303 F.3d 293 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
Before: SCIRICA and COWEN, Circuit Judges,(cid:13) and RESTANI, Judge, United States Court of(cid:13) International Trade*(cid:13) (Filed: September 9, 2002)(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) * The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of(cid:13) International Trade, sitting by designation.(cid:13) ROBERT J. LaROCCA, ESQUIRE(cid:13) (ARGUED)(cid:13) Kohn, Swift & Graf(cid:13) One South Broad Street, Suite 2100(cid:13) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107(cid:13) Attorney for Appellants(cid:13) GEORGE G. GORDON, ESQUIRE(cid:13) (ARGUED)(cid:13) JENNIFER R. CLARKE, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Dechert, Price & Rhoads(cid:13) 4000 Bell Atlantic Tower(cid:13) 1717 Arch Street(cid:13) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103(cid:13) Attorneys for Appellee,(cid:13) American Airlines, Inc.(cid:13) ANN T. FIELD, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Cozen & O’Connor(cid:13) The Atrium(cid:13) 1900 Market Street(cid:13) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103(cid:13) Attorney for Appellee,(cid:13) Continental Airlines, Inc.(cid:13) FRANCIS P. NEWELL, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Montgomery, McCracken, Walker(cid:13) & Rhoads(cid:13) 123 South Broad Street(cid:13) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19109(cid:13) Attorney for Appellee,(cid:13) Delta Airlines, Inc.(cid:13) 2(cid:13) BERT W. REIN, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)(cid:13) JOHN B. WYSS, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Wiley, Rein & Fielding(cid:13) 1776 K Street, N.W.(cid:13) Washington, D.C. 20006(cid:13) BRUCE P. MERENSTEIN, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis(cid:13) 1600 Market Street, Suite 3600(cid:13) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103(cid:13) Attorneys for Appellee,(cid:13) International Air Transport(cid:13) Association(cid:13) RICHARD J. FAVRETTO, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw(cid:13) 1909 K Street, N.W.(cid:13) Washington, D.C. 20006(cid:13) Attorney for Appellee,(cid:13) United Airlines, Inc.(cid:13) OPINION OF THE COURT(cid:13) SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.(cid:13) At issue in this proposed class action is the(cid:13) extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act and its(cid:13) application in this case. The putative plaintiff class(cid:13) comprises certain foreign travel agents located outside the(cid:13) United States who allege major United States air carriers(cid:13) and their trade association illegally conspired to lower their(cid:13) sales commissions. The District Court held the Foreign(cid:13) Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. S 6a, deprived(cid:13) it of subject matter jurisdiction, barring plaintiffs’ claim. We(cid:13) will affirm.(cid:13) I.(cid:13) The major United States air carriers have delegated the(cid:13) licensing of travel agents to their trade association, the(cid:13) International Air Transport Association (IATA). 1 All travel(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. IATA was founded in 1945 by the then-major global airlines, with the(cid:13) goals of promoting international air transportation and providing a(cid:13) 3(cid:13) agents must have an IATA license to access reservation(cid:13) systems of United States-based airlines. In order to make a(cid:13) customer reservation, a travel agent can only enter the(cid:13) airline’s electronic system with an IATA number. The travel(cid:13) agent’s commission is automatically computed from a(cid:13) database in the airline’s electronic system.(cid:13) The Passenger Tariff Coordinating Conference is an IATA(cid:13) committee of airline company representatives who(cid:13) determine and fix the commission rates for travel agents. At(cid:13) the July 1999 Passenger Tariff Coordinating Conference(cid:13) meeting in Montreal, Canada, the Conference reduced(cid:13) commissions paid to IATA-accredited agents in Central(cid:13) America and Panama to a flat seven-percent rate. Previous(cid:13) commission rates had varied from country to country and(cid:13) ranged as high as eleven percent.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) means for collaboration. Section 412(b) of the Federal Aviation Act(cid:13) required the Civil Aeronautics Board to approve any agreement by air(cid:13) carriers it did not find "adverse to the public interest" or "in violation of(cid:13) the act." See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. S 1382, amended by(cid:13) International Air Transportation Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94(cid:13) Stat. 35 (1979); see also CAB Order 80-4-113, Apr. 15, 1980 (describing(cid:13) the statute). In addition, S 414 of the Federal Aviation Act required the(cid:13) CAB to immunize from the antitrust laws transactions specifically(cid:13) approved or necessarily contemplated by an order of approval under(cid:13) S 412, provided such immunity was found to be required in the public(cid:13) interest. Id. Before the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,(cid:13) such immunity attached automatically under S 414 upon approval. Id.(cid:13) The CAB approved the organization of IATA in 1946 and granted(cid:13) indefinite approval to the IATA in 1955, after several one-year temporary(cid:13) approvals. IATA Traffic Conference Resolution , 6 CAB 639 (1945); CAB(cid:13) Order E-9305, June 15, 1955. Prior to 1979, agreements affecting(cid:13) foreign air transportation were approved and immunized by the CAB(cid:13) under broad public interest standards. After the passage of the Airline(cid:13) Deregulation Act, IATA amended its agreement, replacing its "Provisions(cid:13) for the Conduct of the IATA Traffic Conferences." See CAB Order 80-4-(cid:13) 113 (describing the amendment).(cid:13) The government has continued, more recently in the form of the(cid:13) Department of Transportation, to exercise regulatory oversight over the(cid:13) Provisions for the Operation of IATA Traffic Conferences. See generally(cid:13) DOT Order 88-3-67, Mar. 31, 1988.(cid:13) 4(cid:13) On December 27, 1999, Grupo Taca, an alliance of the(cid:13) principal Central American airlines (and not a party to this(cid:13) suit), announced it would pay Central American travel(cid:13) agents only six-percent commissions. The next day,(cid:13) American Airlines announced it would pay six-percent(cid:13) commissions on tickets sold in Belize, Costa Rica, El(cid:13) Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.(cid:13) Soon thereafter, Continental Airlines, United Airlines, and(cid:13) Delta Airlines followed suit.(cid:13) Defendants American Airlines, Delta Airlines, and United(cid:13) Airlines are members of the Passenger Tariff Coordinating(cid:13) Conference. Defendant Continental Airlines is not. None of(cid:13) the airline defendants’ representatives attended the 1999(cid:13) Passenger Tariff Coordinating Conference meeting in(cid:13) Montreal. The minutes of the meeting reflect that"U.S.-(cid:13) based TC [Tariff Commission] Members were prohibited by(cid:13) their authorities from participating in such discussions and(cid:13) . . . were therefore not present for this part of the Agenda."(cid:13) The complaint alleges that during the Montreal meeting, an(cid:13) unidentified Passenger Tariff Coordinating Conference(cid:13) member proposed the reduction in commissions because(cid:13) new technology had streamlined the travel agents’(cid:13) traditional ticket-selling functions.(cid:13) The named plaintiffs are two San Jose, Costa Rica travel(cid:13) agencies and two Managua, Nicaragua travel agencies, who(cid:13) filed suit on behalf of a class of similarly situated travel(cid:13) agencies. The complaint alleged that four major United(cid:13) States air carriers -- American Airlines, Continental(cid:13) Airlines, Delta Airlines, and United Airlines -- and IATA(cid:13) violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to lower(cid:13) travel agents’ commissions, a form of horizontal price fixing(cid:13) constituting a per se violation of the antitrust laws. See(cid:13) United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-(cid:13) 26 (1940). All four airline defendants are based in the(cid:13) United States, providing air passenger service between(cid:13) United States cities and locations within Latin America and(cid:13) the Caribbean (and elsewhere).(cid:13) Plaintiffs contend defendants implemented the conspiracy(cid:13) in December 1999, when they began paying the lower six-(cid:13) percent commissions. The reduced commissions allegedly(cid:13) affected United States commerce because reservations on(cid:13) 5(cid:13) the four defendant airlines account for a substantial(cid:13) portion of the business of Latin American and Caribbean(cid:13) travel agents. The complaint alleges the Passenger Tariff(cid:13) Coordinating Conference meeting in Montreal disguised a(cid:13) pre-arranged agreement by United States air carriers to(cid:13) create the illusion of non-involvement in the reduction of(cid:13) commission rates, in an attempt to avoid antitrust liability(cid:13) under United States laws. Plaintiffs contend defendants(cid:13) assisted in planning this agenda, were aware the vote(cid:13) would be taken and endorsed the reduced rates. Plaintiffs(cid:13) claim the loss of substantial commissions, causing one(cid:13) member of the proposed class to close its business. They(cid:13) request treble damages.(cid:13) The District Court dismissed the action under Fed. R.(cid:13) Civ. P. 12(b)(1), holding, "[P]laintiffs aver nothing from(cid:13) which this Court could find that Defendants’ purported(cid:13) conspiracy caused any injury which was felt in the U.S. or(cid:13) which affected the American economy in any way."(cid:13) Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 829,(cid:13) 834 (E.D. Pa. 2001). The District Court did not address(cid:13) defendants’ other arguments in support of dismissal. We(cid:13) must determine whether the District Court erred in finding(cid:13) the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act deprived it of(cid:13) subject matter jurisdiction.(cid:13) II.(cid:13) We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291.(cid:13) III.(cid:13) Federal jurisdiction obtains for "any civil action or(cid:13) proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating(cid:13) commerce or protecting trade and commerce against(cid:13) restraints and monopolies." 28 U.S.C. S 1337(a). The(cid:13) Sherman Antitrust Act regulates "restraints and(cid:13) monopolies." Sections 1 and 2 of the Act provide:(cid:13) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or(cid:13) otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or(cid:13) commerce among the several States, or with foreign(cid:13) nations, is hereby declared to be illegal . . . . Every(cid:13) 6(cid:13) person who shall monopolize, or attempt to(cid:13) monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other(cid:13) person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade(cid:13) or commerce among the several States, or with foreign(cid:13) nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .(cid:13) 15 U.S.C. SS 1, 2.2(cid:13) Federal courts have often disagreed about the(cid:13) extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act. Various judicial(cid:13) constructions of the Act were developed over the last(cid:13) century. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac(cid:13) VOF et al., 241 F.3d 420, 423-24 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Statoil")(cid:13) ("The history of this body of case law is confusing and(cid:13) unsettled."). Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.(cid:13) 347 (1909) (Holmes, J.), was the first time the Supreme(cid:13) Court considered the extraterritorial application of the(cid:13) Sherman Act, holding it did not apply to conduct occurring(cid:13) outside United States borders. Id. at 357-58. Over time, the(cid:13) Supreme Court altered its approach, holding plaintiffs(cid:13) could bring Sherman Act claims against foreign defendants,(cid:13) provided some of defendants’ conduct occurred within the(cid:13) United States. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,(cid:13) 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927).(cid:13) In 1945, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit(cid:13) established an "effects test" to determine whether there was(cid:13) antitrust jurisdiction over foreign conduct. See United(cid:13) States v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d(cid:13) Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.). Aluminum Corp. held that a federal(cid:13) court had jurisdiction over the conduct of a foreign(cid:13) corporation where the conduct was intended to, and did in(cid:13) fact, affect United States commerce. Id. at 443 ("We should(cid:13) not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its(cid:13) courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences(cid:13) within the United States." (citation omitted)). Over the next(cid:13) half-century, the "effects test," despite its apparent(cid:13) simplicity, proved difficult to apply in many Sherman Act(cid:13) cases. Considerations of international comity, not expressly(cid:13) considered in Aluminum Corp., occasionally entered the(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. 15 U.S.C. S 4 provides, "The several district courts of the United States(cid:13) are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of [the(cid:13) Sherman Act]."(cid:13) 7(cid:13) analysis of later courts. See, e.g., Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice(cid:13) Growers Co-op. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408, 413-16 (5th Cir.(cid:13) 1983); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d(cid:13) 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976).(cid:13) Legislating on this background, Congress in 1982(cid:13) enacted Title IV of the Export Trading Company Act--(cid:13) known as the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act --(cid:13) to facilitate domestic exports and to clarify the application(cid:13) of United States antitrust laws to foreign conduct. The(cid:13) Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act encourages(cid:13) United States exports by facilitating the formation of export(cid:13) trading companies and by exempting certain export(cid:13) transactions from the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C.S 4001(b);(cid:13) Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23(cid:13) (1993) ("The FTAIA was intended to exempt from the(cid:13) Sherman Act export transactions that did not injure the(cid:13) United States economy . . . ."). The Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) Improvements Act also promotes the "certainty in assessing(cid:13) the applicability of American antitrust law to international(cid:13) business transactions and proposed transactions." H.R.(cid:13) REP. NO. 97-686 (1982),reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2494.3(cid:13) Although passed two decades ago, few federal courts have(cid:13) had occasion to apply the Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) Improvements Act. In one such case, we held the Act(cid:13) demonstrated Congress’s intent to exempt from the(cid:13) Sherman Act export transactions not injuring the United(cid:13) States economy, thereby relieving exporters from a(cid:13) competitive disadvantage in foreign trade. Carpet Group Int’l(cid:13) v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 71 (3d Cir. 2000);(cid:13) see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-290 (1982), reprinted in 1982(cid:13) U.S.C.C.A.N. 1234 ("It is the purpose of this act to increase(cid:13) United States exports of products and services by . . .(cid:13) modifying the application of the antitrust laws to certain(cid:13) export trade."). In Carpet Group, we held defendants’(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has(cid:13) observed, "[T]he federal courts have generally disagreed as to the(cid:13) extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws . . . . However, as far as this(cid:13) appeal is concerned, our work is simplified by Congress’ passage in 1982(cid:13) of the FTAIA, which specifically exempts certain foreign conduct from the(cid:13) antitrust laws." Statoil, 241 F.3d at 423-24.(cid:13) 8(cid:13) conduct controlled the inquiry over subject matter(cid:13) jurisdiction. 127 F.3d at 73 ("The crux of [plaintiffs’] case(cid:13) involves [defendants’] conduct in the United States, not(cid:13) conduct abroad. We hold that these activities are not the(cid:13) type of conduct Congress intended to remove from our(cid:13) antitrust jurisdiction when it enacted the FTAIA."); see also(cid:13) Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC , 148(cid:13) F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (alleged injury to(cid:13) advertisers in the United States satisfied the Foreign Trade(cid:13) Antitrust Improvements Act, regardless of the geographic(cid:13) location of the supplier plaintiffs).(cid:13) In Carpet Group, we addressed the applicability of the(cid:13) Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act before(cid:13) considering general subject matter jurisdiction under the(cid:13) Sherman Antitrust Act. 227 F.3d at 69. We will employ a(cid:13) similar approach here. If the Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) Improvements Act does not bar this suit, then it will be(cid:13) necessary to address subject matter jurisdiction under the(cid:13) Sherman Act.(cid:13) Plaintiffs contend there is subject matter jurisdiction and(cid:13) the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act does not bar(cid:13) their claim. As noted, the District Court dismissed(cid:13) plaintiffs’ claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), holding:(cid:13) [A]ssuming as true that the alleged conspiracy and the(cid:13) actions taken in furtherance thereof did occur within(cid:13) United States commerce, the plaintiffs aver nothing(cid:13) from which this Court could find that Defendants’(cid:13) purported conspiracy caused any injury which was felt(cid:13) in the U.S. or which affected the American economy in(cid:13) any way.(cid:13) 152 F. Supp. 2d at 834. We exercise plenary review over(cid:13) this legal conclusion. Gould Elec., Inc. v. United States, 220(cid:13) F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). In this Rule 12(b)(1) appeal,(cid:13) "we review only whether the allegations on the face of the(cid:13) complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke(cid:13) the jurisdiction of the district court." Licata v. United States(cid:13) Postal Serv., 33 F.3d 259, 260 (3d Cir. 1994); see also(cid:13) Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884,(cid:13) 891 (3d Cir. 1977) (when considering a "facial" attack under(cid:13) 9(cid:13) Rule 12(b)(1), "the court must consider the allegations of(cid:13) the complaint as true").4(cid:13) IV.(cid:13) Section 402 of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements(cid:13) Act provides:(cid:13) [The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving(cid:13) trade or commerce (other than import trade or import(cid:13) commerce) with foreign nations unless --(cid:13) (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and(cid:13) reasonably foreseeable effect --(cid:13) (A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or(cid:13) commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade(cid:13) or import commerce with foreign nations; or(cid:13) (B) on export trade or export commerce with(cid:13) foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade(cid:13) or commerce in the United States; and(cid:13) (2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the(cid:13) provisions of [the Sherman Act] other than this(cid:13) section.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be(cid:13) "facial" or "factual." Facial attacks, like this one, contest the sufficiency(cid:13) of the pleadings, and the trial court must accept the complaint’s(cid:13) allegations as true. NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp.,(cid:13) 239 F.3d 333, 341 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2001). In contrast, a trial court(cid:13) considering a factual attack accords plaintiff ’s allegations no(cid:13) presumption of truth. In a factual attack, the court must weigh the(cid:13) evidence relating to jurisdiction, with discretion to allow affidavits,(cid:13) documents, and even limited evidentiary hearings. Accord Garcia v.(cid:13) Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 1997);(cid:13) Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir.(cid:13) 1990); Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1981). In Cestonaro(cid:13) v. United States, 211 F.3d 749 (3d Cir. 2000), we said, "Because the(cid:13) government’s challenge to the District Court’s jurisdiction was a factual(cid:13) one under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), we are not confined to the allegations(cid:13) in the complaint (nor was the District Court) and can look beyond the(cid:13) pleadings to decide factual matters relating to jurisdiction." Id. at 752(cid:13) (citation omitted).(cid:13) 10(cid:13) If [the Sherman Act] appl[ies] to such conduct only(cid:13) because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then[the(cid:13) Sherman Act] shall apply to such conduct only for(cid:13) injury to export business in the United States.(cid:13) 15 U.S.C. S 6a (1997).(cid:13) As noted, the central issue on appeal is whether the(cid:13) Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act bars subject(cid:13) matter jurisdiction in this Sherman Antitrust Act case.(cid:13) Therefore, our primary task is one of statutory(cid:13) interpretation. Cf. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 744(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1994). We have described the Foreign Trade(cid:13) Antitrust Improvements Act as "inelegantly phrased."(cid:13) Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 69 (quoting United States v.(cid:13) Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997)). In(cid:13) rather convoluted language, the Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) Improvements Act introduces two requirements that must(cid:13) be satisfied for a plaintiff to state a valid antitrust claim(cid:13) regarding "conduct involving trade or commerce . . . with(cid:13) foreign nations."5 The first is whether the conduct in fact(cid:13) involves "trade or commerce (other than import trade or(cid:13) import commerce) with foreign nations," as those terms are(cid:13) understood under the statute. 15 U.S.C. S 6a. The second(cid:13) evaluates whether defendants’ conduct has "a direct,(cid:13) substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" anticompetitive(cid:13) effect on United States commerce and whether that conduct(cid:13) "gives rise" to a Sherman Act claim. Id. S 6a(1)-(2). The first(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. Whether plaintiffs are United States citizens is irrelevant to our(cid:13) inquiry. 15 U.S.C. S 15 ("Suits by persons injured") provides jurisdiction(cid:13) for damage claims brought by "any person who shall be injured in his(cid:13) business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust(cid:13) laws . . . ." Id. The legislative history of the Export Trading Company Act(cid:13) states, "Foreign purchasers should enjoy the protection of our antitrust(cid:13) laws in the domestic marketplace, just as our citizens do. Indeed, to(cid:13) deny them this protection could violate the Friendship, Commerce and(cid:13) Navigation treaties this country has entered into with a number of(cid:13) foreign nations." H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.(cid:13) 2495. And in Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), the Supreme(cid:13) Court held that allowing foreign plaintiffs to enforce United States(cid:13) antitrust laws helped compensate victims while deterring future(cid:13) violations. Id. at 314-15.(cid:13) 11(cid:13) inquiry focuses on defendants’ conduct, while the second(cid:13) inquiry focuses on the geographical effect of that conduct.6(cid:13) A.(cid:13) The first inquiry derives from S 6a of the Foreign Trade(cid:13) Antitrust Improvements Act: "[The Sherman Act] shall not(cid:13) apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than(cid:13) import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations(cid:13) unless . . . ." We must determine whether the conduct(cid:13) plaintiffs describe is "trade or commerce with foreign(cid:13) nations" or "import trade or commerce with foreign nations."7(cid:13) Stated differently, under the Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 6. Plaintiffs contend the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act’s(cid:13) principal purpose was to reduce the growing United States trade deficit.(cid:13) For this reason, they suggest the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements(cid:13) Act does not bar their suit because their claim involves neither "export"(cid:13) nor "wholly foreign" commerce, the only types of activity covered by the(cid:13) statutory language. Because defendants, United States companies,(cid:13) allegedly colluded within the United States to fix prices paid in United(cid:13) States dollars, plaintiffs maintain the conduct at issue cannot be(cid:13) described as "export commerce" or "wholly foreign commerce."(cid:13) We disagree. Shreds of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act’s(cid:13) legislative history can be interpreted as supporting plaintiffs’ argument(cid:13) relating to the statute’s purpose. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, reprinted in(cid:13) 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2499 (employing the "export or purely foreign(cid:13) commerce" language. But as noted, the legislative history contains other(cid:13) justifications for the Act as well. E.g., id., reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.(cid:13) 2494 (noting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act’s(cid:13) "promot[ion] of certainty in assessing the applicability of American(cid:13) antitrust law to international business transactions and proposed(cid:13) transactions"). It would therefore appear that the text of the Act(cid:13) demonstrates more than one purpose. More importantly, the Supreme(cid:13) Court has held that "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to(cid:13) the contrary, [statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as(cid:13) conclusive." Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual,(cid:13) Pauma & Pala Bands of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984)(cid:13) (quotation and citations omitted). The plain language of the statute does(cid:13) not limit its scope to "export" or "wholly foreign" commerce. Instead, it(cid:13) addresses whether defendants’ conduct "involv[es] trade or commerce(cid:13) (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations." 15(cid:13) U.S.C. S 6a. We must, of course, apply the plain text of the statute.(cid:13) 7. Of course, the conduct need not necessarily be one or the other.(cid:13) 12(cid:13) Improvements Act, the Sherman Antitrust Act applies to(cid:13) conduct "involving" import trade or import commerce with(cid:13) foreign nations, provided other jurisdictional hurdles are(cid:13) cleared. Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 69.(cid:13) 1.(cid:13) The phrase "trade or commerce with foreign nations"(cid:13) includes transactions between foreign and domestic(cid:13) commercial entities, not just transactions involving a(cid:13) foreign sovereign. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at(cid:13) 796 (Sherman Act applicable to London insurers engaging(cid:13) in unlawful conspiracies to affect United States markets);(cid:13) see also United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 417 (1866)(cid:13) ("Commerce with foreign nations, without doubt, means(cid:13) commerce between citizens of the United States and(cid:13) citizens or subjects of foreign governments, as(cid:13) individuals."). Generally, the conduct must involve a United(cid:13) States purchaser or seller. Cf. Statoil, 241 F.3d at 426; In(cid:13) re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875, 882 (W.D.(cid:13) Wisc. 2000) ("The term ‘commerce . . . with foreign nations’(cid:13) generally refers to transactions in which a foreign seller(cid:13) deals with an American purchaser, or vice versa . . . ."(cid:13) (citations omitted)).8 But where conduct allegedly violating(cid:13) the Sherman Act is directed at the competitiveness of a(cid:13) foreign market, such conduct involves "foreign trade or(cid:13) commerce." See Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC , 284 F.3d(cid:13) 384, 395 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[W]hen there is conduct directed(cid:13) at reducing the competitiveness of a foreign market . . .(cid:13) such conduct involves foreign trade or commerce,(cid:13) regardless of whether some of the conduct occurred in the(cid:13) United States.").(cid:13) The complaint alleges a conspiracy between four(cid:13) domestic airlines and their trade association to fix(cid:13) commissions paid to foreign travel agents located outside(cid:13) the United States. Defendants’ alleged conduct was directed(cid:13) at reducing the competitiveness of Costa Rican,(cid:13) Nicaraguan, and similarly situated foreign travel agents, all(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 8. Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress(cid:13) the authority to regulate interstate commerce and"commerce with(cid:13) foreign nations."(cid:13) 13(cid:13) of whom were foreign-based. Therefore, the complaint(cid:13) properly alleges trade or commerce with foreign commercial(cid:13) entities.9(cid:13) 2.(cid:13) Next we consider whether defendants’ conduct involves(cid:13) "trade or commerce with foreign nations" that is "import(cid:13) trade or import commerce." If so, plaintiffs’ claims could(cid:13) still be cognizable under the Sherman Act, because the(cid:13) Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act only removes(cid:13) certain non-import commerce from federal antitrust(cid:13) jurisdiction. See Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 69 ("[T]he initial(cid:13) sentence of Section 6a, along with its ‘import trade or(cid:13) commerce’ parenthetical, provides that the antitrust law(cid:13) shall apply to conduct ‘involving’ import trade or commerce(cid:13) with foreign nations (provided, of course, that jurisdiction is(cid:13) found to exist under the Sherman Act itself)."). In Carpet(cid:13) Group, we held, "Since the FTAIA clearly states that the(cid:13) Sherman Act is not applicable to trade or commerce other(cid:13) than import trade or import commerce, the Sherman Act(cid:13) continues to apply to import trade and import commerce,(cid:13) thereby rendering the FTAIA’s requirement of a direct,(cid:13) substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect inapplicable(cid:13) to an action alleging an impact on import trade and import(cid:13) commerce." Id. at 72 (quoting 54 Am. Jur. 2d S 18, at 77)).10(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 9. Moreover, plaintiffs’ argument is undermined by their pleadings.(cid:13) Section One of the Sherman Act, on which plaintiffs base their claims,(cid:13) prohibits "trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign(cid:13) nations." 15 U.S.C. S 1. The complaint does not allege trade or commerce(cid:13) "among the several States." Therefore, to be cognizable, plaintiffs’(cid:13) allegations must depict a restraint of "trade or commerce with foreign(cid:13) nations." Plaintiffs cannot argue their allegations do not encompass(cid:13) "trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations" for Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) Improvements Act purposes without sacrificing their ultimate statutory(cid:13) claim under the Sherman Act.(cid:13) 10. Plaintiffs contend our holding in Carpet Group established a general(cid:13) rule that if defendants’ alleged conduct is "based" in the United States,(cid:13) the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act is no bar to federal(cid:13) antitrust jurisdiction. But Carpet Group provides no such bright line. In(cid:13) Carpet Group the defendants’ "import" activity was clear: "Plaintiffs(cid:13) charge that Defendants engaged in a course of activity designed to(cid:13) ensure that only United States importers, and not United States(cid:13) retailers, could bring oriental rugs manufactured abroad into the stream(cid:13) of American commerce." 227 F.3d at 72. To that extent, the facts of(cid:13) Carpet Group are clearly distinguishable.(cid:13) 14(cid:13) The dispositive inquiry is whether the conduct of(cid:13) defendants, not plaintiffs, involves "import trade or(cid:13) commerce." Id. at 71-72. The Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) Improvements Act does not define the term "import," but(cid:13) the term generally denotes a product (or perhaps a service)(cid:13) has been brought into the United States from abroad. See,(cid:13) e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986)(cid:13) (defining an "import" as "something (as an article of(cid:13) merchandise) brought in from an outside source (as a(cid:13) foreign country)"); Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)(cid:13) (defining an "import" as a "product manufactured in a(cid:13) foreign country, and then shipped to and sold in this(cid:13) country"). The travel agent plaintiffs contend the airlines(cid:13) "imported" their services for the purpose of selling airplane(cid:13) tickets. But the complaint alleges that defendants-- the(cid:13) four air carriers and their trade association -- only set the(cid:13) rates that foreign-based travel agents could charge for their(cid:13) services. Defendants did not directly bring items or services(cid:13) into the United States. Therefore, they cannot be labeled(cid:13) "importers." Nor have they engaged in "import trade or(cid:13) commerce."(cid:13) In Kruman, defendants’ conspiracy was "directed at(cid:13) controlling the prices they charged for their services in(cid:13) foreign auctions." 284 F.3d at 395. The Court of Appeals for(cid:13) the Second Circuit found defendants’ conduct did not(cid:13) involve "import trade or commerce":(cid:13) The relevant inquiry is whether the conduct of the(cid:13) defendants -- not the plaintiffs -- involves import trade(cid:13) or commerce. The plaintiffs did not describe conduct(cid:13) by the defendants that was directed at an import(cid:13) market. To the contrary, the defendants’ conspiracy(cid:13) appears to have been directed at controlling the prices(cid:13) they charged for their services in foreign auctions. As(cid:13) the district court aptly observed, the commerce that is(cid:13) the focus of this case is the charging of fixed(cid:13) commissions on the purchase and sale of goods at(cid:13) foreign auctions, not the trade in and subsequent(cid:13) movement of the goods that were purchased and sold.(cid:13) Id. (quotations and citations omitted). That"some of the(cid:13) goods purchased in those auctions may ultimately have(cid:13) been imported by individuals into the United States" was(cid:13) 15(cid:13) immaterial to determining if defendants were involved in(cid:13) "import trade or import commerce." Id. at 395-96. In this(cid:13) respect, the facts here are similar. The alleged conspiracy in(cid:13) this case was directed at commission rates paid to foreign(cid:13) travel agents based outside the United States. That some of(cid:13) the services plaintiffs offered were purchased by United(cid:13) States customers is not dispositive under this inquiry.(cid:13) Defendants were allegedly involved only in unlawfully(cid:13) setting extra-territorial commission rates. Their actions did(cid:13) not directly increase or reduce imports into the United(cid:13) States.(cid:13) The statutory term "involving" has a precise meaning.11 In(cid:13) Carpet Group, we compared the "import trade or commerce"(cid:13) language with another provision of the statute:(cid:13) Admittedly, the FTAIA differentiates between conduct(cid:13) that "involves" such [import] commerce, and conduct(cid:13) that "directly, substantially, and foreseeably" affects(cid:13) such commerce. To give the latter provision meaning,(cid:13) the former must be given a relatively strict(cid:13) construction.(cid:13) 227 F.3d at 72. Unlike in Carpet Group, where the(cid:13) defendant association identified itself as an organization of(cid:13) "rug importers," none of the airline defendants or the IATA(cid:13) self-identifies as an "importer" here. Id. Nor, under the(cid:13) terms of the statute, were defendants "involved" in any of(cid:13) plaintiffs’ "exporting activity."(cid:13) Nor do we agree with plaintiffs’ contention that a foreign(cid:13) travel agent’s access to a computer system based in the(cid:13) United States "transforms" "foreign commerce" into "import(cid:13) commerce." Again, our focus remains on the conduct of(cid:13) defendants, not plaintiffs, rendering this argument(cid:13) extraneous. But we note that under plaintiffs’(cid:13) interpretation, a legion of activities transacted by foreign(cid:13) merchants with some connection to instruments in the(cid:13) United States economy -- a telephone, a fax machine, an(cid:13) Internet connection -- would constitute "import commerce."(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 11. As noted, 15 U.S.C. S 6a provides:"[The Sherman Act] shall not apply(cid:13) to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or(cid:13) import commerce) with foreign nations unless . . . ."(cid:13) 16(cid:13) Although defendants paid commissions in United States(cid:13) dollars, neither the payments nor their calculations on(cid:13) computers based in the United States are properly(cid:13) considered "imports." No items or services were brought(cid:13) into the United States by the payments alone. Nor can(cid:13) plaintiffs demonstrate that defendants’ conduct reduced(cid:13) imports of goods or services into the United States.(cid:13) Therefore, defendants were not involved in "import trade or(cid:13) import commerce," but rather were engaged in"conduct(cid:13) involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or(cid:13) import commerce) with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C.S 6a.(cid:13) B.(cid:13) As we have stated, the Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) Improvements Act bars plaintiffs’ claim unless defendants’(cid:13) conduct has "a direct, substantial, and reasonably(cid:13) foreseeable" anticompetitive effect on United States(cid:13) commerce, and that conduct "gives rise" to a Sherman Act(cid:13) claim.12 15 U.S.C. S 6a(1)-(2). We turn now to this second(cid:13) aspect of the statutory analysis.(cid:13) 1.(cid:13) Plaintiffs allege defendants’ conduct has substantially(cid:13) reduced their business values, forcing at least one member(cid:13) of the putative class out of business. But the District Court(cid:13) found the complaint contained no allegations amounting to(cid:13) any "effect" on United States commerce, failing to satisfy(cid:13) the requirements of 15 U.S.C. S 6a(1)(A). 152 F. Supp. 2d at(cid:13) 834.(cid:13) We agree. The "direct, substantial, and reasonably(cid:13) foreseeable effect" test was intended to serve as"a simple(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 12. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Pfizer does not alter our analysis,(cid:13) because it preceded the enactment of the Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) Improvements Act by four years. Moreover, the holding in Pfizer is(cid:13) cabined to the question of whether a foreign government qualified as a(cid:13) "person" under the Sherman Act. 434 U.S. at 320 (holding "that a foreign(cid:13) nation otherwise entitled to sue in our courts is entitled to sue for treble(cid:13) damages under the antitrust laws to the same extent as any other(cid:13) plaintiff ").(cid:13) 17(cid:13) and straightforward clarification of existing American law."(cid:13) H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487-(cid:13) 88. The House Judiciary Committee Report accompanying(cid:13) the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act stated:(cid:13) "Since Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v.(cid:13) Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir.(cid:13) 1945), it has been relatively clear that it is the situs of the(cid:13) effects, as opposed to the conduct, that determines whether(cid:13) United States antitrust law applies." H.R. REP. NO. 97-686,(cid:13) reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2490.(cid:13) The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act’s(cid:13) emphasis on the geographical "effect" of allegedly illegal(cid:13) conduct reiterates longstanding antitrust principles.13(cid:13) Above all, the United States antitrust laws strive to(cid:13) maintain competition in our domestic markets. See 1 PHILLIP(cid:13) E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 4 (2000) ("The(cid:13) general goal of the antitrust laws is to promote‘competition’(cid:13) . . . ."). Generally, federal antitrust laws do not extend to(cid:13) protect foreign markets from anticompetitive effects and "do(cid:13) not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations’(cid:13) economies." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio(cid:13) Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986) (citations omitted); see also(cid:13) Statoil, 241 F.3d at 421 (applying Matsushita to an Foreign(cid:13) Trade Antitrust Improvements Act claim). But it is"well(cid:13) established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign(cid:13) conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce(cid:13) some substantial effect in the United States." Hartford Fire(cid:13) Ins., 509 U.S. at 796.(cid:13) The geographic target of the alleged anticompetitive(cid:13) conduct matters greatly. As the Court of Appeals for the(cid:13) Second Circuit recently observed, "There is a distinction(cid:13) between anticompetitive conduct directed at foreign(cid:13) markets that only affects the competitiveness of foreign(cid:13) markets and anticompetitive conduct directed at foreign(cid:13) markets that directly affects the competitiveness of(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 13. To reiterate, while the analysis of the "trade or commerce (other than(cid:13) import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations" prong focuses(cid:13) exclusively on defendants’ conduct, the analysis of the "direct,(cid:13) substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" prong focuses exclusively on the(cid:13) geographical effect of defendants’ conduct.(cid:13) 18(cid:13) domestic markets. The antitrust laws apply to the latter(cid:13) sort of conduct and not the former." Kruman , 284 F.3d at(cid:13) 393.(cid:13) Plaintiffs claim that collusion by United States air(cid:13) carriers to fix commissions paid to foreign travel agents(cid:13) satisfies the statutory language. But that allegation does(cid:13) not characterize an "effect" on United States commerce. The(cid:13) alleged collusion is the reason for the lawsuit. It does not(cid:13) designate the geographical effect of defendants’ allegedly(cid:13) illegal activity. That certain activities might have taken(cid:13) place in the United States is irrelevant if the economic(cid:13) consequences are not felt in the United States economy.(cid:13) Fixing the commissions paid foreign travel agents might(cid:13) constitute an illegal conspiracy.14 But this conspiracy only(cid:13) targets the commissions foreign travel agents would receive(cid:13) for work performed outside the United States. United States(cid:13) antitrust laws only apply when a price-fixing conspiracy(cid:13) affects the domestic economy. Cf. Statoil, 241 F.3d at 427-(cid:13) 28 (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to equate "effect" and(cid:13) "conduct" in this context as "not true to the plain language(cid:13) of the FTAIA" and an overly "expansive reading of the(cid:13) antitrust laws" never intended by Congress). Several(cid:13) antitrust actions have been dismissed on analogous(cid:13) grounds. See, e.g., Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 582 n.6 ("The(cid:13) Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but(cid:13) only when the conduct has an effect on American(cid:13) commerce.") (citation omitted) In re Copper Antitrust Litig.,(cid:13) 117 F. Supp. 2d at 887 ("[I]t is irrelevant that some of(cid:13) defendants’ conduct took place in the United States. It was(cid:13) not the conduct that caused plaintiffs’ injuries."); Liamuiga(cid:13) Tours v. Travel Impressions, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 920, 924(cid:13) (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (dismissing a plaintiff service operator’s(cid:13) claim against an American wholesale tour operator(cid:13) operating in St. Kitts, where all "effects" from the(cid:13) conspiracy were felt outside the United States). Therefore,(cid:13) plaintiffs cannot state a cognizable Sherman Act claim,(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 14. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act’s legislative history(cid:13) provides, "[T]he full committee added language to the Sherman and FTC(cid:13) Act amendments to require that the ‘effect’ providing the jurisdictional(cid:13) nexus must also be the basis for the injury alleged under the antitrust(cid:13) laws." H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496-97.(cid:13) 19(cid:13) given the plain text of the Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) Improvements Act.15(cid:13) We do not reach plaintiffs’ contentions, first raised on(cid:13) appeal, that defendants’ conduct could have affected travel(cid:13) agencies and travelers based in the United States. See(cid:13) United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters,(cid:13) Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local Union(cid:13) No. 430, 55 F.3d 138, 140 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) ("It is the(cid:13) general rule that issues raised for the first time at the(cid:13) appellate level will not be reviewed.") (citations omitted).(cid:13) The complaint only sought class certification for"[a]ll IATA-(cid:13) accredited travel agents in Latin America and the(cid:13) Caribbean, excluding any travel agencies owned in whole or(cid:13) in part by defendants to this litigation, or their affiliates or(cid:13) subsidiaries." That plaintiffs now seek to include United(cid:13) States companies or tourists in the class cannot alter our(cid:13) jurisdictional analysis, because those claims were first(cid:13) raised on appeal. Cf. Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434(cid:13) F.2d 727, 734-36 (3d Cir. 1970).(cid:13) Nor need we remand these proceedings to allow plaintiffs(cid:13) to demonstrate "newly discovered effects" on United States(cid:13) commerce. Though they had ample notice of possible(cid:13) deficiencies in their complaint, plaintiffs made no attempt(cid:13) to amend before the District Court ruled on the motion to(cid:13) dismiss. Moreover, the District Court appropriately(cid:13) considered the possible "effects" of defendants’ actions, and(cid:13) how they impacted its jurisdiction. Given these(cid:13) circumstances, we will not grant leave to amend.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 15. The travel agents were permanently located outside the United(cid:13) States, where they performed services for travelers based in their(cid:13) countries and elsewhere, including the United States. In this sense, the(cid:13) facts here are distinguishable from those described in the dissenting(cid:13) opinion in Statoil: "The claim is that defendants allocated the market for(cid:13) hundreds of millions of dollars of commerce -- an allegation that placed(cid:13) United States markets at the mercy of monopoly charges in an industry(cid:13) vital to national security. The charged conspiracy was no foreign cabal(cid:13) whose secondary effects only lapped at United States shores." 241 F.3d(cid:13) at 431 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).(cid:13) 20(cid:13) 2.(cid:13) Even if plaintiffs identified a "direct, substantial, and(cid:13) reasonably foreseeable" anticompetitive effect on United(cid:13) States commerce, they would need to demonstrate the(cid:13) anticompetitive effect "gives rise to a claim" under the(cid:13) Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. S 6a(2). We will not consider this(cid:13) element. But we note the meaning of 15 U.S.C. S 6a(2) has(cid:13) split two of our sister circuits. In Statoil, the Court of(cid:13) Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided opinion, held:(cid:13) Based on the language of Section 2 of the FTAIA, the(cid:13) effect on United States commerce -- in this case, the(cid:13) higher prices paid by United States companies for(cid:13) heavy-lift services in the Gulf of Mexico -- must give(cid:13) rise to the claim that Statoil asserts against the(cid:13) defendants. That is, Statoil’s injury must stem from the(cid:13) effect of higher prices for heavy-lift services in the Gulf.(cid:13) 241 F.3d at 427; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584 n.7(cid:13) ("However one decides to describe the contours of the(cid:13) asserted conspiracy -- whether there is one conspiracy or(cid:13) several -- respondents must show that the conspiracy(cid:13) caused them an injury for which the antitrust laws provide(cid:13) relief."). But in Kruman, the Court of Appeals for the(cid:13) Second Circuit, without referencing Statoil, reached the(cid:13) contrary conclusion:(cid:13) [A] violation of the Sherman Act is not predicated on(cid:13) the existence of an injury to the plaintiff. . . . Rather(cid:13) than require that the domestic effect give rise to an(cid:13) injury that would serve as the basis for a Clayton Act(cid:13) action, subsection 2 of the FTAIA only requires that the(cid:13) domestic effect violate the substantive provisions of the(cid:13) Sherman Act.(cid:13) 284 F.3d at 399-400. We need not take sides in this(cid:13) dispute. Plaintiffs have failed to allege a "direct, substantial,(cid:13) and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States(cid:13) commerce. 15 U.S.C. S 6a(1). We reserve consideration on(cid:13) this element.(cid:13) For these reasons, plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the(cid:13) Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act. Therefore, they(cid:13) may not state a cognizable Sherman Act claim.(cid:13) 21(cid:13) V.(cid:13) Defendants also contend plaintiffs lack standing under(cid:13) United States antitrust laws, a proposition not squarely(cid:13) addressed by the District Court.16 This argument implicates(cid:13) many of the same issues as the jurisdictional analysis(cid:13) under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act. And(cid:13) for the reasons noted, we likewise find plaintiffs lack(cid:13) antitrust standing. See Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal.(cid:13) State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535-45 (1983)(cid:13) (holding the standing inquiry in antitrust cases is(cid:13) dependent on the finding of subject matter jurisdiction).(cid:13) To sue under the United States antitrust laws, plaintiffs(cid:13) must have suffered an injury the antitrust laws were(cid:13) intended to prevent, and the injury must flow from that(cid:13) which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful. Cargill, Inc. v.(cid:13) Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111-13 (1986);(cid:13) Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,(cid:13) 487 (1977); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund(cid:13) v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 927 (3d Cir. 1999); Int’l(cid:13) Raw Materials, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 978 F.2d 1318,(cid:13) 1328 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Pfzizer, 434 U.S. at 314(cid:13) ("Congress’ foremost concern in passing the antitrust laws(cid:13) was the protection of Americans. . . .").(cid:13) Plaintiffs’ injuries occurred exclusively in foreign markets.(cid:13) They are not of the type Congress intended to prevent(cid:13) through the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act or(cid:13) the Sherman Act. Cf. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig.,(cid:13) 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716 (D. Md. 2001) ("a plaintiff who(cid:13) has not participated in the U.S. domestic market may not(cid:13) bring a Sherman Act claim under the FTAIA"). Unlike in(cid:13) Carpet Group, where the plaintiffs’ harm was"inextricably(cid:13) intertwined with the defendants’ wrongdoing," 227 F.3d at(cid:13) 77 (quotation and citations omitted), the conduct at issue(cid:13) here was not directly related to the United States(cid:13) marketplace.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 16. For this reason, undoubtedly, the issue has not been extensively(cid:13) briefed by the parties.(cid:13) 22(cid:13) VI.(cid:13) Defendant IATA urges us to affirm on the basis of its(cid:13) alleged statutory immunity under Sections 412 and 424 of(cid:13) the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. SS 41308-41309. The(cid:13) Act allows the Secretary of Transportation to "exempt a(cid:13) person affected by the order from the antitrust laws to the(cid:13) extent necessary to allow the person to proceed with the(cid:13) transaction specifically approved by the order and with any(cid:13) transaction necessarily contemplated by the order." Id.(cid:13) S 41308(b). Because we need address only the jurisdictional(cid:13) issues, we will not address this matter.(cid:13) VII.(cid:13) For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of(cid:13) the District Court. The Foreign Trade Antitrust(cid:13) Improvements Act acts as a bar to plaintiffs’ proposed(cid:13) Sherman Antitrust Act class action.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 23
