This action was brought by the plaintiff as assignee of one Delphus F. Moisan to recover a balance due for certain stair building done by Moisan upon certain houses in the city of New York. The answer was a general denial. It appeared upon the trial that prior to July, 1891, said Moisan had made a contract with one John H. Steinmetz to do this stair building for the sum of $3,150, and that a portion of the work had been completed, and Steinmetz had paid Moisan $1,800, who refused to go on unless he received more money, claiming that $400 more was then due him. Steinmetz was indebted to the defendant Washburn, and gave him a mortgage to secure that indebtedness, which mortgage included the amount in , which Steinmetz was indebted to Moisan, and was in payment of that amount to Washburn. It would seem, although the evidence is not very explicit upon that point, that it was expected to get other mortgages upon the property, out of which to pay the claim of the plaintiff, and also the money which was due to Washburn; but there not being as much money advanced as Steinmetz
We do riot see how we can interfere with the result arrived at upon the trial. It is true that Moisan, the assignor of the plaintiff, upon his direct examination, swore to a direct promise upon the part of Washburn to pay, if Moisan went on and completed the contract. But upon cross-examination, it seems distinctly to appear that there was no intention upon the part of Washburn to enter into any personal contract to pay the balance which might be due to Moisan; and from the check and the order, which was given as part and parcel of these negotiations and agreements, it would appear that it was the understanding of the parties that the money that Washburn was to pay was to be the proceeds of the loan which was to be obtained upon the property, and that there was no intention upon his part to enter into a personal obligation to pay. Moisan swears that the understanding was that this $950 was to be paid out of the proceeds of the mortgage. It appears from Steinmetz’s testimony that the $400 which was paid was secured by a mortgage which Steinmetz had given to Washburn upon the premises in question; and as a means of getting the balance of his money, Moisan accepted the order upon the persons who were to make the loan upon mortgage. In the face of all these circumstances, there does not seem to have been any question to go to the jury, because the plaintiff was bound by the explicit declarations of Moisan upon his cross-examination, as to the nature of the obligation which Washburn took upon himself by reason of the negotiations between himself and Moisan. It is clear from this testimony that, if there was any personal obligation, it was within the statute of frauds. But it seems to us equally clear that there was no intention to enter into any personal obligation whatever, and that all that Washburn was to do was to see that Moisan got his money out of the loans to be procured. This was very far from assuming any personal obligation to pay the balance which might be due upon the contract.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed. All concur.