note that "although the trial court did not have the benefit of a trial transcript, the trial judge who ruled on the new trial motion was the same judge who presided over the * * * trial," which this court has held to be sufficient. Collier v.Dorcik (Nov. 29, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 3009-M, at *2. Two other appellate courts have held that a trial court committed no error by ruling on a motion for new trial without reviewing the trial transcript when it appeared that the trial court was able to determine the issues based on its memory of the proceedings. Id.; see Zell v. Else (Nov. 7, 1996), 10th Dist. No. 96APE05-634, at *10; Ward v. Angel (June 29, 1990), 2nd Dist. No. 11902, at *27. This Court is persuaded by this reasoning. There is no reason to believe that the trial judge in this case could not rule on the issues based on her memory of the proceedings.
{¶ 10} Accordingly, the Turners' assertions with regard to the propriety of the Denial Order are without merit.
{¶ 12} R.C.
{¶ 13} Because of Mr. Turner's complex medical history, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the treatment Mr. Turner received at the emergency room or thereafter was a matter of common knowledge such that the necessity of the treatment he received should be presumed. The symptoms of which Mr. Turner complained before and after the accident were virtually identical. We must, therefore, review the evidence presented at trial as to Mr. Turner's medical history.
{¶ 15} On August 2, 2001, Mr. Turner came to see Dr. Sese about pain he was having due to the car accident. Mr. Turner complained of more headaches and increased numbness in his left upper extremity. A second MRI was done and read by a different radiologist than the doctor that performed the first MRI. Dr. Sese initially saw no change from the MRI done a month earlier, but because of Mr. Turner's complaints of increased numbness, Dr. Sese sent Mr. Turner to a neurologist. The neurologist pointed out a slight change in the disc herniation from the first MRI. Dr. Sese again reviewed the films and concurred. The change, said Dr. Sese, correlated with the increased left side numbness. The neurologist recommended that Mr. Turner undergo a laminectomy based on his review of the MRI and Dr. Sese concurred as they had exhausted most conservative medical management making surgery reasonable.
{¶ 16} Dr. Collis performed the surgery on Mr. Turner, but Mr. Turner continued to suffer. He continued to treat Mr. Turner through 2002. Dr. Sese later became aware that Mr. Turner had another surgery. Dr. Sese believes that the accident necessitated surgical intervention but acknowledged that Mr. Turner was having the same symptoms pre-accident.
{¶ 19} Given Mr. Turner's pre-existing injuries and the expert testimony related thereto, our review of the record fails to demonstrate a link between the injuries incurred in the car accident and the necessity of the medical treatment Mr. Turner obtained, as set forth in the proffered medical bills, which could be constituted a matter of common knowledge. Thus, the determination of the necessity of the medical treatment must be demonstrated by expert testimony.
{¶ 20} Drs. Sese, Collis, and Stearns testified at trial via video deposition. The trial court is in the best position to weigh the credibility of a witness, including an expert. Crossv. Cross (June 20, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 00CA0074, at 2 citingSeasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984),
"Weight of Expert Testimony. As with other witnesses, upon you alone rests the duty of deciding what weight to give to the testimony of the experts. In deciding its weight, consider their skill, their experience, knowledge, veracity, familiarity with the facts of this case, and the usual rules for testing credibility and deciding the weight to give to the testimony."
{¶ 21} "Absent evidence to the contrary, we indulge the presumption that the jury followed the instructions of the trial court." State v. Hodge (Oct. 18, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 09CA007056, at 6, citing State v. Ferguson (1983),
{¶ 22} Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Turners' motion for new trial. The Turners' assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment Affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellants.
Whitmore, J. Concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 23} I respectfully dissent as in my opinion a new trial should have been granted. At the very least, appellant should have been awarded the emergency room expenses for his evaluation after the accident. I would remand for a new trial.
