33 Pa. Super. 520 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1907
Opinion by
Cely McAlheney, a widow, whose husband has been dead for ten years and whose only child, a daughter, has been married and living with her husband for ten years, hired and served in the poor district of Port Royal borough for eight years prior to June 17,'1905. The question is, whether she gained a settlement thereby.
The act of 1836’ provides that a settlement may be gained in any district “by any unmarried person, not having a child, who shall be lawfully bound or hired as a servant, within such district, and shall continue in such service during one whole year : ” Act of June 13, 1836, sec. 9, par. 5, P. L. 539. This is substantially the same as a clause of sec. 17 of the act of March 9,1771,1 Sm. L. 332, relative to the same subject, and, like many other provisions of the statute, was evidently taken
Our statute differs from the English statute in that time is predicated of the service and not of the contract, and consequently what is required seems to be no more than a continuance in hired service for a year: Heidleberg v. Lynn, 5 Wharton, 430. But so far as concerns the qualifications of the person to gain a settlement by hiring and service, the provision of our statute seems to have been copied from the English statute. There are many decisions of courts outside of this commonwealth to the effect that where congress or the legislature of a state enacts a statute which is a transcript of an English act, that has received a known and settled construction by the courts of that country, that construction at the time of such enactment
In prescribing the conditions upon which a settlement may be gained by hiring and service, why should the legislature make a distinction between an unmarried person, who has no offspring, and an unmarried person, who has a married daughter that has removed from the domicile of the parent, acquired another settlement, become the head of another family, and cannot gain a derivative settlement in the district to which the parent thereafter removes? Such discrimination would be purely arbitrary, and no reason can be conceived for presuming that the legislature intended to make it, unless it be that the word “child” has a fixed and unvarying meaning, and therefore the use of the words “ not having a child ” precludes every other presumption that might be suggested. But the word “ child ” has many meanings 'besides the primary one, and' in determining which one is to be selected in the construction of a statute, regard must be had to the connection in which it is used. For example, in the construction of section 16 of the Act of April 8, 1833, P. L. 249, it was held that the provisions in relation to advancement, which in terms are limited to the case of “ any child of the intestate,” apply not only to children, but to grandchildren who have been advanced: Eshleman’s Appeal, 74 Pa. 42; Storey’s Appeal, 83 Pa. 89. This conclusion was put upon the ground that in construing a statute the real intention will prevail over the literal sense of the terms; that the manifest design of the law is to equalize intestate’s property among all his children, and that it is equally clear that it was not the design of the lawmakers to put a grandchild upon a higher plane than a child would occupy if living. Many other illustrative cases might be cited. Indeed, in the con
Looking at the question from every standpoint, we are of opinion that the long-settled construction of the statutory provision, which we may safely infer was in the mind of the legislature in adopting it, should not now be departed from; indeed, that it could not be departed from without producing absurd results which the legislature did not intend. We conclude that under the undisputed facts Cely McAlheney had acquired a legal settlement in the poor district of Port Royal borough. The case of directors of Allegheny County Home v. Overseers of South Buffalo Township, 26 Pittsburgh Legal Journal, 115, is not in point, for in that case the pauper had a legitimate child, who was still a minor and had not been emancipated.
The order is reversed at the costs of the appellees, and the record is remitted to the court below with directions to grant the order of removal, and to make such further order as to costs, charges and expenses as the circumstances may require.