| W. Va. | Jul 17, 1919
The plaintiff by its bill in this cause seeks to enjoin the ‘State Tax Commissioner from enforcing an assessment against it made, as claimed by the defendant, under the provisions of ‘Chapter 7 of the Acts of 1919, extraordinary session.
Plaintiff is a West Virginia corporation and admittedly liable to pay the excise taxes provided by law. It made its
Plaintiff contends that the act of 1919, • chapter 7 of the •extraordinary session, properly construed, does not authorize the assessment made against it, that act, in so far as it is pertinent to the matter involved here, being as follows:
‘ ‘ Section 1. In addition to the tax imposed by section five ■ of chapter .three of the acts of the legislature of one thous- and nine hundred and fifteen, second extraordinary session, every corporation, joint stock company, or association organized for profit, and having a capital stock represented by shares, and every insurance company, respectively,'now or hereafter organized under the laws of this state, or under the laws of ■any other state or government, and engaged in any business whatsoever in the State of West Virginia, shall pay an annual special excise tax for the privilege of carrying on or doing business in the State of West Virginia equivalent to one-fourth of one per centum upon the entire net income of such company, received by it from all sources during the year, on business transacted and capital invested in this state, as hereinafter set forth;****”
“Section 2. The tax imposed by section one of this act ■shall be levied for the state fiscal year one thousand nine hundred and nineteen, and succeeding years, and shall be
‘ ‘ Section 3. That sections three and four of chapter six of the acts of the legislature of one thousand nine hundred and seventeen, second extraordinary session, be, and the same are hereby repealed. ’ ’
It will be noticed that this act provides that the tax imposed shall be levied for the fiscal year 1919, and succeeding years. The plaintiff insists that the fiscal year 1919 did not begin until July 1, 1919, and hence the assessment made against it in, June 1919; could not be for the fiscal year 1919, while the tax commissioner’s contention is that the fiscal year 1919 was'the fiscal year which ended on June 30, 1919, and consequently the assessment sought to be enforced is clearly within the terms of the act. It will thus be seen that the question to be determined is what is meant by the phrase “fiscal year 1919 ’ ’ in the act of the legislature here involved. If it means the year beginning July 1, 1919, admittedly there is no authority for the assessment complained of. If however, it means the fiscal'year ending June 30, 1919, .the assessment sought to be enjoined is clearly authorized by the act.
By a demurrer to the bill the defendant challenges the jurisdiction of equity to afford any relief in any event, insisting that section 11 of chapter 3 of the Acts of 1915, second extraordinary session, prohibits the granting of an injunction to restrain the collection of such assessments except upon the ground that the same are in violation of the constitution of the State or the United States, were fraudulently made or of a mistake in the amount thereof. We do not think there is merit in this contention. The prohibition against the granting of an injunction only goes to “taxes imposed” by the act, while the very contention here is that the act does not impose the taxes the collection of which it is sought to enjoin: ■ The claim is that the defendant has levied this assessment without any authority of law and seeks to compel the plaintiff to pay it as a prerequisite to doing business. If it
Does the legislative act above quoted authorize this assessment? Counsel for the plaintiff cite instances in the past which he contends show that the legislature, by the use of the phrase “fiscal year 1919,” meant the fiscal year beginning July 1,1919, while opposing counsel is as positive that legislative uses of the term which he cites show that it means the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919. The inquiry here is what was meant' by the phrase in this particular act. It seems that this phrase has never been definitely defined by the legislature-, that is to say, it has never been given a definite and certain signification applicable to it under all circumstances. Here we find the legislature in an extraordinary session incurring certain liabilities, to-wit, the immediate discharge of a considerable part of the Virginia debt, the establishment and maintenance of the department of public safety and increasing the salaries of circuit judges, and making appropriations for each of these purposes. The act in question is one of the means by which the revenue to meet these appropriations is to be raised. The need of the revenue by the terms of the law appropriating it begins on the first day of July, 1919. Why, then, should the legislature pass an act to raise revenue to meet practically immediate needs which would not produce any such revenue for more than a year? Again, the legislature, by the constitutional majority, made this act take effect from its passage, which was on the 31st day of March, 1919. Why did it do this if it was not 'to operate for a year after its passage? We think this fact strongly argues that the .legislature knew these returns of corporations were coming in, were required to be filed by the last day of March and that the tax thereon would be assessed shortly thereafter and by putting this act in effect from its passage the tax commissioner would be required to make the assessment provided by its terms upon the returns then being made by the eorpora-
We are therefore of opinion to affirm the decree complained of.
Affirmed