*1 A.2d REPAIR, INC., A CORPORA- NEW JERSEY TURF LAWNMOWER PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, GLORIA, L. v. TION AND JOHN LOCKLIN, CORPORATION, MARY RECORD BRUCE BERGEN HALL, CAMPBELL, MARCO, BYRON DAVID AND ANNE DE MITCHELL, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND EDWARD WINNERS, EQUIPMENT, ROB- EDDIE’S MARK POWER D/B/A LIVINGSTON, VROEGINDAY, AND JOHN DOE ERT DOUGLAS ROE, INC., RICHARD DEFENDANTS. Argued 1994 Decided March 1995. October *4 argued appellants (Shanley E. Richard Brennan the cause for Denbeaux, Brennan, attorneys; and Mark P. Mr. Mr. & Fisher Cerra, briefs). Denbeaux, Joseph M. on the (Winne, respondents argued Peter Banta the cause for G. Banta, Rizzi, Basralian, attorneys; A Hetherington Donald & brief). Levinsohn, Craig Klein and L. on the curiae, New Cafferty argued the cause for amicus Thomas J. attorneys; (McGimpsey Cafferty, & Mr. Jersey Press Association brief). Turinchak, Arlene Cafferty and M. GARIBALDI, opinion was delivered J. The the Court newspaper involves two articles that appeal This defamation (Turf) Inc., Repair, and its plaintiffs, Turf accused Lawnmower Gloria, prac- president, deceptive L. business owner and John “ripped appeal off’ customers. this we determine tices that all appropriate for busi- whether actual malice is standard nesses, more standard of negligence appropriate or whether is the whose activi- proof in defamation that involve businesses actions safety, do not ties do not concern matters health fraud, subject consumer or whose businesses are constitute government regulations. substantial
I 21, 1988, special Sunday, August published Record On writer, report by Special Investigative its News Editor and staff mowers, Tests, Locklin, entitled, joint clip “A for ex- Bruce lawn deceives, A shop overcharges.” sub- workers reveal Teaneck honesty “Looking faulty for machine” article entitled with accompanied the article. lead Locklin, Gloria, сharacterized
The lead article’s author was who Repair, “fiercely ambitious.” of Turf Mower as the owner Lawn by age run for out to a millionaire 30 and later “[H]e set become Gloria, twenty- Congress.” reported age then Locklin also (cid:127) nine, made his million. Locklin then wrote: had first jobs Though about in the But Ms success is flawed. Ms did 12,000 past shop repair were tM’ee former estimate to 80 percent rip-offs. year’s, employees percent got change who little more and a new Most customers for than an oil paid tune-ups overcharged plug for wMeh were Some paid spark they typically $20 $30. —for junked charged got mowers. new used from were parts repair parts Many never work that was done. *5 tests conducted The Record similar results. Independent by produced Reporters brought in mowers in need of Each Turf recommended or time, simple repairs. work. unnecessary performed continued, customers, quoting employ- Locklin former former ees, competitor: and a injury.
There’s a rudeness at where often add insult to Turf, pervasive employees Daglezt Bogota, customer, One Andrea said the man behind the counter talked guy to her as if she were an idiot. “That almost had fist his throat,” down she my said. “He was so nasty____” Winners is a former Turf who on for a mechanic about after Gloria stayed year became boss. guy. everything “When he worked for he was a As soon as he took Bob, over, nice changed,” quitting Winners said. “I ended because ... I was tired of up getting customеrs off.” ripped bogus longer Winners said Gloria No made standard did tuneups procedure. mechanics install new and condensers or rebuild carburetors routinely points replacing worn parts. got nothing plug, Instead, oil, mowers more than fresh and a spark quick Labor time from 30 or 40 mower to about 5 minutes cleanup. dropped per minutes. Three other former who each worked at Turf for about two mechanics, years during the 1980-86 said had the same Do the fake period, they instructions: at full tuneups tuneup prices. —but generating Mowers in season, said, often broke down later the mechanics more work and to sell new mowers. repair opportunities Ridgefield Bob now an auto mechanic in said that when he Park, Vroeninday, junked working Turf in for was 1982 and Gloria used from mowers parts telling work —without customers. repair charge “On a cracked he’d use an old one and for a new one because you flywheel, that stuff can’t see,” said. you Vroeninday brought often to customers who Winners and said Gloria lied Vroeninday jammed hitting something mowers that had after solid. He would the mower’s say straightened when, crankshaft needed to be the machine needed fact, only small called a Its About part keyway. price? $1. job “A that should have cost would cost about said. $90,” Vroeninday $20 If a his customer Gloria blamed workers. spotted complained, rip-off Doug Livingston, a Turf mechanic from 1984 to recalled how Gloria tried to scapegoat angry make him the customer. “He turned appease immediately guy it. said, around and me and ‘This is the who worked on It’s my pointed ” job.’ fault he didn’t do his got Livingston, who now works at a Fail- Lawn said Gloria sometimes shop, just get at him and vindictive if a customer became “He would mad impatient. ” that for a kick the machine the back and ‘Don’t touch week.’ say, *6 being working got it” for more a month. told than One customer sick of “we’re Broking, Palisades went around back Park, Ron owns Ronnie’s Restaurant in who and found untouched. his mower Broking got “That’s what burned me because never, at,” “It looked said. up never Broldng took it to a lie.” his in his car and another shop. it was mower packed tougher had a time of it. He Turf to fix his Mel of New Milford Clansky paid $54 took it it didn’t work. took it electric mower. But when he still home, Clansky bought waiting, machine for Turf called and back to Turf while a new and, $150. old machine. wanted to the repair $200 just gave it. in Turf couldn’t find returned, wanted the mower but He up Clansky disgust. taking go going to claims court,” “I wasn’t the time off to small Clansky to bother “It said. was unbelievable.” assertions, lengthy After Loeklin commented on these Record’s tests: [Tjests at Turf. The Record evidence produced systematic conducted by rip-offs misdiagnosed took mowers there three times. Turf employees prob- Reporters charged wasn’t for work that wasn’t work that needed and
lems, recommended done____ in The Record’s at Turf started June with a machine that needed Lawnboy tests charged diagnostic a the weeks, carburetor Turf machine three kept repair. $20 and said couldn’t be fixed. fee, it saying Turf to take the оf a new that mower, A salesman offered off the price $20 fix the He to standard even the manufacturer couldn’t Turfs Lawnboy. pointed got have and “We could said, tuneup price you $50 $60.” Nanuet, N.Y., A mower to a dealer in where it was took the reporter Lawnboy and a second took the same machine back to Later, tuned repaired reporter up. plug and said disconnected, Turf. This had been the clamp time spark reporter get couldn’t machine started. she diagnostic charged fee, Turf another three and weeks, the machine kept $20 recommended an unnecessary tuneup. $60 good working In the third took a Bobcat mower in condition to test, reporter Again, plug was so the machine start. Turf. loose wouldn’t clamp pulled spark charged A and for a Turf mechanic Turf the machine four weeks tuneup. kept $63 and But the has a solid- said he rebuilt the carburetor installed new mower points. ignition: state It has no points. article, in response Earlier Loeklin described Gloria’s when agreed investigative him his Gloria to an interview with and researcher, Mary told DeMarco. When Gloria was about tests, Loeklin results The Record wrote Gloria confessed heavily quality slipped year he “his controls this because was quoted politics.” in Loeklin involved other investments Gloria “ my many pots they were saying: fingers T had so as ” potential in- getting Locklin had referred to Gloria’s burned.’ industry repair lawn “revolutionizing” mower volvement earlier in the article. political then-рresiden- detailing work for addition to Gloria’s earlier in the Kemp, highlighted
tial Locklin also candidate Jack story. success inspirational article elements Gloria’s some grew Milford, His mother is a waitress. He New up father is a his postman, got job he [Turf] He there when was 14. By a few blocks from the mower shop. age managing graduated College at was from he place. time he Ramapo go Engel, owner, Bob the mower school, Gloria law but shop had planned for it. offered to sell the business. Gloria went *7 article, emphasized Locklin beginning At the of the Small Jersey’s of as New Administration’s selection Gloria Business young entrepreneur of 1986. method, sub-article, logic, and explained
In a Locklin his results at Turf and at eleven other loose-spark-plug of the test conducted twelve, shops shops identified on one occasion. Of six shops Turf other did not. Locklin rigged problem, and five In that sub- the test as “Bozo-with-a-mower.” characterized article Locklin concluded: in Turf Lawn Teaneck and
A the same machine to Mower Repair took reporter The mower needed told same Turf said the probably tuneup. story. plug was its mower. mower later, ready, spark left the Four weeks reporter The bill was cap place. $63. II Turf, 10, 1989, behalf and on behalf of January on his own On Turf, Gloria, of filed a president sole stockholder acting as and Corporation, Bergen The Record complaint against three-count Sunday newspapers; Record and The publishes which Reсord Locklin, Hall, editor; publisher; Bruce Byron Campbell, David DeMarco, investiga- Editor; Mary and Anne Investigative News alleged complaint plaintiffs In that defen- that tive researcher. plaintiffs maliciously about published a news article dants had Winners, (count libel); Vroeginday, and Robert that Mark one— (Turfs given employees) had false Douglas Livingston former injure plaintiffs’ good malicious statements to defendants to name (count slander); that of because the tortious conduct of two— employees, plaintiffs defendants and former Turf had suffered prospective loss of customers and income and Gloria had suffered (count distress, anxiety, mental emotional and embarrassment prospective three —intentional interference with business advan- tage). August complaint against In plaintiffs of also filed a business, competitor doing Mitchell Edward business as (Mitchell), Equipment claiming Eddie’s Power that Mitchell had cooperated gathering ap- with Locklin in information that had peared destroy plaintiffs’ in The All Record article to business. against employees claims the former Turf were dismissed later consent. discovery,
After extensive defendants and Mitchell moved for summary judgment, granted. which the trial court Mitchell’s motion, granting motion is not before us. defendants’ the trial court held: judgment, For the this court version of purposes summary accepts plaintiffs any contradicted facts. This court the tests were unfair, accepts retrospect
informants and the biased, Nevertheless, loaded. the comments of each questions highly individual to Bruce Locklin were detailed and similar. cumulatively very allegation knowledge There was no deliberate falsehood but of reckless disregard. applied plain- The trial court the actual-malice standard because applicability. Although concluding tiffs had conceded its *8 malice, plaintiffs had failed to establish actual the trial court stated: although negligent grossly Here, the methods have been or even employed may
negligent, the notes and interviews of Locklin are detailed and cumula- sufficiently are and corroborative. tively specific This court is mindful of the article’s detrimental Viewed from impact plaintiff. justice get of the the did not a fair trial before the perspective system, plaintiff Locklin verdict of was in The Record. this court must be mindful of Yet, published underlying the of a free to our and the reasons the importance press society difficult standard our in defamation Court tremendously imposed by Supreme cases. genuine judgment Plaintiff fails to a raise issue of actual malice and is summary granted.
401 grant Appellate court’s of sum The Division affirmed the trial 370, N.J.Super. mary judgment 635 A.2d to defendants. 269 (1994). repair the sale of majority A of that court found that legitimate at subject public of interest.” Id. lawn mowers is “a difference 635 A The court found no between .2d 575. goods provides and one that services. Ibid. provides business that judge affirmed the trial court because she conclud concurring ed, court, plaintiffs apрlica had conceded the as had trial that Thus, judge concurring bility of the standard. actual-malice “unnecessary [petitioners’] business found it to decide whether involving repair mowers is a matter of of lawn the sale (Wefing, A 575. legitimate public Id. .2d interest.” J.A.D., t/a, granted plaintiffs’ petition certifi concurring). We (1994). A .2d cation. 136 N.J.
Ill the appropriate malice is We first address whether actual involving any actions business proof standard of defamation subject newspaper article. The are the of a whose activities the actual-malice majority Appellate Division held “any person opens which or business applies standard because scrutiny subjects to public thereby itself general itself to seeks, it and thus creates naturally with the attention comes N.J.Super. at subject public interest.” 269 legitimate contend, however, imposition of the that the A.2d 575. Plaintiffs subject liability inappropriate. To standard of is actual-malice owner, shoemaker, newspaper and other simi stand local corner heightened standard larly owners such situated business Most local places impossible on them. businesses proof burden voluntarily themselves into thrust and their owners do they controversy merely by opening a Nor do have business. ability effectively to present their cases prominence or financial unfairly falsely by the media. Defen if attacked dants, however, imposition of the actual-malice stan contend that information. protect the free flow of dard is nеeded to *9 402 that such a the law of defamation discloses
An examination of
unnecessary
improper
privilege
and strikes an
balance
broad
is
uninhibited, robust,
preserving
in
public’s
interest
between
good
reputation of
press
protecting
name and
and free
Reviewing
public-policy
a business and its owner.
consider-
standard demonstrates that courts
ations behind the actual-malice
every
will the failure to
impose
it on
business. Nor
should
have
higher
of actual malice on such businesses
apply the
standard
chilling
press.
effect on the
gave redress to a de-
years
For
most state defamation laws
only
publication
private person
proving
that a false
famed
for
hatred,
subjected
contempt,
“him
See Gertz v.
or ridicule.”
Welch,
2997, 3022,
789,
323, 370,
41 L.Ed.2d
Inc. 418 U.S.
94 S.Ct.
(1974)
J.,
(White,
dissenting).
In New York Times Co. v.
822
Sullivan,
(New
Times), however,
York
the United States Su-
developed
preme
placed limits on state defamation law and
Court
recovery by public
the actual-malice standard for
officials. 376
254, 279-280,
710, 725-726,
686,
11 L.Ed.2d
706
U.S.
84 S.Ct.
(1964).
public figures
years
three
Extending that standard to
later,
Publishing
also extended
the Court in Curtis
Co. v. Butts
privilege
report
non-public
or
or
to defendants who write
intimately
private persons who “are nevertheless
involved
or, by
important public questions
reason of their
resolution
fame,
society
large,”
shape
in areas of concern to
at
388
events
(1967)
130, 164,
1975, 1996,
1116
18 L.Ed.2d
U.S.
S.Ct.
(Warren, C.J.,
Hence,
concurring).
genesis
“public
con-
law.
cern”
First Amendment
Inc.,
Metromedia,
91 S.Ct.
Rosenbloom v.
U.S.
(1971), plurality
further extended
However, provide safeguards certain for the Gertz Court did liability First, impose press. held could the Court state Second, requiring showing without some of fault. Ibid. Court recovery permit presumed held that state could not than actual malice. Id. at punitive damages showing on a of less 349, 3011-3012, at later 41 L.Ed.2d 810. The Court 94 S.Ct. at showing falsity plaintiffs imposed private-figure “the burden recovering damages.” Philadelphia News- as as fault well before 767, 776, 1558, 1563, Hepps, 89 papers, Inc. 475 U.S. 106 S.Ct. v. (1986). 783, Moreover, protection as an additional L.Ed.2d 792 “ appellate raising ‘in ... court[s] First Amendment issues cases independent examination the whole record’ must ... make an judgment not constitute order to make sure that ‘the does ” expression.’ v. intrusion on the of free Milkovich forbidden field 2705, 1, 1, 2695, Co., 17, 110 111 L.Ed.2d Lorain J. 497 U.S. S.Ct. 404 (1990) U.S., Inc., (quoting Corp.
17 Bose v. Consumers Union of 485, 499, 104 (1984) 1949, 1958, 466 U.S. S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d Times, (quoting 284-86, supra, New York 376 U.S. at at S.Ct. 709) (omission 11 L.Ed.2d at original)). The Court also recognized ample safeguards protect press constitutional adequately, and therefore establishing concluded that another protection defamatory First Amendment statements made unnecessary. the media was Id. at S.Ct. (holding
L.Ed.2d at categorized that statements “opinion” as as opposed claim). exempt to “fact” are not from defamation
IV
Although
variations,
might
slight
each state
forty-two
formulate
jurisdictions
in the
negligence
United States1 hold that
is the
1
states,
negligence
prevails
thirty-eight
standard
the District of Colum
bia,
Hicks,
jurisdictions.
Corp.
and three other United States
Mead
v.
448 So.2d
(D.Ala.1983);
Inc.,
1529,
Report,
308
F.Supp.
Sisemore v. U.S.News & World
662
(D.Alaska 1987) (court presumed
Supreme
1535
that the Alaska
Court would
“apparently
increasingly
now follow the rule that is
sound and
dominant in
jurisdictions”
apply
other
that actual malice does not
to comment on matters of
public
plaintiff
public figure,
Supreme
concern unless
is a
and the Alaska
Court
Brown,
(1988)
followed District Court’s lead in
v.
405
defen-
private plaintiffs
against
to recover
media
standard
subject
speech
is of
even
matter
dant
when
975,
2239,
(1982);
(Ky.1981),
72 L.Ed.2d 849
denied 456 U.S.
102 S.Ct.
882
cert.
(La.Ct.App.),
denied, 320 So.2d
So.2d
315
393
cert.
Press,
Wilson v.
Capital City
165,
(1976);
(1975);
277 Md.
concern. That choice of supports standard is because it finding our impose that the failure to the actual-malice standard in every involving product defamation action a business or service chilling will not press. have effect on the Neither amicus curiae, Association, Jersey the New Prеss nor defendants have presented any contrary. evidence to the variety
Given the
foregoing authority,
size and
of the
we are
unable to
imposing
delineate each state’s nuances in
such a
negligence
However,
standard.
we discuss the standard in Cali
fornia because its
factually
seminal case is so
similar to this case.
Co.,
Kelly Broadcasting
Brown v.
3d
Cal.Rptr.
Cal.
708, 736-737,
(1989),
Supreme
P.2d
the California
Court held that a
public-
state statute did not contain a broad
privilege
interest
for the television station that had televised
reports
consumer affairs’
critical of a local home contractor. To
damage
professional
mend the
to her
reputation, the contractor
sought a
broadcasting
retraction from the
company and an investi
gation from the Contractor’s State License Board.
Id. 257 Cal.
Rptr. at
broadcasting company
P.2d at 409. The
refused
allegations
by
retract the
made
the homeowner on its televised
programs
given
and claimed that it had
opportu
the contractor an
nity
broadcast,
to defend herself on its second
but she had refused
to do so. Ibid. The Contractor’s State License Board refused to
investigation
help
undertake an
the contractor because it found
support
no factual
allegations
for the homeowner’s televised
against
trial,
the contractor.
Ibid. At
broadcasting company
summary judgment by
won
claiming
enjoyed
that it
privilege
law,
under the California statute as well as federal
which allowed
publish any story
it to
private
interest about a
person, regardless
effects,
of its
long
libelous or slanderous
so
as
711-12,
it did not do so with malice. Id. at
Relying statutory on its interpretation developed own law Court, Supreme the United Supreme States the California *13 Brown rejected privilege sought by the media. The the Court underly public policy following also the considerations court noted First, privilege “the breadth of the ing its decision. it found that 725, 771 Id. at sought defendants is difficult to overstate.” apply it to almost at 423. It “would so broad that would P.2d be every every defamatory communication ... the media [so that] a argue the was action would ... communication defamation 715, 725, 413, 423. Id. at P.2d at matter of interest.” Second, overwhelming authority noting weight of from other the (Second) (1989), Torts, § 580B states the Restatement of standard, no the court saw adopted negligence the Brown which reputation “deny protection for their reason to California citizens P.2d at in other Id. at equal provided to that states.” Third, importance private recognized court the a 425. the reputation, that “‘the defamation ac person’s remembered limited, society tion, in a properly plays important role free also remedy represents against as sole occasional it individual’s vast print media which often have excesses and elеctronic ” upon Ibid. damage to inflict an individual.’ resources untoward Ane], supra, (quoting [Publishing Herald v. 423 So.2d Miami Co. [376] at 387 [ (Fla.App.1982) ]). Fourth, the Brown court recog protections that exist for the constitutional nized substantial 730-31, Cal.Rptr. P.2d at 428-29. media. Id. 257 at news privilege Fifth, of the media expand the court saw no need to of strict liabili negligence is not standard because standard only avoid ty, journalist reasonable care to and a need act with at 430. negligence Id. at 771 P.2d liability under a standard. Sixth, the “free flow of informa did not show that defendant slightest degree in the has restricted even in the tion been adopted negligence has overwhelming number states that press always correct its error. Finally, the can standard.” Ibid. reasons, at For those the California 771 P.2d 431. all Id. negligence appropriate for standard is Supreme Court found the through story private plaintiffs who have been defamed at 423. Id. at 771 P.2d considers of concern. media *14 408
Currently, only jurisdictions three use the actual-malice stan- Colorado, brought by in private persons: dard defamation actions Indiana, explain and our own state. Commentators those three majority acceptance deviations from the of states as of Justice Rosenbloom, reasoning supra, public Brennan’s that the nature statement, disputed public rather than the status of the plaintiff, trigger should the standard of actual malice. Ronald Smolla, (1988). However, Defamation, previ- Law 3-28 as we ously explained, reasoning repudiated by that has been thе Su- Indeed, preme Court Gertz and is not followed in most states. federal courts have cast doubt on the wisdom in both Colorado and applying broadly. Indiana of the actual-malice standard so See Bradstreet, Inc., 511, Corp. Sunward v. Dun & 811 F.2d 526-29 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting Tribune-Republican Publishing Kuhn v. Co., 315, (Colo.1981)) (hinting 637 P.2d 319 the Colorado Supreme misplaced Court has the actual-malice standard devel- “ ”); oped ‘good public supra faith critics of officials’ see 1 note (noting Supreme that federal court convinced the Alaska Court negligence). lower its standard to Judges in both Indiana state and federal courts have noted the acceptance lack of reasoning of Indiana’s standard and but have Supreme refused to abandon the standard because the Court of expressed disapproval Indiana has not Dugan, of it. Jean v. 20 (7th 255, Cir.1994); Chang Telecasting F.3d 262 v. Michiana (7th Cir.1990). 1085, Corp., 900 F. 2d 1087-88
y Jersey parallels complex, yet The law of New ever-changing, law of defamation both federal and other state courts. As we previously, have stated “The evolution of the law defamation society’s competing reflects the tension between interests in en couraging the free flow of information about matters of protecting concern and in reputation.” Dairy individual’s Stores, Co., 125, Publishing 135-36, Inc. v. Sentinel N.J. (1986). A .2d 220 public issues principle that debate to the
We are committed
robust,
uninhibited,
open.
v. Gannett
and wide
Sisler
should be
Stores,
(1986);
Dairy
Co.,
see
To balance
Supreme
States
has followed
United
developed
this Court
public
plaintiffs into
of the class of defamation
delineation
Court’s
balancing
Sisler,
test
termed this
supra,
In
we
private figures.
or
and individual
speech
free
“warring interests of
one between
265,
many
federal
As
In
and
we constructed a test to reflect
Stores
public policy
ignored in other states.
considerations often
See
141-46,
220;
A.2d
In
516 A.2d
water.
effects of a
are
another indicator that statements
Widespread
product
yet
in
another criterion is substantial
about the
are
interest.
Still
product
public
government
regulations of business activities and products.
omitted).]
(citations
[Id. at
Based this knowledge understanding and when a with sufficient experience, private person that his affairs a manner enters into a transaction conducts personal personal legitimate interest public one in his would reasonably expect implicates position that focuses with an attendant risk of defamatory speech upon public publicity, with actual malice. actionable unless it has been interest will be published 1083.] 516 A.2d [7d However, we noted that subjugated individual’s interest the name have not our totally precedents privilege, which at common law Por the fan- comment instance,
free speech. accоunt individual also took into concern, public protected opinion topics legitimate was a matter of in the determination of what fairness. Implicit privilege was a fairness of accrual of the fair comment concern for purposes based on the voluntariness or exposure publicity. assessment expectation 1083.] [Id. at 516 A.2d Dairy and Sisler involved business activities Stores Both interests, a matter of intrinsically implicated important *17 of life as bottled an essential sale of such public health —the by government— industry heavily regulated water —and to busi- actual-malice standard apply continue banks. We However, dowe public concern. of such inherent that are nesses necessary with or appropriate standard not find the actual-malice mowers, the repair lawn sale and like the regard to businesses clothes, local shoes, numerous other cleaning of repair of that do not products or services everyday that involve businesses public interest. legitimate intrinsically involve law, the defama- majority of state the vast Like federal law and or responsible for libelous the media of our state holds tion law made Statements private about citizens. defamatory statements differently from figures treated public are by media about by defined their persons Private are private citizens. those of public limelight voluntarily into the to thrust themselves failure in the media. respond to criticism of them inability to their are like ordinary and their ownеrs businesses find most We therefore, rules we generally, the defamation private persons, and them. equally applicable to private persons are apply to individually- proprietorships or small Many are sole businesses store, stores, pop” stationery shoe- “mom and like a local owned are tailor, cleaner, Although those stores maker, barber. communities, their owners are daily their in the life of important “matters of activities involve figures.” Nor do their “public Supreme Court and States public that the United concern” subject to the have made majority and state courts vast of federal public proof. Neither standard heightened actual-malice the owners in the ordinary businesses see of those nor the owners by selling product or service controversy their vortex of businesses opinion change because those does our public. Nor only in if advertising. do advertise Most businesses do limited Such flyer, and to succeed. shopping to attract customers local into the business or its owner advertising is insufficient to thrust spotlight. Moreover, and their owners have most of those businesses to the channels nor “access the financial resources neither *18 effective ... communication to counteract false to statements” protect their defamatory business and their livelihood from a Gertz, newspaper report. supra, 418 atU.S. 94 S.Ct. at They L.Ed.2d at 808. “public figures” are neither traditional they engage nor do in activities that constitute traditiоnal matters Therefore, public of concern. respect prosaic in of such and businesses, everyday negligence innocuous we conclude that the standard best public preserving balances the interests of the uninhibited, robust, press private and free and the interests of a individual in preserving reputation good and a business their name. does, however, public legitimate any have a interest fraud, charged
business regulatory with criminal a substantial violation, or legitimate consumer fraud that raises a matter of public concern. legiti- When the media addresses those issues of compelling concern, mate and the actual-malice standard of proof apply, regardless type will of the of In business involved. so n ruling, we private person’s right seek a balance between a privacy public’s right dangers and the to know of various in our society.
Here,
repair
we find that
the sale and
of lawn mowers is a
normally
trigger
negligence
business
would
standard.
Certainly,
operations
lawn-mower-repair shop
unregu
of a
are
impact
any
lated and do not
of the “essentials of life.” And the
apply
heightened-proof
factors that
us in
motivated
Sisler to
plainly missing
simple
standard are
from this case. The
business
repair
of lawn-mower
is not imbued “with all of the
Sisler,
governmental
banking industry.”
interests that attend' the
addition,
supra, 104
N.J.
VI
aims
Jersey Legislature has enacted a statute that
The New
from fraud in the sale
advertisement
protect consumers
Act,
merchandise,
Jersey
56:8-1
New
Consumer Fraud
N.J.S.A.
Act).
(the
Legislature
has
to -48
First enacted
“ ‘give
Jersey
frequently
New
one
amended the statute
”
v.
strongest
in the nation.’ Cox Sears
protection
consumer
laws
*19
(1994)
Co.,
2, 15,
(quoting
“[T]he
‘unconscionability’
Acknowledging
is an ‘amor
in the Act.
obviously
to
business
phous concept
designed
establish
broad
ethic,’
have
as
standard of conduct
‘[t]he
we
defined
term
* * *
faith,
good
honesty in fact
observance
contemplating]
and
”
Sales, Inc.,
dealing.’ Meshinsky
fair
v. Nichols Yacht
110
Romain,
(1988)
472,
464,
(quoting Kugler
In
we also determined that
violate
practice”
an
under the Act which we found
must commit
unlawful
acts,
general categories:
knowing
affirmative
fell
three
“into
Cox,
17,
omissions,
regulation
supra,
and
138 N.J.
violations.”
however,
mislead,
prime
“capacity
is the
Hyland
N.J.Super.
v.
1976),
There,
presents
example
of consumer fraud.
instructive
Attorney
pleasure
complained
to the
the owner of
small
boat
hauled, repaired,
about the owner of a business who
and
General
original agree
stored motorboats.
Id. at
The
Division found the cost overrun an unconsciona
Legislature
practice
quality
ble
that was an “act of a
which the
sought
suppress”
enacting
to
56:8-2. Id. at
N.J.S.A.
Moreover,
“practice”
lulling
A .2d20:
the business owner’s
of
security during
consumer into a false sense of
the extended work
practice
presenting
of
with its increased cost as well as' his
consumer with an ultimatum when the consumer went to retrieve
omission”;
practice constitut
his boat was more than “mere
such
deception
misrepresentation.
ed
Id. at
consumer coverage apply, it would media actual-malice standard would as con- highly industries or businesses whose activities regulated safety. cern health and
VII to determine whether hard and fast rules exist No in a alleged reported newspaper article consumer fraud conduct trigger to the actual- a of concern sufficient raises matter depends not malice What constitutes consumer fraud standard. capture investigation employed the media to on the manner of alleged story, of the generally on whether the activities but a of action under the Consumer business would constitute cause Moreover, primarily con Fraud the article must deal with Act. light surrounding all circum viewed as a whole in of sumer fraud substantially allega If the court determines that all stances. article, true, support a set in the if would consumer tions forth apply. standard complaint, fraud then actual-malice will provide plethora jurisprudence The Act and our own fraud. examples does or not amount consumer of what does puffery not consumer fraud. Nor does Mere does constitute charging more for an item than five or five-hundred dollars by nearby competitor amount to consumer fraud. price charged conduct, repetitive Usually, pattern fraud involves consumer separate disagreements Minor between consumer incidents. service, timing of quality over of customer and business owner service, price fraud. or increased is not consumer To constitute standard, trigger the actual-malice consumer fraud sufficient question “misleading” and stand practice must be business practice in that it will outside the norm reasonable business *21 consumer, directly average clearly thus most and victimize the and legitimate of the public involve a matter of concern. conduct Levin, supra, N.J.Super. business owners A.2d Hyland, supra, N.J.Super. and supra 370 A.2d at 413-415, 428-30, examples 655 A.2d at egregious are of such practices. business recognizes
Our standard a distinction between consumer fraud thereby and mere customer dissatisfaction. We seek to accommo- public highly suspect date the need of the to learn of business practices concern, clearly implicate that matters of and the position vulnerable of the business owner whose mechanic fixes problems problems, three a ear has four when or whose sales grumpy helpful assistant is and less than to a customer who requires may immediate service. That business owner run area, guilty best business in the but the owner is not of consumer report fraud. And if a reputa- media defames a business owner’s grounds tion based on that fall short of conduct that violates the Act, person prove only negligence part need on the of the media defendant.
VIII (actual establishing applicable proof burden of mal negligence), analysis ice vs. we direct our to whether article reports legitimate a matter of consumer fraud that amounts to a entirety assuming the article in concern. We examine its If, allegations drawing that all all reasonable its are true. conduct, inferences, fairly normal the article reads and describes activities, average and events that would lead an reader to con engaged practices clude that the owner business that were faith, unconscionable, deceptive, misleading, and reflected bad appliсable. then the actual-malice standard would be However, inferences, drawing the reasonable we consid plaintiff er the introduces to show that evidence article does not set forth consumer fraud conduct that would vigorously opposed Turf constitute a violation of the Act. summary judgment. discovery. motion for There was extensive affidavits, depositions, supplemental and voluminous Numerous affidavits, experts’ reports, together tapes with and tran-
418 plaintiff has determining whether
scripts
tapes,
filed.
were
fails to set
evidence to show that
article
introduced sufficient
legitimate
matters of
acts
fraud that raise
forth
of consumer
Rather,
concern,
we
reporter’s
is irrelevant.
public
conduct
Thus,
is
of the record
on
actions.
our examination
focus
Turfs
Time,
by
Supreme
Inc. v.
Court
similar
that undertaken
(1976)
Firestone,
448, 96
IX mind, principles in we consider whether With those article, actions, would constitute an Turfs set forth as Generally, practice” conduct of a busi “unlawful under Act. alleged consumer fraud but does not constitute ness is to be to raise matter of Act will not deemed violation of the be trigger use of the actual- legitimate public concern would malice standard. Record, reported support that an allegations,
To ’s Locklin produced investigation Better Bureau’s records of the Business ten-year ownership. complaints against during Turf five Gloria’s also in small- complaints appeared Two of docket those article, quoted Daglezt, In the Ms. one claims court. Locklin employee] plaintiffs, stating [a as “that Turf the small-claims nasty.” his so Locklin my almost had fist down throat. He was Green, interviewed, quote, who also filed a did not Doris had but complaint against picked up Turf in small-claims court. Turf two servicing. alleges from her for that a Turf lawn mowers She employee pick-up delivery told her at that time that would employee cost When a Turf told her that the second lawn $15. it, beyond repair, mower was she told him that she wanted but a employee Turf explained that it had been disassembled. When *23 request, they Turf delivered the second machine to her at her requested delivery a fee. Because she believed that the machine degree was still disassembled to some and because she “didn’t like attitude,” Green, Daglezt, Turf his like also sued and Gloria complaints by small-claims court. Both of those were dismissed complainants alleged any the court. We find that neither of those conduct Turf that would constitute consumer fraud under the Act. Broking,
Loeklin also Ron a former Turf interviewed customer complained Broking who had to the Better Business Bureau. mower, weeks, explained to Loeklin that Turf had held his lawn for runaround, him, given him and that after had a and had lied to mower, Turf returning to to check on his he had learned that Turf person although had never touched his mower the counter told working Again, Broking’s him Turf on it. while com- that was plaint practices, allega- alleged sloppy business we find that his support a tions of Turfs actions would not be sufficient to consum- complaint er fraud under the Act.
However, Clansky, allegations of Mel another former Turf customer, Turf had taken his electric lawn mower to who charged Turf repair, support would a claim of consumer fraud. $54, him machine worked “for all of about two minutes and the jammed thing happened again [machine and the same smoked up].” Clansky again. kept Turf took the mower to Turf and, according Clansky, gave him machine for four weeks to a fixing Turf him it a runaround. told would cost and new $200 Clansky Eventually, bought machine would a cost $125 $130. shop. Clansky Turf to new mower from a different When asked mower, return his old Turf told him that the mower was Clansky got old mower or a refund. never his different location. Bureau, Turf told him that Better Business which He wrote to the complaints. responded prior had never accurately in the inter- restated article his Although Locklin complaints, all who Better Business Bureau views those filed with only Clansky’s complaint, complaints, except for illustrated those discourtesy, sloppy practices, employee attitude and business bad Thus, poor complaints on such is judgment. reliance business support a claim that Turf violated Act. insufficient to matters determining an article forth that would whether sets Act, may consider the various a violation of the courts constitute story. reports source for consumer fraud sources for the One provide could useful information might employees who be former employers. practices of their former Never- about the business theless, disgruntled, fired if the sole of an article is source employee, competitor, a sole a court could conclude that support an sufficient to action that evidence alone would not be the Act. plaintiffs conduct violated fraud, against allegations his Turf of consumer support To *24 employees of Turf. never interviewed four former He Locklin employees had fired-. in the article that the former been disclosed made it in the article that Locklin’s failure have clear use of former employees had been fired casts doubt on his allegations support the of Turfs employees’ statements to article’s consumer fraud conduct. Mitchell, competitor, Edward
Locklin also interviewed one employees. his Equipment,'and one of owner of Eddie’s Power year twenty each custom- Locklin that at least times Mitchell told him after Turf had worked on them. brought ers their mowers to supposed- that Turf repairs told Mitchell about customers mower, made, ly he could tell had and after Mitchell examined immediately employ- Turf claimed. The had not done what it interview, during employment Gloria had told alleged ee his oil, in, him, “Look, sharpen put spark plug change we we we $40, blade, don’t fix until hope they charge we run. We we em they bring them back.”
Certainly, competitor the statement of one and his mechanic do support Locklin’s broad assertion that customers “[m]ost who paid tune-ups got for change little more than an oil and a new spark plug they typically overcharged which were $20 —for Thus, support those statements alone would not a claim $30.” Nevertheless, they allege that Turfs conduct the Act. violated do conduct, typical consumer fraud and do offer some corroborative alleged evidence that Turfs conduct constituted consumer fraud.
X However, reporting during Locklin’s of Turfs conduct both the support allegations second and third tests is sufficient to his against Turf of consumer fraud. conduct could Such lead average engaged prac- reader to that Turf conclude business unconscionable, deceptive, misleading, tices that were and reflect- ing bad faith that would constitute a violation of the Act. article,
In his Locklin described in three sentences The Rec- ord’s second visit to Turf for service. After the first test his assistant, DeMarco, took Turf. the same machine back to This disconnected, spark plug clamp time the had been and DeMarco employees get Turf told the that she couldn’t the machine started. weeks, kept charged diag- Turf the machine another three a $20 fee, unnecessary tuneup. nostic and recommended an In her notes DeMarco wrote that Locklin had also loosened the on/off prevented starting. switch which the machine from She also employee immediately wrote that the Turf identified the had switch, fee, diagnostic loosened her of the had informed $20 on/off they and had advised her to the machine so that could leave diagnose problem. After several weeks DeMarco returned to mower, picked up diagnosed Turf and her lawn Turf as which had needing tune-up sharpening and a blade DeMarco $68.49. *25 fee, tune-up, paid diagnostic elected not to have the the and $20 newly repaired left with the mower. the lawn mower When was order, DeMarco, brought good working except in it inwas for spark plug. There- and loosened switch disconnected the on/off fore, tune-up it a blade needed a and Turfs assertion Thus, misleading. conduct be Turfs sharpening appeared to test sufficient with the second would be alleged connection fraud of a consumer violation. evidence Likewise, conduct average reader conclude that Turfs could deceptive and mis- alleged in the third test was connection with visits, third leading. In to the first two The Record’s comparison Using a Bob lawn quite Turf different. Cat brand visit to was mower, loose-spark-plug in which test Locklin conducted another twelve, shops shops. other Of the six he visited Turf and eleven part, and problem, in the loose rigged the screwed identified shops as “win- charged nothing. The sub-article identified these immediately identify problem the shops Five did not ners.” other rigged he have to leave the lawn informed Locklin that would and shops tune-up. In the sub-article those diagnosis mower for or addition, to judged tests.” Locklin refused no verdict “were shops, and received mower at other “bad” leave lawn repair shops diagnosis and from of those for estimates three three termed ranging shops from One of those was $60. $35 notes, day” by Locklin in but not noted of the his was “worst again similar to that conducted the article visited tests Turf. describing third part article test reads: good working took a mower in condition In the third Bobcat test, reporter Again, plug loose so the machine wouldn’t start.
Turf. was clamp the spark pulled charged for a A Turf mechanic four weeks and Turf machine tuneup. kept $63 But a solid- new the mower has said he rebuilt the carburetor installed points. ignition. state It has no points. Turf, picked up Locklin leaving After the Bob Cat at had tune-up, for a which paid four later and machine weeks $63 why rebuilding questioned Locklin included the of the carburetor. started, him that the mower had not and the mechanic told n problem starting it he rebuilt he had had a had because oil, gas, points. new Locklin put had fresh carburetor and mower and learned that Bob Cat checked with three sources *26 ignition had a solid-state points. with no Accordingly, we find that rebuilding Turfs of the carburetor in a mower that apparently good was in condition and the installation points of new in a machine that points, visit, did not need in tandem with the second are support sufficient to a claim that Turf committed consumer fraud under the Act.
XI
motion,
summary judgment
context of a
whether this
record
alleged
establishes that Turfs
conduct
support
could
cause of action for consumer fraud under the Act
ais
difficult
question. Certainly,
alleged
Turfs
conduct was not as “mislead
ing” or so outside the norms of
practices
reasonable business
as
Levin,
the conduct of the business
supra,
owners in
179 N.J.Su
per.
Hyland,
A.2d 157 and
supra,
N.J.Super.
However,
XII We next consider presented whether the evidence must by plaintiffs for actual malice was sufficient to withstand a summary motion for judgment. summary To survive a motion for convincing clear must establish judgment, plaintiffs with the published the article either the defendants evidence or with reckless disre knowledge the statements were false Times, supra, they false. York gard of whether were New *27 Thus, 279-80, 11 at 706. at 84 S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d U.S. very heavy establishing that plaintiffs burden in have a Costello, published an article with actual malice. See defendants 614-19, (explaining applica A.2d supra, 136 at N.J. heavy plaintiffs and the burden the tion of actual-malice standard burden). applica determine the meeting in that Because we face bility standard in the context of defendants’ of actual-malice light in the summary judgment, “we the facts view motion plaintiff, giving [plaintiff] benefit of all favorable to the most may legitimately from that be drawn favorable inferences Stores, 220; A.2d Dairy supra, 104 record.” N.J. Newark, 173, 184-85, 536 City Kirk v. 109 N.J. A.2d accord of (1988). Therefore, accept plaintiffs’ experts’ we criticisms methods, journalistic staff and the other Record members’ Locklin scathing improprieties of The Record’s and their reviews of on Turf. article Smith, III, Washington H. & Lee Hampden
Professor head University’s found article be Department of Journalism to “originated unprofessional totally unfair as it in a inaccurate and on completely improper focus Turf way developed and with a in Reсord its He cited numerous instances which The alone.” universally journalis- accepted “failed follow staff had members preparation in the of the tic in a number of instances standards article____” specifically how the “com- Professor Smith outlined parison developed by comparison Locklin not a because test” was once, shops properly investigated than other not more were against complaints shops such records of and suits were selectively tape tapes was sought, and the recorder used Also, selectively destroyed. in Locklin had failed to mention that business, ten-year period only complaints had been five filed against all favor. Turf and that had been resolved Turfs He only opinion quoted competitor one who had an of Turfs business practices, opinion upon allegations based made the com- petitor’s addition, customers. In Locklin told his “sources” that investigating he was shops, investiga- but his lawn-mower-repair exclusively tion was focused on Turf and Gloria. Professor Smith posited, theoretically possible every repair shop is “[I]t other Bergen County frequently By was sued more than Turf. focusing solely Turf, studiously research Locklin and DeMarco learning good complaint avoided how or bad Turfs court and comparison addition, shops.” records were with other Professor employees, Smith criticized Locklin’s sources: former employees. wrote, only people rather than current He “The sought quite likely out negative were those to have attitudes and negative information.” Professor Smith also noted that Locklin attempted identify any had never might source who be favor- Instead, plaintiffs. investigation able to Locklin corroborated his sources, by interviewing approximately ten each of whom he knew against had a bias Gloria and Turf. *28 Lasher, Ph.D, Marilyn Analysis
Plaintiffs also retained of Media & Communications Research. She conducted an extensive review work, law, of The applicable Record’s consumer-fraud as well judicial as the entire record of the case. She concluded that the independent and so-called scientific tests that Locklin had con- validity, reliability requirements ducted “were devoid of and other experimental design.” of scientific method and Greene, expert, Even defendants’ own Robert then Assistant W. Managing Newsday, Editor of New York determined that al- though performed way, they tests had been a valid had not Nevertheless, scrupulously. been conducted he concluded that the type “readers could decide for themselves ... what conclusions they could draw from the tests.” plaintiffs’ experts’
The record confirms that much of criticism of justified, particularly emphasis the article are their on the omis- sion of relevant and reliance on To biased sources. information malice, plaintiff prove establish actual needs to “that the defen- dant in fact entertained serious doubts about the truth of the 426 subjective awareness of that had a or defendant
statement 615, Costello, suprа, at falsity.” 136 N.J. story’s probable Time, Inc., F.2d v. (citing Co. Schiavone Constr. A.2d Cir.1988)). (3d agree court Although the trial 1069, we with grossly even may negligent have been or Locklin’s “methods that that Locklin prove have failed to negligent,” plaintiffs we find that consumer constituted serious that Turfs conduct ever doubted Plaintiffs, therefore, have to establish failed practices. fraud reporting. malice his demonstrated actual Locklin XIII among judiciary is for constant accommodation The need goals important An often-conflicting the First Amendment. person’s reputation. As Justice is at societal value issue —a Baer, “The in his in Rosenblatt v. stated concurrence Stewart reputation from protection man to of his own right of a our wrongful hurt more than unjustified invasion and reflects no every human dignity and concept of the worth basic essential any system concept at decent of ordered being the root of —a 75, 92, 15 L.Ed.2d liberty.” 383 U.S. 86 S.Ct. (1966). of defamation chilling not fail to consider the effect
We do
however,
recognize,
that substantial
on the media. We
actions
403-404, 655
press, supra
protections exist for
constitutional
informa
no
shows that the free flow of
A.2d at
evidence
overwhelming
number of states
restricted in the
tion has been
Therefore,
today'
hold
adopted
negligence
standard.
we
have
appropriate
the most
standard
negligence standard is
that the
product
everyday
with
adopt
regard to businesses
with
involved
fraud,
service,
practices
not constitute consumer
whose
do
*29
citizenry,
safety
Jersey’s
of New
impinge on the health and
industry.
comprise activity
highly-regulated
within a
strong protection
By
opinion,
not diminish the
this
we do
in this
press
of
actions that the
has
against the threat
defamation
robust,
free,
public
protection
the
of the
That
has assured
State.
matters,
and uninhibited
of
especially
flow information on all
those
public
protection
concern. That
imposed by
exceeds that
the
Supreme
majority
United States
Court and the vast
of states
(forty-two),
supra at
n.
We do
as
close the
press protection,
door to additional
allowing
only
it
if the Act is
Although
practices
violated.
business
that fall short of consumer
subject
press scrutiny
press
fraud will be
even when the
has the
standard,
protection
only negligence
recognize
may
we
there
practices
damaging
be occasions when such
are so
to the
as
protection
press through
to call for the
of the
a malice standard.
every possible
We are not omniscient and cannot foresee
instance
protection
press
required
when
additional
for the
would be
general
interest. Our decision announces a
rule that
alleged
when the conduct
would constitute a cause of action under
Act,
applies.
the Consumer Fraud
the actual-malice standard
recognize
imposed
plaintiffs
We
the enormous difficulties
seeking
part
press.
to establish actual malice on the
of the
Costello,
supra,
only
XIV Appellate trial judgment affirm the of the Division the We summary judgment granting for the court’s order defendants’ opinion. exрressed in this reasons POLLOCK, J., concurring. Bergen majority
I the Record did not agree with the that subject publish knowledge the facts in the articles either with falsity disregard false or with reckless for the truth were therefore, majority, I would affirm the those facts. Like the however, majority, summary judgment for defendants. Unlike the that, stop majority opinion point. Beyond I at that would unquestioningly. points many in too directions for me to follow it majority opinion is that the media act in the The tenor writing public interest about conduct that violates Con when (the Act). Act, outset, At the Fraud 56:8-1 to -60 sumer N.J.S.A. however, majority states whether conduct constitutes necessarily, depends generally fraud not “but wheth consumer alleged er of the business would constitute cause of activities 416, Act.” Ante at 655 A .2dat action under Consumer Fraud added). (emphasis engenders the ma That ambivalence internal inconsistencies example, majority jority opinion. For finds that encompass overcharging, about interest does articles ante service, A.2d at and inferior ante at 655A.2d at Yet, practices that were uncon 430. it would include “business faith____” scionable, deceptive, reflecting misleading, and bad service, Overcharging, Ante at 655 A.2d at like inferior 430. unconscionable, deceptive, misleading, can be and reflect bad faith. *31 read, Fairly majority opinion proposition stands for the that illustrates, restrict, a the Act violation of but does not the terms “public “public concern” and interest.” To the extent that majority recognizes that the Act does not constitute the universe concern, public I agree. of perform
I believe that the media
a valuable service both when
writing
contrary
Legislature
about matters that the
finds
to the
public
bringing
interest and in
such matters to the attention of the
Hence,
Legislature
public.
and the
I doubt that the media can
discharge
they
legislative
that function if
are confined to a
defini
public
My
today,
tion of the
interest.
concern is that after
notwithstanding
contrary,
majority’s protests
reporting
to the
“uninhibited, robust,
public
on matters in the
interest will be less
408,
open.”
and wide
Ante at
Unlike the
would characterize
exploit
interest articles about businesses that
vulnerable сonsum-
join
prefer
public
I
that find in the
interest
ers.
those courts
shops.
exposure
practices
repair
of unfair or
dishonest business
(9th
1049,
Cir.1990),
Corp. Rooney,
v.
912 F.2d
See Unelko
(1991)
denied,
Finally, I be less would majority’s excessive reliance on regret the express about concept of “actual malice.” on the cases and their reliance federal it could solve the to its own decisions only If the would look Court I principles. resort to constitutional present problem without that сontinue to believe nothing striking of the common law of from the vocabulary “malice”
we lose
speaking
altogether,
the term
Restatement
eschews
Indeed,
defamation.
legal
recognize
privilege.”
direct
to
It
is more
of the “abuse of
instead
without
recourse to so
of certain statements
of the publication
consequences
ambiguous
we need not resort
Por example
a word with such a checkered past.
Although we discard the
has a license to he.
“malice” to state that no one
the term
or conditional
to overcome
qualified
we adhere to the
label,
principle
statement
to be
privilege,
knew the
must establish
publisher
a plaintiff
disregard
With or without
of its truth
falsity.
or acted in reckless
false
interest
whether,
balance,
critical
is
determination
term,
right
outweighs
obtaining
his or her reputa-
the individual’s
protect
information
tion.
(1986)
DISTRIBUTEC, INC., v. NEW JERSEY F AND PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL DEPARTMENT O RESOURCES, ENERGY, RESPON OF COASTAL DIVISION DENT-RESPONDENT, PARTNERSHIP LAND AND DELANCO DELANCO, INTERVENORS-RE OF AND THE TOWNSHIP SPONDENTS. 1995. February March
Argued 1995 Decided (Picco Her- Mack appellant for argued the cause Yoskin Neil bert, attorneys). General, argued the cause Attorney Deputy Mullally,
Kathe F. Protec Environmental Jersey Department of respondent New Jersey, Poritz, of New (Deborah Attorney General tion, T. etc. General, Jacobson, of coun Attorney Mary Assistant attorney; C. *33 sel). Partner- Delanco Land cause for argued
Arnold C. Lakind Blader, Blumstein, attor- Lakind, Waiter & ship (Szaferman, neys). Township Delanco cause for argued the J. Costa
Nicholas (Costa Vetra, attorneys). &