20 Ga. App. 682 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1917
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
In the McDonough case, supra, the granting clause of the deed contained this language: “ Said parties of the ■ first part . . have granted, bargained, sold, remised, conveyed, released, and quitclaimed, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell, remise, convey, release, and forever quitclaim unto said parties of the second part, in their full possession and seizin, and to their heirs and assigns, the following lots of land, and all the estate, right, title, interest, use, trust, property, claim, and demand whatsoever, both at law and in equity, of said parties of the first part of, in, to, or out of all those lots, tracts, or parcels of land,” etc. The deed in that case contained a clause of warranty against those claiming under the grantor, but did not contain the usual covenant of general warranty. The question there involved was whether such a covenant could be implied from a recital contained in the instrument that title was in the grantor, as evidenced by a certain deed; and it was held: “Where the terms of a deed of conveyance, tak
In the instrument before us the “right, title, and interest” of the grantor in and ty the timber on lot number 165 is conveyed, and the title thereto is warranted both as against those claiming under the grantor and as against the claims of all persons whomsoever. A more particular description of the subject-matter of the sale is made therein by reference to a former recorded deed from Dickson & Dorminy to the Garbutt Lumber Company, which conveyed the timber described; and the habendum clause of the deed now under consideration contains this.statement: “It being the intention hereby to transfer, assign, and convey unto the said party of the second part, its successors, heirs, and assigns, all of the-rights, powers, privileges, and timber [italics ours] described in the respective conveyances hereinbefore referred to and thereby"
In addition to what has been outlined in the statement of facts preceding this opinion, it was shown, that J. C. Turner was the president both of the Taylor-Cook Cypress Company, the payee of the note, and of the J. C. Turner Lumber Company, the plaintiff, and that as president of the former company he signed the deed we have heretofore discussed, for the sale of the timber involved
In view of all these circumstances, taken together, we think it was properly a question for the jury, under the evidence, to determine whether the purchase was bona fide, or whether there was enough to have placed the plaintiff company on its guard before becoming the owner of the paper.
Judgment affirmed.