Turner v. Google LLCTurner v. Google LLC
Before the Court is plaintiff Jennifer Turner‘s (“plaintiff” or “Turner“), motion to remand, Doc. 11, Turner‘s motion to stay the case pending resolution of the motion to remand, Doc. 13, and defendant Google LLC‘s (“defendant” or “Google“) motion to transfer. Doc. 15. This matter is suitable for resolution without a hearing in accordance with Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Turner‘s motion to remand, GRANTS Turner‘s request for jurisdictional discovery and to file a renewed motion to remand, GRANTS Turner‘s motion to stay, and STAYS this case pending jurisdictional discovery and the court‘s ruling on a renewed motion to remand and, if reached, the motion to transfer.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 30, 2026, Google filed a notice of removal removing this action, which was originally filed in the Superior Court for the County of Madera, to this Court. Doc. 1 at 2. Turner
Google alleges that this Court has original jurisdiction over this action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat 4 (“CAFA“), codified at
On May 29, 2026, Turner filed her motion to remand. Doc. 11 at 1. Turner does not dispute that the amount in controversy and numerosity requirements are met. See Doc. 12 at 4–5. Rather, Turner argues that Google fails to properly allege diversity based on “information and belief.” Id. Alternatively, Turner argues that CAFA‘s mandatory home state exception applies.
On June 12, 2026, Google filed an opposition to Turner‘s motion to remand, arguing that it satisfies CAFA jurisdiction, that Turner fails to satisfy the home state exception, and that jurisdictional discovery is not justified. Doc. 17 at 4–11. Turner filed a reply in support of her motion to remand on June 22, 2026. Doc. 19 at 2–6.
On June 11, 2026, Google filed a motion to transfer venue, seeking an order transferring this case to the Northern District of California. Doc. 15 at 2. It argues that transfer is warranted under the first-to-file rule as previously filed and similar class actions are pending in the Northern District. Doc. 15-1 at 2. It further argues that transfer is appropriate under
Turner also moves to stay the case pending a ruling on the motion to remand. Doc. 13 at 1. Turner argues that the Court should evaluate subject matter jurisdiction prior to proceeding to the merits of the case. Doc. 14 at 3. Additionally, noting that Google has an upcoming deadline to file a responsive pleading to the complaint, Turner argues “it would be a waste of time and
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Remand
A suit filed in state court may be removed to the district court for the district embracing the place where such action is pending if the district court has original jurisdiction over the action.
CAFA grants district courts original jurisdiction over any civil action in which (i) the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, (ii) the proposed class of plaintiffs has at least one hundred members, and (iii) any member of the class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any defendant.
“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is upon the party seeking removal.” Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). District courts must decline
B. Motion to Transfer
“For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”
C. Motion to Stay
A district court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). In deciding whether to grant a stay, the court considers “the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” Lockyear v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Before considering the motions, it is necessary to decide which motion to address first. Turner contends that, because the Court must assess subject matter jurisdiction prior to transfer, it must first address the motion to remand. Doc. 22 at 1–3. Google argues that, as a motion to transfer is not a decision on the merits, the Court has discretion to decide the motion to transfer before assessing its subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. 25 at 3.
It is proper to decide the motion to remand first. The Ninth Circuit has noted that “jurisdiction must be first found over the subject matter . . . before one reaches venue.” Bookout v. Beck, 354 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1965); see also Abrams Shell v. Shell Oil Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“A court may not transfer an action for improper venue unless it has subject matter jurisdiction.“); Gradetech, Inc. v. Am. Emps. Grp., No. C 06 02991 WHA, 2006 WL 1806156, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2006) (“In this circuit a court must determine whether or not it has subject-matter jurisdiction before considering whether the venue is proper.“).
Granted, some courts have argued that Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007), allows discretion to consider a motion to transfer first. See, e.g., Core Litig. Tr. by & through Kravitz v. Apollo Glob. Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00927 JFW (AGRx), 2017 WL 3045919, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2017). Sinochem held that a court may dismiss a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens prior to conclusively establishing its own jurisdiction. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 425. But the Court made clear that the specific question it addressed concerned dismissal under forum non conveniens. Id. Dismissal under this doctrine, which is appropriate when, for example, “the chosen forum would establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff‘s convenience,” Id. at 429 (internal citation omitted), presents different issues than a motion to transfer venue.
Even assuming there is discretion to consider a motion to transfer before a motion to remand, there is not good reason to do so here. “Courts generally resolve remand prior to transfer.” Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Mallinckrodt ARD LLC, No. 21-cv-00165-JSC, 2021 WL 2474272, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2021). Considering transfer first may be appropriate in “rare circumstances,” when, for example, jurisdiction presents “difficult questions.” Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Am. Int‘l Grp., Inc., No. SA CV 15-cv-00687, 2015 WL 3631833, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2015). Given that a court can transfer an action only to a court “where it might have been brought,”
A. Motion to Remand
For the reasons discussed below, while Google satisfies CAFA, Turner fails to establish applicability of the home state exception. But as there is a fair likelihood that jurisdictional discovery may allow Turner to meet her burden, jurisdictional discovery is appropriate.
1. CAFA Jurisdiction
CAFA requires that the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, that the proposed plaintiff class has at least 100 members, and that a member of the class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any defendant.
The minimal diversity requirement though is disputed. Google must show that at least one member of the class is not a citizen of either Delaware or California.1 Google‘s burden depends on how Turner challenges diversity. A challenge to CAFA jurisdiction may be either facial or
Turner‘s motion to remand presents a facial attack. She does not contest Google‘s allegation that at least one member of the class is not a citizen of either Delaware or California. Rather, Turner argues that Google‘s allegation of diversity based on information and belief is, on its face, insufficient. Doc. 12 at 4–5. Therefore, Google‘s allegations will be accepted as true.
Google has satisfied its burden. In a facial attack, a defendant does not have to provide any evidence of citizenship. Ehrman v. Cox Comm‘cns, Inc., 932 F.3d 1223, 1225 (9th Cir. 2019). “A party‘s allegations of minimal diversity may be based on ‘information and belief.‘” Id. at 1227 (quoting Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc., 741 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2014)). A defendant does “not have to explain why it believe[d]” some of the class members were not citizens of particular states. Id. Google satisfies its burden by alleging “[o]n information and belief [that] at least one member of the putative class is a citizen of a State other than Delaware and California.” Doc. 1 at ¶ 16.
2. The Home State Exception
Turner contends that even if there is jurisdiction under CAFA, the Court must decline jurisdiction under the home state exception because at least two-thirds of the members of the proposed class are citizens of California. Doc. 12 at 5–7. “The burden of establishing that a CAFA exception applies is on [plaintiff], as the party seeking to remand.” King v. Great Am. Chicken Corp., Inc., 903 F.3d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 2018). Because Google factually contests Turner‘s argument, Doc. 17 at 8, the Court “makes factual findings regarding jurisdiction under a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Mondragon, 736 F.3d ay 883–84; King, 903 F.3d at 878. “Although such a finding must be based on more than mere guesswork . . . the burden of proof on a plaintiff should not be exceptionally difficult to bear.” Adams v. West Marine Prods. Inc., 958 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). But “class definitions standing alone—without any evidence proferred—[are] insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff‘s burden.” Id. at 1222; Mondragon, 736 F.3d at 883–84; King, 903 F.3d at 878.
Here, Turner has failed to provide evidence of citizenship and instead relies solely on the class definition. Turner argues that she meets the two-thirds requirement because “the proposed Class is expressly limited to California residents whose communications were allegedly collected by Defendant without consent.” Doc. 12 at 5–6. But residency and citizenship are distinct, as one‘s citizenship is determined by one‘s domicile. Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). “A person‘s domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with the intention to remain or to which she intends to return.” Id. Turner does not offer evidence of citizenship beyond this bare class definition based on residency.
Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Finance is directly on point. In that case, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court‘s remand order under CAFA because there was no evidence that two-thirds of the class members were citizens of California. Mondragon, 736 F.3d at 881–84. The classes were defined to include those who had purchased vehicles for personal use to be registered in the State of California. Id. at 882–83. Though it was “likely that most of the prospective class members . . . were California citizens . . . [t]here [was] simply no evidence in the record.” Id. at 884. “A complete lack of evidence does not satisfy [the] standard.” Id. at 884. Similarly here, even if it is likely that two-thirds of the class members are citizens of California, Turner has provided no such evidence. Even if residency is a better indication of citizenship than purchasing a car to be registered in California, because Turner has provided no evidence that the class members are citizens as well as residents of California, she has not met her burden.
3. Jurisdictional Discovery
Alternatively, Turner seeks jurisdictional discovery. Doc. 12 at 6. “[D]iscovery should ordinarily be granted where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Laub v. U.S. Dep‘t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Butcher‘s Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986)). “[D]iscovery should be granted when . . . the jurisdictional facts are contested or more facts are needed.” Id.
On multiple occasions the Ninth Circuit has noted that a plaintiff who did not satisfy his burden under a CAFA exception should be given the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. See Mondragon, 736 F.3d at 886; King, 903 F.3d at 880–81. In evaluating whether to grant jurisdictional discovery, courts consider factors including the strength of the jurisdictional allegations and the efficaciousness of the proposed discovery. See Roth v. CHA Hollywood Medical Ctr., L.P., No. 2:12-cv-07559-ODW(SHx), 2013 WL 12303362, *4 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2013); Spearman v. I Play, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-01563-TLN-KJN, 2018 WL 3770052, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2018); Ali v. Setton Pistachio of Terra Bella Inc., No. 1:19-cv-00959-NONE-BAM, 2021 WL 1187264, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2021).
As facts are disputed and there is a fair possibility that Turner can meet her burden with some discovery, jurisdictional discovery is appropriate. Turner has proposed some information, including class members’ IP addresses, that may be helpful in establishing jurisdiction. Doc. 19 at 6. This is particularly likely given that her proposed class consists only of California residents. See Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 37. Though parties may not rely solely on class definition to establish a CAFA exception, district courts are also “permitted to make reasonable inferences from facts in evidence.” Mondragon, 736 F.3d at 886. Evidence may be interpreted in light of Turner‘s class definition. Turner‘s problem is not that residency is a weak basis to infer citizenship. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “residence constitutes some evidence of” citizenship. Adams, 958 F.3d at 1221. The problem for Turner is that she relied entirely upon her class definition, and the Ninth Circuit has clearly held that a class definition standing alone is insufficient. Id. at 1222. If Turner can provide some supporting evidence, there may be a strong argument in favor of the
At the same time, extensive discovery at this stage risks unduly burdening Google, particularly as Turner has provided only minimal explanation of what she will seek. Doc. 12 at 6–7. The discovery must be limited to addressing the relevant jurisdictional issue. The parties must therefore meet and confer and submit to the assigned magistrate judge a joint plan addressing the limited jurisdictional discovery to be sought.
B. Motion to Transfer
Google‘s motion to transfer, Doc. 15, is stayed. As Turner will have the opportunity to present a renewed motion to remand after jurisdictional discovery, the motion to transfer the case is stayed pending the court‘s ruling on a renewed motion to remand.
C. Motion to Stay
The case is otherwise stayed pending jurisdictional discovery, the resolution of the jurisdictional question, and the motion to transfer. A stay will not prejudice either party as it is unopposed. Doc. 18 at 2; Doc. 20 at 2. It would additionally waste judicial resources to rule on further arguments prior to deciding whether to remand or transfer this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above:
- Turner‘s motion to remand, Doc. 11, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
- Turner is GRANTED leave to file a renewed motion to remand following jurisdictional discovery;
- Turner is GRANTED leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery consistent with this Order;
- Within 14 days of the entry of this Order, the parties shall meet and confer and file a plan for jurisdictional discovery and a proposed briefing schedule for a renewed motion to remand, for consideration by the assigned magistrate judge;
- Turner‘s motion to stay the case, Doc. 13, is GRANTED;
- Google‘s motion to transfer, Doc. 15, is STAYED pending resolution of Turner‘s renewed motion to remand; and
- This matter is referred to the assigned magistrate judge to set a schedule for jurisdictional discovery and a briefing schedule on a renewed motion to remand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 31, 2026
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE