TURNER PROFESSIONAL SERV. v. BroussardTURNER PROFESSIONAL SERV. v. Broussard
Franklin J. Foil, Baton Rouge, for Defendant-Appellant Patrick J. Broussard.
Andre G. Bourgeois, Baton Rouge, for Defendants-Appellants Professional Employee Leasing Co. and Employer Resource Center, Inc.
Thomas E. Balhoff, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiff-Appellee Turner Professional Services, Ltd.
BEFORE: SHORTESS, C.J., FOGG and KLINE,1 JJ.
SHORTESS, C.J.
Can a noncompetition and nonsolicitation agreement that derogates from the requirements of Louisiana Revised Statute 23:921(B) be enforced? In this case, the trial court reformed a geographically overbroad contract and enforced it. Defendants contend this was legal error.
Louisiana has consistently had a strong public policy against noncompetition contracts.2 Before 1989, Revised Statute 23:921 provided that those agreements were null and unenforceable unless the employer had incurred significant expense in training the employee or advertising the business. In 1989, the legislature amended the statute to permit agreements prohibiting competition for up to two years
In this case, Turner Professional Services, Ltd. (plaintiff) successfully enjoined Patrick J. Broussard, its former employee; and Professional Employee Leasing Company, Inc., and Employer Resource Center, Inc., Broussard‘s current employers, from competing with plaintiff and soliciting plaintiff‘s clients. The agreement at issue contains the following clause:
EMPLOYEE agrees that for two (2) years after the date of his Or her termination of employment with Turner Professional Services, Ltd ., EMPLOYEE shall refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of Turner Professional Services, Ltd. [sic], and/or from soliciting customers of Turner Professional Services, Ltd., within the state of Louisiana, so long as Turner Professional Services, Ltd., carries on a like business in said areas.
(Emphasis added.) Although the contract clearly does not comply with the statute‘s mandate of specifying “parish or parishes, municipality or municipalities, or parts thereof,” the trial court reformed the contract based on Broussard‘s testimony and enjoined him from soliciting or competing with plaintiff in nine specific parishes. The court also enjoined Broussard‘s current employers from disclosing any of plaintiff‘s trade secrets or confidential or proprietary information.
The trial court found that although the agreement “technically does not comply with the strict language of Louisiana R.S. 23:921,” the contract would be enforced because “the spirit of 921 [was] met.” Defendants contend the trial court erred in reforming the contract to make it comply with the statute.
Public policy requires that the provisions of noncompetition agreements be strictly construed in favor of the employee,4 and the agreements must strictly comply with the requirements of the statute.5 In the only case on this issue decided by the first circuit, we stated in Cellular One v. Boyd6 that “noncompetition agreements which fail to specify the `parish or parishes, municipality or municipalities, or parts thereof’ wherein the employer carried on a similar business are unenforceable.”
Cases rendered in 1992 and 1993 by other circuits have held that such agreements with no territorial limits whatsoever,7 with a territorial limitation of “anywhere within the continental United States,”8 and with a territorial scope of the “greater New Orleans area”9 were absolutely null. More recent cases, however, have allowed reformation of the contract under certain circumstances. In
In our opinion, Petroleum Helicopters goes too far, and we decline to follow it.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and judgment is rendered dismissing plaintiff‘s suit, at its costs.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
SHORTESS, C.J.