215 S.W. 831 | Tex. Comm'n App. | 1919
For a complete statement of the case we refer to the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, 182 S. W. 438.
It appears from the findings of the ap-Xiellate court that there is no material dispute with reference to the evidence. The opinion of that court, as we interpret it, practically is a holding that under the undisputed facts, as a matter of law, the original contract of subscription did not evidence the intention of the parties to be that the corporation should accept the notes of Turner in payment for stock and issue to him its stock upon the faith of the notes; also that the undisputed facts did not, as a matter of law, show that the corporation did accept the subscription of Turner and accompanying notes with the purpose of issuing therefor its stock and acceptance of the notes in payment. Nor did the facts in law evidence the issuance on the part of the corporation of the stock to Turner as a contemporaneous part of the original subscription and in consideration for the notes.
In order to a correct understanding of the matters involved in the question under discussion, it becomes proper to recur to the law governing subscriptions for stock and the relationship of shareholders and the corporation to each other. ¡
The authorities are practically a unanimity in holding that the “capital stock of a corporation is the fund, property, or other means contributed, or agreed to ¡3© contributed, by the shareholders as the financial basis for the prosecution of the business of the corporation, such contribution being made either directly through stock subscription, or indirectly through the declaration of dividends.
Different persons in different rights are the owners of the property of a corporation and the shares of stock therein.
All these matters are of importance in determining whether or not in the instant case the contract of subscription — which includes the proxy of the subscriber, the notes covering the subscription, and the collateral assignment — evidence the respective intentions of the parties with reference to the status of the subscriber in relation to the issuance of the stock. Ann. Cas. 1913C, 421; 7 R. C. L. 280, 324; Commonwealth v. Dalzell, 34 Am. St. Rep. 640; 7 R. C. L. 327; Royal Consolidated Mining Co. v. Royal Consolidated Mines Co., 137 Am. St. Rep. 165; In re Long Island Ry. Co., 32 Am. Dec. 429.
It seems to be the rule in some jurisdictions that,- where a corporation has been organized, upon the acceptance of a stock subscription by it the relationship of stockholder is created. 7 R. C. L. 274; Blien v. Rand, 77 Minn. 110, 79 N. W. 606, 46 L. R. A. 618; note Ann. Cas. 1913C, 419; 1 Thompson Corporation (3d Ed.) § 551, p. 660; Railway Co. v. McCormick, 71 Am. Dee. 337; Kentucky Insurance Co. v. Jenks, 5 Ind. 96.
This brings us to a consideration of the facts bearing upon the question of whether or not the stock involved in this litigation was issued.
How, then, is it possible to say it was not intended on the part of the parties that the subscriber by the contract should become, upon acceptance by the corporation, a stockholder in the corporation, to whom should pass the right of title in the stock, and who returned that right to the corporation only so far as same might be necessary in satisfying the collateral obligation?
It appears in the collateral contract that the parties clearly intended that the stock mentioned in the subscription should be subject to sale. How would it be possible to sell the stock if it were not to be issued — that is, if the subscriber were not to be treated by the corporation as being the possessor of a pro rata interest in the funds of the corporation upon the acceptance by it of the subscription contract?
We take it that the contract of subscription itself ^contains within itself the evidence showing that it was the fixed intention and purpose of the parties to it that upon its acceptance by the corporation it should be in completion of a sale and purchase; that the subscriber should become immediately the owner of 500 shares of stock in the corporation; and that the notes táken should be the payment which he should make for that interest. We believe we are fortified in this position by the further terms of the contract wherein it is‘ shown that the note shall bear interest from date until paid at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum. It provides that the drawers and indorsers severally waive presentation for payment, protest, and nonpayment of this note, and then -it provides for the change of interest from 6 per cent, to 8 per cent.
We are of opinion that the contract of sub-
However, if we are in error with reference to the construction given to the contract, as it discloses the intent of the parties on its face, yet when the contract, in all of its terms and stipulations, is read in the light of its interpretation by the parties as shown by their subsequent conduct, we are driven irresistibly to the conclusion that such intention is shown.
In the interpretation of a written contract sometimes, and in fact quite often, the intention of the parties can best be gathered from the acts done by them in the performance of the terms of the contract as these acts may be interpreted under the law applicable to them. After the execution and delivery of this subscription' contract we find that- the parties performed acts inconsistent with the view maintained by the defendant in error, and consistent with the intention which we have gathered from the contract.
The evidence shows that on the very day of the acceptance of the subscription the corporation entered on its^ stock book the subscription of Turner for stock, and showed payment in notes; that is, the entry appears “Paid in cash, n<?ne,” followed by the entry of the payment made in notes.
The entry of this subscription in the stock book is prima facie evidence of ownership by the subscriber of stock in the Corporation. 7 R. O. L. 327; Royal Consolidated Mining Co. v. Royal Consolidated Mines Co., 157 Cal. 737, 110 Pac. 123, 137 Am. St. Rep. 165; In re Long Island Ry. Co., 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 37, 32 Am. Dec. 429.
The corporation immediately caused a certificate for the stock to be written up. Its stubbook showed the issuance of the certificate. The certificate, as written, bore in-dorsements evidencing recognition of ownership by Turner. 7 R. C. L. 182.
In further recognition of ownership of the stock on the part of Turner the certificate was attached to the note, and thereafter- he was permitted to appear and vote the stock through his proxy, and exercise the rights, privileges, and powers of a stockholder. He was permitted by the corporation to participate in the distribution of the dividends which the common property had earned. His dividends were appropriated under the' collateral agreement as credits on the note. These acts of the corporation are capable of no other construction than that of a recognition by it of Turner as a stockholder, and as manifestly carrying out the intention of the parties to the contract of subscription.
We are therefore clearly of the opinion that, under any view of this record, a transaction falling within the denouncement of the Constitution is apparent on the facts as a matter of law.
We respectfully recommend that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals be reversed, and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.
did not participate in the consideration of this case.
The judgment recommended by the Commission of Appeals is adopted and will be entered as the judgment of the Supreme Court.
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