Turner v. IDS Financial Services, Inc.
471 N.W.2d 105
Minn.
1991
Check Treatment

*1 shall, respondent That 2. order, notify of this each of his

of the date inability represen- his to continue

clients of fully the client and shall otherwise

tation of provisions Rule

comply with Lawyers Responsibil- Professional

Rules

ity. TURNER, Respondent,

C. Thomas SERVICES, INC., FINANCIAL

IDS Marketing Corporation, IDS

f/k/a al., petitioners, Appellants.

et

No. C3-90-267.

Supreme of Minnesota. Court

June Levine, Wahoske, John D. Michael J. Sheehy, Dorsey Whitney, D.

Kathleen & Minneapolis, appellants. for Knocke, Stephen Snyder, J. Laurie A. Peterson, Winthrop L. Kristen & Wein- stine, Paul, respondent. St. SIMONETT, Justice. does statute of limitations be-

gin employment dis- to run on an unfair resulting crimination time the termination? At the termination, gives notice actually occurs? or at the time termination former, and we reverse the We think the appeals. court Turner Plaintiff-respondent C. Thomas Minneapolis manager of was the division Services, defendant-appellant IDS Financial 19, 1986, Inc. December Turner was On managerial duties suspended from his investigation allegations pending an Turner had introduced an subordinates that atmosphere into the inappropriate religious office.

106 Act, Minn. Rights Human later, The Minnesota Febru- weeks on 6 Approximately (1986), 363.06, provides that: subd. 3 1987, a letter to Stat. 4, hand-delivered § IDS ary The letter lifting suspension. discriminatory practice his Turner A claim of unfair * * * however, on, say: to brought as a civil action be went must of days after the occurrence termination of notice of the is also This In 1988 the limita- practice. with Agreements [Employment] [Note: your * * * days period from 300 17, 1987, tion was extended pursuant on March IDS year.] to 1 Agree- right to terminate those days’ thirty writ- without cause on ments practice” does “occurrence of the What ten notice. offending practice occur Does the mean? employer notifies the December when being suspended on After discharged, defendant IDS being as or he is returned to his office Turner never the date does it occur on asserts? Or The Febru- any work for IDS. performed ends, plaintiff officially employment Turner that he was ary notifying 4th letter in- Turner contends? days hence also being terminated 30 arrangements to Turner to make structed issue, yet al have not decided We get “in near future” to go the office argues otherwise. In though plaintiff belongings. personal his Bd. No. v. School I.S.D. Richardson (1973), 210 N.W.2d 911 8, 1988, 297 Minn. January more than 300 On standing policy re the school district’s his notice of termi- he had received after they resign when quired teachers nation, days after actual less than 300 but As pregnancy. fifth month of termination, this law- reached the Turner commenced contract, began to the statute of limitations claims for breach of to when suit. His defamation, brought by an individual intentional infliction of run on a claim by pregnancy dismissed on de- the district’s distress were teacher affected emotional summary judgment. interpret the occur motion for said: “We policy, fendant’s we although his em- claimed that forth in this Plaintiff also rence of the as set party permitted resig either ployment discharge required contracts a case to mean days’ the contracts on 30 no- nation, to terminate commences the the date of which tice, really pre- his termination was that Minn. statutory period of limitations.” 297 discharge discriminatory based text for a if We added that at 210 N.W.2d at 916. 48) (Turner religion, absence, age on was given teacher was a leave of Rights Human of the Minnesota violation limitations would commence the statute of not, The defendant contended Act. did the end of the leave. Id. We claim was barred that the discrimination however, peri when the limitations discuss (then) 300-day limita- Act’s statute of employer gives a begin where an od would plaintiff’s court let discrim- tions. The trial termination to an individu specific notice of stand, but certified to Thereafter, ination employee. al Buchholz important and appellate (Minn. court as doubtful Homes, Inc., N.W.2d 893 Capp following question: case, 1982), age discrimination we stated case, discharge commenced the discharge employment In an does that running the statute of limitations under period of Limitations con- the Statute 363.06, 3, citing subd. Richardson. tained in Minn.Stat. 363.06 Subd. 3 section § however, there no notice of Again, run on the Date of Termi- was commence to involved, consequently, the Date of Notice of Termi- termination nation or question giving of whether the of notice nation? discharge discharge triggers or the decision, appeals, split in a The court of period not discussed. limitations was of limitations com- that the statute held however, has di- appeals, The court of on the date termination. Turn- mences Inc., Services, question now before rectly dealt with the Financial er IDS Corp., In (Minn.App.1990). granted Fitzgerald We us. v. Norwest N.W.2d 143 pet. rev. (Minn.App.1986), review. N.W.2d 290 petition for further IDS' denied, (Minn., 24, 1986), ing April gender the court of discrimination was a con- period on appeals tinuing act). held that the limitations rights violation our human age began discrimination claim plaintiffs arguments against The using the notice plaintiff run not when was notified she triggering of termination as the event for being was terminated but when (rather purposes limitations than date of *3 actually occurred. Id. at 292. The court of termination) are set out in the Chardon appeals felt that Richardson and Buchholz dissenting opinions. They can be summa- court had chosen not to fol- indicated this rized as follows: The date of termination is in low the rule federal Title VII cases usually identify more definite and easier to which holds that notice of termination be- termination; than the date of notice of gins running of the statute of limita- might notice of termination be revoked be- But, noted, already tions. as neither Rich- arrives; discharge fore the date of the com- ardson nor Buchholz considered the dis- pensable necessary harm to commence an discharge tinction between notification of money damages action for usually not moreover, discharge; and actual Richard- and, discharge; sustained until actual final- son was decided before the United States ly, using the date of notice of termination adopted rule in Supreme Court the federal depart sharply “would too from the under- Ricks, College Delaware v. 449 U.S. State standing Chardon, ordinary people.” 498, (1980), 250, 101 S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d 431 10, (Stevens, J., 454 U.S. at 102 at 30 S.Ct. 6,102 Fernandez, and v. 454 U.S. Chardon dissenting). 28, (1981). 70 L.Ed.2d 6 S.Ct. employer disputes The defendant each of In Title VII cases the United States Su- arguments. argues these It preme Court has held that notice of dis- always easily termination also is not identi- charge begins running of the statute of {e.g., day employee fiable whether the last Chardon, supra. limitations. While we worked, worked, or could have or for which rule, are not bound follow federal we etc.); paid, purpose employer’s of an principles developed have relied on under give notice of termination is to the dis- construing Title VII the Minnesota Hu- charged employee time to look for another Rights Independent man Act. Carlson v. job, not for the its 623, 216, Sch. Dist. No. 392 N.W.2d 220 mind; injunctive an action for relief and (Minn.1986). appears It almost all state prospective salary loss can be commenced courts which have addressed this issue termination; and, at date of notice of final- have chosen to follow the federal rule.1 ly, employees for most the notice of termi- construing phrase In “occurrence of very significant nation is a event that practice,” and state Chardon Ricks employee to alerts the the need to seek proper upon “the focus is the discriminato- legal advice. acts, ry upon not the time at which arguments All of the on either side of consequences of the acts most become degree; Ricks, the issue have merit more or less 258, painful.” 449 U.S. at 101 S.Ct. indeed, problem, We, too, part this is of the as the adopted at 504. have this an- competing arguments alytical approach. tend to counterba- Sigurdson See v. Isanti Co., 62, (Minn.1989)(decid- Perhaps helpful 448 N.W.2d 67 lance each a more other. See, Cook, Petersburg (Cal.App.1984); Humphreys St. Motor Club v. v. Riv Cal.Rptr. 567 217 Dist.1990); Naylor Co., 18, v. (Fla.App. Mfg. Ga.App. So.2d 488 2d erside 169 311 S.E.2d 223 Comm'n, W.Va. Human Rts. Rothbardt, 378 S.E.2d 843 (1983); Board Governors v. 98 (W.Va.1989); Wapella Educ. Ass'n v. Illinois 951, 423, Ill.App.3d Ill.Dec. 424 N.E.2d 742 53 Bd., 153, Educ. Labor Rel. Ill.App.3d 177 126 Board, (1981); Appeal Horn v. Human Rts. 75 (Ill.App. N.E.2d Ill.Dec. 531 1371 4th Dist. (1980); Ching v. A.D.2d 428 N.Y.S.2d 368 Industry, 1988); Department Hilmes v. Labor (1st Cir.1990) Corp., Mitre (applying 921 F.2d 11 Relations, & Human 147 Wis.2d N.W.2d 433 law). Contra: Board Ed. v. Massachusetts Indep. (Wis.App.1988); Fire Co. No. 1 251 Comm’n, Rights Ohio Civil 66 Ohio St.2d Comm'n, W.Va. Human Rts. 376 S.E.2d 612 Chardon); (1981) Jani (predates 421 N.E.2d 511 (W.Va.1988); Quicker v. Colorado Civil Rts. (6th Corp., kowski v. Bendix Cir. 823 F.2d 945 Comm’n, Amb (Colo.App.1987); 747 P.2d law). 1987) Michigan (applying Co., Cal.App.3d rose Natomas and, prior to a lame duck status a closer look attains

approach is take discharge, employ- may dis- well incur language: claim of unfair actual statutory “A ** * agency damages fees brought ment and sustain criminatory practice must be (see anguish suffering” “mental days after the occurrence 363.071, 2). way, if language, subd. Put another construing In we practice.” § discharged employee prior to the date focusing on the discrimi- committed are discharge another the conse- of actual obtains natory act rather than when better, painful. well or we do not think paying most quences of act become always claim is supra. the unfair discrimination Sigurdson, usually gone. even sum- is terminated discharge unfair discrimination claim must not marily, notice of The *4 Only with an action for breach of when be confused are one indivisible occurrence. employment contract where the cause of separated by a the two events are time not the statute of action does accrue and any ambiguity arise as to interval does begin does not to run until the limitations “practice” does it what is the and when breach, usually at and where the breach is intervenes, a “occur.” When time interval discharge. may may There not actual emerge: the decision three distinct events of in an em- be a breach contract involved discriminatory allegedly terminate for to situation, ployment but the discrimination made; is notice of that decision is reasons separate discrimination is a claim termi- given employee; the and individual contract, and, any of as we from breach in takes effect the date stated the nation on seen, compensable harm from the dis- have notice. practice prior criminatory is sustained the dis The notice to terminate embodies discharge. actual criminatory decision, together and the two hold, therefore, that in an unfair prac We discriminatory the act or constitute employment claim for discrimination happens time sequence, tice. In this what unequivocal, where an uncondi termination on the date of termination is seen more as given, of the tional notice termination is consequence discriminatory of a the act. begins to run from statute of limitations of termi says, Thus Chardon “The fact time the notice termination is re the illegal nation is not itself an act.” Char employee. ceived don, at at 29. It 454 U.S. 102 S.Ct. is communicated notice termination notice If we hold—as we have—that end; employment that causes the event, significant is of termination (or. day the fact that the of work as in last argues our should have plaintiff decision case, day pay though Turner’s last not only prospective a effect and should working) is some hence makes the not parties in Plaintiff apply to this case. notice of termination no less effective. says rely Fitzgerald, he was entitled to on contrast, way periods appeals

By the limitation 382 N.W.2d the court of making chapter tort and contract actions in decision run, controlling pure deter- begin to our case law has event. We do not think mined, in ly prospective justified when the of action “accrues.” is cause decision Assuming accrues decision is arguendo Thus a breach contract on case. our law,” generally while a tort action accrues when “the new rule breach “new [of damages applied are The statute to the the court some sustained. is case before law] claim, arising of limitations for a discrimination and to claims after the date of however, overruling decision.” L contained Act. McGuire v. C & within Inc., an unfair “occurs” is not 346 N.W.2d Restaurant (Minn.1984). purely pro same as action “ac- We quite the when a tort have made crues,” rulings in unprofitable push spective only very and it is limited situa so, Olson, comparison too far. Even when an tions. State 258 N.W.2d See (Minn.1977) (where unequivocal, of termi- unconditional notice 907 n. 15 given, immediately proceed- nation is law affects criminal constitutional Blondell, 235 N.W.2d ings); Nieting (Minn.1975)(change in of sov- law

ereign immunity). appeal

Although the issue on involved facts, simple parties includ-

only a few lengthy appendices to their briefs deal-

ed

ing with the substantive merits of the case. superfluous costs for these materials

No

should be taxable.

Reversed.

YETKA, (dissenting). Justice

I affirm the court of dissent and would

appeals holding it is the date of ought trigger

discharge which the stat-

ute of limitations. appears

It to me that there are three

good ap- reasons to affirm the court of *5 (1)

peals: discharge may a notice of never

result termination —the can mind; (2) 300-day its a short limita- period ought strictly

tion is harsh and to be

construed; (3) an actual date bright-line rule to better follow.

GARDEBRING, (dissenting). Justice

I concur the dissent of Justice Yetka. HOLMES, Respondent,

Thomas R. COMPANY,

WATSON-FORSBERG Third-Party

Defendant and

Plaintiff, Respondent, SYSTEMS, INC.,

PRO-TECH ROOF Defendant,

Third-Party

Appellant, Administration,

Employee Benefit

Intervenor, Respondent.

No. C9-90-2637. Appeals

Court of of Minnesota.

June 1991. Aug.

Review Granted